Chapter LXXVII (3)

The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part preserved, after the renovation of the democracy in B.C. 403, during the archonship of Eukleides.[236] Though eligibility to the great offices of state had before that time ceased to be dependent on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to possess some means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not merely in case of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the liability to serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent on a man’s enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of property. It seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main principles of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s property being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes according to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion of taxable capital to each man’s property was assumed, and each was entered in the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the sum of taxable capital corresponding to his property, according to the proportion assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable capital bore a greater ratio to the actual property than in the less rich; in the second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of all these items of taxable capital, in all the different classes, set opposite to each man’s name in the schedule, constituted the aggregate census of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was imposed, in equal proportion upon every man.

[236] This is M. Boeckh’s opinion, seemingly correct, as far
as can be made out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public
Economy of Athens, B, iv, ch. 5).

Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, which had been introduced in 403 B.C. at the archonship of Eukleides, we have no information. Nor can we make out how large or how numerous were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed at Athens between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C. But at this latter epoch the register was again considerably modified, at the moment when Athens was bracing herself up for increased exertions. A new valuation was made of the property of every man possessing property to the amount of twenty-five minæ (or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards. Proceeding upon this valuation, every one was entered in the schedule for a sum of taxable capital equal to a given fraction of what he possessed. But this fraction was different in each of the different classes. How many classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor can we tell, except in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum was taken as the minimum for any one of them. There could hardly have been less, however, than three classes, and there may probably have been four. But respecting the first or richest class, we know that each man was entered in the schedule for a taxable capital equal to one-fifth of his estimated property; and that possessors of fifteen talents were included in it. The father of Demosthenes died in this year, and the boy Demosthenes was returned by his guardians to the first class, as possessor of fifteen talents; upon which his name was entered on the schedule with a taxable capital of three talents set against him; being one-fifth of his actual property. The taxable capital of the second class was entered at a fraction less than one-fifth of their actual property (probably enough, one-sixth, the same as all the registered metics); that of the third, at a fraction still smaller; of the fourth (if there was a fourth), even smaller than the third. This last class descended down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or twenty-five hundred drachmæ; below which no account was taken.[237]

[237] Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p.
836; cont. Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ.
Ath. iv, 7.

In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new
property-schedule introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus,
he inclines to the hypothesis of four distinct Classes, thus
distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of his Staats-haushaltung
der Athener):—

1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to
the value of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the
schedule, each for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.

2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to
the amount of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was
enrolled in the schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent.
upon his property.

3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the
value of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was
entered in the schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon
his property.

4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of
twenty-five minæ, but below the maximum of two talents. Each was
entered in the schedule for the amount of eight per cent. upon
his property.

This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to
illustrate the principle of distribution, and of graduation, then
adopted.

Besides the taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the schedule also included those of the metics or resident aliens; who were each enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller property, above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to one-sixth of his actual property;[238] being a proportion less than the richest class of citizens, and probably equal to the second class in order of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to five thousand seven hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,[239] forming the aggregate schedule of taxable property; that is, something near about six thousand talents. A property-tax was no part of the regular ways and means of the state. It was imposed only on special occasions; and whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon this schedule,—every man, rich or poor, being rated equally according to his taxable capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per cent. would thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred and twenty talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of Athens during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule was first prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then imposed, but we do not know to what amount.[240]

[238] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος
εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.

[239] Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the
latter (De Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown,
that Polybius did not correctly conceive what the sum which he
stated really meant.

[240] I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from
M. Boeckh, who sets it down as positive matter of fact that
a property-tax of five per cent., amounting to three hundred
talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship of Nausinikus
(Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The
evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of
Demosthenes cont. Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν ~παρὰ τὰς
εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου~, παρ’ ἴσως τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ
μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ
οὗτος (Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these words imply,—not that
a property-tax of about three hundred talents had been levied
or called for _during_ the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that
a total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been
levied (or called for) by all the various property-taxes imposed
_from the archonship of Nausinikus down to the date of the
speech_. The oration was spoken about 355 B.C.; the archonship
of Nausinikus was in 378 B.C. What the speaker affirms,
therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been
levied or called for by all the various property-taxes imposed
between these two dates; and that the aggregate sum of arrears
due upon all of them, at the time when Androtion entered upon his
office, was fourteen talents.

Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three
hundred talents is very small, as the aggregate of all
property-taxes imposed for twenty-three years, suggests that
it might be proper to read ~ἐπὶ~ Ναυσινίκου instead of ~ἀπὸ~
Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that reading.
But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon
such a change of text, even if the existing text were more
indefensible than it actually is. And surely the plural number
τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator has in view, not the single
property-tax imposed in the archonship of Nausinikus, but two
or more property-taxes, imposed at different times. Besides,
Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding
arrears generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He
would have no motive to single out those which had accrued in
the year 378 B.C.; moreover, those arrears would probably have
become confounded with others, long before 355 B.C. Demosthenes
selects the year of Nausinikus as his initial period, because it
was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning, began.

Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new distribution of the citizens now took place into certain bodies called Symmories. As far as we can make out, on a very obscure subject, it seems that these Symmories were twenty in number, two to each tribe; that each contained sixty citizens, thus making one thousand two hundred in all; that these one thousand two hundred were the wealthiest citizens of the schedule,—containing, perhaps, the two first out of the four classes enrolled. Among these one thousand two hundred, however, the three hundred wealthiest stood out as a separate body; thirty from each tribe. These three hundred were the wealthiest men in the city, and were called “the leaders or chiefs of the Symmories.” The three hundred and the twelve hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to the old Solonian classes of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which latter class there had also been twelve hundred, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.[241] The liturgies, or burdensome and costly offices, were discharged principally by the Three Hundred, but partly also by the Twelve Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body essentially fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for some time, discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi or Generals suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred, and promoted one of the latter body to take his place in the Three Hundred. As between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted the process called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen who believed himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies, and that another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not borne his fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require the other to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might tender to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he would undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were made over to him.

[241] Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh,
Staats-haushaltung der Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur.
Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt, De Symmoriis, p. 18 _seq._

It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from the minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not know, at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded, speaking loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian census. The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred and twenty richest members) superintended the property-register of each tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less wealthy registered members. Occasionally, when the state required immediate payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making up altogether the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax chargeable upon the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement against the other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable upon each. The richest citizens were thus both armed with rights and charged with duties, such as had not belonged to them before the archonship of Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process, but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never anticipated.

At present, however, I only notice this new financial and political classification introduced in 378 B.C., as one evidence of the ardor with which Athens embarked in her projected war against Sparta. The feeling among her allies, the Thebans, was no less determined. The government of Leontiades and the Spartan garrison had left behind it so strong an antipathy, that the large majority of citizens, embarking heartily in the revolution against them, lent themselves to all the orders of Pelopidas and his colleagues; who, on their part, had no other thought but to repel the common enemy. The Theban government now became probably democratical in form; and still more democratical in spirit, from the unanimous ardor pervading the whole mass. Its military force was put under the best training; the most fertile portion of the plain north of Thebes, from which the chief subsistence of the city came, was surrounded by a ditch and a palisade,[242] to repel the expected Spartan invasion; and the memorable Sacred Band was now for the first time organized. This was a brigade of three hundred hoplites, called the Lochus, or regiment of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the Kadmeia, or acropolis.[243] It was put under constant arms and training, at the public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of whom mention was made in my seventh volume.[244] It consisted of youthful citizens from the best families, distinguished for their strength and courage amidst the severe trials of the palæstra in Thebes, and was marshalled in such manner, that each pair of neighboring soldiers were at the same time intimate friends; so that the whole band were thus kept together by ties which no dangers could sever. At first its destination, under Gorgidas its commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who fought in 424 B.C. at the battle of Delium),[245] was to serve as front rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from a circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge was then found irresistible.[246]

[242] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.

[243] Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.

[244] Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.

[245] Diodor. xii, 70.

