Chapter LXXVI (3)

It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading Spartans encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition against Asia, in compliance with propositions from some disaffected subjects of Artaxerxes.[107] Upon some such project, currently discussed though never realized, Isokrates probably built his Panegyrical Oration, composed in a lofty strain of patriotic eloquence (380 B.C.) to stimulate both Sparta and Athens in the cause, and calling on both, as joint chiefs of Greece, to suspend dissensions at home for a great Pan-hellenic manifestation against the common enemy abroad. But whatever ideas of this kind the Spartan leaders may have entertained, their attention was taken off, about 382 B.C. by movements in a more remote region of the Grecian world, which led to important consequences.

[107] Diodor. xv, 9, 19.

Since the year 414 B.C. (when the Athenians were engaged in the siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans were still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê) which she had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion, seconded by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of Macedonia, undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on the Strymon.[108] But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled Athens from maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to her along with her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we do not know how. At the same time, during the last years of the Peloponnesian war, the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in power; partly, we may conceive, from the helpless condition of Athens,—but still more from the abilities and energy of Archelaus, son and successor of Perdikkas.

[108] Thucyd. vii, 9.

The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not to have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The reign of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first instance, he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,[109] who appears (so far as we can make out) to have had the better right to it; next he had also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his subordinate principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus, was one of the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the expedition undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year of the Peloponnesian war.[110] On the death of Perdikkas (about 413 B.C.), his eldest or only legitimate son was a child of seven years old; but his natural son[111] Archelaus was of mature age and unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas was yet alive, and had now considerable chance of reëstablishing himself on the throne; Archelaus, inviting him and his son under pretence that he would himself bring about their reëstablishment, slew them both amidst the intoxication of a banquet. He next despatched the boy, his legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a well; and through these crimes made himself king. His government, however, was so energetic and able, that Macedonia reached a degree of military power such as none of his predecessors had ever possessed. His troops, military equipments, and fortified places, were much increased in numbers; while he also cut straight roads of communication between the various portions of his territory,—a novelty seemingly everywhere, at that time.[112] Besides such improved organization (which unfortunately we are not permitted to know in detail), Archelaus founded a splendid periodical Olympic festival, in honor of the Olympian Zeus and the Muses,[113] and maintained correspondence with the poets and philosophers of Athens. He prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides and Agathon, as well as the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in Macedonia, where Euripides especially was treated with distinguished favor and munificence,[114] remaining there until his death in 406 or 405 B.C. Archelaus also invited Sokrates, who declined the invitation,—and appears to have shown some favor to Plato.[115] He perished in the same year as Sokrates (399 B.C.), by a violent death; two Thessalian youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together with a Macedonian named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a hunting-party. The first two were youths to whom he was strongly attached, but whose dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and non-performance of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for having made an offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had been given up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that he might be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence to be inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront, found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding the assassins of Archelaus.[116]

[109] This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.

... Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν
τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, ~ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο~, etc.

This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother
Alketas from the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the
commentators. Perhaps it may help to explain the chronological
embarrassments connected with the reign of Perdikkas, the years
of which are assigned by different authors, as 23, 28, 35, 40,
41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he
discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs,
Lection. Diodoreæ, p. 159.

There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas
began—nor exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he
was king in 432, and in 414 B.C. But the fact of his acquiring
the crown by the expulsion of an elder brother, renders it less
wonderful that the beginning of his reign should be differently
stated by different authors; though these authors seem mostly
to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of Alexander,
without any notice of Alketas.

[110] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.

[111] The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging
to Alketas; it is for this reason that Plato calls Alketas
~δεσπότην~ καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus (Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471
A.)

[112] Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in
Ch. lxix, p. 17 of Vol. ix.

[113] Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.

[114] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.

[115] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6;
Ælian, V. H. xiv, 17.

[116] See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle
(Politic. v, 8, 10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D),
while mentioning the assassination of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ
represents the motive of the latter differently from Aristotle,
as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself of the
throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed
Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.

Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο,
παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν
ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν
εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. _l.
c._).

Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of
persons actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed
himself of the privilege accorded by Archelaus.

