Chapter LXXXI (1)

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

In the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.

If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September 413 B.C.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island,—for all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians,—and Agrigentum, which remained neutral.[835] Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings of the Syracusans, immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance against them.[836] But both this city and Naxos, though exposed to humiliation and danger as allies of the defeated Athenians, contrived to escape without the loss of their independence. The allies of Syracuse were probably not eager to attack them, and thereby to aggrandize that city farther; while the Syracusans themselves also would be sensible of great exhaustion, arising from the immense efforts through which alone their triumph had been achieved. The pecuniary burdens to which they had been obliged to submit—known to Nikias during the last months of the siege,[837] and fatally misleading his judgment,—were so heavy as to task severely their powers of endurance. After paying, and dismissing with appropriate gratitude, the numerous auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to hire,—after celebrating the recent triumph, and decorating the temples, in a manner satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the citizens[838]—there would probably be a general disposition to repose rather than to aggressive warfare. There would be much destruction to be repaired throughout their territory, poorly watched or cultivated during the year of the siege.

[835] Thucyd. vii, 50-58.

[836] Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.

[837] Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.

[838] Diodor. xiii, 34.

In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of exasperation and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude towards the Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident persuasion reigned throughout Greece that Athens[839] could not hold out for one single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion, founded greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act against her from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. In this day of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more numerous. Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,[840] which had been friendly to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his expedition to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred of the leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor Lysias), and espoused the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of reaction at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the citizens of both places to take active part in an effort promising to be easy and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. And volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian satraps of the sea-board were now competing with each other in invitations to the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.

[839] Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.

[840] Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.
453.

Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 B.C. (the year following the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a Sicilian squadron of twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from Selinus, under the command of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and joined the Lacedæmonian fleet in its expedition across the Ægean to Miletus. Another squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under the Rhodian Dorieus, and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum, and Lokri, followed soon after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly instigated his countrymen to this effort.[841] Throughout the trying months of the siege, he had taken a leading part in the defence of Syracuse, seconding the plans of Gylippus with equal valor and discretion. As commander of the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet now acting against Athens in the Ægean (events already described in my sixty-first chapter), his conduct was not less distinguished. He was energetic in action, and popular in his behavior towards those under his command; but what stood out most conspicuously as well as most honorably, was his personal incorruptibility. While the Peloponnesian admiral and trierarchs accepted the bribes of Tissaphernes, conniving at his betrayal of the common cause and breach of engagement towards the armament, with indifference to the privations of their own unpaid seamen,—Hermokrates and Dorieus were strenuous in remonstrance, even to the extent of drawing upon themselves the indignant displeasure of the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus, as well as of the satrap himself.[842] They were the more earnest in performing this duty, because the Syracusan and Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in larger proportion than the remaining fleet.[843]

[841] Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.

[842] Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.

[843] Thucyd. viii, 84.

The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates and his companions in crossing the sea from Sicily,—that one single effort would gloriously close the war,—was far from being realized. Athens resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred. Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.[844] Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans at home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those splendid anticipations under which their squadron had departed, received news generally unfavorable, and at length positively disastrous. They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and distressed; while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found means to assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the mastery of the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats, which the Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the Hellespont[845] (one at Kynossema,—411 B.C.,—a second between Abydos and Dardanus,—410 B.C.); and at length of a third, more decisive and calamitous than the preceding,—the battle of Kyzikus (409 B.C.), wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet captured or destroyed. In this defeat the Syracusan squadron were joint sufferers. Their seamen were compelled to burn all their triremes without exception, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; and were left destitute, without clothing or subsistence, on the shores of the Propontis amidst the satrapy of Pharnabazus.[846] That satrap, with generous forwardness, took them into his pay, advanced to them clothing and provision for two months, and furnished them with timber from the woods of Mount Ida to build fresh ships. At Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium, one great place of export for Idæan timber), where the reconstruction took place, the Syracusans made themselves so acceptable and useful to the citizens, that a vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was passed to all of them who chose to accept it.[847]

[844] Thucyd. viii, 85.

[845] Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.

[846] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.

[847] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.

