Chapter LXXVI (1)

FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.

The peace or convention[1] which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians _medising_!”—“Nay (replied the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) _laconising_.”[2]

[1] It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ
εἰρήνη—Isokrates, of αἱ συνθῆκαι.

Though we say, the peace _of_ Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ
ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it
with the genitive case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.

[2] Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23;
and his Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς
τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!...
Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.

These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s purposes and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian Xenophon.[3] While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.[4] This addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced by Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s name from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means of standing out, even if the supplementary article had been omitted. Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger shares both of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, that Athens, as well as Thebes,[5] assented to the peace only under fear and compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and degradation.

[3] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.

[4] The restoration of these three islands forms the basis
of historical truth in the assertion of Isokrates, that the
Lacedæmonians were so subdued by the defeat of Knidus, as to come
and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας)
Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.); s. 83. But the
assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians
really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been
enfeebled and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before
(Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 3).

[5] Diodor. xiv, 111.

That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance. It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece. Its authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction from his concluding threat, that he would make war against all recusants. It was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along with Antalkidas), read by him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to the regal seal.[6] Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at the hands of the Persian king, and which she now not only set the example of sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even avouched as guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing to enforce it at the point of the sword against any recusant state, whether party to it or not. Such was the convention which was now inscribed on stone, and placed as a permanent record in the temples of the Grecian cities;[7] nay, even in the common sanctuaries,—the Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the great _foci_ and rallying points of Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of a convention, it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding from the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to all Pan-hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.[8] Effacing altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world, bound together and regulated by the self-acting forces and common sympathies of its own members,—even the words of the convention proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign power, and erected the barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of Grecian differences; a guardian[9] who cared for the peace of Greece more than the Greeks themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it was tantamount to that symbol of submission—the cession of earth and water—which had been demanded a century before by the ancestor of Artaxerxes from the ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand, which both Sparta and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so cruelly, as to put to death the heralds by whom it was brought,—stigmatizing the Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying with it.[10] Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than what stood embodied in the inscription on that “colonna infame,” which placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic glories and ornaments at Olympia.[11]

[6] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος
παρεῖναι ~τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι~, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην
καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον,
~ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα~, ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ
γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·

Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς ~νομίζει δίκαιον~, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις
ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας
Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν
Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι
Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, ~τούτοις
ἐγὼ πολεμήσω~, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ
θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.

[7] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς
ἠνάγκασεν (the Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν
τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν
ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.

The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380
B.C., seven years afterwards) from which I here copy, is
the best evidence of the feelings with which an intelligent
and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty at the time;
when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time
to see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other
orations, though valuable and instructive, were published
later, and represent the feelings of after-time.

Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245
D), stigmatizes severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ
ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering Greeks to the foreigner,” and
asserts that the Athenians resolutely refused to sanction it.
This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting the peace of
Antalkidas.

[8] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν,
καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, ~προστάγματα καὶ οὐ
συνθήκας~ εἶναι, etc. (s. 213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς ~ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος
ὑβριζομένης~, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.

The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of
Xenophon (put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at
Sparta), respecting the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by
Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν ~Βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν~ αὐτονόμους τὰς
πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).

[9] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ
διαλύειν ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε
ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν,
ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;

The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus
(whether it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot
be certain—see Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position
taken by Artaxerxes in reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην
ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which implies the peremptory decision
of an official judge, analogous to another passage (139) of the
Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός (Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ
διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ
τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ ~τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε~, καὶ
τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν;

[10] Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν,
προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

[11] Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.

Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses
himself in terms of bitter and well-merited indignation of this
peace,—“if indeed (says he) we are to call this ignominy and
betrayal of Greece by the name of _peace_, which brought with it
as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta (he says) lost
her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been
lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.

It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate
Agesilaus from any share in the peace. From the narrative
(in Xenophon’s Hellenica, v. i, 33) of his conduct at
the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused it most
warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7)
takes credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was
true, from the year B.C. 396 to B.C. 394. But in B.C. 387,
at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, he had become
μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred
of Thebes.

See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing
the disgraceful position of the Greek cities at a later time
in calling in Philip of Macedon as arbiter; a passage not less
applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; and perhaps borrowed from
Theopompus.

Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her own estimation even more than in that of others,[12]—had so lost all Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an obsequious minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for political objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation have appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.