These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization of the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for the poets and philosophers of Athens makes him sympathize warmly with Euripides, and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an offensive remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by drawing upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. _L’Etat, c’est moi_—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens, no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand, neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs, which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without the avowed intrusion of any man’s personality. To Euripides,—who had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal, by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life, upon any free Athenian citizen.

Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, after which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the throne, under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, after about four years, made away with his ward, and reigned in his stead for two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated and succeeded by Amyntas.[117] This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as the father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great), though akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an attendant of Æropus,[118] until he made himself king by putting to death Pausanias.[119] He reigned, though with interruptions, twenty-four years (393-369 B.C.); years, for the most part, of trouble and humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional exile for himself. The vigorous military organization introduced by Archelaus appears to have declined; while the frequent dethronements and assassinations of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father of Archelaus, and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central authority and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name; which naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together by a firm hand.

[117] Diodor. xiv. 84-89.

[118] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin,
vii, 4.

[119] Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν
Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν·
τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.

The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north, north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian and Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often formidable. Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the government, the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first year of his reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other princes of the interior,[120] and at all events their coming would operate as a signal for malcontents to declare themselves. Amyntas,—having only acquired the sceptre a few months before by assassinating his predecessor, and having little hold on the people,—was not only unable to repel them, but found himself obliged to evacuate Pella, and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. Despairing of his position, he made over to the Olynthians a large portion of the neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities round the Thermaic Gulf.[121] As this cession is represented to have been made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may fairly suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or valuable equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a moment of so much exigency.

[120] See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince
of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with
the Illyrian invaders—B.C. 423.

Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a
prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person
(Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 11).

[121] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις
μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων
δωρησαμένου πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ
δυναστείας, etc.

The flight of Amyntas, after a year’s reign, is confirmed by
Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263.

It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength. The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering (so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and soon extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger towns in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable city of the country.[122] As they began this enterprise at a time when the Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas to despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos. The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against the will of the inhabitants.

[122] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης
μεγίστη πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων
προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν ἃς, ἐφ’ ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ
συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ
δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν αἱ
ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο·
καὶ κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν,
ἥπερ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα
ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ
πάσης Μακεδονίας.

We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair,
and ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the
Olynthians. Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and
Amyntas (here alluded to), must have taken place when he came
back and tried to resume his dominion.

How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps the confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. Our information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian envoy Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards (B.C. 383), and describing in a few words the confederacy as it then stood. But there is one circumstance which this witness,—himself hostile to Olynthus and coming to solicit Spartan aid against her,—attests emphatically; the equal, generous, and brotherly principles, upon which the Olynthians framed their scheme from the beginning. They did not present themselves as an imperial city enrolling a body of dependent allies, but invited each separate city to adopt common laws and reciprocal citizenship with Olynthus, with full liberty of intermarriage, commercial dealing, and landed proprietorship. That the Macedonian cities near the sea should welcome so liberal a proposition as this, coming from the most powerful of their Grecian neighbors, cannot at all surprise us; especially at a time when they were exposed to the Illyrian invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the country. They had hitherto always been subjects;[123] their cities had not (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its own separate autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to them by the Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past subjection under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate to protect them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also these various cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, Pydna, etc.,—may have contained, among the indigenous population, a certain proportion of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the proposition of the Olynthians would be especially acceptable.

[123] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.

We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily; others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent. The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration, refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the sword.

Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities (next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore, the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians did not make application, until they had already attracted within their confederacy a considerable number of other Grecian as well as Macedonian cities. They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come in, upon the same terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The proposition being declined, they sent a second message intimating that, unless it were accepted within a certain time, they would enforce it by compulsory measures. So powerful already was the military force of the Olynthian confederacy, that Akanthus and Apollonia, incompetent to resist without foreign aid, despatched envoys to Sparta to set forth the position of affairs in the Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit intervention against Olynthus.

