Chapter LXXVIII: Battle of Leuktra and Its Consequences (3)

[464] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got
on the roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems
to imply that they were admitted into the houses by the villagers.

[465] Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and
advances various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the
road from Sparta to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and
that Karyæ was on the road from Sparta northward, towards Tegea.
The French investigators of the Morea, as well as Professor Ross
and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and place Sellasia on the
road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake, Peloponnesiaca,
p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin, 1841).

Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high;
yet the opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to
me preferable.

Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing it; a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on the other side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore marched down the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the houses in his way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles below Sparta. Here he found a ford, though the river was full, from the winter season; and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a severe contest, a body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now on the same side of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and cautiously made his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops always in the best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped, by felled trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies dispersed around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.[466]

Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had no auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had come back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that even these troops would remain with them, if the invasion became formidable.[467] On the first assemblage of the irresistible army on their frontier, they had despatched one of their commanders of foreign contingents (called Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of such Peloponnesian allies as remained faithful to them; and also envoys to Athens, entreating assistance from that city. Auxiliaries were obtained, and rapidly put under march, from Pellênê, Sikyon, Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis.[468] But the ordinary line of march into Laconia was now impracticable to them; the whole frontier being barred by Argeians and Arcadians. Accordingly they were obliged to proceed first to the Argolic peninsula, and from thence to cross by sea (embarking probably at Halieis on the south-western coast of the peninsula) to Prasiæ on the eastern coast of Laconia; from whence they made their way over the Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being poorly provided with vessels, they were forced to cross in separate detachments, and to draw lots for priority.[469] By this chance the Phliasian contingent did not come over until the last; while the xenagus, eager to reach Sparta, left them behind, and conducted the rest thither, arriving only just before the confederate enemies debouched from Sellasia. The Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ, found neither their comrades nor the xenagus, but were obliged to hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately they arrived there both safely and in time, eluding the vigilance of the enemy, who were then near Amyklæ.

[466] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.

[467] This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ
μέντοι ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.

[468] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.

[469] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ ~διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι
λαχόντες~ (the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων
... οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς ~τοὺς
προδιαβεβῶτας~ λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς ᾤχετο, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν,
ἀλλ’ ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ
Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.

These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness. Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots in Laconia, inferior citizens at Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy, indeed, a certain feeling of common interest arose, since even the disaffected might reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if not repelled at the point of the sword, would make their condition worse instead of better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public proclamation, that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve in the ranks as an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than six thousand Helots gave in their names to serve. But a body thus numerous, when seen in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to the Spartans; so that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ was welcomed as a security, not less against the armed Helots within the city, than against the Thebans without.[470] Open enmity, however, was not wanting. A considerable number both of Periœki and Helots actually took arms on behalf of the Thebans; others remained inactive, disregarding the urgent summons from the ephors, which could not now be enforced.[471]

[470] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον
συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.

[471] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.

It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the
number of Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very
considerable; and that the contrast between the second and third
passages evinces the different feelings with which the two seem
to have been composed by Xenophon.

In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas,
with a wish to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and
calamity as much as he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more
than this,—“there were some among the Periœki, who even took
active service in the attack of Gythium, and fought along with
the Thebans,”—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ ἐπέθεντο καὶ
συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων.

But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called
Agesilaus, ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the
Phliasians to Sparta under adverse circumstances of the latter.
Hence it then suits his argument, to magnify these adverse
circumstances, in order to enhance the merit of the Phliasians;
and he therefore tells us,—“_Many_ of the Periœki, all the
Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from
Sparta,”—σφαλέντων δ’ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων
μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ
τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς, ὡς
εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians).

I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though
in opposite directions. I have adopted in the text something
between the two.

Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even of Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring all the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder the Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon Amyklæ and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards which they immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on the point of breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the projects. Two hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were marching, without orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis) called the Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, but Agesilaus, repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, addressed them in language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them that they had mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not at the Issorium, but in another part of the city. They obeyed his orders, and moved to the spot indicated; upon which he immediately occupied the Issorium with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing night, he seized and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the two hundred. Another conspiracy, said to have been on the point of breaking out, was repressed by seizing the conspirators in the house where they were assembled, and putting them to death untried; the first occasion (observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was ever put to death untried,[472]—a statement which I hesitate to believe without knowing from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves that the Spartan kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens the same measure as to Periœki and Helots.

