Chapter LXXX (3)

In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy, the counsellor, the debater, of his country,[774] as well as her minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Bœotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried bluster of Menelaus.[775] The possession of such eloquence, amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and action,—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting, which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists[776] set before their hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans, Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself. He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or wealth,—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs,—nor even determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own. But the great revolution of 379 B.C., which expelled from Thebes both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not. As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever he was to be found; and in no other living man could they obtain the same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a statesman. But it is alike true of both,—and the remark tends much to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence,—that neither sprang exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them,—trained to varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects than those that came before the public assembly,—familiarized with reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.

[774] See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and
negotiator on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος,
etc. Athenæus, xiv, p. 650 E.

[775] Homer, Iliad, iii, 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)—

Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν,
Ἤτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,
Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολύμυθος, etc.
... Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή ῥ’ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἵει (Odysseus),
Καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,
Οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆΐ γ’ ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, etc.

[776] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxvii, p.
357-397—φρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, etc.

On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom,—his advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power. One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of permanent causes,—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas would have done,—whether he would have followed out maxims equally prudent and penetrating,—if he had survived the victory of Mantinea,—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to Greece generally.

Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he is said to have indulged.[777] Among the countrymen of Pindar,[778] devoted attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was more frequent than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed by interchange of mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was reckoned upon as the firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour of battle. Asopichus and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom Epaminondas was much devoted. The first fought with desperate bravery at the battle of Leuktra, and after the victory caused an image of the Leuktrian trophy to be carved on his shield, which he dedicated at Delphi;[779] the second perished along with his illustrious friend and chief on the field of Mantinea, and was buried in a grave closely adjacent to him.[780]

[777] Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.

[778] Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch,
Pelopidas, c. 18; Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12.

See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by
him when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the
Skolia, in Dissen’s edition, and Boeckh’s edition of Pindar, vol.
iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 605 C.

[779] See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p.
605 A.

[780] Plutarch, Pelopid. _ut sup._; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761
D.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 39.

It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships, all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. The Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan party in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been merged in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the Eleians, insisted on seceding, and returning to their original autonomy. But for foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty. A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory members in communion.[781] And it appears that the interference thus obtained was permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this recent Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.

[781] Diodor. xv, 94.

I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these
three thousand men were _Athenians_, not _Thebans_; that the
Megalopolitans sent to ask aid from _Athens_, and that the
_Athenians_ sent these three thousand men under Pammenes.

That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for
Athenians, appears to me, on the following grounds:—

1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes
in the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period)
respecting the propriety of sending an armed force to defend
Megalopolis against the threats of Sparta—will see, I think,
that Athens can never before have sent any military assistance
to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which Demosthenes urges, and
those which he combats as having been urged by opponents, exclude
the reality of any such previous proceeding.

2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was
delivered, the Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus,
xvi, 39) under special alliance with, and guardianship of,
Thebes—though the latter had then been so much weakened by the
Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed doubtful whether
she could give them complete protection against Sparta. But
in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance
between Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between
Megalopolis and Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The
Thebans (then in unimpaired power), who had fought for them in
the preceding year,—not the Athenians, who had fought against
them,—would be the persons invoked for aid to Megalopolis; nor
had any positive reverses as yet occurred to disable the Thebans
from furnishing aid.

3. Lastly, Pammenes is a _Theban_ general, friend of Epaminondas.
He is mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another
place (xvi, 34), but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as
the general who had been sent to watch over the building of
Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Plutarch,
Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v, 16, 3).
We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith,
mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31.
p. 521); but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so
named.

Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and
his troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.

I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on
this point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).

The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, to see the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her influence in Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally sanctioned even by her own allies. All his protests, and those of his son Archidamus, so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only ended by isolating Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and sympathy. Archidamus probably never seriously attempted to execute the desperate scheme which he had held out as a threat some two or three years before the battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians would send away their wives and families, and convert their military population into a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until they should have reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.[782] Yet he and his father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet abandoned the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money for levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and the revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have been for some time in a sort of correspondence.[783]

[782] See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85-93.

[783] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.

About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem, for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 B.C. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the region near the Propontis and the Hellespont, appears to have revolted about the year 367-366 B.C. In other parts of Asia Minor, too,—Paphlagonia, Pisidia, etc.,—the subordinate princes or governors became disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection was for a certain time kept down by the extraordinary ability and vigor of a Karian named Datames, commander for the king in a part of Kappadokia, who gained several important victories over them by rapidity of movement and well-combined stratagem. At length the services of Datames became so distinguished as to excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandees; who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxes with a powerful force to subdue Datames. The latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridates (son of Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a traitor both to his father Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated zealous coöperation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.[784]

[784] Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some
length, recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He
places Datames, in point of military talent, above all _barbari_,
except Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii,
29) recounts several memorable proceedings of the same chief.
Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.