In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch, addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition of the defeated armament—“Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain. The men are hungry. We know not what to do.”[848] This curious despatch has passed into history, because it was intercepted by the Athenians, and never reached its destination. But without doubt the calamitous state of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew rapidly, under many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus and to Syracuse. Sad as the reality was, the first impression made by the news would probably be yet sadder; since the intervention of Pharnabazus, whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would hardly be felt or authenticated until after some interval. At Syracuse, the event on being made known excited not only powerful sympathy with the sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against Hermokrates and his colleagues; who, having instigated their countrymen three years before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to commence a foreign expedition for the purpose of finally putting down Athens, had not only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of reverses, ending at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom they had pronounced to be incapable of farther resistance.

[848] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ καλά. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα·
πεινῶντι τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.

It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the defeat of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was transmitted to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the armament, convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting against its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the armament to maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to choose new admirals for the time, until the successors nominated at Syracuse should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by the trierarchs, the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; who, attached to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant openness of communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their opinions, loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor serve under, any other leaders.[849] But the admirals repressed this disposition, deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. They laid down their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them to prefer his complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers of the many victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea, which had knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship. No man stood forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the continued request of the armament, to remain in command, until their three successors arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then retired amidst universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding themselves by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure their restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.[850]

[849] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27.

[850] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27-31.

Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would doubtless find response when he invoked the remembrance of past victories, yet he would hardly have found the like response in a Syracusan assembly. For if we review the proceedings of the armament since he conducted it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian fleet, we shall find that on the whole his expedition had been a complete failure, and that his assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but disappointment. There was therefore ample cause for the discontent of his countrymen. But on the other hand, as far as our limited means of information enable us to judge, the sentence of banishment against him appears to have been undeserved and unjust. For we cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to any misconduct or omission on his part; while in regard to personal incorruptibility, and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of Tissaphernes, he stood out as an honorable exception among a body of venal colleagues. That satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates had fallen into disgrace, circulated a version of his own, pretending that the latter, having asked money from him and been refused, had sought by calumnious means to revenge such refusal.[851] But this story, whether believed elsewhere or not, found no credit with the other satrap Pharnabazus; who warmly espoused the cause of the banished general, presenting him with a sum of money even unsolicited. This money Hermokrates immediately employed in getting together triremes and mercenary soldiers to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force.[852] We shall presently see how he fared in this attempt. Meanwhile we may remark that the sentence of banishment, though in itself unjust, would appear amply justified in the eyes of his countrymen by his own subsequent resort to hostile measures against them.

[851] Thucyd. viii, 85.

[852] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.

The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor, young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting intestine discontent.[853] But in the period immediately after the siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered it still more democratical. On the proposition of an influential citizen named Dioklês, a commission of Ten was named, of which he was president, for the purpose of revising both the constitution and the legislation of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, one of which was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the principle of election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, a new code, or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was drawn up and sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we are told that its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief. It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklês, the chief of the Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the dominion of the Romans.[854]

[853] Thucyd. vii, 55.

[854] Diodor. xiii, 33-35.

We have the austere character of Dioklês illustrated by a story (of more than dubious credit,[855] and of which the like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators), that having inadvertently violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the duty of obedience by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know the substance of his laws, which would have thrown so much light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian Greeks. Nor can we distinctly make out to what extent the political constitution of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells us that the lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, yet he does not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, or under what reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those adopted at Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people, after the Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial democracy into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five or six years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism, by the most violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused, disgraced, and overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of the functions of government.[856] If the constitutional forms were rendered more democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have materially changed, and that the persons actually in leading function still continued to be rich men.

[855] Compare Diodor. xiii, 75—about the banishment of Dioklês.

[856] Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος,
αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ
πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.

v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων
ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν.

The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, after continuing more than three years,[857] was brought to a close by an enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. This time, the invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient foe of Hellas, Carthage.

[857] Diodor. xiii, 56.