[12] Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt
from Darius king of Persia about 500 B.C., had implored the aid
of Sparta (Herodot. v, 49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων
παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον
μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ~ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς
Ἑλλάδος~.

How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of
Antalkidas! and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus
himself if he could have heard of the latter event!

Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an apology, little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not unconscious of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads that Sparta, when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought not to be blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks aid for her own preservation.[13] From the earliest commencement to the seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized in Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest reached their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and contradicted each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to understand what they meant,[14] sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in the seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens; where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him, with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able to reach Susa.

[13] Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι
ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων ~καὶ βαρβάρων~, εἴ ποθέν τινα
~ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων~ δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (~ἀνεπίφθονον~ δὲ,
ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας
μόνον ~ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους~ προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), etc. Compare
also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.

[14] Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.

Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and that too without any stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my last volume.[15] She had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an excuse and not as a justification—of self-defence against aggression from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object was something quite different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens. Yet to accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but of pure ambition, Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of her Asiatic kinsmen; a price which Archidamus at the beginning of the war would certainly never have endured the thoughts of paying, notwithstanding the then formidable power of Athens. Here, too, we find Athens following the example; and consenting, in hopes of procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though the bargain was never consummated. It is true that she was then contending for her existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how much the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the battle of Ægospotami.[16]

[15] See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.

Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33,
p. 666) attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians
of his time, about this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by
Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior. Libertate, c. 13, p. 199,
where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by Athens with Persia in
449 B.C., in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, contracted
under the auspices of Sparta.

[16] This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii,
(Panathen.) s. 167-173. In this passage, however, he distributes
his blame too equally between Sparta and Athens, whereas the
blame belongs of right to the former, in far greater proportion.
Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the Great King,
and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also
carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point
of selfishness and subservience. Athens is guilty of following
the bad example of her rival, but to a less extent, and under
greater excuse on the plea of necessity.

Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting
the various acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest
of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους ~ὀψιμαθεῖς~ αὐτῶν
γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ~τὰ μὲν πρώτους, τὰ δὲ μόνους~,
ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which is much nearer the truth
than the passage before referred to.

After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand, and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis, takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself, and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,[17] and Athenian aid was still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse of self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.

[17] Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.

But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than in regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time so powerful, even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the allies at the Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held together only by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive against her, and would probably have been disunited by reasonable offers on her part; nor would she have needed even to recall Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of the revived Long Walls and refortified Piræus, and springing at once to the fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed forty years before, was about to start into life; a fancy little likely to be realized, since the very peculiar circumstances which had created the first Athenian empire were now totally reversed. Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first object with Sparta was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put down all partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in order that there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting herself, the strongest of all individual states. As a means to this end, which was no less in the interest of Persia than in hers, she outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King, betrayed to him not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, but also the general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner,—and volunteered to _medise_ in order that the Persians might repay her by _laconising_.[18] To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps, who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their own, Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon all her countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and herself into a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and destructive than that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, for which the Theban Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and that, too, by the Spartans themselves.[19] Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;[20] foreboding but too clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to run.

[18] Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας
κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν
ἕξουσιν.

[19] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.

[20] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.

That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer sent by the Athenians[21] to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B.C., refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship,—that sentiment which had been during the two following generations the predominant inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the former, overlaid by more pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished. Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from the smaller states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere to and defend it, when upheld.[22] But so soon as Sparta was seen to solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint), the proclamation under the king’s hand and seal brought down by Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems of Grecian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the bosoms of individual patriots.

[21] Herodot. viii, 143.

The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys,
of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of
refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than
the answer itself.

But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the
Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read
in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the
Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the
temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).

[22] The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets
forth emphatically the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive
principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public
conduct,—as altogether different from the simple considerations
of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states
like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110).

Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities
of the convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by
superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally
enforced by her, for her own political ends.

Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about
the dissension of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful
effects.

If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct. I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts, it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil, the present of a friend or of an enemy.

The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace, sent down by the king,”[23] undertook the duty of execution; and we shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely. They did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good, and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner, and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political interests and purposes. The promise made by the convention, except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own power by dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout Greece, we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious import; demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should be left free, which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them herself at the close of the war, had she not preferred to convert it into a far harsher empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of Antalkidas) there were no large body of subjects to be emancipated, except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as well as what was realized, even by the most specious item of this disgraceful convention, was—“that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;” a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,[24] in the debates preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text for Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of Antalkidas and the battle of Leuktra.