We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the
chronology, of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last
ten years of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken
place a little before the death of that prince; which last event
is to be assigned to 359-358 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast.
Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.

Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia; Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the last having now apparently joined the revolters, though he had before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontes as their chief; confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars we know little or nothing.[785]

[785] Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.

Our information about these disturbances in the interior of
the Persian empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the
facts can be said to be certainly known. Diodorus has evidently
introduced into the year 362-361 B.C. a series of events, many
of them belonging to years before and after. Rehdantz (Vit.
Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154-161) brings together all the
statements; but unfortunately with little result.

Both the Spartan king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were invited to Egypt to command the forces of Tachos; the former on land, the latter at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer, without any public sanction or order from Athens. But the service of Agesilaus was undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the authorities at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who came out as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the Persian king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and as the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in return lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But dissension and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the Persian king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,[786] was received with little respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom they had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed old man, of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, careless of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment in sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the supreme command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as general of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded in chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems for obtaining money from the Egyptians.[787] The army having been thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant, nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself to be proclaimed king of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to Agesilaus to sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian throne; while Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for the favor of the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at home, but in spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided in favor of Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of Tachos,[788] who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias returned home to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom he had come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen, in consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt. Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents. Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home by his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey was not to be obtained.[789]

[786] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.;
Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 8.

[787] See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 25.

[788] Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom
I follow) in respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis
with Agesilaus; affirming that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and
supported him with success, against Nektanebis.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 B.C.
(Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).

[789] Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38-40; Cornelius
Nepos, Agesil. 8.

Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and most energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage, denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character and exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view by a friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for partiality in this picture, there will still remain a really great and distinguished character. We find the virtues of a soldier, and the abilities of a commander, combined with strenuous personal will and decision, in such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant ascendency over the minds of others far beyond what was naturally incident to his station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous bodily deformity, amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point. Of the merits which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair results of a Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and indifference to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under every form. But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority to pecuniary corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which attached to him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal to himself. We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a man equally above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to Brasidas or Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with a disputed title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of Lysander; whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta and in Greece, had planted everywhere dekarchies and harmosts as instruments of ascendency for imperial Sparta—and under the name of Sparta, for himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself as second to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as had been constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander; yet without following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking to build up the like individual dictatorship, on his own account. His ambition was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the first place, and for himself only in the second. The misfortune was, that in his measures for upholding and administering the imperial authority of Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and foreign coërcion (represented by the dekarchy and the harmost) which had been introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified equality, and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference, proclaimed by Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and Torônê—and with the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.

The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.[790]

[790] Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii, 7. Εἰ δ’ αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην
εἶναι, etc.

He was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the Asiatic Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself had imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid against Athens.

The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back an altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had been exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired the force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between 394-387 B.C., he displayed that vigor and ability which never forsook him in military operations. But when he found that the empire of Sparta near home could not be enforced except by making her the ally of Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, he was content to purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the still greater dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the time, his policy seemed to succeed. From 387-379 B.C. (that is, down to the time of the revolution at Thebes, effected by Pelopidas and his small band), the ascendency of Sparta on land, in Central Greece, was continually rising. But her injustice and oppression stand confessed even by her panegyrist Xenophon; and this is just the period when the influence of Agesilaus was at its maximum. Afterwards we find him personally forward in sheltering Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing upon his countrymen a war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the conduct of that war his military operations were, as usual, strenuous and able, with a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the war turns out unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 B.C., she is obliged to accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her position in 387 B.C.; and the only compensation which she receives, is, the opportunity of striking the Thebans out of the treaty, thus leaving them to contend single-handed against what seemed overwhelming odds. Of this intense miso-Theban impulse, which so speedily brought about the unexpected and crushing disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands out as the prominent spokesman. In the days of Spartan misfortune which followed, we find his conduct creditable and energetic, so far as the defensive position, in which Sparta then found herself, allowed; and though Plutarch seems displeased with him[791] for obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the autonomy of Messênê (at the peace concluded after the battle of Mantinea), when acknowledged by all the other Greeks,—yet it cannot be shown that this refusal brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and circumstances might well have so turned out, that it would have been a gain.

[791] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.

On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem. We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left her at his death—“Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit.” Nothing but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had ever before encountered.

