Chapter LXXVII (1)

FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.

At the beginning of 379 B.C., the empire of the Lacedæmonians on land had reached a pitch never before paralleled. On the sea, their fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem to have held divided empire with Athens over the smaller islands; while the larger islands (so far as we can make out) were independent of both. But the whole of inland Greece, both within and without Peloponnesus,—except Argos, Attica, and perhaps the more powerful Thessalian cities,—was now enrolled in the confederacy dependent on Sparta. Her occupation of Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an oligarchy of local partisans, appeared to place her empire beyond all chance of successful attack; while the victorious close of the war against Olynthus carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her far-reaching power. Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many cases by Spartan harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on Sparta,—were much more dependent upon her than they had been during the time of the Peloponnesian war.

Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated as the “despot city.[160]” And this sentiment was farther aggravated by the recent peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of Sparta; which she had first procured, and afterwards carried into execution. That peace was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by the king of Persia, enforced in his name, and surrendering to him all the Asiatic Greeks. But it became yet more disgraceful when the universal autonomy which it promised was seen to be so executed, as to mean nothing better than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts yet committed by Sparta, not only in perversion of the autonomy promised to every city, but in violation of all the acknowledged canons of right dealing between city and city,—the most flagrant was, her recent seizure and occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her subversion (in alliance with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas king of Macedonia) of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly less offensive to every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism. She appeared as the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of Amyntas the Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius on a third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner, and seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.

[160] Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.

Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably as the head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her headship, or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic and free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, the former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia during the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, B.C. 384, three years after the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration (of which unhappily only a fragment remains, preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias raises the cry of danger to Greece, partly from the Persian king, partly from the despot Dionysius of Syracuse.[161] He calls upon all Greeks to lay aside hostility and jealousies one with the other, and to unite in making head against these two really formidable enemies, as their ancestors had previously done, with equal zeal for putting down despots and for repelling the foreigner. He notes the number of Greeks (in Asia) handed over to the Persian king, whose great wealth would enable him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian soldiers, and whose naval force was superior to anything which the Greeks could muster; while the strongest naval force in Greece was that of the Syracusan Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as chiefs of Greece, Lysias expresses his astonishment that they should quietly permit the fire to extend itself from one city to another. They ought to look upon the misfortunes of those cities which had been destroyed, both by the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home to themselves; not to wait patiently, until the two hostile powers had united their forces to attack the centre of Greece, which yet remained independent.

[161] Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap.
Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk.

... Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν
αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων
ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.

... Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν
περιεστηκότας. Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς
θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· ~τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων~· ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται,
πολλὰς δ’ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας....

... Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους
ἐποίησαν, τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν
ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα,
τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, ~καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν~,
ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.

... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ
ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας·
οὐδ’ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ~ἀμφοτέρων~
(of Artaxerxes and Dionysius) ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν
τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.

Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted
between the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in
concert and dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141,
ed. Didot). The assertion is made by the rhetor Aristeides,
and the allusion to Ephorus is here preserved by the Scholiast
on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring it to
Dionysius _the younger_). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of
this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates,
and Timotheus; the former of whom captured the fleet of
Dionysius, while the latter defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at
Leukas. But these events happened in 373-372 B.C., when the
power of Dionysius was not so formidable or aggressive as it had
been between 387-382 B.C.: moreover, the ships of Dionysius
taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron.
Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which
the assertion of Ephorus really referred.

