Chapter LXXVII (4)

This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties. The confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was redoubled; so that by the year 374 B.C., they had cleared Bœotia of the Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local oligarchies which sustained them; persuading or constraining the cities again to come into union with Thebes, and reviving the Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus, Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus became again Bœotian;[292] leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its dependency Chæroneia,) which was on the borders of Phokis, and still continued under Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the party friendly to Thebes was numerous, and the change, on the whole, popular; though in some the prevailing sentiment was such, that adherence was only obtained by intimidation. The change here made by Thebes, was not to absorb these cities into herself, but to bring them back to the old federative system of Bœotia; a policy which she had publicly proclaimed on surprising Platæa in 431 B.C.[293] While resuming her own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian federation, she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by convention, probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient rights, their security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the system which had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.

[292] That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all
Bœotia, and revived the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by
Xenophon, Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1.

[293] Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the
Theban troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa)
εἴ τις βούλεται ~κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν~ ξυμμαχεῖν,
τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ
τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.

Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν
(iii, 61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of
their own professions and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431
B.C., may be taken as fair analogy to judge of their professions
and views towards the recovered Bœotian towns in 376-375 B.C.

The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis, the port of Thespiæ,[294] they fortified it, and built some triremes to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta, and auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from ancient times, on friendly terms with Athens.[295] So hard pressed were the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly was at the same time their bitter enemy,[296]—that unless assisted, they would have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, and along with them Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison then occupying it; while the treasures of the Delphian Temple would also have been laid open, in case the Thebans should think fit to seize them. Intimation being sent by the Phokians to Sparta, King Kleombrotus was sent to their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four Lacedæmonian divisions of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.[297] This reinforcement, compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both Phokis and Orchomenus in safety. While Sparta thus sustained them, even Athens looked upon the Phokian cause with sympathy. When she saw that the Thebans had passed from the defensive to the offensive,—partly by her help, yet nevertheless refusing to contribute to the cost of her navy,—her ancient jealousy of them became again so powerful, that she sent envoys to Sparta, to propose terms of peace. What these terms were, we are not told; nor does it appear that the Thebans even received notice of the proceeding. But the peace was accepted at Sparta, and two of the Athenian envoys were despatched at once from thence, without even going home, to Korkyra, for the purpose of notifying the peace to Timotheus, and ordering him forthwith to conduct his fleet back to Athens.[298]

[294] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.

[295] Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.

[296] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.

[297] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.

This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes
Clinton in 375 B.C. (Fast. Hel. ad 375 B.C.). To me it seems
to belong rather to 374 B.C. It was not undertaken until the
Thebans had reconquered all the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1,
1); and this operation seems to have occupied them all the two
years,—376 and 375 B.C. See v, 4, 63, where the words οὔτ’ ἐν ᾧ
Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include, not simply
the time which Timotheus took in _actually circumnavigating_
Peloponnesus, but the year which he spent afterwards in the
Ionian Sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his
exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighborhood generally.
The “Periplus” for which Timotheus was afterwards honored at
Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c. 90, p. 458) meant the
exploits performed by him during the year and with the fleet of
the “Periplus.”

It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this
year 374 B.C.,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first
quarter of that archon, or the third Olympic year; about the
beginning of August, Chabrias won a prize at these games with a
chariot and four; in celebration of which, he afterwards gave a
splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called Kôlias, near
Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).

[298] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.

Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen.
Hellen. vi, 3, 4).

This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta, and served somewhat to countervail a mortifying revelation which had reached the Spartans a little before from a different quarter.

Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been in alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one of their garrisons.[299] In the usual state of Thessaly, the great cities Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some smaller cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement with each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they could be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a supreme chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was now in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree, indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements. Being a wealthy man, “hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian fashion,” he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came in.[300]

[299] Diodor. xiv, 82.

[300] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη,
παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου,
ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν
Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.

Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues
helps us to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into
his hands the management of their harbors and customs-duties
(Demosthen. Olynth. i, p. 15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking
contrast with the exactness of the Athenian people about
their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the
inscriptions yet remaining.