[472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H.
xiv, 27.

By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while the strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the wider approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.[473] Though destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by position. Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the Arcadians and others in his army spreading themselves to burn and plunder the neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry occupied the Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near the river, under the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan cavalry, though inferior both in number and in goodness, gained an advantage over them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas. To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation and even of boasting,[474] that he had not dared to assail them in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief, resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy, are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing, as to increase much the difficulty of defence.[475] We are even told that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be if their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a hostile and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.[476]

[473] Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.

[474] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν
προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι.

This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators
unanimous either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit
μὴ, construe ἐδόκει as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and
translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον “excessively rash.”

I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and
construction. I have given in the text what I believe to be the
meaning.

[475] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8;
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c.
4.

[476] Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the
opinion of those political philosophers who maintained that a
city ought to have no walls, but to be defended only by the
bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons against such
opinion, and adds “that these are old-fashioned thinkers; that
the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal
courage, have been proved to be wrong by actual results”—λίαν
ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς
ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.

The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that
Aristotle has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban
invasion. I do not see what else he can mean; yet at the same
time, if such be his meaning, the remark is surely difficult to
admit. Epaminondas came close up to Sparta, but did not dare
to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city had had walls
like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her
any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show
(contrary to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so
strong by position, combined with the military character of her
citizens, that she could dispense with walls.

Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom
borrowed, to the effect that Epaminondas might have taken
Sparta, but designedly refrained from doing so, on the ground
that the Arcadians and others would then no longer stand in need
of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of fact, nor the reason,
appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv, 8) has the
same story, but with a different reason assigned.

On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country, and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they had acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.[477]

[477] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.

Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon, unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable territory and an unapproachable city.

The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as regards their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies expected; the belief in their power was thus proportionally abridged. It now remained for Epaminondas to complete their humiliation by executing those two enterprises which had formed the special purpose of his expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê, and the consolidation of the Arcadians.

The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative, had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas. When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves. Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,[478] that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition to his great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,[479] from all sides of this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were from the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii, three great sections of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of villages. Four little townships, occupying a portion of the area intended for the new territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were constrained to join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was so strong, that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and went to join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who received them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even slain by the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of the new city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more than five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,[480] Phigalia, and Heræa.

[478] Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ
τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.

[479] Diodor. xv, 72.

[480] Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.

See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where
the facts respecting Megalopolis are brought together and
discussed.

It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes
that the capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the
Mantineans see the folly of having a river run through their
town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis, this same feature
was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice the Mantineans
were parties concerned.

The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.[481] The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of their calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of Mount Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon, in a dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances of this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the revolted Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications of dreams, prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the deliberate choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this hill Ithômê (then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together with the Akrocorinthus, were marked out by Demetrius of Pharus as the two horns of Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of the bull.[482] Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above the level of the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of water, called Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis of the new town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was situated lower down on the slope, though connected by a continuous wall with its acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered, by Epaminondas, who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,[483] to Dionysius and Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê and Zeus Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the Dioskuri. Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines of the Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior Aristomenes, that they would now come back and again take up their residence as inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground was marked out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian and Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas. The best masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to lay out the streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper distribution and construction of the sacred edifices.[484] In respect of the fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident. Such was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter for admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.[485]

[481] Pausan. iv, 26, 6.

[482] Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.

[483] Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of
Epaminondas (ix, 15, 4).

[484] Pausan. iv, 27, 3.

[485] Pausan. iv, 31, 5.

From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward, their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much was cut off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the north-eastern coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say. But it would appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that neighborhood, were converted into an independent community and protected by the vicinity of Messênê.[486] What is of more importance to notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê[487] (not far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes erected his hostile fort, near which the important capture at Sphakteria was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to Sparta, about forty-six miles from the city;[488] Aulon (rather farther north, near the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadon a township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.[489] Now all this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian Gulf westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed from Sparta to become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted into freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as before, but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their tenure. It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to pieces the Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,[490] killing the Spartan polemarch Geranor; and probably about the same time the other Lacedæmonian garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been expelled. Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new Messênê as the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides confirming the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted some other towns,[491] which under Lacedæmonian dominion had probably been kept unfortified and had dwindled away.

