Chapter LXXIX (3)

While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an important point was gained in their favor on the other side of Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison, despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once lost and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier, many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, demots of the neighboring Deme Græa.[610] So recently before as the period immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished.[611] It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves of Oropus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to Athens.[612] So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians, that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their general, Chares, with that mercenary force which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to impartial arbitration.[613]

[610] See the instructive Inscription and comments published by
Professor Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first
distinctly made known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle,
1846).

[611] Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.

[612] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 B.C.,
was accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd.
viii, 60).

[613] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont.
Ktesiphont. p. 397, s. 85.

It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the
trial of Chabrias and Kallistratus in Athens, together with
the memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard
as a youth with such strong admiration. But our information is
so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing certainly on
the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.
109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an
instructive chapter.

This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence. Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town; who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians. Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies, for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus, although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes; the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian rescript.[614] Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition, from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled, and these men put him to death at once.[615] In spite of his death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to pass, though not without opposition.

[614] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.

[615] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.

Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were
plenty of vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his
choice, and to determine where he would disembark. He fixed upon
the exact spot where the exiles were assembled, not knowing that
they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.

Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer, in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus, the most distinguished orator at Athens, who had been sent by his countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. “Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his mother, a native of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply) they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these persons, while they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so. As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed guilt.”[616] This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.

[616] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger.
Præc. p. 810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.

Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes
embodied in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).

Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus,
that Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly
at Mêssenê, to which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17,
3); possibly enough, against Epaminondas also.

As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus; while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under Chares was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the Corinthian port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut out even from admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give in any complaints for which they might have ground, as their services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.[617]

[617] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.

The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to
the success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which
secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in
like manner, in Thucydides, iii, 3.

The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos, were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;[618] but while thus providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we make peace without you.” The Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience for peace.[619]

[618] It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by
the Corinthians under the command of Timophanes, and employed by
him afterwards as instruments for establishing a despotism.

Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries
equipped about this time (as far as we can verify his chronology)
and to the Corinthian mercenaries now assembled, in connection
with Timoleon and Timophanes, of whom I shall have to say much in
a future chapter.

[619] Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi,
(Archidamus), s. 106.

It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavored to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription. They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they had lost;[620] and although they could not directly prohibit the Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves,—yet they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor.[621] The Spartan prince conjured his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messênê, even if they had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.

[620] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.

[621] This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is
strongly and repeatedly set forth in the oration of Isokrates
called Archidamus, composed as if to be spoken in this
synod,—and good evidence (whether actually spoken or not) of
the feelings animating the prince and a large party at Sparta.
Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to
surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had
broken off altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians,
and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο δ’ ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας,
καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς
ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται
δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἵν’ αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς
καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς
ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ
μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς.
Compare sect. 67, 87, 99, 105, 106, 123.

We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the
displeasure of the Spartans against their allies, because the
latter advised them to relinquish Messênê,—was much greater than
the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to
believe.

In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among
various other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes
to ask for peace, and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace
would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι.
Now the Spartans had never sent to Thebes for this purpose; the
Corinthians went to Thebes, and there learnt the peremptory
condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized. Next, the
Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute
(ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans
themselves.

Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians, Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the independence of each separate city within its own territory, without either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined, saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side; whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect, of Theban headship.[622]

[622] Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys
to Greece who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems
no ground for believing that any Persian envoys had visited
Greece since the return of Pelopidas, whose return with the
rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. The peace
now concluded was upon the general basis of that rescript; so
far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus
about Persian intervention is exact.

This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and Argos,—Sparta and Athens,[623]—still at war; as well as Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however, were now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance, with the Arcadians; while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.

[623] Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the
peace as universally accepted, and as being a conclusion of the
Bœotian and Lacedæmonian war, which had begun with the battle of
Leuktra.

As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they were no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript granted to Pelopidas.[624] The Athenians also were dissatisfied with this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favorable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession instead of a free city.[625] Whether that other article also in the former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems probable.