It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year (480 B.C.) which transported Xerxes across the Hellespont to meet his defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had poured into Sicily a vast mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the purpose of reinstating in Himera the despot Terillus, who had been expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been slain, and his large army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, in the memorable battle of Himera. So deep had been the impression left by this defeat, that for the seventy years which intervened between 480-410 B.C., the Carthaginians had never again invaded the island. They resumed their aggressions shortly after the destruction of the Athenian power before Syracuse; which same event had also stimulated the Persians, who had been kept in restraint while the Athenian empire remained unimpaired, again to act offensively for the recovery of their dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. The great naval power of Athens, inspiring not merely reserve but even alarm to Carthage,[858] had been a safeguard to the Hellenic world both at its eastern and its western extremity. No sooner was that safeguard overthrown, than the hostile pressure of the foreigner began to be felt, as well upon Western Sicily as on the eastern coast of the Ægean.

[858] Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at
Syracuse—δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ
γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι
αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, etc.

From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion of the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive scale, so as to act powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian Greeks. Whether any internal causes had occurred to make them abstain from intervention during the preceding generations, we are unable to say. The history of this powerful and wealthy city is very little known. We make out a few facts, which impart a general idea both of her oligarchical government and of her extensive colonial possessions, but which leave us in the dark as to her continuous history. Her possessions were most extensive, along the coast of Africa both eastward and westward from her city; comprehending also Sardinia and the Balearic isles, but (at this time, probably) few settlements in Spain. She had quite enough to occupy her attention elsewhere, without meddling in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as her province in Sicily was rather a dependent ally than a colonial possession. In the early treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians restrict and even interdict the traffic of the Romans both with Sardinia and Africa (except Carthage itself), but they grant the amplest license of intercourse with the Carthaginian province of Sicily; which they consider as standing in the same relation to Carthage as the cities of Latium stood in to Rome.[859] While the connection of Carthage with Sicily was thus less close, it would appear that her other dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in consequence of her own harsh and extortionate dominion.

[859] Polybius, iii, 22, 23, 24.

He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part)
between the Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three
belongs to the days of Pyrrhus, about 278 B.C.; the earliest to
508 B.C. The intermediate treaty is not marked as to date by
any specific evidence, but I see no ground for supposing that
it is so late as 345 B.C., which is the date assigned to it by
Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii,
27. I cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier
date, somewhere between 480-410 B.C. This second treaty is far
more restrictive than the first, against the Romans; for it
interdicts them from all traffic either with Sardinia or Africa,
except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted
such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second
treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome,
which would rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth
century B.C., than to the latter half of the fourth.

All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage and her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second centuries B.C., yet it may be held to justify presumptive conclusions as to the fifth century B.C., especially in reference to the general system pursued. The maximum of her power was attained before her first war with Rome, which began in 264 B.C.; the first and second Punic wars both of them greatly reduced her strength and dominion. Yet in spite of such reduction we learn that about 150 B.C., shortly before the third Punic war, which ended in the capture and depopulation of the city, not less than seven hundred thousand souls[860] were computed in it, as occupants of a fortified circumference of above twenty miles, covering a peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its citadel Byrsa was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own, and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. The numerous population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a considerable city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even Carthage itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though in the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within the distance of seven miles from Carthage[861] on the one side, and Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that time, too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred tributary cities in Libya.[862] Yet this was but a small fraction of the prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the fourth century B.C., and in all probability also between 480-410 B.C. That empire extended eastward as far as the Altars of the Philæni, near the Great Syrtis,—westward, all along the coast to the Pillars of Herakles and the western coast of Morocco. The line of coast south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay called the Lesser Syrtis, was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium and the Emporia) for its fertility. Along this extensive line were distributed indigenous Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a mixed population called Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and coalition of some of these tribes either with colonists from Tyre and Sidon, or perhaps with a Canaanitish population akin in race to the Phœnicians, yet of still earlier settlement in the country.[863] These Liby-Phœnicians dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness of their soil.[864] Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not known to us, but it must have been prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathokles and Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than two hundred. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as having fifty towns.[865]

[860] Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.

Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia,
and the breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is
noticed by Barth as much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste
des Mittelmeers, p. 85).

[861] Appian. Reb. Punic, viii, 75.

[862] Strabo, _ut sup._

[863] This is the view of Movers, sustained with much
plausibility, in his learned and instructive work—Geschichte der
Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p. 435-455. See Diodor. xx, 55.

[864] Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of
Herodotus.

[865] Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.