[486] Pausan. iv, 31, 2.

[487] Thucyd. ii, 25.

[488] Thucyd. iv, 3.

[489] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.

[490] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.

[491] Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc.
Pausanias, following the line of coast from the mouth of the
river Pamisus in the Messenian Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the
mouth of the Neda in the Western Sea,—enumerates the following
towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides, Asinê, the Cape Akritas,
the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus, Aulon (Pausan.
iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus, c.
46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused
and unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of
Laconia; but he seems to have conceived these cities as being in
the _central southern_ projection of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape
Tænarus forms the extremity); and not to have conceived at all
the _south-western_ projection, whereof Cape Akritas forms the
extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus of
the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast
of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then
after that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and
Psamathus, with Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces
in Messenia two different cities,—one called Messênê, the other
called Ithômê; whereas there was only one Messênê situated on
Mount Ithome.

I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this
account of Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of
Peloponnesus remained a portion of Laconia and belonging to
Sparta, long after the establishment of the city of Messênê. See
the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax of Karyanda,—in
his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.

In the spring of 425 B.C., when Demosthenes landed at Pylus, Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, and a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,[492]—especially as their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it! We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all comprised in the domain of the new city.

[492] Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.

They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their border.[493] Herein were included, not only such of these two classes as, having before dwelt in servitude throughout the territory westward of Ithômê, now remained there in a state of freedom—but also doubtless a number of others who deserted from other parts of Laconia. For as we know that such desertions had been not inconsiderable, even when there was no better shelter than the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may be sure that they became much more numerous, when the neighboring city of Messênê was founded under adequate protection, and when there was a chance of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, free lands with a new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as had actually joined the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, would be forced from simple insecurity to quit the country when he retired, and would be supplied with fresh residences in the newly-enfranchised territory. All these men would pass at once, out of a state of peculiarly harsh servitude, into the dignity of free and equal Hellens,[494] sending again a solemn Messenian legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival, after an interval of more than three centuries,[495]—outdoing their former masters in the magnitude of their offerings from the same soil,—and requiting them for previous ill-usage by words of defiance and insult, instead of that universal deference and admiration which a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed to look upon as his due.

[493] The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits
powerfully the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this
abstraction of territory, and emancipation of serfs, for the
purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς
Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ’
εὐλογωτέρως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους
ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ τοῦτ’ εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς
χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ τοὺς δούλους ἡμετέρους
ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας.

Again—s. 101. ἢν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν
πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν
βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν ὄντες; compare also
sections 8 and 102.

[494] Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν
Ὀλυμπιάδα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος
ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν
τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν
τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
~τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας~ ἧς οἱ πατέρες
ἡμῖν κατέλιπον ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους,
ἀκουσόμενος δ’ ~αὐτῶν τοιαύταις βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ
εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας~, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν
τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους.

This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of
Leuktra, is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan
feeling under such severe humiliations.

[495] The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the
first Messenian war, after which they became subjects of Sparta.
The second Messenian war arose from their revolt.

No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia
since the termination of the first war; which is placed by
Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in 723 B.C.; though the date is not to be
trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives two hundred and eighty-seven
years between the end of the second Messenian war and the
foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the note of Siebelis on
this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot be made out.

The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia, the renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two new cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that Greece had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification of the historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare facts, with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant. Xenophon, under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly omits to notice them;[496] Pausanias, whom we have to thank for most of what we know, is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine signs and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details are altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable. Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In describing societies already established and ancient, we find the force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the same presiding genius, Epaminondas; destined to sustain each other in neighborly sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the attacks of Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards, remained engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like Polybius.[497]

[496] The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the
beginning of Xenophon’s history, becomes more and more
exaggerated throughout the two latter books wherein he recounts
her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by spite against the
Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is hardly
any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable,
as the case now before us. In describing the expedition of
Epaminondas into Peloponnesus in the winter of 370-369 B.C., he
totally omits the foundation both of Messênê and Megalopolis;
though in the after part of his history, he alludes (briefly)
both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents
the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent
army, for the simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the
Spartans, and to have been desirous of returning to Bœotia, as
soon as it was ascertained that the latter had already returned
to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention the name of
Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any more
than he mentions him at Leuktra.