Of the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades[162] in the ninetieth Olympiad (B.C. 420). While instigating the spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the liberation of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias exhorted them to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against the latter, by plundering the splendid tent before them, which insulted the sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth extorted from Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation was partially, but only partially, acted upon.[163] Some persons assailed the tents, but were, probably, restrained by the Eleian superintendents without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in B.C. 384. This was the first Olympic festival after the peace of Antalkidas; a festival memorable, not only because it again brought thither Athenians, Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must have been prevented by the preceding war from coming either in B.C. 388 or in B.C. 392,—but also as it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the Asiatic Greeks, for the first time since they had been handed over by Sparta to the Persians,—and the like also from those numerous Italians and Sicilian Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these sufferers, especially the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of complaints respecting the hardships of their new lot, and against Sparta as having betrayed them; complaints, which would call forth genuine sympathy in the Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had submitted reluctantly to the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a large body of sentiment prepared to respond to the declamations of Lysias. And many a Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands on the Syracusan tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent to the orator’s remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire[164] at both sides; that Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already passed into the hands of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these two formidable enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central Greece would be in great danger.

[162] See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII.
of this History, Ch. lv, p. 53.

[163] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109.
ὥστε τινας τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.

Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias;
but Diodorus places it at Olympiad 98—B.C. 388—the year before
the peace of Antalkidas. On this point I venture to depart from
him, and assign it to Olympiad 99, or 384 B.C., three years
after the peace; the rather as his Olympic chronology appears not
clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7 with xiv, 109.

1. The year 388 B.C. was a year of war, in which Sparta with
her allies on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos
on the other,—were carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war
would hinder the four last-mentioned states from sending any
public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic festival. Lysias, as
an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at all; but he
certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold
oratorical demonstration.

2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered
after the cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν
αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent
after the peace of Antalkidas; but not at all admissible before
that peace. The same may be said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ
ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας;
which must be referred to the recent subjection of the Asiatic
Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by
Dionysius.

3. In 388 B.C.—when Athens and so large a portion of the
greater cities of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore
contesting her headship,—Lysias would hardly have publicly
talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ
διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην.
This remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich. Griech. bis zur
Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed so
ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was
still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.

On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when
I recount the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this
oration of Lysias is unsuitable to B.C. 388—but perfectly
suitable to 384 B.C.

[164] Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν,
etc.

It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame would tend to raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of his speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read at the next Olympic festival of B.C. 380), speaks out more plainly. He denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the general security and freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign kings as well as Grecian despots to aggrandize themselves at the cost of autonomous Grecian cities,—all in the interest of their own selfish ambition. No wonder (he says) that the free and self-acting Hellenic world was every day becoming contracted into a narrower space, when the presiding city Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to absorb it,—and herself undertook unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus, Phlius, and Mantinea.[165]

[165] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his
Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.

Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the
Lacedæmonians at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of
Antalkidas (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 26).

The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta, during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379 B.C.). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still more emphatic in his condemnation of Sparta. Having described her triumphant and seemingly unassailable position after the subjugation of Olynthus and Phlius, he proceeds to say,[166]—“I could produce numerous other incidents, both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take careful note of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which I am now about to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians, who had sworn to leave each city autonomous, having violated their oaths by seizing the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very men whom they had wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before triumphed over them. And the Theban faction who had introduced them into the citadel, with the deliberate purpose that their city should be enslaved to Sparta in order that they might rule despotically themselves,—were put down by no more than seven assailants, among the exiles whom they had banished.”

[166] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ
ἄλλα λέγειν, καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν
ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ
προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὀμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν
τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν μόνων
τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε
ἀνθρώπων κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν
ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν
δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν ... τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον
τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.

This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his
Commentatio Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82)
as the turning-point in the history:—

“Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit,
atque uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis
fastigium ascendere videt, et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem
divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in hac Spartanorum fortunâ
conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id solet facere,
suppresserit.”

What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency, entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides by the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian[167] council; or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,[168] by the warnings of the prophet Teiresias.

[167] See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.

[168] Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.