The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters, that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the exception of Egypt), unimpaired.

He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently about a year after it, in 359-358 B.C.), having reigned forty-five or forty-six years.[792] His death was preceded by one of those bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the transmission of a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of Artaxerxes, had been declared by his father successor to the throne. According to Persian custom, the successor thus declared was entitled to prefer any petition which he pleased; the monarch being held bound to grant it. Darius availed himself of the privilege to ask for one of the favorite inmates of his father’s harem, for whom he had contracted a passion. The request so displeased Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely to make a new appointment as to the succession; discarding Darius and preferring his younger son Ochus, whose interests were warmly espoused by Atossa, wife as well as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed at this prospect, Darius was persuaded by a discontented courtier, named Teribazus, to lay a plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the plot was betrayed, and the king caused both Darius and Teribazus to be put to death. By this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was improved, and his ambition yet farther stimulated. But there still remained two princes, older than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these brothers he contrived to put out of the way; the one by a treacherous deceit, entrapping him to take poison,—the other by assassination. Ochus thus stood next as successor to the crown, which was not long denied to him,—for Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down by the fatal consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not survive the additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so speedily afterwards.[793] He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the name of Artaxerxes, succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting as king the same sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had placed himself on the throne.

[792] Diodor. xv, 93.

There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical
Canon, in the statements about the length of reign, and date of
death, of Artaxerxes Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 B.C.
See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316—where
the statements are brought together and discussed. Plutarch
states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon to have lasted sixty-two
years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be correct, though
in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot determine.

An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year
of the reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in
the Astronomical Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of
reign. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p.
470.

This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the
duration of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus
recognized himself as satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in
the year beginning November 359 B.C., which corresponds with the
forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon. The revolt therefore must
have been suppressed before that period: see Sievers, Geschichte
von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 373, note.

[793] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1-3.

Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for,
was, Aspasia of Phokæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger,
who had fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of
Kunaxa, and had acquired a high place in the monarch’s affections.

But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear
hardly possible that the lady who inspired so strong a passion
to Darius, in or about 361 B.C., as to induce him to risk the
displeasure of his father—and so decided a reluctance on the
part of Artaxerxes to give her up—can have been the person who
accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa _forty years_ before; for the battle
of Kunaxa was fought in 401 B.C. The chronological improbability
would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch’s statement that
Artaxerxes reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the
battle of Kunaxa occurred very near the beginning of his reign,
and the death of his son Darius near the end of it.

Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of
Artaxerxes Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that
the plot against the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius
in conjunction with several of his brothers; and that, on the
plot being discovered, all these brothers, together with their
wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming to the
throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the
principal persons about the court, together with their wives and
children—fearing a like conspiracy against himself.

During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, though relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to have been entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. She had been considerably embarrassed by two events; by the Theban naval armament under Epaminondas, and by the submission of Alexander of Pheræ to Thebes,—both events belonging to 364-363 B.C. It was in 363-362 B.C. that the Athenian Timotheus,—having carried on war with eminent success against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic Gulf, but with very bad success against Amphipolis,—transferred his forces to the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian Chersonese. The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont greatly distracted the Athenian general, and served as a powerful assistance to Kotys; who was moreover aided by the Athenian general Iphikrates, on this occasion serving his father-in-law against his country.[794] Timotheus is said to have carried on war against Kotys with advantage, and to have acquired for Athens a large plunder.[795] It would appear that his operations were of an aggressive character, and that during his command in those regions the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only lend his aid to Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his service when he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese.[796]

[794] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.

[795] The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that
Timotheus made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into
the Athenian treasury twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant
as to amount; even if we accept it as generally true.

[796] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.

We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal or retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year, we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese, and Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against Amphipolis.[797] The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were far from improving. Besides that under the new general she seems to have been losing strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon her hands a new maritime enemy—Alexander of Pheræ. A short time previously, he had been her ally against Thebes, but the victories of the Thebans during the preceding year had so completely humbled him, that he now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops to join the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,[798] and equipping a fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet captured the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades, and laid siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and about the end of August (362 B.C.),[799] two months after the battle of Mantinea, a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs, and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes and six hundred prisoners.[800] We are even told that soon after this naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before), where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay, before there was any force ready to repel them.[801] The Thessalian marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned to death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in person, had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and by contract, were censured or put upon trial.[802]

[797] See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.
151, and the preceding page.

M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all
the fragments of evidence respecting this obscure period; and
has elicited, as it seems to me, the most probable conclusions
deducible from such scanty premises.