These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were
called Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a
name borrowed from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described
in the Iliad and probably in many of the lost epic poems; the
charioteer being himself an excellent warrior, though occupied
for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes and Sthenelus,
Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon, etc.

[246] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.

Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud
Athenæum, xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military
division which bore the same title, composed of chosen and
wealthy citizens, two thousand five hundred in number (Diodor.
xvi, 80).

We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, both as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, with the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient in Thebes, belonging to those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown by Kadmus.[247] He seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas was younger, and of a very rich family; yet the relations between the two were those of equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day of battle, wherein the two were ranged side by side as hoplites, and where Epaminondas had saved the life of his wounded friend, at the cost of several wounds, and the greatest possible danger, to himself.[248]

[247] Pausan. viii, 11, 5.

Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that
he could not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas
(Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19).

[248] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to
Plutarch, Epaminondas had attained the age of forty years, before
he became publicly known (De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).

Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was
desperately wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place
at Mantinea, when they were fighting on the side of the
Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis, against the Arcadians; the
Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta, and having sent a
contingent to her aid.

I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The
Thebans were never so united with Sparta as to send any
contingent to her aid, after the capture of Athens (in 404 B.C.).
Most critics think that the war referred to by Plutarch, is, the
expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea, whereby the
city was broken up into villages—in 385 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton’s
Fasti Hellenici ad 385 B.C. But, in the first place, there cannot
have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for
Thebes was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not
her ally. In the next place, there does not seem to have been any
battle, according to Xenophon’s account.

I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch’s account, as to
this alleged battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that
Epaminondas may have saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier
conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.

Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military and gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen. But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased in part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.[249] He also learned music, vocal and instrumental, and dancing; by which, in those days, was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or blowing the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive, and emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body; rhythmical pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and disciplined movements, for taking part in a choric festival with becoming consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such gymnastic and musical training, the combination of which constituted an accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes, the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which, excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player. The Athenian Alkibiades[250] was heard to remark, when he threw away his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard to the countrymen of Pindar[251] generally, the remark was hardly less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre[252] as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had become more and more friendly, growing at length into alliance and joint war against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he profited by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But the person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not only heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close of an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out, had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.[253] With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable positive instruction, but also became practised in new and enlarged intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,[254] emancipated from that timorous interpretation of nature, which rendered so many Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens. His patience as a listener, and his indifference to showy talk on his own account, were so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of Aristoxenus), after numerous conversations with him, affirmed that he had never met with any one who understood more, or talked less.[255]

[249] Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192
D.; Aristophan. Acharn. 872.

Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of
form required in the runner was also different from that required
in the wrestler (Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).

[250] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.

[251] Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.

ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὗν, etc.

[252] Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos
the lyre (Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184;
Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).

[253] Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
p. 583, Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian,
V. H. iii, 17.

The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied
by Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught
Epaminondas, had been one of the persons actually present in
the synod of Pythagoreans at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the
house, and that he with another had been the only persons who
escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.

[254] Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and
Plutarch, Demosthenes, c. 20.

[255] Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας
διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ
(Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου λέγει,
μηδενί που τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα
γιγνώσκοντι μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel. Nepos,
Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.

We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was
communicated by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch
copied it; and we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned
other particulars respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p.
184). We see thus that Plutarch had access to good sources of
information respecting the latter. And as he had composed a life
of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately
it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken
some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials
would naturally be employed in his dramatic dialogue, “De Genio
Socratis.” This strengthens our confidence in the interesting
statements which that dialogue furnishes respecting the
character of Epaminondas; as well as in the incidental allusions
interspersed among Plutarch’s other writings.

Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best Athenian opponents.[256] But his disposition was essentially modest and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual curiosity and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race usually erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little moved by personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by unworthy means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score of money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life, not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also the solicitous tenders of personal friends;[257] though we are told that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he permitted his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.[258] As he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character; the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias. Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the other exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it; partly on prudential grounds, but partly, also, on conscientious scruples.[259] None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate by his subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and vindictive passions.[260]

[256] Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip.
Gerend. p. 819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any
pretensions to oratorical talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos
had ever produced (Brutus, c. 13, 50).