The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since the blow struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his oligarchical partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. Respecting the details of its proceedings we have scarce any information. We can only (as above remarked) judge of it by the analogy of the Thirty tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, to which it was exactly similar in origin, position, and interests. That the general spirit of it must have been cruel, oppressive, and rapacious,—we cannot doubt; though in what degree we have no means of knowing. The appetites of uncontrolled rulers, as well as those of a large foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; besides which, those rulers must have been in constant fear of risings or conspiracies amidst a body of high-spirited citizens who saw their city degraded, from being the chief of the Bœotian federation, into nothing better than a captive dependency of Sparta. Such fear was aggravated by the vicinity of a numerous body of Theban exiles, belonging to the opposite or anti-Spartan party; three or four hundred of whom had fled to Athens at the first seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had been doubtless joined subsequently by others. So strongly did the Theban rulers apprehend mischief from these exiles, that they hired assassins to take them off by private murder at Athens; and actually succeeded in thus killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief successor of the deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at the rest.[169] And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes subservient to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not only that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the government was put down,[170] but also that in the fervor of that revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such fierce antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a crowd of Theban women.[171] In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even showed themselves in public;[172] so that this furious demonstration of vindictive sentiment must have been generated by the loss or maltreatment of sons, husbands, and brothers.

[169] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
c. 29, p. 596 B.

[170] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.

[171] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ’
ἡμέραν ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.

Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic
party, named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed,
and the conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have
accelerated the hour of their plot partly to preserve his life
(Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D, p. 586 F.).

[172] The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598
C.) is illustrated by the description given in the harangue of
Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. (c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm
prevalent in Athens after the battle of Chæroneia, such that
even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ
τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of Makaria, in
the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his
description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.

The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, but genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was now gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both cities;[173] and requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta, who demanded that the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in the earlier occasion demanded that the Athenian refugees should be dismissed from Thebes. To protect these Theban exiles, however, was all that Athens could do. Their restoration was a task beyond her power,—and seemingly yet more beyond their own. For the existing government of Thebes was firmly seated, and had the citizens completely under control. Administered by a small faction, Archias, Philippus, Hypatês, and Leontiades (among whom the first two were at this moment polemarchs, though the last was the most energetic and resolute)—it was at the same time sustained by the large garrison of fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and allies,[174] under Lysanoridas and two other harmosts, in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian posts in the other Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, Tanagra, etc. Though the general body of Theban sentiment in the city was decidedly adverse to the government, and though the young men while exercising in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being more strenuously prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at Sparta) kept up by private communication the ardor of an earnest, but compressed, patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was forcibly kept down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as well as the citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling minority.[175]

[173] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.

See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian
democrats, towards those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes
during the exile along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out
in an oration of Lysias, of which unfortunately only a fragment
remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47, Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de
Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration had been received at
Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the latter was
now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed
him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but
also delivered this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery;
Pherenikus having rightful claims on the property left behind by
the assassinated Androkleidas.

[174] Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De
Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 586 E.

In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one)
he sets down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the
smaller number is most likely to be true.

[175] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c.
25, p. 594 C; c. 27, p. 595 A.

For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes of some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. At length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to despair of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take the initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several men of the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of chariots, jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at the various festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus, Pherenikus, and others.[176]

[176] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.

Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν
ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα
πέρυσιν;

Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, though almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and self-devotion, in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon communicated itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping up constant private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt assured of the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could once strike a blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the destruction of the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor would any one within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger. It was this conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten other exiles (the entire band is differently numbered, by some as seven, by others, twelve[177]) undertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes came in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the design as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless, in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas, for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against other political enemies.[178]

[177] Xenophon says _seven_ (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and
Cornelius Nepos say _twelve_ (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p.
576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c. 8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c.
2).

It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of
Pelopidas in this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception)
throughout his Hellenica.

[178] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.

The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the secretary, who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and Philippus, in celebration of the period when they were going out of office as polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring into their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of the best families in Thebes.[179] In concert with the general body of Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to Thebes the instant that they should receive intimation,—and in concert also with two out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took on themselves privately to countenance the enterprise, without any public vote,—Pelopidas and Mellon, and their five companions,[180] crossed Kithæron from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about December B.C. 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, with no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the gates of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming men were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at the house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.

[179] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν
ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch,
Pelopid. c. 9.