[798] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.

[799] We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly,—the
twenty third of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of
Molon,—mentioned by Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.

[800] Diodor xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.

[801] Polyænus, vi, 2, 2.

It must have been about this time (362-361 B.C.) that Alexander
of Pheræ sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of
Charidemus and his mercenary band, then in or near the troad. His
application was not accepted (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 675,
s. 192).

[802] Demosthenes, de Coronâ Trierarch. p. 1230, s. 9.

Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Chares in
command of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this
admiral took himself off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder
the allies (Diodor. xvi, 95).

Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become worse under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also, who had succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, achieved no permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, to defend themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the Macedonian king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That prince had before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force under Timotheus against Olynthus; and their joint invasion had so much weakened the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis. At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a possession of Macedonia.[803] Kallisthenes thus found himself at war under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas as his enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would appear, he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas to the necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon the Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained time during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled, on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; and at the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home from the Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of the war against Kotys.[804] The people were much incensed against both; but most against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that Kallisthenes was tried first, and condemned to death. On the next day, Ergophilus was tried. But the verdict of the preceding day had discharged the wrath of the dikasts, and rendered them so much more indulgent, that they acquitted him.[805]

[803] Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-176;
and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.

[804] The facts as stated in the text are the most probable
result, as it seems to me, derivable from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p.
250, c. 14.

[805] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 3, 3.

Ergophilus seems to have been fined (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p.
398, s. 200).

Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against Kotys that his operations were necessary. The Prokonnesians, allies of Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens, but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine. The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets; and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the safe transit of such supplies to Athens herself.[806] The Athenian fleet, guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy for the autumnal exports of this essential article.

[806] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 6.

In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored with an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful Thracian named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so alarmed Kotys, that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive tone, and sent envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. At the same time Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in person—to Athens, to present his own case and solicit aid. He was however coldly received. The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed on hearing the case (and probably procured in part through the friends of Iphikrates), was so unfavorable,[807] as to send him away not merely in discouragement, but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all his power in Thrace, and even became master of the Sacred Mountain with its abundance of wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite of this imprudent vote, the Athenians really intended to sustain Miltokythes against Kotys. Their general Autokles was recalled after a few months, and put upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put down this enemy unassisted.[808] How the trial ended or how the justice of the case stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of Demosthenes.

[807] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont.
Polyklem. p. 1207.

ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος ... ἐγράφη τι παρ’ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα
τοιοῦτον, δι’ οὗ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν ~ἀπῆλθε~ φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας
ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ
καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο.

The word ἀπῆλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person.

The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the
revolt of Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s.
136, 137.

[808] Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont.
Aristok. p. 655, s. 123.

Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede Autokles; and was himself again superseded after a few months, by Timomachus. Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became necessary anew, as in the preceding year; and was furnished a second time during the autumn of 361 B.C. by the Athenian ships of war;[809] not merely for provisions under transport to Athens, but also for those going to Maroneia, Thasos, and other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in the Chersonese became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter of 361-360 B.C., Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of Abydene citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont from Abydos, contrived to surprise Sestos;[810] the most important place in the Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont on its European side, for all vessels passing in or out. The whole Chersonese was now thrown open to his aggressions. He made preparations for attacking Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief possessions of Athens, and endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in his projects. But that general, though he had assisted Kotys in defence against Athens, refused to commit the more patent treason involved in aggressive hostility against her. He even quitted Thrace, but not daring at once to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.[811] In spite of his refusal, however, the settlers and possessions of Athens in the Chersonese were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed the whole peninsula as his own, and established toll-gatherers at Sestos to levy the dues both of strait and harbor.[812]

[809] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 24-26; p. 1213, s.
27; p. 1225, s. 71.

[810] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. Ἐκ γὰρ
Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ
Σηστὸν καταλαβόντες, εἰς Σηστὸν διέβαινεν, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is
speaking of Charidemus.)

The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains
distinct intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians
_until after November 361_ B.C. Apollodorus the Athenian
trierarch was in the town at that time, as well as various
friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must have been still an
Athenian possession in November 361 B.C.

It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that
the purpose of this oration against Polykles (composed by
Demosthenes, but spoken by Apollodorus) requires great precision
and specification of dates, even to months and days. Apollodorus
complains that he has been constrained to bear the expense of
a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which it was
incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person
whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of
the year, but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy
of Apollodorus began in August 362 B.C., and lasted (not merely
to Aug. 361 B.C., its legal term, but) to November 361 B.C.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the
valuable chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of
the period, has overlooked this exact indication of the time
_after which_ the Athenians lost Sestos. He supposes the loss to
have taken place two or three years earlier.