Considering the momentous and striking character of these
facts, and the eminence of the Theban general by whom they were
achieved, such silence on the part of an historian, who professes
to recount the events of the time, is an inexcusable dereliction
of his duty to state the _whole truth_. It is plain that
Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan
sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of
the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had
withdrawn from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet
he can find space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity,
the two applications of the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the
favorable reception which they obtained,—also the exploits of the
Phliasians in their devoted attachment to Sparta.

[497] See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also
Pausan. v, 29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.

Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but as the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name, and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent communities had the right of attending, should be periodically convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers) was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried all officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations of public misconduct.[498] The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus, Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.[499] What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion of action and sentiment which had never before existed;[500] and to prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen, gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it.[501]

[498] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.

[499] Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220,
Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.

[500] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59;
Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106,
ed. Neumann.

[501] Polybius, ii, 55.

Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf now rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory which lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the Skiritæ (hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent upon Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),[502] with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and hostile to Sparta.[503] The same is the case even with a place much nearer to Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by the Lacedæmonians four or five years afterwards.[504]

[502] Thucyd. v, 66.

[503] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.

[504] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.

Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration of his command in Arcadia and Laconia.[505] The sufferings of a severe mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by the Arcadians, who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them an excess of hospitality which he could not permit consistently with his military duties.[506] He stayed long enough to settle all the preliminary debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious execution the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the completion of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face and character of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary. Accordingly, a Theban division under Pammenes was left to repel all obstruction from Sparta;[507] while Tegea also, from this time forward, for some years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.[508]

[505] The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus
(xv. 67), seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus
or some other older author.

Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions “three entire
months,” which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses
himself as if Epaminondas spent all this time in ravaging
Laconia. Yet again, in the Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare
Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of Pelopidas (c. 25),
Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held the
command four whole months over and above the legal time, being
engaged in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems
to me the more probable interpretation of the case; for the
operations seem too large to have been accomplished in either
three or four months.

[506] See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda
Respublica (c. 8, p. 788 A.).

[507] Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an
earnest friend of Epaminondas, but of older political standing;
to whom Epaminondas partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger.
Præcep. p. 805 F.).

Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same
Olympic year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after
that battle, during the archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens;
that is, between Midsummer 371 and Midsummer 370 B.C. (Pausan.
viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation of Messênê in the next
Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens; that
is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 B.C. (iv, 27, 5).

The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to
date from the initial determination taken by the assembled
Arcadians, soon after the revolution at Tegea, to found a
Pan-Arcadian city and federative league. This was probably taken
before Midsummer 370 B.C., and the date of Pausanias would thus
be correct.

The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the
expedition of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369
B.C. which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at
Athens, as Pausanias affirms.

What length of time was required to complete the erection and
establishment of either city, we are not informed.

Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 B.C. (xv,
72).

[508] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.

Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these proceedings of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of force against Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like him, it seemed sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians were now neutral in the contest, such a prospect was not at all agreeable to them,[509] involving the aggrandizement of Thebes to a point inconsistent with their security. It was in the midst of the successes of Epaminondas that envoys came to Athens from Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius, to entreat her aid. The message was one not merely humiliating to the Lacedæmonians, who had never previously sent the like request to any Grecian city,—but also difficult to handle in reference to Athens. History showed abundant acts of jealousy and hostility, little either of good feeling or consentient interest, on the part of the Lacedæmonians towards her. What little was to be found, the envoys dexterously brought forward; going back to the dethronement of the Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, the glorious expulsion of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of both cities,—and the auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465 B.C., to assist the Spartans against the revolted Messenians on Mount Ithômê. In these times (he reminded the Athenian assembly) Thebes had betrayed the Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had been an object of common hatred to both. Moreover the maritime forces of Greece had been arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy of Delos, with full sanction and recommendation from Sparta; while the headship of the latter by land had in like manner been accepted by the Athenians. He called on the assembly, in the name of these former glories, to concur with Sparta in forgetting all the deplorable hostilities which had since intervened, and to afford to her a generous relief against the old common enemy. The Thebans might even now be decimated (according to the vow said to have been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in spite of their present menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta could be brought heartily to coöperate; and might be dealt with as Thebes herself had wished to deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta refused to concur in pronouncing the sentence of utter ruin.[510]

[509] Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.