[624] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην
ἐπιθήσειν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων,
ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.

[625] This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court
(pursuant to the invitation contained in the rescript given to
Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in
Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150, p. 420, s. 283; Or. De
Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.

If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put
to death by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he
sent down (κατέπεμψεν) a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this
information can only have been communicated, and the new rescript
only obtained, by a second embassy sent to him from Athens.

Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second
Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with
a friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon,
Enc. Ages. viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.),
brought by a Persian messenger. But the statement is too vague to
enable us to verify this as the actual occasion.

At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of his long-established military reputation to promote the interests of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them.[626] Ariobarzanes was then preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.[627] That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer, exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.

[626] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.

[627] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont.
Aristokrat. p. 666, s. 165; p. 687, s. 242.

Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos; which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap on the opposite mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting contributions from allies.[628] An important possession was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanes, and the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring satraps, shook for some time the king’s authority, and absorbed his revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and Mausôlus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus.[629] As the latter had no army, nor any means of allurement (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanes), we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a few years afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the Persian king.[630] Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid for Sparta.[631]

[628] Demosth. _ut sup._; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118;
Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.

The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops
at Samos, are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic.
ii, 23; and in Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand
them, they appear to be only contributions, levied under a thin
disguise, upon the inhabitants.

Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have
given some to Timotheus during this siege.

[629] Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26.

I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer
the siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to
relinquish by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the
place (Aristot. Politic. ii, 4, 10).

[630] It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out
anything like a thread of events at this period; so miserably
scanty and indistinct are our authorities.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap. v, p.
118-130) is an instructive auxiliary in putting together the
scraps of information; compare also Weissenborn, Hellen. p.
192-194 (Jena, 1844).

[631] Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.

The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens. It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus, declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over to him Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for occupation.[632]

[632] Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius
Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.

Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests
of Timotheus secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν
ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει
γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114).

From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular
supply of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes
called “the flour-board of the Peiræus”—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς
(Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).

Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion, new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction of the Athenian empire in 405 B.C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favorable turn of fortune and eventual reëntry.[633] That moment had now arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation of her second confederacy in 378 B.C., as a means of conciliating maritime allies—was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in fear of Sparta. The same system of kleruchies, which had so much discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any kleruchs there before.[634] But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less of success, to regain their previous lands; reinforced by bands of new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and Krithôtê, soon extended his acquisitions to Elæus and other places; whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese, or at least most part of it, as her own ancient possession,—from its extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of Kardia, down to Elæus at its southern extremity.[635]

[633] See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.

[634] That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in
part) by kleruchs, _began_ in 366 or 365 B.C.,—is established
by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18, when he mentions the restoration of
the Samians forty-three years afterwards by the Macedonian
Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the fact that additional
detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in 352 B.C.,
as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31
c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of
Wesseling, who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I
dissent from his criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh
(Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F.
H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly improbable that so long an
interval should have elapsed between the capture of the island
and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure,
offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been
_first_ resorted to by Athens in 352 B.C., when she had been
so much weakened both by the Social War, and by the Progress of
Philip. Strabo mentions two thousand kleruchs as having been
sent to Samos. But whether he means the first batch alone, or
altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p. 638). The father of the
philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs; compare Diogen.
Laert. x, 1.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to
me to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this
period.

Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general
review of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in
Olym. 106, before 352 B.C. (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).

[635] See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De
Fals. Legat. 264, s. 74.

This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined
with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited
a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious
tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from
those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378
B.C. Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias
pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the
kleruchs to Samos.[636] However, obnoxious as the measure was to
criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the
expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have
involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of
her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into
conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,[637] which resisted
her pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to
aid her citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy,
Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as
Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus,
when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanes drove him away,[638] to make room
for Timotheus and the Athenians.

[636] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.

[637] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.

[638] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.

