Chapter XCI (2)

Three days’ march, from the scene of action, brought Alexander to the Danube, where he found some armed ships which had been previously ordered to sail (probably with stores of provision) from Byzantium round by the Euxine and up the river. He first employed these ships in trying to land a body of troops on the island of Peukê; but his attempt was frustrated by the steep banks, the rapid stream, and the resolute front of the defenders on shore. To compensate for this disappointment, Alexander resolved to make a display of his strength by crossing the Danube and attacking the Getæ; tribes, chiefly horsemen armed with bows,[59] analogous to the Thracians in habits and language. They occupied the left bank of the river, from which their town was about four miles distant. The terror of the Macedonian successes had brought together a body of 4000 Getæ, visible from the opposite shore, to resist any crossing. Accordingly Alexander got together a quantity of the rude boats (hollowed out of a single trunk) employed for transport on the river, and caused the tent-skins of the army to be stuffed with hay in order to support rafts. He then put himself on shipboard during the night, and contrived to carry across the river a body of 4000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry; landing on a part of the bank where there was high standing wheat and no enemy’s post. The Getæ, intimidated not less by this successful passage than by the excellent array of Alexander’s army, hardly stayed to sustain a charge of cavalry, but hastened to abandon their poorly fortified town and retire father away from the river. Entering the town without resistance, he destroyed it, carried away such movables as he found, and then returned to the river without delay. Before he quitted the northern bank, he offered sacrifice to Zeus the Preserver—to Hêraklês—and to the god Ister (Danube) himself, whom he thanked for having shown himself not impassable.[60] On the very same day, he recrossed the river to his camp; after an empty demonstration of force, intended to prove that he could do what neither his father nor any Grecian army had ever yet done, and what every one deemed impossible—crossing the greatest of all known rivers without a bridge and in the face of an enemy.[61]

[59] Strabo, vii. p. 303.

[60] Arrian, i. 4, 2-7.

[61] Neither the point where Alexander crossed the Danube,—nor
the situation of the island called Peukê,—nor the identity of the
river Lyginus—nor the part of Mount Hæmus which Alexander forced
his way over—can be determined. The data given by Arrian are too
brief and too meagre to make out with assurance any part of his
march after he crossed the Nestus. The facts reported by the
historian represent only a small portion of what Alexander really
did in this expedition.

It seems clear, however, that the main purpose of Alexander
was to attack and humble the Triballi. Their locality is known
generally as the region where the modern Servia joins Bulgaria.
They reached eastward (in the times of Thucydides, ii. 96) as
far as the river Oskius or Isker, which crosses the chain of
Hæmus from south to north, passes by the modern city of Sophia,
and falls into the Danube. Now Alexander, in order to conduct
his army from the eastern bank of the river Nestus, near its
mouth, to the country of the Triballi, would naturally pass
through Philippopolis, which city appears to have been founded
by his father Philip, and therefore probably had a regular road
of communication to the maritime regions. (See Stephanus Byz.
v. Φιλιππόπολις.) Alexander would cross Mount Hæmus, then,
somewhere north-west of Philippopolis. We read in the year 376
B. C. (Diodor. xv. 36) of an invasion of Abdêra by the
Triballi; which shows that there was a road, not unfit for an
army, from their territory to the eastern side of the mouth of
the river Nestus, where Abdêra was situated. This was the road
which Alexander is likely to have followed. But he must probably
have made a considerable circuit to the eastward; for the route
which Paul Lucas describes himself as having taken direct from
Philippopolis to Drama, can hardly have been fit for an army.

The river Lyginus may perhaps be the modern Isker, but this is
not certain. The Island called Peukê is still more perplexing.
Strabo speaks of it as if it were near the mouth of the Danube
(vii. p. 301-305). But it seems impossible that either the range
of the Triballi, or the march of Alexander, can have extended so
far eastward. Since Strabo (as well as Arrian) copied Alexander’s
march from Ptolemy, whose authority is very good, we are
compelled to suppose that there was a second island called Peukê
higher up the river.

The Geography of Thrace is so little known, that we cannot wonder
at our inability to identify these places. We are acquainted, and
that but imperfectly, with the two high roads, both starting from
Byzantium or Constantinople. 1. The one (called the King’s Road,
from having been in part the march of Xerxes in his invasion
of Greece, Livy, xxxix. 27; Herodot. vii. 115) crossing the
Hebrus and the Nestus, touching the northern coast of the Ægean
Sea at Neapolis, a little south of Philippi, then crossing the
Strymon at Amphipolis, and stretching through Pella across Inner
Macedonia and Illyria to Dyrrachium (the Via Egnatia). 2. The
other, taking a more northerly course, passing along the upper
valley of the Hebrus from Adrianople to Philippopolis, then
through Sardicia (Sophia) and Naissus (Nisch), to the Danube near
Belgrade; being the high road now followed from Constantinople to
Belgrade.