[257] Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab.
Max. c. 27. Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos.
Epamin. c. 4.

[258] Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.

[259] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ
πείθων ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως
ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος.

... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν
ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι
τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον.

Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos,
Pelopidas, c. 4.

Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may
be well applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means,
without which the former could not have got possession of the
sceptre, were performed by others and not by him; while all the
meritorious and admirable functions of command were reserved for
Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).

[260] See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about
Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς,
τὸ δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς
ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς
διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ δυνάμενος, δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον
ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like
purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25:
Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—“patiens admirandum in modum.”

Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, however, it was necessary that he should give proof of the extraordinary capacities for action with which they were combined, and that he should achieve something to earn that exclamation of praise which we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards pronouncing, on seeing him at the head of the invading Theban army near Sparta,—“Oh! thou man of great deeds!”[261] In the year B.C. 379, when the Kadmeia was emancipated, he was as yet undistinguished in public life, and known only to Pelopidas with his other friends; among whom, too, his unambitious and inquisitive disposition was a subject of complaint as keeping him unduly in the background.[262] But the unparalleled phenomena of that year supplied a spur which overruled all backwardness, and smothered all rival inclinations. The Thebans, having just recovered their city by an incredible turn of fortune, found themselves exposed single-handed to the full attack of Sparta and her extensive confederacy. Not even Athens had yet declared in their favor, nor had they a single other ally. Under such circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by the energy of all her citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical as well as the rest. As the necessities of the case required such simultaneous devotion, so the electric shock of the recent revolution was sufficient to awaken enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than that of Epaminondas. He was among the first to join the victorious exiles in arms, after the contest had been transferred from the houses of Archias and Leontiades to the open market-place; and he would probably have been among the first to mount the walls of the Kadmeia, had the Spartan harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas being named Bœotarch, his friend Epaminondas was naturally placed among the earliest and most forward organizers of the necessary military resistance against the common enemy; in which employment his capacities speedily became manifest. Though at this moment almost an unknown man, he had acquired, in B.C. 371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation both as speaker and as general, that he was chosen as the expositor of Theban policy at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the battle of Leuktra, upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we may fairly conclude, that the well-planned and successful system of defence, together with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta, during the intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his work.[263]

[261] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!

[262] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν
ἁπάντων τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι
καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.

[263] Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas
(Epaminondas, und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834,
p. 26), seems to conceive that Epaminondas was never employed
in any public official post by his countrymen, until the period
immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra. I cannot concur in
this opinion. It appears to me that he must have been previously
employed in such posts as enabled him to show his military
worth. For all the proceedings of 371 B.C. prove that in that
year he actually possessed a great and established reputation,
which must have been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous
position; and as he had no great family position to start from,
his reputation was probably acquired only by slow degrees.

The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this
supposition; for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.

The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal of Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in seconding as well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved at the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, thought it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They organized on a more systematic scale the military force of their confederacy, and even took some conciliatory steps with the view of effacing the odium of their past misrule.[264] The full force of their confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present Spartan power, even the distant Olynthians,[265]—was placed in motion against Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who contrived, by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries acting in the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its neighbor the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the passes of Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have notice of his passing the Lacedæmonian border.[266] Then crossing Kithæron into Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ, a post already under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced his attacks upon the Theban territory, which he found defended partly by a considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the main force of Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries, sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own side of the palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, and attacked Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such sallies were frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break of day, he forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into their inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.[267] The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the knee, and their spears protended. So imposing was their appearance, that Agesilaus called off his troops without daring to complete the charge.[268] After a month or more of devastations on the lands of Thebes, and a string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to have lost rather than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the fortifications of which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a considerable force in occupation, and then leading back his army to Peloponnesus.

[264] Diodor. xv, 31.

[265] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.

[266] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.

[267] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.

[268] Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias,
c. 1,—“obnixo genu scuto,”—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.

The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor
of Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design
(Diodor. xv, 33).

Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with his own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who promised him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on reprisals from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed by Phœbidas with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, however, hurrying incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden turn of the Theban cavalry;[269] upon which all his troops fled, chased by the Thebans to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in consequence of this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and division to replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly strengthened by their recent victory. They pushed their success not only against Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still held by local oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time, these oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their own popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable numbers as exiles to Thebes.[270]

[269] Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.

[270] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων
ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο, καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας
τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας
ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν,
ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας ἐδέοντο.

A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus in the ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was neither more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though he contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the Theban palisade, and lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory; and even showed, more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage except upon perfectly equal terms.[271] It became evident that the Thebans were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia, but also acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against the Spartans; insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions remonstrated with Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only to give improving lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and called upon him to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia, however, after the summer’s campaign, without any such step.[272] In his way he appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break out in Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced a strain or hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has been mentioned already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his surgeon to open a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation. When this was done, however, the blood could not be stopped until he swooned. Having been conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he was confined to his couch for several months; and he remained during a much longer time unfit for active command.[273]

[271] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.

The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning
faint-heartedness and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are
likely to apply (certainly in part) to this campaign.

[272] Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.

[273] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.

The functions of general now devolved upon the other king Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so that he was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to dismiss his troops without achieving anything.[274]

[274] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.

His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn to Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes, to the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former object was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty triremes, fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis, was cruising in the Ægean; especially round the coast of Attica, near Ægina, Keos, and Andros. The Athenians, who, since their recently renewed confederacy, had been undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found themselves thus threatened, not merely with loss of power, but also with loss of trade and even famine; since their corn-ships from the Euxine, though safely reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of Eubœa), were prevented from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely this interruption, they fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty triremes,[275] with crews mainly composed of citizens; who, under the admiral Chabrias, in a sharply contested action near Naxos, completely defeated the fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the mastery of the sea. Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled or captured, eight with their entire crews.[276] Moreover, Chabrias might have destroyed all or most of the rest, had he not suspended his attack, having eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up both the living men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all Athenians who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are told[277]), from distinct recollection of the fierce displeasure of the people against the victorious generals after the battle of Arginusæ. And we may thus see, that though the proceedings on that memorable occasion were stained both by illegality and by violence, they produced a salutary effect upon the public conduct of subsequent commanders. Many a brave Athenian (the crews consisting principally of citizens) owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the terrible lesson administered by the people to their generals in 406 B.C., thirty years before.

[275] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc.
Boeckh (followed by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p.
58) connects with this maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp.
Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a vote of gratitude, passed by
the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus, a native of Parium
in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can hardly belong
to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to be
informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile
fleet near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus
must have related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the
transit of hostile ships along the Hellespont, which a native
of Parium would be the likely person first to discover and
communicate.

[276] Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.

I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated
by Demosthenes; in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller
number. The orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in
this oration, not only speaks from a written memorandum in his
hand, which he afterwards causes to be read by the clerk,—but
also seems exact and special as to numbers, so as to inspire
greater confidence than usual.

[277] Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ,
ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας
στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν,
~αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ
ἔθαψαν~· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens’s note)
μή ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν
παραπλήσια. Διόπερ ~ἀποστὰς τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν
τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας διέσωσε, τοὺς
δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν~. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν
ἐπιμέλειαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.

This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume
(Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ
and the proceedings at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus
incorrectly represented the excitement at Athens against the
generals as arising from their having neglected to pick up the
bodies of the _slain_ warriors for burial,—and that he omitted
the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded
warriors to perish.

It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above
cited, Diodorus repeats his erroneous affirmation about the
battle of Arginusæ; while in the second sentence he corrects the
error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by the warning, took
care to pick up the _living_ men on the wrecks and in the water,
as well as the dead bodies.