The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and
beauty (Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).

[180] Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.)
mentions Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them.
Compare Cornel. Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.

It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been turned back, and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named Hipposthenidas, friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who had been let into the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so frightened as the moment of execution approached, that he took upon himself, without the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a faithful slave of Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from Thebes, to meet his master on the road, and to desire that he and his comrades would go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to render the project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home to fetch his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his wife where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at last confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became so irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation with his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. He at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His departure was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended message of countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.[181]

[181] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17,
p. 586 B.; c. 18, p. 587 D-E.

In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing day, on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus was to take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them at that banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become full of wine, in female attire, as being the women whose visit was expected. The hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen, and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on to comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the rest. He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he found already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from Athens, that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They had sent for him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles; but he had little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas, in blinding the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to resume their conviviality.[182] He was allowed to retire and rejoin his friends. Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were the favorable chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh message was delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake Archias the Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the names and scheme of the conspirators, which had become known to the philo-Laconian party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered it to Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious matters. “Serious matters for to-morrow,” said the polemarch, as he put the despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch on which he was reclining.[183]

[182] Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit
of Charon to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene
with his son. He only notices Charon as having harbored the
conspirators in his house, and seems even to speak of him as a
person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι, etc. (v, 4, 3).

The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch
(De Gen. Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too
interesting to be omitted, being perfectly consistent with
what we read in Xenophon; though it has perhaps somewhat of a
theatrical air.

[183] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30,
p. 596 F. Εἰς αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα.

This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon.
Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31)
makes a general reference to the omission of immediate opening
of letters arrived, as having caused the capture of the Kadmeia;
which was, however, only its remote consequence.

Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently called upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his promise. Upon this the secretary retired, and brought the conspirators, clothed in female attire, into an adjoining chamber; then going back to the polemarchs, he informed them that the women would not come in unless all the domestics were first dismissed. An order was forthwith given that these latter should depart, while Phyllidas took care that they should be well provided with wine at the lodging of one among their number. The polemarchs were thus left only with one or two friends at table, half-intoxicated as well as themselves; among them Kabeirichus, the archon of the year, who always throughout his term kept the consecrated spear of office in actual possession, and had it at that moment close to his person. Phyllidas now conducted the pretended women into the banqueting-room; three of them attired as ladies of distinction, the four others following as female attendants. Their long veils, and ample folds of clothing, were quite sufficient as disguise,—even had the guests at table been sober,—until they sat down by the side of the polemarchs; and the instant of lifting their veils was the signal for using their daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain at once and with little resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear tried to defend himself, and thus perished with the others, though the conspirators had not originally intended to take his life.[184]

[184] The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination
of the polemarchs at Thebes, differs materially from that of
Plutarch. I follow Xenophon in the main; introducing, however,
several of the details found in Plutarch, which are interesting,
and which have the air of being authentic.

Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the
story given in the text, there was also another story told by
some,—that Mellon and his companions had got access to the
polemarchs in the guise of drunken revellers. It is this latter
story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries him into
many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon.
I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in
female attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by
the exact analogy of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander
son of Amyntas, prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat.
c. 31, p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many
different circumstances, yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas
in female attire killed the Spartan general. The story alluded to
by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names both Thebes and
Archias, can hardly refer to this event.

It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus
the archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that
the archon during his year of office never left out of his hand
the consecrated spear. As a Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless
familiar with these old customs.

From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of
this revolution at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of
Pelopidas and in the treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not
know. Some critics suppose him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus
and Anaxis—Bœotian historians whose work comprised this period,
but of whom not a single fragment is preserved (see Fragm.
Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).

Having been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man, he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him, after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house of Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the roof.[185]

[185] Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen.
Socr. p. 597 D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the
latter represents that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades
_without_ Phyllidas,—which appears to me altogether improbable.
On the other hand, Xenophon mentions nothing about the defence
of Leontiades and his personal conflict with Pelopidas, which
I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake and
sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous
to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death
of Leontiades as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious
enterprise, and the most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non
posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).