A few of the towns along the coast,—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus, Leptis, etc.,—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as much as one-half of their produce,[866] and doubled at one stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred and sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected without extreme harshness of enforcement, sometimes stripping the tax-payer of all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his family to be sold in person for a slave.[867] Accordingly the general sentiment among the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled fear and hatred, which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing of any foreign invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have guarded against such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also provided a species of garrison from among their own citizens; by sending out from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of land with the cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens as emigrants (mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing feature in the Carthaginian political system, serving the double purpose of obviating discontent among their own town population at home, and of keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.[868]

[866] Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks,
who work on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of
Turkish proprietors—“The Helots seem to have resembled the
Greeks, who labor on the Turkish farms _in the plains_ of Turkey,
and who are bound to account to their masters for one-half of the
produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the Messenians of his
time—

Ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι
Δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες, ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,
Ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.
(Tyrtæus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)

The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so
hard” (Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).

[867] Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62.

Movers (Geschichte der Phœnizier, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this
large assessment to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can
relate only to Leptis Parva, in the region called Emporia.

Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near
the Great Syrtis.

Dr. Barth (Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des
Mittelländischen Meers, p. 81-146) has given a recent and
valuable examination of the site of Carthage and of the
neighboring regions. On his map, however, the territory called
Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred miles from
Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the name
Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and
approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his
expedition from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia.
He intended to land very near Carthage; and he actually did land
on the White Cape, near to that city, but on the north side, and
still nearer to Utica. This region north of Carthage was probably
not included in the name Emporia (Livy, xxix, 25-27).

[868] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 9; vi, 3, 5.

In the fifth century B.C., the Carthaginians had no apprehension of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; an enterprise first attempted in 316 B.C., to the surprise of every one, by the boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles. Nor were their enemies on the land side formidable as conquerors, though they were extremely annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and other native tribes, half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished for speed as well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the individual cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of ditch to keep them off.[869] But these barbarians did not acquire sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., therefore (prior to the invasion of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by the Carthaginians was constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. For these purposes they chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion from Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands of the Western Mediterranean, together with conscripts from their Libyan dependencies. The native Carthaginians,[870] though encouraged by honorary marks to undertake this military service, were generally averse to it, and sparingly employed. But these citizens, though not often sent on foreign service, constituted a most formidable force when called upon. No less then forty thousand hoplites went forth from the gates of Carthage to resist Agathokles, together with one thousand cavalry, and two thousand war-chariots.[871] An immense public magazine,—of arms, muniments of war of all kinds, and provisions,—appears to have been kept in the walls of Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage.[872] A chosen division of two thousand five hundred citizens, men of wealth and family, formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage,[873] distinguished for their bravery in the field as well as for the splendor of their arms, and the gold and silver plate which formed part of their baggage. We shall find these citizen-troops occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most part of the Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, etc., a mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in language as well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment to the cause in which they fought,—seldom, to the commanders under whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction.[874] A military system such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied, like Persians, upon numbers,—manifesting little or no military skill; until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.

[869] Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus,
c. 18. Εὔμαχος δέ φησιν ἐν Περιηγήσει, Καρχηδονίους
περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὑρεῖν ὀρύσσοντας δύο
σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους, etc.

The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage
of the Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards,
as they grew more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the
trench; as we see by the passages of Appian above referred to.

Movers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench
with the one which Pliny names near Thenæ on the Lesser Syrtis,
as having been dug by order of the second Africanus—to form a
boundary between the Roman province of Africa, and the dominion
of the native kings (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such
identity. It appears to me that this last is distinct from the
Carthaginian trench.

[870] A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served
campaigns (Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).

[871] Diodor. xx, 10.

[872] Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with
an immense stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered
up to the perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the
last siege of Carthage.

See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20-25.

[873] Diodor. xvi, 8.

[874] See the striking description in Livy, of the motley
composition of the Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he
bestows just admiration on the genius of Hannibal, for having
always maintained his ascendency over them, and kept them in
obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare Polybius, i,
65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his mercenaries
to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75-77).

Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts known are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend its real working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and precedence were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the Senate.[875] They seem to have been renewed annually, though how far the same persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do not know, but they were always selected out of some few principal families or Gentes. There is reason for believing that the genuine Carthaginian citizens were distributed into three tribes, thirty curiæ, and three hundred gentes—something in the manner of the Roman patricians. From these gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred, out of which again was formed a smaller council or committee of thirty _principes_ representing the curiæ;[876] sometimes a still smaller, of only ten _principes_. These little councils are both frequently mentioned in the political proceedings of Carthage; and perhaps the Thirty may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia, or Council of Ancients,—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls the Senate.[877] Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of Carthage to the two kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also to that of Sparta;[878] which latter consisted of thirty members, including the kings who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to any assembly at Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate. He mentions two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of one hundred and four; and certain Boards of Five,—the pentarchies. He compares the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors; yet again he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive functions, and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest authority in the state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with the assembly of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the Senate as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum; of which Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year, instead of being perpetual.[879]

[875] There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each
of the other Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius
Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7) talks of Hannibal as having been made
_king_ (rex) when he was invested with his great foreign military
command, at twenty-two years of age. So Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks
about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about Hamilkar.

[876] See Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.

[877] Polybius, x, 18; Livy, xxx, 16.

Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at
Carthage as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed
to the πλῆθος or people (vi, 51). It would seem that by Γερόντιον
he must mean the same as the assembly called in another passage
(x, 18) Σύγκλητος.

[878] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.

[879] Livy, xxxiii, 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred
select Senators set apart as judges.

These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage may be said to be unknown.[880] But it seems clear that the general spirit of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich, old, and powerful families, divided among themselves the great offices and influence of the state; that they maintained themselves in pointed and even insolent distinction from the multitude;[881] that they stood opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained by gross perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which, through these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were visited, was cruel in the extreme.[882] It appears that wealth was one indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling the citizens in collective banquets of the _curiæ_ or the political associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the _phiditia_ or public mess of Sparta.[883] There was a demos or people at Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and the small Council were not all of one mind.[884] How numerous this demos was, or what proportion of the whole population it comprised, we have no means of knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or less considerable, its multitude was kept under dependence to the rich families by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative appointments with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The purposes of government were determined, its powers wielded and the great offices held—suffetes, senators, generals, or judges,—by the members of a small number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition which they encountered, was from their feuds against each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well for internal tranquillity as for systematic foreign and commercial aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion.[885]

[880] Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p.
138, 3rd edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de
Politiâ Carthaginiensium, Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these
passages with ability. But their materials do not enable them to
reach any certainty.

[881] Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. “Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem
et Campanum senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à
plebe balneo lavabatur, hic diverso foro utebatur.”

[882] Diodor. xx, 10; xxiii, 9; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.

[883] Aristotel Politic. iii, 5, 6.

These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings,—as
well as multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant
for the comparison which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public
mess. But even granting the analogy on these external points,—the
intrinsic difference of character and purpose between the two
must have been so great, that the comparison seems not happy.

Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the _circuli et convivia_ at Carthage;
but this is probably a general expression, without particular
reference to the public banquets mentioned by Aristotle.

[884] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 3.

[885] Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the
abortive conspiracy of Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned
in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said to have formed the plan of
putting to death the Senate, and making himself despot. But he
was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; all his
family being put to death along with him.

Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle’s statements
about the Carthaginian government,—but some of them are even
contradictory. One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who proposes to read ἐν Χαλκηδόνι instead
of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls
Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατουμένῃ) a state democratically
governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he says in ii, 8,
respecting its government.

Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at
Carthage to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so
numerous a body could have transacted the infinite diversity of
administrative and other business performed by the five ephors.

The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is Mago (seemingly about 530-500 B.C.), who is said to have mainly contributed to organize the forces, and extend the dominion, of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished after a victorious career in Sardinia;[886] the other, Hamilkar, commanding at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated and slain by Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death of Hamilkar, his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, and passed his life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.[887] But the sons of Hasdrubal still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so powerful, that a check upon their ascendency was supposed to be necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.[888] Such wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians from farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between 480-410 B.C. There were probably other causes also, not known to us,—and down to the year 413 B.C., the formidable naval power of Athens (as has been already remarked) kept them on the watch even for themselves. But now, after the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter were dissipated; so that Carthage again found leisure, as well as inclination, to seek in Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.

[886] Justin. xix, 1.

[887] Diodor. xiii.

[888] Justin, xix, 2.

