Chapter LXXVII (2)

[197] The daring _coup de main_ of Pelopidas and Mellon, against
the government of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by
which Evagoras got into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot
(Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor. s. 34).

[198] See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point,
Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.

As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian mind from the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its positive effects it altered forthwith the balance of power in Greece. The empire of Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly universal over Greece, is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort, until at length it is completely overthrown.[199]

[199] If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through
the mouth of a Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans,
immediately after their revolution, sent an humble embassy to
Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to be admitted as
allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors
the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had
rendered; an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by
desiring them to receive back their exiles, and to cast out the
assassins Pelopidas and his comrades. It is possible that the
Thebans may have sent to try the possibility of escaping Spartan
enmity; but it is highly improbable that they made any such
promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that they
speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which
they saw to be approaching.

See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.

This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be
an assemblage of nearly all the topics which could possibly be
enforced, truly or falsely, against Thebes.

The exiles from Thebes, arriving at Sparta, inflamed both the ephors, and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest pitch. Though it was then the depth of winter,[200] an expedition was decreed forthwith against Thebes, and the allied contingents were summoned. Agesilaus declined to take the command of it, on the ground that he was above sixty years of age, and therefore no longer liable to compulsory foreign service. But this (says Xenophon[201]) was not his real reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta would say,—“Here is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order that he may uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and had been reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the reproaches against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from Lysias and Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well as with foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in Sparta herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, and had never commanded before.

[200] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.

[201] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν
οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα
τῇ πόλει παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.

Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth through Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of Thebans, composed chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent revolution, who had been placed for the defence of the intervening mountain-pass. From Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from thence to Kynoskephalæ in the Theban territory, where he lay encamped for sixteen days; after which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears that he did nothing, and that his inaction was the subject of much wonder in his army, who are said to have even doubted whether he was really and earnestly hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with customary exaggeration, may have led him to hope that they could provoke a rising in Thebes, if he would only come near. At any rate the bad weather must have been a serious impediment to action; since in his march back to Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ the wind blew a hurricane, so that his soldiers could not proceed without leaving their shields and coming back afterwards to fetch them. Kleombrotus did not quit Bœotia, however, without leaving Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with one third of the entire army, and with a considerable sum of money to employ in hiring mercenaries and acting vigorously against the Thebans.[202]

[202] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.

The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa, had passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ into Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had touched Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as in the war between 394 and 388 B.C.) since the retirement of king Pausanias in 404 B.C.; furnishing a proof of the exposure of the country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind all the terrible recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian war. It was during the first prevalence of this alarm,—and seemingly while Kleombrotus was still with his army at Thespiæ or Kynoskephalæ, close on the Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian envoys, Etymoklês and two others, arrived at Athens to demand satisfaction for the part taken by the two Athenian generals and the Athenian volunteers, in concerting and aiding the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades. So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid giving offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them accused before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and executed; the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant to the psephism of Kannônus,[203] the two would be put on trial separately), escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him.[204] These two generals had been unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse of their official functions. They had brought the state into public hazard, not merely without consulting the senate or assembly, but even without taking the sense of their own board of Ten. Nevertheless the severity of the sentence pronounced indicates the alarm, as well as the displeasure, of the general body of Athenians; while it served as a disclaimer in fact, if not in form, of all political connection with Thebes.[205]

[203] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the
psephism of Kannônus.

[204] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.

Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does
not expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for
the conduct of these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot
doubt, however, that the fact was so; for in those times, there
were no resident envoys,—none but envoys sent on special missions.

[205] The trial and condemnation of these two generals has
served as the groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian
democracy. Wachsmuth (Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces
it as “a judicial horror, or abomination—ein Greul-gericht.”
Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 44, 45) says,—“Quid?
quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in Bœotiam factam esse,
non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta suis decretis
comprobaverant?” ... “Igitur hanc _illius facinoris excusationem_
habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (_i. e._ by the
propositions of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying
to get enrolled as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I
have noticed above as being, in my judgment, very inaccurately
recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo _enixius subvenerant,
eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi_ sunt.... Sed tantum abfuit ut
sibimet irascerentur, ut, _e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui
perfecerant id quod tum populus exoptaverat_.”

The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of
fact,—1. That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the
public assembly to send assistance to Thebes, under two generals,
who accordingly went out in command of the army and performed
their instructions. 2. That the Athenians, becoming afterwards
repentant or terrified, tried and condemned these two generals
for having executed the commission entrusted to them.

I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing
that the first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as
dependent on it, will therefore be incorrect also.

These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each
of the two _inconsistent_ narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus,
and blend them together in a way which contradicts both.

Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians
sent to Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along
with the Thebans against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not
only is not to be found in Xenophon, but which his narrative
plainly, though indirectly, excludes.

Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians
tried and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the
conspiracy of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ,
οἳ συνηπιστάσθην τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην
ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now the mention of these two generals
follows naturally and consistently in _Xenophon_. He had before
told us that there were _two_ out of the Athenian generals, who
both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards
went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted
on to the narrative of _Diodorus, who never says a word about
this condemnation by the Athenians_—nor even mentions _any two
Athenian generals_, at all. He tells us that the Athenian army
which went to Thebes was commanded by Demophon; he notices
no colleague whatever. He says in general words, that the
conspiracy was organized “with the assistance of the Athenians”
(συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any _two
generals_ as especially active.

Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously,
that these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not
by Diodorus) are identical with Demophon and another colleague,
commanders of an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by
Diodorus and not by Xenophon).

The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before
observed) are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have
to make our option between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon,
for reasons previously given. But if any one prefers that of
Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether the story of the
condemnation of the two Athenian generals (_who nowhere appear
in Diodorus_), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon
that point, as upon the other facts of the case.

That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic
narrative as true) should be tried and punished, when the
consequences of their unauthorized proceeding were threatening to
come with severity upon Athens,—appears to me neither improbable
nor unreasonable. Those who are shocked by the very severity
of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks which the
Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on the conduct
of Sphodrias.

To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the
narrative of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought
to regard the execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders
who surrendered the Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to
Diodorus, these officers had done everything which brave men
could do; they had resisted a long time, repelled many attacks,
and were only prevented from farther holding out by a mutiny
among their garrison.

Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of
Xenophon over that of Diodorus. According to the former, these
Lacedæmonian commanders surrendered the Kadmeia without any
resistance at all. Their condemnation, like that of the Athenian
two generals, becomes a matter easy to understand and explain.

Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, however, an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely altered the Athenian temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus had left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being informed that Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night watch,—since there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of surprising it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering at one stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of Athens. Putting his troops under march one evening after an early supper, he calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before daylight. But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook him when he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near Eleusis; from whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned back and retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing various acts of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.

This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. Had Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements as rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might not have succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would have been changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of Peiræus, both could and would have maintained the place. But it was one of those injustices, which no one ever commends until it has been successfully consummated,—“consilium quod non potest laudari nisi peractum.[206]” As it failed, it has been considered, by critics as well as by contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as a fault, and its author Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly weak and hot-headed.[207] Without admitting the full extent of this censure, we may see that his present aggression grew out of an untoward emulation of the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the simulated or transient displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired by seizing the Kadmeia. That Sphodrias received private instructions from Kleombrotus (as Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved; while the suspicion, intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he was wrought upon by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the Thebans, for the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta, is altogether improbable;[208] and seems merely an hypothesis suggested by the consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies had bribed him, he could not have served them better.

[206] Tacit. Histor. i, 38.

Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey
to his captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to
cut the cables of the ship, while Octavius and Antony were
dining on board, and to seize their persons,—“I cannot permit
any such thing; but you ought to have done it without asking my
permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of Shakspeare’s
Antony and Cleopatra.

[207] Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v.
Σφοδρίας; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch,
Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation of Sphodrias as to the time
necessary for his march to Peiræus is not worse than other
mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse, ix,
12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on
Tactics) recounts as having been committed by various other able
commanders.

[208] Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα
δόντες, ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29;
Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.

Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.

In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was
the Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may
remark—1. That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and
its success would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they
been the instigators, they would not have failed to give notice
of it at Athens at the same time; which they certainly did not
do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished Sphodrias, no war
would have ensued. Now every man would have predicted, that
assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish him.
3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the
fate of Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the
general character of the latter,—are quite consistent with a
belief on his part that Sphodrias (like Phœbidas) may have done
wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition in the service
of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the Thebans
beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under the
influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been
disposed to let justice take its course, but would have approved
and promoted the condemnation.

On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed
to the Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with
just as little cause.

The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain was communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city, and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of the offending general.[209]

[209] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.

The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he was acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his general character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that all the friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter of course. But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his friends dreaded that the latter would declare against him, and bring about his condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner: “To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who, as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor. Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.[210]” The friends of Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable, that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as a certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and friend of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.[211]

[210] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας
ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον
εἶναι· ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ
καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι·
τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.

Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very
interesting manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and
Archidamus, and the appeal of Archidamus to his father. The
statement has all the air of being derived from personal
knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders me from
giving it in full.

Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.

[211] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.