It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,[639]—the new Thracian enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had enabled to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the Athenians for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and Chalkidikê, and especially against Amphipolis; but he had neither taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of a mercenary general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like Iphikrates, is to be explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous contrast with Timotheus, who had just acquired Samos and the Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikrates, too, was presented by the fact, that Athens was now at war with his father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to recall him, and appoint Timotheus[640] to an extensive command, including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikrates had been the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have seized this opportunity of retaliating.[641] At all events the dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens.[642] He had got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to him by Harpalus; which gave great hopes of extorting the surrender of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the mercenary general Charidemus, though a vote had been passed in the Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens.[643] As soon as the appointment of Iphikrates was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all. Though Charidemus had been three years with his band in the service of Athens under Iphikrates, yet when the new general Timotheus wished to reëngage him, he declined the proposition; conveying away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikrates himself.[644] He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardia to take service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was again prevailed on to serve Athens.

[639] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.

[640] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν
Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ’ ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ
Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε στρατηγὸν, etc.

[641] See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.

Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian
assembly, on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν
ξενίας; but he never realized this engagement, and he even
afterwards became so far reconciled with Iphikrates, as to give
his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter (ibid. p. 1204,
s. 78).

To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is
to be referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας
may refer to the connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which
might entail in some manner the forfeiture of his right of
citizenship; for it is difficult to understand how γραφὴ ξενίας,
in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original right
of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against
Iphikrates; who not only performed all the active duties of a
citizen, but served in the highest post, and received from the
people distinguished honors.

[642] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ
τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.

[643] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting
these hostages, I can do nothing more than repeat the brief
and obscure notice of Demosthenes. Of the various conjectures
proposed to illustrate it, none appear to me at all satisfactory.
Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.

[644] Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175.

The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus
to the Athenian people, in support of these allegations.
Unfortunately these letters are not cited in substance.

It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia, which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. Ptolemy of Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B.C.) by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.[645] Perdikkas, during the first year or two of his reign, seems to have been friendly and not hostile to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the coast of Macedonia.[646] Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have been again acquiring strength during the years of recent Spartan humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, just as his father Amyntas had invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, Methônê, and various other places. As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus, the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered it.[647] Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a temporary coinage of base metal.[648] Yet though Timotheus was thus victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had most at heart,—the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental capture of Charidemus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully appreciated at Athens.[649] Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus, who was repulsed,—then landed himself and attacked the city. But the Amphipolitans, aided by the neighboring Thracians, in large numbers (and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance, that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from the wide part of the river Strymon above, could not be brought off in the face of the enemy.[650]

[645] Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.

[646] Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the
assistance of the Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus.
Compare also his oration ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9).
This can hardly allude to anything else than the war carried on
by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 B.C. See also Polyæn. iii,
10, 14.

[647] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or.
xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14.
cont. Philokl. s. 19.

I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth
contained in the large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας
κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119). The orator states that Timotheus acquired
twenty-four cities in all; but this total probably comprises
his conquests in other times as well as in other places. The
expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit” is vague.

[648] Isokrates, _l. c._; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn.
iii, 10, 14.

[649] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.

[650] Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is
explained by comparing (in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of
the attack made by the Athenian Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414
B.C.

These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive,
in that catalogue of _nine_ defeats, which the Scholiast on
Æschines (De Fals. Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been
undergone by Athens at the territory called _Nine Ways_ (Ἐννέα
Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot where Amphipolis was built.
They form the eighth and ninth items of the catalogue.

The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The
fourth is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—

5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way
in which I can make historical fact out of these words, is,
by supposing that they allude to the driving in of all the
out-resident Athenians to Athens, after the defeat of Ægospotami.
We know from Thucydides that when Amphipolis was taken by
Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there settled retired
to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the
Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should
then have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—“the
Athenians residing at Eion;” which, though not a usual sense
of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, seems the only
definite meaning which can be made out here.

6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν.