The four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having been now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to the prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions of the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all. To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance of safety and triumph.[186] Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to excite the citizens to arms.[187]

[186] Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen.
Socr. p. 598 B.

[187] This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from
Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).

The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh’s Collection record the
prizes given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp.
Inscr. No. 1584, 1585, etc.).

Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent feeling, and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned, and the truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy and patriotic enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.[188] Both horsemen and hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the local gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of delight and gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon, as the first renewed Bœotarchs.[189] The revival of this title, which had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was in itself an event of no mean significance; implying not merely that Thebes had waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian confederacy also had been, or would be, restored.

[188] The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the
revolution was welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the
citizens turned out to support it by armed force,—is attested by
Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen. v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα
ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ
ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.

[189] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.

Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a body of Athenian volunteers, or _corps francs_, all of whom were ready on the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to complete the work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent to Platæa and Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had been distracted and alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights showing themselves here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts for the recent success.[190] Apprised speedily of the slaughter of the polemarchs, from whom they had been accustomed to receive orders, they knew not whom to trust or to consult, while they were doubtless beset by affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, who would hurry up the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on a diversion in their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ. But these forces were not permitted even to approach the city gate; being vigorously charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the newly-mustered Theban cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The Lacedæmonians in the citadel were thus not only left without support, but saw their enemies in the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the auxiliary volunteers.[191]

[190] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.

[191] Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were
invited to come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the
two generals and the volunteers; all of whom were before privy
to the plot, and were in readiness on the borders of Attica—τοὺς
~πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις~ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι ~ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων~ ἤδη παρῆσαν (Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).

Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves at the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up to the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to those who should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian commander sent proposals for a capitulation.[192] Undisturbed egress from Thebes, with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to him by oath, the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were marching out of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came forth also. But against these latter the exasperation of the victors was so ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as they passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children along with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, had not the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted every effort to get them out of sight and put them into safety.[193] We are not told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were protected under the capitulation. Even had they been so, however, the wrathful impulse might still have prevailed against them. Of the three harmosts who thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow, two were put to death, the third was heavily fined and banished, by the authorities at Sparta.[194] We do not know what the fortifications of the Kadmeia were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return of Alexander from Illyria.[195] The first messenger who brought news to Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to have communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated the Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles from the defeated party.[196]

[192] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν
ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc.

Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
παρακαλέσαντες (the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas,
etc.) ~συνέργους ἔσχον ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους~.

[193] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.

[194] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27.

Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by
saying that the Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually
met at Megara the reinforcements under king Kleombrotus, which
had advanced thus far, on their march to relieve the Kadmeia.
But this is highly improbable. The account of Xenophon intimates
clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on the next morning after
the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated in the first
moment of distraction and despair, without even standing an
assault.

[195] Arrian, i, 6.

[196] In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the
proceedings of the Athenians in regard to it, I have followed
Xenophon almost entirely.

Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the
Theban exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly
through the concurrence of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν
Ἀθηναίων)—slew the rulers—called the citizens to freedom next
morning, finding all hearty in the cause—and then proceeded to
besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians in
the Kadmeia.

But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed,
in a manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)—

The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta
of what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The
Thebans at once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed
with great loss, both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they
might not be able to take the fort before reinforcement should
come from Sparta, they sent envoys to Athens to ask for aid,
reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans) had helped to
emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy
(ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ~συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον~ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The
Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from
a wish to secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a
public vote to assist them forthwith. Demophon the general got
together five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen, with
whom he hastened to Thebes on the next day; and all the remaining
population were prepared to follow, if necessary (πανδημεί).
All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so
that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand
hoplites and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the
Athenians being among them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night,
relieving each other; but were repelled with great loss of killed
and wounded. At length the garrison found themselves without
provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending reinforcement;
and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who formed
the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians,
refusing to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the
Lacedæmonian governor was obliged perforce to do, though both he
and the Spartans along with him desired to hold out to the death.
The Kadmeia was accordingly surrendered, and the garrison went
back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta
arrived only a little too late.