But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in Thessaly,—Jason, despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening the independence of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. Though the force of Jason can hardly have been very considerable when the Spartans passed through Thessaly, six years before, in their repeated expeditions against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of Pheræ, but master of nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron of Pheræ had partially succeeded in becoming thirty years before),[301] as well as of a large area of tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them, but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas, prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects. He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he (Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians, and afterwards by Agesilaus.

[301] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.

The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason
sending a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior
to the recapture of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting
Epaminondas,—appears not entitled to credit. Before that time,
Epaminondas was too little known to be worth corrupting;
moreover, Jason did not become _tagus_ of Thessaly until long
after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).

Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which the energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who replied, that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that he could take no resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to Sparta, then (rejoined Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack Pharsalus, and that it is for them to afford you protection. If they cannot comply with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the interests of your city if you do not embrace my offers.” It was on this mission that Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that unless aid could be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly to sever himself from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy against whom you will have to contend is formidable in every way, both from personal qualities and from power; so that nothing short of a first-rate force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me what you can do.”

The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly. Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly, he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.[302]

[302] See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech
of Polydamas, which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in
Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 4-18).

The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had sent three powerful armies in succession to crush the liberal and promising confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian cities on the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to which her armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas. The parties in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a claim, as friends or allies; while those _against_ whom she acted, had neither done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the main ground on which her interference was invoked, was to hinder the free and equal confederation of Grecian cities. _Now_, a claim, and a strong claim, is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus, an old friend and ally. It comes from a region much less distant; lastly, her political interest would naturally bid her arrest the menacing increase of an aggressive power already so formidable as that of Jason. Yet so seriously has the position of Sparta altered in the last eight years (382-374 B.C.), that she is now compelled to decline a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy alike prompted her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian confederacy, that their honorable and well-combined aspirations fell exactly during those few years in which Sparta was at her maximum of power! So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not only for Olynthus, but for Greece generally:—since nothing but Spartan interference restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast, while the Olynthian confederacy, had it been allowed to expand, might probably have confined them to the interior, and averted the death-blow which came upon Grecian freedom in the next generation from their hands.

The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus, being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet. He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post. Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints at Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having been in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off, and war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail was despatched to assist the Zakynthians,[303] while plans were formed for the acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra. The fleet of Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent Korkyræan party formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians as friends, and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of twenty-two triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a voyage to Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the plot, refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.

[303] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.

The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides
that on some points, though not in the main, they contradict
Xenophon. Diodorus states that those exiles whom Timotheus
brought back to Zakynthus, were the philo-Spartan leaders, who
had been recently expelled for their misrule under the empire of
Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect. The exiles
whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan
party in the island.

But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by
representing that universal and turbulent reaction against the
philo-Spartan oligarchies, which really did not take place until
after the battle of Leuktra—as if it had taken place some three
years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor. xv, 40, seem to me
to belong to a period _after_ the battle of Leuktra.

Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the
Athenians sent _Ktesikles_ as auxiliary commander to _Zakynthus_
(xv, 46); whereas this very commander is announced by himself
in the next chapter (as well as by Xenophon, who calls him
_Stesikles_) as sent to _Korkyra_ (Hellen. v, 2, 10).

I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian
expedition under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent
to Zakynthus—then again, as sent to _Korkyra_. The latter is the
truth. No Athenian expedition at all appears on this occasion to
have gone to Zakynthus; for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians
among those who helped to fit out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2,
3).

On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the
reality of the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of
374 B.C.—one under Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under
Alkidas to Korkyra—which Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It
is true that Xenophon does not notice either of them; but they
are noway inconsistent with the facts which he does state.

The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by pecuniary payments from other confederates, who preferred commuting their obligation to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body of one thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled; besides some Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.[304] At the same time, application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan despot, for his coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the connection of that island with Athens had proved once, and might prove again, dangerous to his city.

[304] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the
commutation of personal service for money.

Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the
expedition of Mnasippus, though differing on several other
contemporary points.

It was in the spring of 373 B.C. that this force proceeded against Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Mnasippus; who, having driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss of four triremes, landed on the island, gained a victory, and confined the inhabitants within the walls of the city. He next carried his ravages round the adjacent lands, which were found in the highest state of cultivation, and full of the richest produce; fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in surpassing condition,—with splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed wine-cellars, and abundance of cattle as well as laboring-slaves. The invading soldiers, while enriching themselves by depredations on cattle and slaves, became so pampered with the plentiful stock around, that they refused to drink any wine that was not of the first quality.[305] Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, of the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded economy, at the time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not less memorable than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of Archidamus), of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical Athens, at the moment when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator was first felt there in 431 B.C.[306]

[305] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus
landed), ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς
καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν, μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ
οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’ ἔφασαν τοὺς
στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν,
εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα
ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.

Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood
after πίνειν.

[306] Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι
νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ
ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται.

Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the
second speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11).

To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties
of the wealthy men established throughout the area of
Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις
τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες (_i. e._ by the
invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.

With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from supplies out of the country, while he at the same time blocked up the harbor with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in want. Yet they seemed to have no chance of safety except through aid from the Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing entreaties,[307] and who had now reason to regret their hasty consent (in the preceding year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from the island. However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new fleet to be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts, under Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest route, to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during the delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased daily; and at length became so severe, that many of the citizens deserted, and numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to receive them, making public proclamation that every one who deserted should be sold into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless continued to come, he caused them to be scourged back to the city-gates. As for the unfortunate slaves, being neither received by him, nor re-admitted within, many perished outside of the gates from sheer hunger.[308]

[307] The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon,
v, 2, 9) would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the
aid of Alketas. This would be a much quicker way for them than
the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus: and it would suggest
the same way for the detachment of Stesiklês presently to be
mentioned.

[308] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.

Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching hour of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and the general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, through the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from allies in commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed several of his mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them unpaid for the last two months. His present temper made him not only more harsh towards his own soldiers,[309] but also less vigilant in the conduct of the siege. Accordingly the besieged, detecting from their watch-towers the negligence of the guards, chose a favorable opportunity and made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on seeing his outposts driven in, armed himself and hastened forward with the Lacedæmonians around him to sustain them; giving orders to the officers of the mercenaries to bring their men forward also. But these officers replied, that they could not answer for the obedience of soldiers without pay; upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that he struck them with his stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such an insult inflamed still farther the existing discontent. Both officers and soldiers came to the combat discouraged and heartless, while the Athenian peltasts and the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing out of several gates at once, pressed their attack with desperate energy. Mnasippus, after displaying great personal valor, was at length slain, and all his troops, being completely routed, fled back to the fortified camp in which their stores were preserved. Even this too might have been taken, and the whole armament destroyed, had the besieged attacked it at once. But they were astonished at their own success. Mistaking the numerous camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they retired back to the city.

[309] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16.

Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν
πόλιν, καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας
αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν
ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν, ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.

Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed, was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers, were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued them from capture, slavery, or starvation.[310]

[310] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.

The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as to incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when it did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the orator Kallistratus,[311]—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote of the people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in April 373 B.C.), when the Athenians first learned that the formidable Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra, had been directed to proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty triremes,—found a difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and therefore undertook a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and contributory funds, from the maritime allies. His first act was to transport the six hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, where he entered into relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded the latter to become the ally of Athens, and to further the march of Stesiklês with his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, to Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the Athenian confederacy.

[311] Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.

