Chapter LXXVIII: Battle of Leuktra and Its Consequences (4)

What are we to understand _by the city of the Athenians_? The
natural sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of
the commentators relate. But when the battle was fought between
Corinth and Kenchreæ, can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas
pursued the fugitives to Athens—through the city of Megara, which
lay in the way, and which seems then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have
been allied with Athens? The station of Iphikrates was _Corinth_;
from thence he had marched out,—and thither his cavalry, when
repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands
Pausanias to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated
cavalry to Corinth,—that Epaminondas then marched straight on
to Athens,—and that Iphikrates followed him. “Possibly (he
says) the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents
the _presence_ of Iphikrates, instead of his _absence_, as the
cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to
Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.”

I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon.
Neither he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas
marched to the walls of Athens, which supposition is derived
solely from the words of Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch
intimate only that Iphikrates interposed some opposition, and not
very effective opposition, near Corinth, to the retreating march
of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.

That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under
the circumstances of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia,
appears to me in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more
improbable by the silence of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable
to put this construction even upon Pausanias; who may surely
have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not Athens,
but _the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged_,—that is,
_Corinth_. _The city of the Athenians_, in reference to this
battle, was Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of
Iphikrates had just marched, and to which, on being defeated,
they naturally retired for safety, pursued by Epaminondas to the
gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that Iphikrates would not let
the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out to fight,—then follows
naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would not come out,
drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.

The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29),
can hardly be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias.
It purports to be a nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans
against Athens; which certainly must be quite different (if it
be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas. And the
stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a strange and
highly improbable character.

On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already retained it for four months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although, by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent. Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies, likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition just finished; the invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto unvisited by any enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their walls,—the liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment of Messênê as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city, forming, with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line of defence on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent depression of the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece generally, from Spartan ascendency, now consummated.

Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant. He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without even going through the formality of collecting the votes.[519] And it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.[520]

[519] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194
B.; Pausan. ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8;
Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.

Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others,
especially Nepos and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact,
surround it with colors exaggerated and false. They represent
Epaminondas as in danger of being put to death by ungrateful
and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos puts into his
mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare
Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520
Dindorf.); which, had it been really made, would have tended more
than anything else to set the public against him,—and which is
moreover quite foreign to the character of Epaminondas. To carry
the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch (De Vitioso Pudore, p.
540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and begging for his life.

Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be
passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But
he had a good justification. It was necessary that he should put
in the justification; when put in, it passed triumphantly. What
more could be required? The facts, when fairly stated, will not
serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude of the people
towards great men.

[520] Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch
without interruption, annually re-appointed, from the revolution
of Thebes down to his decease. Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34)
affirms that when Pelopidas died, he was in the thirteenth year
of his appointment; which may be understood as the same assertion
in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen, does not appear.

Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of
Epaminondas. But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my
judgment, Epaminondas appears again as commander in Peloponnesus
during this same year (369 B.C.) Sievers holds Epaminondas to
have commanded without being Bœotarch; but no reason is produced
for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von
Mantinea, p. 277).