All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only
completely different from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his
conception of the event. We must reject either the one or the
other.

Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is
in this case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the
case.

1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by
public vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the
assistance which the Thebans had before sent to restore the
Athenian democracy against the Thirty. Now this is incorrect
in point of fact. The Thebans had _never sent any assistance_,
positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats
against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand,
and without any public government-act; and they had refused to
serve along with the Spartans against him. But they never sent
any force to help him against the Thirty. Consequently, the
Athenians _could not_ now have sent any public force to Thebes,
_in requital_ for a similar favor done before by the Thebans to
them.

2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public
army, and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on
the Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been
the most flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities
against Sparta. No Spartan envoys could, after that, have gone
to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of the Proxenus,—as we
know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the story of Sphodrias
(presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that Athens was at
peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility against
her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at
Thebes. It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about
the public vote of the Athenians, and the public Athenian force
under Demophon, aiding in the attack of the Kadmeia. Strange
to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters afterwards (xv, 29),
relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same manner
(with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with
a declaration, that _the Athenians were still at peace with
Sparta_, and forgetting that he had himself recounted a distinct
rupture of that peace on the part of the Athenians.

3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have
taken the Athenian public completely by surprise (though some
few Athenians were privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme
which had no chance of succeeding except by profound secrecy.
Now, that the Athenian public, hearing the news for the first
time,—having no positive act to complain of on the part of
Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no previous
circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous
resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes,
and provoke war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated
by Diodorus,—this is, in my judgment, eminently improbable,
requiring good evidence to induce us to believe it.

4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable
explanation can be given of the erroneous version which we
read in Xenophon? The facts as he recounts them conflict most
pointedly with his philo-Laconian partialities; first, the
overthrow of the Lacedæmonian power at Thebes, by a handful
of exiles; still more, the whole story of Sphodrias and his
acquittal.

But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can
give a very plausible explanation how the erroneous version
in Diodorus arose. A few months later, after the acquittal of
Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians did enter heartily into
the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public force (indeed
five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon,
according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling
Agesilaus with the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural
that their public vote and expedition undertaken about July 378
B.C.,—should have been erroneously thrown back to December 379
B.C. The Athenian orators were fond of boasting that Athens
had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might be said with
some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered
afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in
general terms; but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more
distinct, and gives in a few words a version the same as that
which we find in Diodorus; so also does Aristeides, in two very
brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or. xxxviii, Socialis, p.
486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may have copied
from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand
the mistake out of which their version grew.

5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of
the Athenians, and the regular division of troops under Demophon
which Diodorus asserts to have aided in the storming of the
Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23;
Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as Xenophon does, that there
were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the exiles.

M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses
this discrepancy at considerable length, and cites the opinion
of various German authors in respect to it, with none of whom I
altogether concur.

In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as
belonging to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting
the public vote at Athens, and the army said to have been sent to
Thebes under Demophon; and to accept the more credible narrative
of Xenophon; which ascribes to Athens a reasonable prudence, and
great fear of Sparta,—qualities such as Athenian orators would
not be disposed to boast of. According to that narrative, the
question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia
could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since
that citadel was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.

This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the four leaders, in their houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of repugnance which withdraws his attention from the other features of this memorable deed. Now an ancient Greek not only had no such repugnance, but sympathized with the complete revenge for the seizure of the Kadmeia and the death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides, the extraordinary personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the skilful forecast of the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force so contemptibly small, of a government which the day before seemed unassailable.[197] It deserves note that we here see the richest men in Thebes undertaking a risk, single-handed and with their own persons, which must have appeared on a reasonable estimate little less than desperate. From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles down to the end of free Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the Palæstra,[198] and exposes his person in the ranks as a soldier like the poorest citizens; being generally superior to them in strength and bodily efficiency.