This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the general purpose of collecting means for the expedition to Korkyra, began in the month of April or commencement of May 373 B.C.[312] On departing, it appears, he had given orders to such of the allies as were intended to form part of the expedition, to assemble at Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to Poseidon) where he would himself come and take them up to proceed onward. Pursuant to such order, several contingents mustered at this island,—among them the Bœotians, who sent several triremes, though in the preceding year it had been alleged against them that they contributed nothing to sustain the naval exertions of Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a long time. Reliance was placed upon him, and upon the money which he was to bring home, for the pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes accordingly fell into distress and disorganization at Kalauria, awaiting his return.[313] In the mean time fresh news reached Athens that Korkyra was much pressed; so that great indignation was felt against the absent admiral, for employing in his present cruise a precious interval essential to enable him to reach the island in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from serving with Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt for the Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially loud in their accusations against him. And as the very salvation of Korkyra required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the appointment of Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates, Kallistratus, and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to Korkyra without delay.[314]

[312] The manner in which I have described the preliminary
cruise of Timotheus, will be found (I think) the only way of
uniting into one consistent narrative the scattered fragments of
information which we possess respecting his proceedings in this
year.

The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by
Demosthenes, adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the
archonship of Sokratidês—April 373 B.C. Diodorus says that he
proceeded to Thrace, and that he acquired several new members for
the confederacy (xv, 47); Xenophon states that he sailed towards
the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two statements not directly the
same, yet not incompatible with each other. In his way to Thrace,
he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along the coast
of Thessaly.

We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra,
not by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across
Thessaly and Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that
the Athenians “asked Alketas to help them to cross over from
the mainland of Epirus to the opposite island of Korkyra: and
that they were in consequence carried across by night,”—Ἀλκέτου
δὲ ἐδεήθησαν ~συνδιαβιβάσαι~ τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ~νυκτὸς
διακομισθέντες~ που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing
Thessaly; nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the
permission and escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the
dependent of Jason, whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary
(Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).

We farther know that in the year preceding (374 B.C.), Jason
was not yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to
become so, though the Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen.
Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November 373 B.C., Jason (as well as
Alketas) appears as the established ally of Athens; not as then
becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely an
established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose
of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his
favor—Ἀφικομένου γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus)
ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου ἄρχοντος, ~ἐπὶ τὸν
ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ~ καὶ καταγομένων εἰς τὴν
οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc. (Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p.
1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus) ~ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν~
τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ~Ἀλκέτου
καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν~, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι
(Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence, therefore,
that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been
contracted in the early part of 373 B.C.; we see farther that it
had been contracted by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which
is the only reasonable way of explaining the strong interest felt
by Jason as well as by Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing
them to take the remarkable step of coming to Athens to promote
his acquittal. It was Timotheus who had first made the alliance
of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c.
2), a year or two before.

Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with
confidence, that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited
Jason, contracted alliance between him and Athens, and prevailed
upon him to forward the division of Stesikles across Thessaly to
Epirus and Korkyra.

In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact
dates mentioned, which are a great aid to the understanding of
the historical events of the time. That oration is spoken by
Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus the repayment of money lent
to him by Pasion the banker, father of Apollodorus; and the dates
specified are copied from entries made by Pasion at the time in
his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).

[313] Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ
στράτευμα καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199.
προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν
τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παραλαμβάνειν· ~ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν
συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ~
(Timotheus) ~ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων~· καὶ σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν
λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.

[314] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth.
c. 3. p. 1188.

Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several new adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account of general success.[315] He went down to Kalauria to supply the deficiencies of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his absence had occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs without borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for though the sum brought home from his voyage was considerable, it would appear that the demands upon him had been greater still. At first an accusation, called for in consequence of the pronounced displeasure of the public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and Kallistratus. But as these two had been named joint admirals for the expedition to Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial was postponed until the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the accused, and doubtless seconded by his friends.[316]

[315] Diodor. xv, 47.

[316] I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth.
c. 3. p. 1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus
was about to sail home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it
is certain that his trial did not take place until the month
Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the trial must have been
postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates and
Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.

Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of the public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed (though perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have been allowed) not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to coërce the trierarchs with severity,[317] and to employ all the triremes reserved for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two sacred triremes called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a fleet of seventy sail, promising to send back a large portion of it directly, if matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to find on the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his own, he arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed with training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat. The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard: Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller sails sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which greatly accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the men in excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and rest, on an enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such extreme dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible time was consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get together. On reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first time the defeat and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the correctness of his information, he still persevered both in his celerity and his precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he first fully satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. The excellent management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is spoken of in terms of admiration by Xenophon.[318]

[317] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη
στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους
ἠνάγκαζε.

[318] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.

Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from the defence of the coast.[319] After making himself master of some of the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded onward to Korkyra; where the squadron of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the point of arriving; sent by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but as yet uninformed of their flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the hills to give notice of their approach, set apart twenty triremes to be ready for moving at the first signal. So excellent was his discipline, (says Xenophon,) that “the moment the signal was made, the ardor of all the crews was a fine thing to see; there was not a man who did not hasten at a run to take his place aboard.”[320] The ten Syracusan triremes, after their voyage across from the Iapygian cape, had halted to rest their men on one of the northern points of Korkyra; where they were found by Iphikrates and captured, with all their crews and the admiral Anippus; one alone escaping, through the strenuous efforts of her captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates returned in triumph, towing his nine prizes into the harbor of Korkyra. The crews, being sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum of sixty talents; the admiral Anippus was retained in expectation of a higher ransom, but slew himself shortly afterwards from mortification.[321]

[319] Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.

[320] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.

[321] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.

We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the
Athenians under Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes
of Dionysius, carrying sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia.
They detained and appropriated the valuable cargo, of which
Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.

This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to
any other triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would
probably have mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since
it presents the enemies of Sparta as committing sacrilege. And
whether the triremes were carrying sacred ornaments or not, it is
certain that they were coming to take part in the war, and were
therefore legitimate prizes.

Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time to pay his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary disappointment to him, and he soon began to need money. This consideration induced him to consent to the return of his colleague Kallistratus; who,—an orator by profession, and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates,—had come out against his own consent. Iphikrates had himself singled out both Kallistratus and Chabrias as his colleagues. He was not indifferent to the value of their advice, nor did he fear the criticisms, even of rivals, on what they really saw in his proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus, and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among his assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of them with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military ability of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the former.[322] As the result of the expedition, however, was altogether favorable, all such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well afford to part with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged, that if permitted to go home, he would employ all his efforts to keep the fleet well paid from the public treasury; or if this were impracticable, that he would labor to procure peace.[323] So terrible are the difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in procuring money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service they are acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered the same embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year before,—and which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance forward in the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen by finding work for them on the farms of the Korkyræans, where there must doubtless have been ample necessity for repairs after the devastations of Mnasippus, while he crossed over to Akarnania with his peltasts and hoplites, and there obtained service with the townships friendly to Athens against such others as were friendly to Sparta; especially against the warlike inhabitants of the strong town called Thyrieis.[324]

[322] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not
very clear, nor is even the text perfect.

Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα
ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ ~προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ~ (this shows
that Iphikrates himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν
δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν
νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι,
συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι· ~εἴτε
ἀντιπάλους νομίζων~, οὕτω θρασέως (some words in the text seem to
be wanting) ... μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν,
μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.

I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which
appears to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3)
shows that Kallistratus was an unwilling colleague.

[323] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει
(Kallistratus) ~εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει~, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ
εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.

[324] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.

The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 B.C., that the former, as well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus, underwent each his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers;[325] though probably in a spirit of greater gentleness and moderation, in consequence of his recent joint success and of the general good temper prevalent in the city. And while the edge of the accusation against Timotheus was thus blunted, the defence was strengthened not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking in his favor with increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon of two powerful foreign supporters. At the request of Timotheus, both Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little before the trial, to appear as witnesses in his favor. They were received and lodged by him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora, the principal square of the Peiræus. And as he was then in some embarrassment for want of money, he found it necessary to borrow various articles of finery in order to do them honor,—clothes, bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion, a wealthy banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose to the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who had inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across Thessaly and Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would be powerfully affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; and we are not surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death, and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.