Their embassy reached Sparta about B.C. 383, when the Spartans, having broken up the city of Mantinea into villages, and coërced Phlius, were in the full swing of power over Peloponnesus,—and when they had also dissolved the Bœotian federation, placing harmosts in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon any movement of Thebes. The Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself to the Assembly of Spartans and their allies, drew an alarming picture of the recent growth and prospective tendencies of Olynthus, invoking the interference of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian confederacy (he said) already comprised many cities, small and great, Greek as well as Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its military power, even at present great, was growing every day.[124] The territory, comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could sustain a numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at hand, while the numerous harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving trade as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and would thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold mines of Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach. “All that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is matter of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of hope and confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious pains to prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,[125] permit the aggregation of so much more formidable a power, both by land and by sea, as this of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither from Athens and Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an embassy in return for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, your enemies will derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and Apollonia, having declined the proposition to join the confederacy voluntarily, have received notice that, if we persist, they will constrain us. Now we are anxious to retain our paternal laws and customs, continuing as a city by ourselves.[126] But if we cannot obtain aid from you, we shall be under the necessity of joining them,—as several other cities have already done, from not daring to refuse; cities, who would have sent envoys along with us, had they not been afraid of offending the Olynthians. These cities, if you interfere forthwith, and with a powerful force, will now revolt from the new confederacy. But if you postpone your interference, and allow time for the confederacy to work, their sentiments will soon alter. They will come to be knit together in attached unity, by the co-burgership, the intermarriage, and the reciprocity of landed possessions, which have already been enacted prospectively. All of them will become convinced that they have a common interest both in belonging to, and in strengthening the confederacy,—just as the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans, as allies, are not only enabled to preserve their own property, but also to plunder others. If, by your delay, the attractive tendencies of the confederacy should come into real operation, you will presently find it not so much within your power to dissolve.[127]”

[124] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14.

The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight
hundred hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one
thousand horsemen, assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined
the confederacy. It has been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others,
that these numbers, as they here stand, must be decidedly smaller
than the reality. But we have no means of correction open to us.
Mr. Mitford’s suggestion of eight thousand hoplites in place of
eight hundred, rests upon no authority.

Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had
brought all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων
πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed
four hundred horsemen, and a citizen population of 5000; no more
than this (he says) at the time when the Lacedæmonians attacked
them. The historical statements of the great orator, for a time
which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to be received
with caution.

[125] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς,
ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ
μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.

I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.

[126] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται
εἶναι· εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ’ ἐκείνων
γίγνεσθαι.

[127] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι,
ὡς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις
ἐστίν· αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων ~τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι~,
αὗται, ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· ~εἰ μέντοι
συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ’ ἀλλήλαις,
ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων
ἕπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστὶν~, ὥσπερ Ἄρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά
τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—~ἴσως οὔκεθ’ ὁμοίως
εὔλυτα ἔσται~.

This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally, of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of his argument. “Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you will not prevail on them to forego it.” By implication, he also admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make union secure, profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe how perfectly the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though at the moment preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory, and would give place to attachment when the union came to be felt as a reality; and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in clenching the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for any beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her own dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it were pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so that each city, or each village, while protected against subjection to any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and dependent in reference to Sparta.

It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from the dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached Sparta to ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, after having abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the Olynthians, had obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to reinstate himself by force. In this scheme he had failed, being defeated by the Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named Argæus, mentioned as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and possessing it for two years.[128]

[128] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.

Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his
kingdom by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657).
If this be historically correct, it must be referred to some
subsequent war in which he was engaged with the Thessalians,
perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ acquired dominion over
Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).

After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first declared their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put down Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of the assembled allies.[129] Among these latter, there was no genuine antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were under oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over their fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and at Mantinea had operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep the favor of Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the speakers as well as most of the votes, declared for war,[130] and a combined army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make up such total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each confederate; combined with the proviso now added for the first time, that each might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A cavalry-soldier, to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned as equivalent to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two peltasts; or pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in default were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ) per day, for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by Sparta.[131] Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for personal service, is the same as I have already described to have taken place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos under the presidency of Athens.[132] It was a system not likely to be extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already grown up in practice.

[129] See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.

[130] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν
ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι
Λακεδαιμονίοις χαρίζεσθαι, etc.