This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not merely philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) shows how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings. It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed, but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or an injured individual, against the harmost? The contrast between Spartan and Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days before, the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles. In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence, capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous and independent dikastery.

The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice of Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.[212] But the Athenians, who had so recently given strenuous effect to the remonstrances of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by it to the quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the extraordinary compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was made to turn. They immediately contracted hearty alliance with Thebes, and made vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both by land and sea. After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so as to place it beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied themselves to the building of new ships of war, and to the extension of their naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.[213]

[212] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.

[213] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.

From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates (in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon; since, while the discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was widely spread, the late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen that sentiment of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To Thebes, the junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her leaders gladly enrolled their city as a constituent member of the new confederacy.[214] They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of Athens,—reserving, however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights as presidents of the Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be reconstituted; which reconstitution was at this moment desirable even for Athens, seeing that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies of Sparta under harmosts and oligarchies.

[214] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates,
Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.

The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city, small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same authority might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be, maintenance of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each confederate, by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as much as possible those associations of tribute and subjection which rendered the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.[215] And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers in various dependencies, but had been deprived of their properties at the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to pass a formal decree,[216] renouncing and barring all revival of these suspended rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should on any pretence hold property, either in house or land, in the territory of any one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor as security for money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition. Any Athenian infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed against before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive him of the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the general purposes of the confederacy.

[215] The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος;
see Isokrates, De Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις.

Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα
κατέστησαν.

[216] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ ~τῶν μὲν κτημάτων
τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε~, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς
μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc.

Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ ~τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας
ἀποκαταστῆσαι τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι~, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο
μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης
τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὔνοιαν,
ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.

Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language
which might make us imagine that it was one of distinct
restitution, giving back property _actually enjoyed_. But the
Athenians had never actually regained the outlying private
property lost at the close of the war, though they had much
desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of
circumstances might enable them to effect the recovery. As the
recovery, if effected, would be at the cost of those whom they
were now soliciting as allies, the public and formal renunciation
of such rights was a measure of much policy, and contributed
greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands; though in point of
fact nothing was given up except rights to property not really
enjoyed.

An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording
the original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions
are mentioned in my text. It bears date in the archonship of
Nausinikus. It stands, with the restorations of M. Boeckh
(fortunately a portion of it has been found in tolerably good
preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his
work,—“Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und
Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener,”
p. xx.

Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ
Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε
οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ, μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ
τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν,
ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν
συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ
τῷ φῄναντι, τὸ δὲ ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις
[ἴῃ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν
ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις καὶ
κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ
τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ, ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα,
ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν
αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ
τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς
διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν. Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου
Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ τιμήθῃ, μὴ
ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.

Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of
Five Hundred shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone,
and place it by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius;
with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess to disburse sixty
drachmas for the cost of so doing.

It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of
such cities as had already joined the confederacy, together with
certain other names added afterwards, of cities which joined
subsequently. The Inscription itself directs such list to be
recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε οὐσῶν πόλεων
συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.

Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which,
moreover, he states to have been preserved only in a very partial
and fragmentary condition. He notices only, as contained in it,
the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus in the island of Keos,—and
Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as autonomous communities.

Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and just, like the Herodotean Deiokês,[217]—and formally ratified, as well by the Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate deputies assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact of alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to be maintained against Persia and other enemies.[218] Periodical meetings of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how often, we do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as competent judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with treason against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the confederates generally, it was provided in the original compact, that if any Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to the vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that document,—he should be tried before the synod for treason; and that, if found guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest punishment.

[217] Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ
δίκαιος ἦν.

[218] This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς
Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus
Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving immediately
after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii, 71). So
the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian
dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii,
142).

Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.[219]

[219] Diodor. xv, 29.

The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., she had had no need of their services; hence both of them had been absent from the city during much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still to have been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded, Iphikrates was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with Evagoras in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the head of a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their troops, and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands, and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and requested at the same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for the Athenian service,[220] and despatched Iphikrates to take command along with the Persians.

[220] Diodor. xv, 29.

Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his peltasts in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, near the shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of certain lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, and whose daughter he presently married.[221] Not only did he enjoy great scope for warlike operations and plunder, among the “butter-eating Thracians,”[222]—but he also acquired, as dowry, a large stock of such produce as Thracian princes had at their disposal, together with a boon even more important,—a seaport village not far from the mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where he established a fortified post, and got together a Grecian colony dependent on himself.[223] Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other eminent Athenians had done the same thing before him; though Xenophon had refused a similar proposition when made to him by the earlier Seuthes.[224] Iphikrates thus became a great man in Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with Athens, but making his position in each subservient to his importance in the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the Chersonese and other parts of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of Athenian naval and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace, but to others even beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas king of Macedonia became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt him for his son.[225] When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the request of Pharnabazus (about 378 B.C. apparently), Iphikrates had fair ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was opening before him.[226]

[221] Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

[222] See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv,
p. 131) of the comedy called _Protesilaus_—by the Athenian poet
Anaxandrides (Meineke, Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It
contains a curious description of the wedding of Iphikrates with
the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by an abundant banquet
and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of Thracians in the
market-place:—

δειπνεῖν δ’ ~ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγας~
αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,

brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys
himself girt round, and serving the broth in a golden basin,
then going about to taste all the bowls of wine and water ready
mixed, until he was himself the first man intoxicated. Iphikrates
brought from Athens several of the best players on the harp and
flute.

The distinction between the _butter_ eaten, or rubbed on the
skin, by the Thracians, and the _olive-oil_ habitually consumed
in Greece, deserves notice. The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to
indicate the absence of those scented unguents which, at the
banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the hair of the
guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears
that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed
themselves with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv.
Koloten, p. 1109 B.

The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to
Iphikrates by Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that
his exploits there were renowned as well as long-continued.

[223] Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat.
p. 664.

[224] Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen.
Hellen. i, 5, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.

See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont.
Ergokl. s. 5) about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a
discontented fellow-citizen, to seize Byzantium, marry the
daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.

[225] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.

At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly
make out; Amyntas died in 370 B.C., while from 378-371 B.C.,
Iphikrates seems to have been partly on service with the Persian
satraps, partly in command of the Athenian fleet in the Ionian
Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch. 4). Therefore, the
adoption took place at some time between 387-378 B.C.; perhaps
after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by
the Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 B.C.
Amyntas was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and
other land-neighbors (see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s.
112), that it was much to his advantage to cultivate the favor
of a warlike Athenian established on the Thracian coast, like
Iphikrates.

[226] From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias,
a conclusion has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian
people. They were so envious and ill-tempered (it has been said),
that none of their generals could live with comfort at Athens;
all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3)
makes the remark, borrowed originally from Theopompus (Fr. 117,
ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators as if
it were exact and literal truth—“Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i. e. on
being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of
Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam
fuit necesse. Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum,
quod et vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut
invidiam vulgi posset effugere. Est enim hoc commune vitium in
magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriæ comes sit, et
libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; neque
animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque
Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus
ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt
idem, quod tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a
conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit,
Iphicrates in Thraciâ, Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo.”

That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their
fair share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that
these attributes belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner,
cannot (in my judgment) be shown by any evidence extant,—and most
assuredly is not shown by the evidence here alluded to.

“Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious
indulgence.” If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a
Spartan, he would undoubtedly have been compelled to expatriate
in order to gratify this taste; for it was the express drift and
purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize property,
but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils,
of the rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of
Lykurgus,—Xenophon and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than
Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and others. If then it were
considered a proof of envy and ill-temper, to debar rich men
from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we might
fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and
Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece
where the means of luxurious and comfortable living were more
abundantly exhibited for sale, nor where a rich man was more
perfectly at liberty to purchase them. Of this the proofs are
everywhere to be found. Even the son of this very Chabrias,
Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without the
greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying
his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted
his whole substance in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
Athenæus, iv, p. 165). And Chares was even better liked at Athens
in consequence of his love of enjoyment and license,—if we are to
believe another Fragment (238) of the same Theopompus.

The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither
true as matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to
sustain the hypothesis of a malignant Athenian public, with which
they connect it. Iphikrates and Chabrias did not stay away from
Athens because they loved enjoyments or feared the envy of their
countrymen; but because both of them were large gainers by doing
so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of them were
men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of
Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1);
both of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities
quite compatible with strong appetite for enjoyment; while
neither of them had either taste or talent for the civil routine
and debate of Athens when at peace. Besides, each of them was
commander of a body of peltasts, through whose means he could
obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so that
we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to
be absent from Athens during most part of the nine years that
the peace of Antalkidas continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was
abroad three or four years, in service with the Persian satraps,
by order of the Athenians; Chabrias also went a long time
afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the same time
when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying
long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens
to the Chersonese in 359-358 B.C.—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p.
677, s. 204); but neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape
the mischief of envious countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of
Iphikrates as being uncomfortable in Athens, or anxious to get
out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p. 535, s. 83.

Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it
is truly surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of
Athenian jealousy or ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately
after the disaster of Ægospotami, and remained there, or remained
away from Athens, for eleven years (405-393 B.C.) until the
year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected that
he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the fleet
at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable
ruin upon Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with
well-merited infamy the generals commanding. Konon was so far
less guilty than his colleagues, as he was in a condition to
escape with eight ships when the rest were captured. But he could
not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to show his
face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some
signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country,
by the victory of Knidus in 394 B.C.; and then came back the
year afterwards, to a grateful and honorable welcome at Athens.
About a year or more after this, he went out again as envoy to
Persia in the service of his country. He was there seized and
imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make his
escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 B.C.
Nothing therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of
Theopompus, “that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was
afraid of undeserved ill-temper from the public at Athens.” For
what time Timotheus may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of
saying. But from the year 370 B.C. down to his death, we hear of
him so frequently elsewhere, in the service of his country, that
his residence cannot have been long.

Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, in the mission and measures for organizing their new confederacy, two other colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of his time.[227] The abilities of Kallistratus were not military at all; while Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished military merit. But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies to her proposed congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive appeal, conciliatory dealing, and substantial fairness in all her propositions, not less than of generalship. We are told that Timotheus, doubtless as son of the liberator Konon, from the recollections of the battle of Knidus—was especially successful in procuring new adhesions; and probably Kallistratus,[228] going round with him to the different islands, contributed by his eloquence not a little to the same result. On their invitation, many cities entered as confederates.[229] At this time (as in the earlier confederacy of Delos) all who joined must have been unconstrained members. And we may understand the motives of their junction, when we read the picture drawn by Isokrates (in 380 B.C.) of the tyranny of the Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as well as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former of whom had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the peace of Antalkidas,[230]—all entered into the confederacy. An Athenian fleet under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and the other islands of the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmosts,[231] together with their devoted local oligarchies, wherever they still subsisted; and all the cities thus liberated became equal members of the newly-constituted congress at Athens. After a certain interval, there came to be not less than seventy cities, many of them separately powerful, which sent deputies to it;[232] an aggregate sufficient to intimidate Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the hope of restoration to something like her former lustre.

[227] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.

[228] The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead
of the unpopular term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to
Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.

[229] Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv,
Permut. s. 120). So also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15;
cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement of Æschines, that Timotheus
brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy, appears large,
and must probably include all that that general either acquired
or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think
the number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult
to identify what towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he
particularizes, includes Samos, Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were
not acquired until many years afterwards,—in 366-365 B.C.

Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which
Timotheus brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when
it was first formed (among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most
part of it—Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others
which he afterwards took by siege, like Samos.

[230] Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.

[231] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κατὰ
κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν
δὲ τοῦ συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.

The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 B.C., about a
year before the battle of Leuktra.

[232] Diodor. xv, 30.

The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, and two hundred triremes.[233] Probably the insular and Ionic deputies promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond. We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements, large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire by constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 B.C., we may presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of promises on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not exact, and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet that Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising, the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process; to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and difficult.

[233] Diodor. xv, 29.

Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians _sent out_ (not
merely, _voted_ to send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned
one hundred triremes.

Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by
the Athenians alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with
the newly-assembled synod of allies.

It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities came together from a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and coöperation. A few years afterwards, we shall find this changed; Athens selfish, and the confederates reluctant.[234] Inflamed, as well by their position of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity against Sparta, the Athenians made important efforts of their own, both financial and military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time was superior in the Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of Histiæa in Eubœa, and annexed to their confederacy the islands of Peparêthus and Skiathus. They imposed upon themselves also a direct property-tax; to what amount, however, we do not know.

[234] Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ’, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν
ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ~ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται~ τοῦ
ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;

In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of
wreaths or crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed
by the Eubœans, as well as by the general body of allies. These
crowns were still to be seen thirty years afterwards at Athens,
with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen. cont. Androtion. c.
21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).

It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the city; a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, (B.C. 378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian citizens as well as metics were now classified anew for purposes of taxation. It will be remembered that even from the time of Solon[235] the citizens of Athens had been distributed into four classes,—Pentakosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished from each other by the amount of their respective properties. Of these Solonian classes, the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct taxes; while the three former were taxed according to assessments representing a certain proportion of their actual property. The taxable property of the richest (or Pentakosiomedimni, including all at or above the minimum income of five hundred medimni of corn per annum) was entered in the tax-book at a sum equal to twelve times their income; that of the Hippeis (comprising all who possessed between three hundred and five hundred medimni of annual income) at ten times their income; that of the Zeugitæ (or possessors of an annual income between two hundred and three hundred medimni) at five times their income. A medimnus of corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma; which permitted the application of this same class-system to movable property as well as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax (or _eisphora_) was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional tax, so far as regarded all the members of the same class; but as a graduated or progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer class as compared with those of the poorer.

[235] For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III,
Ch. xi, p. 117, of this History.