[510] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.

This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus, had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in 371 B.C., first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens, guaranteeing universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy from Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which she now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the meed of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries and remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, she would act in accordance with her own true interests; since, should Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads of Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.[511]

[511] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.

It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, that she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and to entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past. The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through the Peloponnesian war.

At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the sentiment of the assembly being apparently rather against than for them. “Such language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled citizens) is intelligible enough during their present distress; but so long as they were in good circumstances, we received nothing but ill-usage from them.”[512] Nor was the complaint of the Spartans, that the invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace guaranteeing universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some said that the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves, by their previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that the intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable, since Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been the first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal made by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held in 404 B.C., after the surrender of Athens,—when the Theban deputy had proposed that Athens should be totally destroyed, while the Spartans had strenuously protested against so cruel a sentence—made a powerful impression on the assembly, and contributed more than anything else to determine them in favor of the proposition.[513] “As Athens was then, so Sparta is now, on the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the same enemy: Athens was then rescued by Sparta, and shall she now leave the rescue unrequited?” Such was the broad and simple issue which told upon the feelings of the assembled Athenians, disposing them to listen with increasing favor both to the envoys from Corinth and Phlius, and to their own speakers on the same side.

[512] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ
ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα
λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.

[513] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων παρὰ
Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.

To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of the situation gradually became more and more predominant in the assembly. Kallistratus[514] the orator spoke eloquently in support of the Lacedæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened to, as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen[515] at Athens, since the peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled from Korkyra.

[514] Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353.

Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for
supporting Sparta (ib.).

[515] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.
479.

As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside the gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the next morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many citizens went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates himself; and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve thousand men,—not named under conscription by the general, but volunteers.[516] He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that he had formidable enemies to deal with. After having established his position at Corinth, and obtained information regarding the enemy, he marched into Arcadia, and there made war without any important result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted Laconia, while many of the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the plunder acquired; so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled in part by the recent manifestation of Athens,[517] the Theban general himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which it was necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground, and afforded good means of resistance to the passage of an army; nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its two extremities, did not attempt directly to bar the passage of the Thebans. He contented himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But Epaminondas beat them back with some loss, and pursued them to the gates of Corinth. Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body within the town were eager to march out and engage in general battle. Their ardor was however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth, suffered the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.[518]

[516] This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).

[517] To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius
Nepos (Iphicrates, c. 2).

[518] The account here given in the text coincides as to the
matter of fact with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also
(in my belief) with Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch,
Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).

But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either
his suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the
conduct, of Iphikrates. Other modern critics appear to me not
to have sufficiently distinguished Xenophon’s _facts_ from his
_suppositions_.

Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line
of Mount Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able
to reach Bœotia,—left the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ
unguarded. Then,—wishing to inform himself, whether the Thebans
had as yet passed the Mount Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the
Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry. Now (observes Xenophon)
a few scouts can see and report as well as a great number; while
the great number find it more difficult to get back in safety.
By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a
body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not
have happened if he had only sent out a few.

The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is
plain, from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates
never intended to bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he
sent out his whole body of cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to
harass the enemy on ground which he thought advantageous for the
purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates should have been
guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon here reproaches
him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more probable
that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed
should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a
murderous conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward
march of the Thebans? His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but
Sparta was now no longer in danger; and it was for the advantage
of Athens that the Thebans should go back to Bœotia, rather than
remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content himself with
harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat directly,
is a policy which we should expect from him.

There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited
discussion among the commentators, and on which I dissent from
their views. It is connected with the statement of Pausanias, who
says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ (Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο,
καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης
ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ
τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, ~καὶ
πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ~, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης, ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας
ἀπήλαυνε.

In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling
Iphikrates “son of Timotheus;” and speaking of _Lechæum_, where
Pausanias ought to have named _Kenchreæ_. For Epaminondas could
not have passed Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long
Walls, reaching from one to the other, would prevent him;
moreover, the “rugged ground” was between Corinth and Kenchreæ,
not between Corinth and Lechæum.

But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which
follow: “Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and _having come to
the city itself of the Athenians_, when Iphikrates forbade the
Athenians to come out and fight, he (Epaminondas) again marched
away to Thebes.”