[131] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.

Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned
equivalent to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian
muster-roll of a few years afterwards; but it must have been
equally necessary to fix the proportion on the present occasion.

[132] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.

The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work or appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian force (they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only keep those who had refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also induce others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which resolutely stood aloof.[133] Amyntas brought a force to coöperate with him.

[133] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.

The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of consequences no less momentous than unexpected. The direct line from Peloponnesus to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a passage which the Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes, were not powerful enough to refuse, though they had contracted an alliance with Olynthus,[134] and though proclamation was made that no Theban citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having departed at a moment’s notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt, in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in Thebes organized a conspiracy.

[134] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.

They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban feelings of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should coöperate with them in any party movement which they might find opportunity of executing;[135] and when he halted with his detachment near the gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias, were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,[136]—the leaders were Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.

[135] This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and
substantially that of Plutarch (Agesil. c. 24), who intimates
that it was the general belief of the time. And it appears to me
much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that the
first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes,
and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act
on his own responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the
ephors after the fact is like that of persons who had previously
contemplated the possibility of it. But the original suggestion
must have come from the Theban faction themselves.

[136] Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that
most of these generals of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were
afterwards in exile with Pelopidas at Athens.

We have little or no information respecting the government of
Thebes. It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized
oligarchy. There was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the
Polemarchs may have been more than two in all, though the words
of Xenophon rather lead us to suppose _only_ two)—and there seems
also to have been a civil magistrate, chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς
ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was marked by his
constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state (τὸ
ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p.
597—B.—C.).

At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such
officers as Bœotarchs; since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the
peace of Antalkidas, had put an end to the Bœotian federation.

While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas, Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the day of the Thesmophoria,[137] a religious festival celebrated by the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia was consecrated to their exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat of a summer’s noon had driven every one out of the streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of which, as well as those of the town, were opened by his order as polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the same time they became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less importance,—the persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served as hostages for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the citizens in the town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of the gates, and then descended into the town, giving orders that no man should go up without his order.[138]

[137] The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.;
p. 419 Dind.) states that the Kadmeia was seized during the
Pythian festival. This festival would take place, July or August
382 B.C.; near the beginning of the third year of the (99th)
Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. liv, p. 455,
note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian festival
was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators.
I agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the
third Olympic year. And the date of the march of Phœbidas would
perfectly harmonize with this supposition.

Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in
course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for
it had no particular reference to Thebes.

[138] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.

The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of the acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken among the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The lochages and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously given orders, stood close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not intimidated by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia; for they assure us that they have no hostile purpose against any one who does not court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am empowered by law to seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and capitally criminal. Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the great inflamer of war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay hold of him, and carry him off where your orders direct.” Ismenias was accordingly seized and hurried off as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while the senators, thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance. Such of them as were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and many even of the more neutral members, left the Senate and went home, thankful to escape with their lives. Three hundred of them, including Androkleidas, Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety by voluntary exile to Athens; after which, the remainder of the Senate, now composed of few or none except philo-Spartan partisans, passed a vote formally dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new polemarch in his place.[139]

[139] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 30, 31.

This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,[140] twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty. Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer, Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new _régime_, the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis. Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that “order reigned” at Thebes.

[140] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII.
Ch. lxv. p. 252.

The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized public law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta had not the shadow of a pretence. It was even worse than the surprise of Platæa by the Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted of the partial excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas in this case, the Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything to violate the peace of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon[141] himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to Spartan power. It had been achieved with preëminent skill and success; and Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her two really formidable enemies.[142]

[141] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.

[142] It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man
more warm-hearted than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered
no real service to Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2,
28). The explanation of this is, that Xenophon wrote his history
at a later period, after the defeat at Leuktra and the downfall
of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by the reaction
against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially after
the capture of the Kadmeia,—or (in the pious creed of Xenophon)
by the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down
upon her (v, 4, 1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that
Phœbidas had not acted with true wisdom, and that he had done
his country more harm than good; a criticism, which we may be
sure that no man advanced, at the time of the capture itself, or
during the three years after it.

Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became the object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service, even _impromptu_ and without previous orders.

Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For every man at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself; and felt it still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble in solicitation as well as profuse in promise. In his speech addressed to the assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just put down,—and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. “Now (added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For the future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short despatch, to get every service which you require.[143]” It was resolved by the Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their garrison now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues in the government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial. Yet they at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of Greece, passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from his command, and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however, most probably was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of Sphodrias afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at first genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.

[143] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34.

Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε
μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς
τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν
ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη,
ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν πάντα πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν δέησθε—ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς
ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν, ἐπιμελῆσθε.

Xenophon mentions the displeasure of the ephors and the Spartans
generally against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδᾳ) but not
the fine, which is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch
(Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius
Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1).

That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction. Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be, cannot be urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom they put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of three Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city. He was accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies, of having entered into friendship and conspiracy with the Persian king to the detriment of Greece,[144]—of having partaken in the Persian funds brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being the real author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395 B.C. down to the peace of Antalkidas. After an unavailing defence, he was condemned and executed. Had this doom been inflicted upon him by his political antagonists as a consequence of their intestine victory, it would have been too much in the analogy of Grecian party-warfare to call for any special remark. But there is something peculiarly revolting in the prostitution of judicial solemnity and Pan-hellenic pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here committed. They could have no possible right to try Ismenias as a criminal at all; still less to try him as a criminal on the charge of confederacy with the Persian king,—when they had themselves, only five years before, acted not merely as allies, but even as instruments, of that monarch, in enforcing the peace of Antalkidas. If Ismenias had received money from one Persian satrap, the Spartan Antalkidas had profited in like manner by another,—and for the like purpose too of carrying on Grecian war. The real motive of the Spartans was doubtless to revenge themselves upon this distinguished Theban for having raised against them the war which began in 395 B.C. But the mockery of justice by which that revenge was masked, and the impudence of punishing in him as treason that same foreign alliance with which they had ostentatiously identified themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the whole proceeding.

[144] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576
A. Plutarch in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias
as having been conveyed to Sparta and tried there.

Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men, which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition, to be commanded by Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general, a man of very popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of this large army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as horsemen, furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion to Sparta. He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging upon him the most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering the Macedonian cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and also to Derdas, prince of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia, inviting his coöperation against that insolent city, which would speedily extend her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region to the interior, unless she were put down.[145]

[145] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.

Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had their hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with powerful forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred excellent Macedonian horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found no easy enterprise.[146] The Olynthian cavalry, in particular, was numerous and efficient. Unable as they were to make head against Teleutias in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless in a desultory engagement which took place near the city gates, they defeated the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the infantry into confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete victory, had not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a diversion which forced them to come back for the protection of the city. Teleutias, remaining master of the field, continued to ravage the Olynthian territory during the summer, for which, however, the Olynthians retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the cities in alliance with him.[147]

[146] Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with
proper commendation of the brave resistance made by the
Olynthians against the great force of Sparta. But his expressions
are altogether misleading as to the tenor and result of the
war. If we had no other information than his, we should be led
to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the
Lacedæmonians baffled.

[147] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 40-43.

In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were more and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias became confident and began to despise them. Under these dispositions on his part, a body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning, passed the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards the Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring, Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them; upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts rushed impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the river. No sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had crossed it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously, and put them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas and a hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who completely lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to cover the fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to all his troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also. But the Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city, with such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers ascending the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed close up to the walls.[148] Here, however, they were received by a shower of missiles which forced them to recede in disorder; upon which the Olynthians again sallied forth, probably, from more than one gate at once, and charged them first with cavalry and peltasts, next with hoplites. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, disturbed and distressed by the first, were unable to stand against the compact charge of the last; Teleutias himself, fighting in the foremost ranks, was slain, and his death was a signal for the flight of all around. The whole besieging force dispersed and fled in different directions,—to Akanthus, to Spartôlus, to Potidæa, to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was the pursuit of the Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was immense. The whole army was in fact ruined;[149] for probably many of the allies who escaped became discouraged and went home.

[148] Thucyd. i, 63—with the Scholiast.

[149] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους καὶ
ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος.

Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.