[811] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.

[812] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s.
211.

What is said in the latter passage about the youthful
Kersobleptes, is doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.

The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. All her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus, had been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, and had undergone accusation at home.[813] Timomachus was now superseded by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both Iphikrates and Kotys.[814] But Kephisodotus achieved no more than his predecessors, and had even to contend against a new enemy, who crossed over from Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys—Charidemus with the mercenary division under his command. That officer, since his service three years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had been for some time in Asia, especially in the Troad. He hired himself to the satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took advantage to seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; intending to hold them as a little principality.[815] Finding his position, however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens. This proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for Charidemus was enabled, through a truce unexpectedly granted to him by the satrap, to cross over from Abydos to Sestos without any Athenian ships. But as soon as he found himself in the Chersonese, far from aiding Athens to recover that peninsula, he actually took service with Kotys against her; so that Elæeus and Krithôtê, her chief remaining posts, were in greater peril than ever.[816]

[813] Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals.
Leg. p. 398, s. 200.

[814] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.

[815] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671, s. 183. Compare
Pseudo-Aristot. Œconomic. ii, 30.

[816] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.

The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor
of Krithôtê, announcing the formidable increase of force which
threatened the place since the arrival of Charidemus.

The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic military character.[817] Having made their escape, Python and his brother retired to Athens, where they were received with every demonstration of honor, and presented with the citizenship as well as with golden wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having relieved the Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.[818] Disclaiming the warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in the assembly, Python is said to have replied—“It was a god who did the deed; we only lent our hands:”[819] an anecdote, which, whether it be truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration of tyrannicide.

[817] Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states
that the two young men did it to avenge their father. He does
not expressly say what Kotys had done to the father; but he
notices the event in illustration of the general category,—Πολλαὶ
δ’ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι
τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about _mos
regius_—Annal. vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of
cruel mutilation inflicted by Kotys,—Ἀδάμας δ’ ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ
τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ παῖς ὢν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.

Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap.
Athenæ. xii, p. 531, 532.

Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725,
726) places the death of Kotys in 359 B.C.; and seems to infer
from Athenæus (vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual
communication with Philip of Macedon as king, whose accession
took place between Midsummer 360 and Midsummer 359 B.C. But the
evidence does not appear to me to bear out such a conclusion.

The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters
reaching Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys;
because it seems impossible that Philip, in the first year of
his reign, can have had any such flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip
being at that time in the greatest political embarrassments, out
of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable energy and
ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned
by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal
communication with Kotys.

My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more
probably in 360 B.C.

[818] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s.
150; p. 675, s. 193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch,
adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.

[819] Plutarch, De Sui Laude, _ut sup._

The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in the Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes, was only a youth:[820] moreover two other Thracian chiefs, Berisades and Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in the kingdom of Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and minister the mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already married, or did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been formed in like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and Bianor—and by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, who (like Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed a certain independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.[821] These Grecian mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial ties to the princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to Xenophon, and as the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century ennobled themselves by similar alliance with princely families—for example, Sforza with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian competitors were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, it seems, Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest. He and his army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the Propontis, where the Athenian commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable, that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.[822] Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, and fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as one of the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.[823]

[820] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. μειρακύλλιον,
etc.

[821] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s.
153 (in which passage κηδεστὴς may be fairly taken to mean any
near connection by marriage).

About Athenodorus compare Isokrates, Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 31.

[822] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199.

In sect. 194, are the words, ~ἧκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγῶν~,
πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἔπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ
αἱ τριήρεις, αἳ, ὅτ’ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ
συγχωροῦντος Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν ἔμελλον αὐτόν.

The verb ἧκε, in my judgment—not to the _first coming out_ of
Kephisodotus from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment.
ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators
think, but—to the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes _to
Perinthus_, near which place Charidemus was, for the purpose of
demanding fulfilment of what the latter had promised; see s.
196. When Kephisodotus came to him at Perinthus (παρόντος τοῦ
στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς ὃν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμφει—s. 195) to make this
demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly, acted like
a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter
from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have
been on the spot for some time, and therefore that ἧκε cannot
refer to his first coming out.

The term ἑπτὰ μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of
Kotys.

[823] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont.
Ktesiphont. p. 384, c. 20.

Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs
called before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place
at Perinthus and Alopekonnesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
676, s. 200); Euthykles, the speaker of the discourse against
Aristokrates, had been himself also among the officers serving
(p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).