It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same quarrel, who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent invasion by Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters to Carthage. The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war with rival neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting parties. They had applied to Carthage first, without success,[889] before they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war indeed had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger Athenian enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that catastrophe, wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The Egestæans had not only lost their protectors, but had incurred aggravated hostility from their neighbors, for having brought upon Sicily so formidable an ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel with Selinus had related to a disputed portion of border territory. This point they no longer felt competent to maintain, under their present disadvantageous circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident as well as angry, were now not satisfied with success in their original claim. They proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands indisputably belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity as well as the independence of the city. To no other quarter could the Egestæans turn, with any chance of finding both will and power to protect them, except to Carthage.[890]

[889] Diodor. xii, 82.

It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have
taken place in 452 B.C., between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was
really a war between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor, xi, 86—with
Wesseling’s note). Lilybæum as a town attained no importance
until after the capture of Motyê by the older Dionysius in 393
B.C.

[890] Diodor. xiii, 43.

The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) was situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not far from the western cape of the island, and in the immediate neighborhood of the Carthaginian settlements,—Motyê, Panormus (now Palermo), and Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western cape, but on the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory conterminous to the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the Egestæan envoys presented their urgent supplications at Carthage for aid, proclaiming that unless assisted they must be subjugated and become a dependency of Selinus,—the Carthaginians would not unreasonably conceive, that their own Sicilian settlements would be endangered, if their closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus to aggrandize herself. Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid solicited; yet not without much debate and hesitation. They were uneasy at the idea of resuming military operations in Sicily,—which had been laid aside for seventy years, and had moreover left such disastrous recollections[891]—at a moment when Syracusan courage stood in high renown, from the recent destruction of the Athenian armament. But the recollections of the Gelonian victory at Himera, while they suggested apprehension, also kindled the appetite of revenge; especially in the bosom of Hannibal, the grandson of that general Hamilkar who had there met his death. Hannibal was at this moment king, or rather first of the two suffetes, chief executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather had been seventy years before. So violent had been the impression made upon the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal, and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He had chosen the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also had spent his youth, though restored since to his country and to his family consequence,—and from whence he brought back an intense antipathy to the Greek name, as well as an impatience to wipe off by a signal revenge the dishonor both of his country and of his family. Accordingly, espousing with warmth the request of the Egestæans, he obtained from the Senate authority to take effective measures for their protection.[892]

[891] Diodor. xiii, 43.

[892] Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ
νόμους τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱωνὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα
πολεμήσαντος Ἁμίλκου, καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρᾳ τελευτήσαντος, υἱὸς δὲ
Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἧτταν ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν
ἐν τῇ Σελινοῦντι. Ὁ δ’ οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὢν μὲν καὶ ~φύσει μισέλλην~,
ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc.

The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his
life, deserves notice, as a point of comparison between the
Greek republics and Carthage. A defeated general in Greece, if
he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently banished, even
where there seems neither proof nor probability that he had
been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But I
do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus
apparently innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the
battle, his son was banished for life, as Giskon was banished
by the Carthaginians. In appreciating the manner in which the
Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical, dealt with
their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage is one
important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks,
will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review
the proceedings of the Carthaginians.

His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, to remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected. The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately sent over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five thousand Libyans or Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, but had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.[893]

[893] Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.

In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance of Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta. Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and recaptured the whole booty.[894]

[894] Diodor. xiii, 44.

The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now, had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed by a citizen named Empedion,[895] urgently recommended: for Selinus appears always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage than any other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of Himera, the Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but had actually fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;[896] a plea, which, had it been pressed, might probably have had weight with Hannibal. But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears only to have rendered them more confident and passionate in braving her force and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask for aid, which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised to send them. But the promise was given with little cordiality, as appears by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as from the neutrality which they had professed so recently before; for the contest seemed to be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so that Syracuse had little interest in helping her to conquer Egesta. Neither Syracusans nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense preparations, and energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at once altered the character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He employed all the ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous host of mercenary troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with various Greeks who were willing to take service.[897]

[895] Diodor. xiii, 59.

[896] Diodor. xiii, 55; xi, 21.

[897] Diodor. xiii, 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες
ξυμμαχοῦντες, etc.

It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms,
Timoleon, c. 30,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks
in their service, at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—B.C.
340.