7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς
ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, these last words are inserted by Bekker from
a MS.). These two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether
unknown. We may perhaps suppose them to refer to the period when
Iphikrates was commanding the forces of Athens in these regions,
from 368-365 B.C.

8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκíμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων
αὑτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος.

The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place
of Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske’s edition.

9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος.

Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the
archonship of Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the
command of Timotheus in these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer
363 B.C.). But the other archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti
of Athens. Winiewski (Comment. in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39),
Böhnecke, and other commentators follow Corsini in representing
Kalamion to be a corruption of _Kallimedes_, who was archon
from Midsummer 360-359 B.C.; and Mr. Clinton even inserts the
fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with Rehdantz
(Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after
Midsummer 360 B.C., can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings
in the Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by
Demosthenes in the Oration against Aristokrates. Without being
able to explain the mistake about the name of the archon, and
without determining whether the real mistake may not consist
in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ,—I cannot but think that
Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, and
another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in
364 or the early part of 363 B.C. During great part of 363 B.C.,
the attention of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the
Chersonese, Byzantium, Kotys, etc.

My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with
that of Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).

Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a Theban fleet.

I have already mentioned that in 366 B.C., Thebes had sustained great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably repulsed, and had only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas, then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardor to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on the Thebans to place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading Thessaly.[651]

[651] Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.

At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athenians under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans. Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should grapple with Athens on her own element, and compete for the headship of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the rescript brought down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension, by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring the chastisement of the Great King;[652] a mandate, which she had so completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon his countrymen, that, Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, and by Hermokrates at Syracuse,[653]—that men such as the Thebans, brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once been mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced them to take to the sea.[654] “We must put down this haughty rival (he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel, the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of the acropolis at Athens.”[655]

[652] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

[653] Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.

[654] Diodor. xv, 78.

[655] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας,
οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ
πλήθει τῶν Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια
μετενεγκεῖν εἰς τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.

Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardor on the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands near Ionia; while invitations were at the same time despatched to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with Athens.[656] Some opposition however was made in the assembly to the new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker, who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men such as Pelopidas and Epaminondas, has been handed down by Nepos and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, whose power resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war: I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,[657] that it is not a fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes. Menekleidas at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view to emulate the glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. “By the help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was ten years in taking a single city; while _I_, with the single force of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of the Agamemnonian Sparta.”[658] While repelling the charge of personal motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be equivalent to an abnegation of the headship of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished to maintain that ascendant station, she must keep her citizens in constant warlike training and action.

[656] Diodor. xv, 78, 79.

[657] See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.

[658] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c.
25; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.

Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly
either the attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon
is here brought forward. As I have given it in the text, there is
a real foundation for the attack, and a real point in the reply;
as it appears in Cornelius Nepos, there is neither one nor the
other.

That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the
leadership of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus,
vii, 159.

To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas resemble but too closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against Syracuse.[659] If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove too hard for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting, that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.[660]

[659] Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.

[660] Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors
represented Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this
maritime expedition. He explains such reluctance by reference
to the disparaging opinion expressed by Plato about maritime
service. But this opinion of Plato is founded upon reasons
foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it seems to me
evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced
the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a
general on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea,
when he took command of a fleet; putting himself in a function
for which he had little capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch,
Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).

Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die
Hegemonie, Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas
was constrained against his own better judgment to undertake this
maritime enterprise. I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle
which Bauch cites from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little
as the above extract from Plutarch.

The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 B.C. In the same year, apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the fleet achieved, we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of the allies of Athens to declare in his favor.[661] Both he and Timotheus appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both declined to furnish aid.[662] Timotheus is said to have liberated the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.[663] Epaminondas brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained any splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes; yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B.C. than they had been in 364 B.C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in the next year (362 B.C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still farther;[664] but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition of Thebes was likewise the last.

[661] Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας
τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that
these general words apply to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which
had before been mentioned.

[662] Justin, xvi, 4.

[663] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.

[664] Diodor. xv, 79.