This was the first great victory (in September, 376 B.C.[278]) which the Athenians had gained at sea since the Peloponnesian war; and while it thus filled them with joy and confidence, it led to a material enlargement of their maritime confederacy. The fleet of Chabrias,—of which a squadron was detached under the orders of Phokion, a young Athenian now distinguishing himself for the first time and often hereafter to be mentioned,—sailed victorious round the Ægean, made prize of twenty other triremes in single ships, brought in three thousand prisoners with one hundred and ten talents in money, and annexed seventeen new cities to the confederacy, as sending deputies to the synod and furnishing contributions. The discreet and conciliatory behavior of Phokion, especially obtained much favor among the islanders, and determined several new adhesions to Athens.[279] To the inhabitants of Abdêra in Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by aiding them to repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting their abode from famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating the Abderites and plundering their territory. The citizens, grateful for a force left to defend their town, willingly allied themselves with Athens, whose confederacy thus extended itself to the coast of Thrace.[280]

[278] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.

[279] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.

[280] Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was
afterwards assassinated at Abdera.

Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast of Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager to keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her from conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the Bœotian port of Kreusis.[281] This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing, and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra, voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid all violence or interference with the political constitution, his popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince of the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and the Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.[282] While near Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the Peloponnesian ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to his fleet. He defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced by other triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those waters, that the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having received only thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that he had great difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an advance of money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet, of seven minæ towards the pay of their respective ships; and that he also sent home requests for large remittances from the public treasury;[283] measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.[284] This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased employment of mercenary bands.

[281] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.

[282] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.

[283] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116;
Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, c. 2.

The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus
from the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by
Demosthenes cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M.
Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring
this advance to his expedition to Korkyra and other places in the
Ionian Sea in 375-374 B.C.; not to his subsequent expedition of
373 B.C., to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser, and others
would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second
expedition, it does not appear that he ever had really sixty
triremes, or sixty trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v,
4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent with Timotheus to Korkyra
consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact number of trierarchs
named by Demosthenes.

[284] Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.

The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not favorably received. Though her naval position was now more brilliant and commanding than it had been since the battle of Ægospotami,—though no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb her in the Ægean,[285]—yet the cost of the war began to be seriously felt. Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina annoyed her commerce, requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while the contributions from the deputies to the confederate synod were not sufficient to dispense with the necessity of a heavy direct property tax at home.[286]

[285] Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.

[286] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.

In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, were represented.[287] Application was made to them to contribute towards the cost of the naval war; the rather, as it was partly at their instance that the fleet had been sent round to the Ionian Sea. But the Thebans declined compliance,[288] nor were they probably in any condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal occasioned much displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at the strides which they had been making during the two last years, partly through the indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens. At the end of the year 377 B.C., after the two successive invasions of Agesilaus, the ruin of two home crops had so straitened the Thebans, that they were forced to import corn from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise their ships and seamen were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian harmost at Oreus in Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon led not only to an outbreak of their seamen who had been taken prisoners, but also to the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that the communication of Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded. For the two succeeding years, there had been no Spartan invasion of Bœotia; since, in 376 B.C., Kleombrotus could not surmount the heights of Kithæron,—while in 375 B.C., the attention of Sparta had been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in the Ionian Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted themselves vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in most of which a strong party, if not the majority of the population, was favorable to them, though the government was in the hands of the philo-Spartan oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.[289] We hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa, under Charon; and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the Lacedæmonian harmost in that town, was slain.[290]

[287] See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.

[288] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν
ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ’ οὐ συμβαλλομένους
εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς
καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν
παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.

[289] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.

[290] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.

But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan harmost, with his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, had gone away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise the place. It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs were at the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit to the north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between Orchomenus and the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving near Orchomenus, he ascertained that there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no surprise could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But on reaching Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, returning with their troops from the Lokrian excursion. As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half, they rejoiced in the encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were at first dismayed, and required all his encouragement to work them up. But in the fight that ensued, closely and obstinately contested in a narrow pass, the strength, valor, and compact charge of the Sacred Band proved irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were both slain; their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed retreat; but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the combat until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.[291]

[291] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.

Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus
mentions, what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he
does not name Tegyra.

Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to
have given various particulars respecting the religious legends
connected with that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap.
Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).