[23] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.

Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο~ ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’
Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· ~προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ
βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης~ καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι
πράττοντες, etc.

[24] Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys)
ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους
ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν
κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι ~μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται~.

I have already mentioned that the first two applications of the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were to extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its Argeian auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient presidency of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an object which they had long had at heart;[25] and by both, their ascendency in Greece was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by the new development of Persian force as well as partially bribed by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of the peace,—was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the proceedings of the Persians.

[25] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.

Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual aid in reconquering Egypt.[26] It was not merely these Greeks who were exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus, to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however, having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with all his children.[27] About 395 B.C., we find Nephereus king of Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.[28] Two years afterwards (392-390 B.C.), during the years immediately succeeding the victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus across the Ægean to Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts to reconquer Egypt.[29] Having thus repulsed the Persians, the Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390-380 B.C.,[30] sending aid to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in spite of farther efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native kings in that country maintained their independence for about sixty years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.

[26] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.

It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date
between 414-411 B.C.; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh,
Manetho und die Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and
Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.

M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places
the revolt rather earlier, about 414 B.C.; and Mr. Fynes Clinton
(Fasti Hellen. Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same
date.

[27] Diodor. xiv, 35.

This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above
cited, p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the
list of Manetho, under a different name. It is also possible,
however, that he may have been king over a part of Egypt,
contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.

[28] Diodor. xiv, 79.

[29] This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ
Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on
very probable grounds, principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv,
(Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.

[30] Diodor. xv, 2, 3.

But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities much superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief attention of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid for with the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the contemporary Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration and partiality, even the trustworthy features of the picture are sufficiently interesting.

Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the Teukridæ, which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them, from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian) Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father Telamon, and given commencement to the city of that name on the eastern coast of Cyprus.[31] As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek and Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities, which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns being all dependent upon one or other of them,—seven pass for Hellenic, the two most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three for Phœnician,—Paphos, Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however, there was in each a mixture of Greek and Phœnician population, in different proportions.[32] Each was ruled by its own separate prince or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek immigrations (though their exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have been later in date than the Phœnician. At the time of the Ionic revolt (B.C. 496), the preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished through the aid of the Phœnicians[33] on the opposite continent. And though doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450 B.C.) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with the Persians, had prudently relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;[34] so that the Grecian element in the former, receiving little extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to the Phœnician.

[31] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s.
21; Pausanias, ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.

The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of
Evagoras, seems to have related many legendary tales respecting
the Greek Gentes in Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon
himself as ultimately migrating to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed.
Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. Photium).

The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus.
See the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.

[32] Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the
Phœnicians (vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 _seq._), attempts to
establish the existence of an ancient population in Cyprus,
called Kitians; once extended over the island, and of which the
town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes them to have
been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the
Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus
he reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these
natives. He supposes the Kilikian population to have been in
early times Canaanitish also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166)
inclines to admit the same hypothesis as highly probable.

The sixth century B.C. (from 600 downwards) appears to have been
very unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe
pressure from the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the
Jews. During the same period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was
greatly extended, especially by the reign of the Phil-hellenic
Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. Much of the Grecian
immigration into Cyprus probably took place at this time; we know
of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to Soli, under the
assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 _seq._).

[33] Herodot. v, 109.

Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and
arms of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental
(vii, 90). The Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v,
113); as the Carthaginians did, before they learnt the art of
training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27).

[34] See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.

It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of the Teukrid Gens,[35] were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician exile who gained their confidence and made himself despot in their place.[36] To insure his own sceptre, this usurper did everything in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician population, as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The same policy was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but seems also to have been imitated in several of the other towns; insomuch that during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became sensibly dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed; new Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the body which were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals; while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were rapidly on the decline.[37]

[35] One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the
Phœnician name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).

[36] We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v,
104-114, with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.

[37] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.

Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) ~τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην~, καὶ διὰ
τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας
ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.

Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ
χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι
βελτίστους οἵ ~τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι~
τυγχάνοιεν, etc.

This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the
oration of Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the
visit of the latter to Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν
Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ
μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα,
~οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος~ ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).

Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of
this narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor
do I myself see any, for this contradiction.

Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and
family at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De
Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 38).

Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.[38] The usurper, mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon all conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief, tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile, he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation, stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment, that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.[39]

[38] Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus
(xiv, 98) calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both
are correct, and that he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had
migrated from Salamis during the Athenian preponderance there.
There were Kitians, not natives of the town of Kition, but
belonging to the ancient population of the island, living in the
various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as
resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).

[39] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii,
(Nikokl.) s. 33; Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot.
Diodor. xiv, 98.

The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which
Isokrates does not specify.

The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.[40] His conduct fully justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for the gratification of personal appetite; abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian despot to stamp his reign with letters of gold, and the more remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible temperament of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under due control.[41] But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction by which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.[42] His government was at the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards the multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own personal supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out his own line of policy, and kept watch over its execution.[43] He was foremost in all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed security, he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and military force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went on increasing.

[40] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.

[41] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
ἀγόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.

[42] Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς
τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, ~νομίμως δὲ τοὺς
ἐξαμαρτάνοντας~ κολάζων (s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν
πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα
τὴν νῆσον, ~ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα~ προήγαγεν, etc.; compare
s. 81.

These epithets, _lawful_ punishment, _mild_ dealing, etc., cannot
be fully understood except in contrast with the mutilations
alluded to by Lysias, in the passage cited in a note on page
16, above; also with exactly similar mutilations, mentioned by
Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders by Cyrus
the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν (says
Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς
ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.

[43] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.

The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless
be founded in truth, as the result shows.

Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing to be the great naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot exactly make out the date at which Evagoras began to reign, we may conclude it to have been about 411 or 410 B.C. It seems to have been shortly after that period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian;[44] moreover, he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B.C., after the battle of Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and other parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done under the auspices of Solon,[45] a century and a half before. He took especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts, teaching, music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was so successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns of the island.

[44] Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.

[45] Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.

Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat of Ægospotami (B.C. 405), all such out-settlers as then remained were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in some other locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian admiral Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out of the great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would present a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, we learn that numerous settlers of the best character, from different parts of Greece, crowded to Salamis.[46] Many Athenian women, during the years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find husbands in that city;[47] while throughout the wide range of the Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting. The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.

[46] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or.
xix, (De Aristoph. Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.

[47] Isokrates, _l. c._ παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν
γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc.

For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying
times consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.

The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young
woman of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an
Athenian named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold
her to the despot of Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being
threatened with prosecution for this act before the Athenian
Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought her back to
Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, and
punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune
to escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261;
Tzetzes, Chiliad. vi, 367).

How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no
means of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the
Athenian maidens, who had no dowry at home, were provided for by
their relatives elsewhere. Probably Andokides took this young
woman out, under the engagement to find a Grecian husband for her
in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for his own profit
to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having so
sold her.

During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We find him towards the year 390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Kitium in his own island, and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps, or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras had not only paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian fleet placed under Konon to act against the Lacedæmonians, himself serving aboard.[48] It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates) to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed. Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously began to manœuvre against him, and forced him into the war in self-defence.[49] Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not only worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities, under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much vigor as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover, upon some of the Kilikian towns to declare against the Persians.[50] He received powerful aid from Akoris, the native and independent king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by the Athenians.[51] Beginning apparently about 390 B.C., the war against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his long protection to Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the battle of Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the Persians her enemies.

[48] This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias,
given by Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).

Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot)
recounted the causes which brought about the war between the
Persian king and Evagoras.

[49] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον
(Evagoras) οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), ~ὥστε
μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ~, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ
ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ ~ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν~ (_i. e._ Evagoras).

[50] Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus,
Frag. 134, ed. Didot.

[51] Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem,
p. 479, s. 84.

The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction with Sparta, the peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission. It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be abandoned;[52] the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.[53] But the peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic sea-board, and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not only their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents from these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by constraint, neither well paid nor well used,[54] and therefore not very efficient.

[52] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς
συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.

We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the
king of Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to
Athens, concluded by Perikles about 449 B.C., and called the
peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, neither a new demand on
the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on the part of the
Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.

[53] Diodor. xv, 2.

It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of
Hekatomnus for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).

About 380 B.C., Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely
dependent in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the
first opportunity (Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).

[54] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.