[325] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.

As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the misfortune to his delay.[326] And although he was now acquitted, his reputation suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing spring he was glad to accept an invitation of the Persian satraps, who offered him the command of the Grecian mercenaries in their service for the Egyptian war; the same command from which Iphikrates had retired a little time before.[327]

[326] The narrative here given of the events of 373 B.C., so far
as they concern Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only
way of satisfying the exigencies of the case, and following the
statements of Xenophon and Demosthenes.

Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ
Iphicratis, etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take
command of the fleet, nor depart from Athens, until _after_ the
trial of Timotheus. There are some expressions in the oration of
Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance this supposition;
but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively study
the series of facts.

1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the
siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373
B.C. For his arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet,
was known at Athens _before_ Timotheus received his appointment
as admiral of the fleet for the relief of the island (Xen.
Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12).

2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in
April 373 B.C.

3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 B.C.; Alketas
and Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses
in his favor.

Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from
Athens with his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in
November, we must suppose that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus
lasted seven months, and the cruise of Timotheus nearly five
months. Both the one and the other are altogether improbable. The
Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra to incur so terrible
a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial of
Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of
Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of
Mnasippus (that already pay was owing to them for _as much as two
months_,—καὶ δυοῖν ~ἤδη~ μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that
it could hardly have lasted more than three months in all. Let
us say, that it lasted four months; the siege would then be over
in August, and we know that the fleet of Iphikrates arrived just
after the siege was concluded.

Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the
express purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus
was already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would
have spent so long a time as _five_ months in his preliminary
cruise?

I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about _two_
months; and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to
raise strong displeasure against him at Athens, when the danger
and privations of Korkyra were made known as hourly increasing.
At the time when Timotheus came back to Athens, he found all
this displeasure actually afloat against him, excited in part
by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus (Dem.
cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public
assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against
him, caused a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to
Korkyra, and nominating in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias
and Kallistratus. Probably those who proposed this vote would at
the same time give notice that they intended to prefer a judicial
accusation against Timotheus for breach or neglect of duty. But
it would be the interest of all parties to postpone _actual
trial_ until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which
purpose the saving of time would be precious. Already too much
time had been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole
chance of success depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his
friends would look upon postponement as an additional chance
of softening the public displeasure, besides enabling them to
obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still, though trial
was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment.
The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered by
Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though
speaking loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches
against Timotheus _in the public assembly_ (in June 373 B.C.,
or thereabouts, whereby his deposition was obtained), from the
accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in November
373 B.C., _before the dikastery_—is nevertheless not incorrect
in saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς
διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ ~κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο
εἰς τὸν δῆμον~, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and
again respecting his coming from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων
τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ δανείζεται, etc.
(p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed over to the
people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria _for
his trial_—might well be asserted respecting his position in
the month of June, though his trial did not actually take place
until November. I think it cannot be doubted that the triremes at
Kalauria would form a part of that fleet which actually went to
Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go thither until after
the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as soon as
Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 B.C.

Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in
July, he must have returned to Athens in November to the trial
of Timotheus, which is contrary to Xenophon’s affirmation that
he remained in the Ionian sea until 371 B.C. But if we look
attentively at the oration of Demosthenes, we shall see that
there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have
been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of
Timotheus. The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ’ αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος
καὶ Ἰφικράτης ... οὕτω δὲ διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου
αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc., may be well
explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned, by supposing them
to allude to those pronounced censures in the public assembly
whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was obtained,
and whereby the general indignation against him was first
excited. I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates
was actually present at the trial of Timotheus in November. But
Kallistratus was really present at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197,
1198); which consists well enough with the statement of Xenophon,
that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates to leave
him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus
directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer
of Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances
of the case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding
Timotheus in the command and gaining an important success at
Korkyra—might be well-pleased to be dispensed from the obligation
of formally accusing him before the dikastery, in opposition to
Jason and Alketas, as well as to a powerful body of Athenian
friends.