Chapter LXXXI (2)

In the spring of the memorable year 409 B.C., through the exuberant wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition to leave Africa with a great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen hundred transports or vessels of burthen;[898] conveying an army, which, according to the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, amounted to more than one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus extended the number to two hundred thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, together with muniments of war and battering machines for siege. With these he steered directly for the western Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum; taking care, however, to land his troops and to keep his fleet on the northern side of that cape, in the bay near Motyê,—and not to approach the southern shore, lest he should alarm the Syracusans with the idea that he was about to prosecute his voyage farther eastward along the southern coast towards their city. By this precaution, he took the best means for prolonging the period of Syracusan inaction. The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the advent of an enemy so much more overwhelming than they had expected, sent pressing messengers to Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. They had made no provision for standing on the defensive against a really formidable aggressor. Their walls, though strong enough to hold out against Sicilian neighbors, had been neglected during the long-continued absence of any foreign besieger, and were now in many places out of repair. Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. Instead of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias had done five years before) by months of empty flourish and real inaction, he waited only until he was joined by the troops from Egesta and the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then marched his whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing the river Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near its mouth, he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He distributed his army into two parts, each provided with battering machines and movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls on many points at once, choosing the points where they were most accessible or most dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers were posted near the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and chase away the defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such discharge, six wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the wall, to which they were equal or nearly equal in height, so that the armed men in their interior were prepared to contend with the defenders almost on a level. Against other portions of the wall, battering-rams with iron heads were driven by the combined strength of multitudes, shaking or breaking through its substance, especially where it showed symptoms of neglect or decay. Such were the methods of attack which Hannibal now brought to bear upon the unprepared Selinuntines. He was eager to forestal the arrival of auxiliaries, by the impetuous movements of his innumerable barbaric host, the largest seen in Sicily since his grandfather Hamilkar had been defeated before Himera. Collected from all the shores of the western Mediterranean, it presented soldiers heterogeneous in race, in arms, in language,—in everything, except bravery and common appetite for blood as well as plunder.[899]

[898] Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα
τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται,
ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἄλλα εὐπορεῖ.

[899] Diodor. xiii, 54, 55.

The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found themselves under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to be described. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose conditions or grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of their town to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to hold out with the courage of desperation, until they could receive aid from their Hellenic brethren on the southern coast,—Agrigentum, Gela, and especially Syracuse,—all of whom they had sent to warn and to supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance. They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually,—though their own strength was every day failing,—and though not a single friend arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after terrible loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the weak part of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the city. Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were carried, continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend their narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing down stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All these barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted numbers, and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the defenders were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most of them closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small minority, among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they received the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.[900]

[900] Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.

Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites,—murderous, lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscriminately elders and children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished heads on the points of their spears and javelins.[901] The Greeks (seemingly not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing in these ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate the deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.[902] These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.

[901] Diodor. xiii, 57.

[902] Diodor. xiii, 57, 58.

It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon the like elaborate siege,—and not reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host of miscellaneous foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives he could afford to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of Athens and other Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the murderous but thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against strong walls recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being informed that nine days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The Syracusan soldiers, a select body of three thousand, who at length joined the Geloans and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in time to partake in the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint embassy was sent by three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to permit the ransom of the captives, and to spare the temples of the gods; while Empedion went at the same time to sue for compassion on behalf of his own fugitive fellow-citizens. To the former demand the victorious Carthaginian returned an answer at once haughty and characteristic,—“The Selinuntines have not been able to preserve their freedom, and must now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods have become offended with them, and have taken their departure from the town.”[903] To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced partisan of the Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All the relatives of Empedion, found alive among the captives, were at once given up; moreover permission was granted to the fugitive Selinuntines to return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with its lands, as tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time that he granted such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused the walls to be razed, and even the town with its temples to be destroyed.[904] What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not hear.

[903] Diodor. xiii, 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν
Σελινουντίους μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πεῖραν τῆς
δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινοῦντος οἴχεσθαι,
προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.

[904] Diodor. xiii, 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient
temples of Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as
specimens of Doric art, during the fifth and sixth centuries
B.C. From the great magnitude of the fallen columns, it has been
supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake. But the
ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have been
first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.

This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the
Carthaginian destroyers, is stated by Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte
Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 207.

Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot. Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success, but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed by the Syracusan Dioklês, had come to the city as a reinforcement. For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults. No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field. Ten thousand gallant men,—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian allies,—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely and slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus, but not less than twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad statement of Ephorus), exhorting each other not to think of making prisoners. But in the haste and exultation of pursuit, they became out of breath, and their ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward condition, they found themselves face to face with the fresh body of reserve brought up by Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive and succor his own defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle was now so completely turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely contending for some time against these new enemies, found themselves overpowered and driven back to their own gates. Three thousand of their bravest warriors, however, despairing of their city and mindful of the fate of Selinus, disdained to turn their backs, and perished to a man in obstinate conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the Carthaginians.[905]

[905] Diodor. xiii, 60.

Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of her troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city. So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklês and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency now reigning. Dioklês not only enjoined the captains of the fleet to sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against the apprehended surprise, but also insisted upon marching back thither himself by land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning the farther defence of Himera. He would in his march home meet his fellow-citizens on their march outward, and conduct them back along with him. To the Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse than death. It plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But there was no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon Dioklês to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying off the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.

Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these unhappy Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the feebler part of the population,—elders, women, and children,—crowding on board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklês also marched out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally. Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their departure along with Dioklês, as their only chance of escape; since it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all. The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the physical force, of these brave men, was now at an end. The gods were quitting Himera, as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment when the triremes were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian assailants broke down a wide space of the fortification with their battering-rams, poured in through the breach, and overcame all opposition. Encouraged by their shouts, the barbaric host now on all sides forced the walls, and spread themselves over the city, which became one scene of wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made over as a recompense to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the slaughter, being anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and increasing the number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in the temples. A few among this wretched population may have contrived to reach the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or fell into the hands of the victor.[906]

[906] Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.

It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, and satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather. Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose. Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the houses in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having been first stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. The women and children taken captive were distributed as prizes among the soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there put to death with indignity,[907] as an expiatory satisfaction to his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated name of Himera might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma (so designated because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards founded by the Carthaginians in the neighborhood.[908]

[907] Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ’ αἰχμαλώτων γυναικάς τε καὶ παῖδας
διαδοὺς εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ’ ἀνδρῶν τοὺς
ἁλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας, παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ
πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῃρέθη, καὶ πάντας
αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.

The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307
B.C., sacrificed their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to
the gods (Diodor. xx, 65.)

[908] Diodor. xiii, 79.

No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts of Hannibal’s life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honor as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the prisoners had been even more numerous, all of them would have been equally slain, rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the more honorable and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human sacrifices were not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest manifestation of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to in times of distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods was accounted most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations.

In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have been unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no examples of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the events just recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them been stormed, ruined, and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three months.[909] No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495 B.C.),[910] which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island, the sympathy with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped Grecian cities.

The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized. Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily (from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home. Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.[911] Hannibal carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.[912]

[909] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.

[910] Herodot. vi, 28.

[911] Diodor. xiii, 62-80.

[912] Diodor. xiii, 62.

Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and Syracuse especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives for keeping themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. Unfortunately, it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan general Hermokrates had recently arrived at Messênê in Sicily; where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent serving with the Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against the three admirals. Hermokrates was exceedingly popular among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence, unmerited by his behavior, was dictated by acute vexation for the loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations which Hermokrates had held out; combined with the fact that Diokles and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Syracuse. When the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained of its injustice and illegality, he obtained warm sympathy, and even exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against their common city and country;[913] upon which the trierarchs, when they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means untried for procuring his restoration.

[913] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν
πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.

The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism, had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money, which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships, to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own restoration.[914] Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily, and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture of Himera by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh triremes to be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of the expelled Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in the city, who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.

[914] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.

The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we are not in a condition to judge. But such reverses in themselves were sure to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon which he marched his little army across the interior of the island, and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers of inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.[915] Having defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily; for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.

[915] Diodor. xiii, 63.

These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valor of Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding of Diokles at Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been banished, was emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his return, and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera, informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have lain upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border. Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display respect for the law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering them to the citizens for the purpose of being honored with due funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure against Diokles, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of battle. “It was to Hermokrates (so his partisans urged) and to his valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering to them the funeral solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans, after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against Diokles by a sentence of banishment.”[916] Diokles with his partisans was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of Hermokrates, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here the feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were received and interred, amidst the respectful attendance of all; and so strong was the reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans of Hermokrates carried their proposition for sentencing Diokles to banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as to obtain the restoration of Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command,—that his readmission would have been nothing less than a deliberate surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.[917]

[916] Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.

[917] Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν δὲ
Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ’ ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς
τόλμαν, μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.

Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote of consent, Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre. Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence. After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head of three thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,[918] and reached the concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at Corinth[919]) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval, the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened, mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them. Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a condemnation.[920]

[918] Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ
ὁρῶν εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα.
Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον, τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ
τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἧκε νυκτὸς
ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.

[919] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.

[920] Diodor. xiii, 75.

Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων
ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along
with the envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far
as Gordium in Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the
requisition of Cyrus) for three years. This must have been in the
year 407 B.C. Now I cannot reconcile this with the proceedings
of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus; his coming to the
Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his various attempts
to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which must have
occurred in 408-407 B.C., ending with the death of Hermokrates.

It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon
as accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the
eminent Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same
name,—or whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not
take upon me to determine. There were really two contemporary
Syracusans bearing that name, for the father of Dionysius the
despot was named Hermokrates.

Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the
Lacedæmonians at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so
called; who however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer
or autumn of 405 B.C. There is some mistake in the assertion of
Polybius, but I do not know how to explain it.

Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.

Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable name in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in history. He was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position, described as even of low birth and low occupation; as a scribe or secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential, function.[921] He was the son of Hermokrates,—not that eminent person whose death has been just described, but another person of the same name, whether related or not, we do not know.[922] It is highly probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies; and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents for military action,—bravery, force of will, and quickness of discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took arms in the city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle, and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead by his relations.[923] In this manner he escaped the sentence of banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party lent their aid to exalt him.

[921] Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.

Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν
Συρακοσίων καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc.

Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι,
etc. Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως
ὁρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare Polyænus, v, 2, 2.

[922] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor.
xiii, 91.

[923] Diodor. xiii, 75.

Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing the sentiments of the rich,—and that they seem to have manifested but little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their projects, the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.[924]

[924] Diodor. xiii, 79.

In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had been got together during the winter, greater than that which had sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age, and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less than one thousand five hundred transports.[925] To protect the landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared, disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western cape of Sicily.

[925] Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.

Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy. The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was to be expected, since her whole efforts were now devoted to the prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.

Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in their service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced by eight hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera, but had quitted him in disgust.[926]

[926] Diodor. xiii, 81-84.

Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity and magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;[927] numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid cities of the Hellenic world.[928] Of the numerous prisoners taken at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before, a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines, and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the advantage or ornament of the city.[929] The hospitality of the wealthy citizens,—Gellias, Antisthenes, and others,—was carried even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its breed of horses,[930] which the rich Agrigentines vied with each other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last Olympic games immediately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion (that is at the 93rd Olympiad,—408 B.C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences, not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the citizens on guard.

[927] Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.

[928] Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.

[929] Diodor. xi, 25.

[930] Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.

Such was Agrigentum in May 406 B.C., when Hannibal and Imilkon approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions, however, were not of a hostile character. They invited the Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both propositions were declined.[931]

[931] Diodor. xiii, 85.

Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of the sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side towards the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The town of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum, and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine sepulchres.[932]—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or movable towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began his attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering train, which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.[933] Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged in breaking down the monument of Theron, when their progress was arrested by a thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal sacrilege. Every night the spectres of those whose tombs had been profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on guard; while the judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops, by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal victims as offerings to Poseidon.[934]

[932] See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas,
p. 21, 23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).

The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this
vast aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and
around which the traces of the old walls may be distinctly made
out, with considerable remains of them in some particular parts.

Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.

Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν
οἴκημα ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.

[933] Diodor. xiii, 85.

We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is
said to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies,
into incautious pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have
inflicted upon them a serious defeat.

[934] Diodor. xiii, 86.

These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated, or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon, while desisting from all farther meddling with the tombs, was enabled to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but this manœuvre produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by the arrival of a powerful army which marched from Syracuse, under Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Reinforced in its road by the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, on reaching the river Himera, the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon despatched against them a body of Iberians and Campanians;[935] who however, after a strenuous combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement, the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.

[935] Diodor. xiii, 87.

It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum
still bears the name of _Il Campo Cartaginese_, raising some
presumption that it was once occupied by the Carthaginians.
Evidently, the troops sent out by Imilkon to meet and repel
Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward of Agrigentum,
from which side the Syracusan army of relief was approaching.
Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes that
they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy
of the Roman siege in 262 B.C., when the Carthaginian relieving
army under Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei
(Polyb. i, 19).

Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum, and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory, were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter, the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation. Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most violent of all was the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders, seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was severely censured.[936]

[936] Diodor. xiii, 87.