But apart from these two roads, scarcely anything whatever is
known of the country. Especially the mountainous region of
Rhodopê, bounded on the west by the Strymon, on the north and
east by the Hebrus, and on the south by the Ægean, is a Terra
Incognita, except the few Grecian colonies on the coast. Very few
travellers have passed along, or described the southern or King’s
Road, while the region in the interior, apart from the high
road, was absolutely unexplored until the visit of M. Viquesnel
in 1847, under scientific mission from the French government.
The brief, but interesting account, composed by M. Viquesnel,
of this rugged and impracticable district, is contained in the
“Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Litteraires”, for 1850,
published at Paris. Unfortunately, the map intended to accompany
that account has not yet been prepared; but the published data,
as far as they go, have been employed by Kiepert in constructing
his recent map of Turkey in Europe; the best map of these regions
now existing, though still very imperfect. The Illustrations
(Erläuterungen) annexed by Kiepert to his map of Turkey, show
the defective data on which the chartography of this country is
founded. Until the survey of M. Viquesnel, the higher part of the
course of the Strymon, and nearly all the course of the Nestus,
may be said to have been wholly unknown.

The terror spread by Alexander’s military operations was so great, that not only the Triballi, but the other autonomous Thracians around, sent envoys tendering presents or tribute, and soliciting peace. Alexander granted their request. His mind being bent upon war with Asia, he was satisfied with having intimidated these tribes so as to deter them from rising during his absence. What conditions he imposed, we do not know, but he accepted the presents.[62]

[62] Arrian, i. 4, 5; Strabo, vii. p. 301.

While these applications from the Thracians were under debate, envoys arrived from a tribe of Gauls occupying a distant mountainous region westward towards the Ionic Gulf. Though strangers to Alexander, they had heard so much of the recent exploits, that they came with demands to be admitted to his friendship. They were distinguished both for tall stature and for boastful language. Alexander readily exchanged with them assurances of alliance. Entertaining them at a feast, he asked, in the course of conversation, what it was that they were most afraid of, among human contingencies? They replied, that they feared no man, nor any danger, except only, lest the heaven should fall upon them. Their answer disappointed Alexander, who had expected that they would name him, as the person of whom they were most afraid; so prodigious was his conceit of his own exploits. He observed to his friends that these Gauls were swaggerers. Yet if we attend to the sentiment rather than the language, we shall see that such an epithet applies with equal or greater propriety to Alexander himself. The anecdote is chiefly interesting as it proves at how early an age the exorbitant self-esteem, which we shall hereafter find him manifesting, began. That after the battle of Issus he should fancy himself superhuman, we can hardly be astonished; but he was as yet only in the first year of his reign, and had accomplished nothing beyond his march into Thrace and his victory over the Triballi.

After arranging these matters, he marched in a south-westerly direction into the territory of the Agriânes and the other Pæonians, between the rivers Strymon and Axius in the highest portion of their course. Here he was met by a body of Agriânes under their prince Langarus, who had already contracted a personal friendship for him at Pella before Philip’s death. News came that the Illyrian Kleitus, son of Bardylis, who had been subdued by Philip, had revolted at Pelion (a strong post south of lake Lychnidus, on the west side of the chain of Skardus and Pindus, near the place where that chain is broken by the cleft called the Klissura of Tzangon or Devol[63])—and that the western Illyrians, called Taulantii, under their prince Glaukias, were on the march to assist him. Accordingly Alexander proceeded thither forthwith, leaving Langarus to deal with the Illyrian tribe Autariatæ, who had threatened to oppose his progress. He marched along the bank and up the course of the Erigon, from a point near where it joins the Axius.[64] On approaching Pelion, he found the Illyrians posted in front of the town and on the heights around, awaiting the arrival of Glaukias their promised ally. While Alexander was making his dispositions for attack, they offered their sacrifices to the gods: the victims being three boys, three girls, and three black rams. At first they stepped boldly forward to meet him, but before coming to close quarters, they turned and fled into the town with such haste that the slain victims were left lying on the spot.[65] Having thus driven in the defenders, Alexander was preparing to draw a wall of circumvallation round the Pelion, when he was interrupted by the arrival of Glaukias with so large a force as to compel him to abandon the project. A body of cavalry, sent out from the Macedonian camp under Philotas to forage, were in danger of being cut off by Glaukias, and were only rescued by the arrival of Alexander himself with a reinforcement. In the face of this superior force, it was necessary to bring off the Macedonian army, through a narrow line of road along the river Eordaikus, where in some places there was only room for four abreast, with hill or marsh everywhere around. By a series of bold and skilful manœuvres, and by effective employment of his battering-train or projectile machines to protect the rear-guard, Alexander completely baffled the enemy, and brought off his army without loss.[66] Moreover these Illyrians, who had not known how to make use of such advantages of position, abandoned themselves to disorder as soon as their enemy had retreated, neglecting all precautions for the safety of their camp. Apprised of this carelessness, Alexander made a forced night-march back, at the head of his Agrianian division and light troops supported by the remaining army. He surprised the Illyrians in their camp before daylight. The success of this attack against a sleeping and unguarded army was so complete, that the Illyrians fled at once without resistance. Many were slain or taken prisoners; the rest, throwing away their arms, hurried away homeward, pursued by Alexander for a considerable distance. The Illyrian prince Kleitus was forced to evacuate Pelion, which place he burned, and then retired into the territory of Glaukias.[67]

[63] For the situation of Pelion, compare Livy, xxxi. 33, 34, and
the remarks of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol.
iii. ch. 28. p. 310-324.

[64] Assuming Alexander to have been in the Territory of the
Triballi, the modern Servia, he would in this march follow mainly
the road which is now frequented between Belgrade and Bitolia;
through the plain of Kossovo, Pristina, Katschanik (rounding
on the north-eastern side the Ljubatrin, the north-eastern
promontory terminating the chain of Skardus), Uschkub, Kuprili,
along the higher course of the Axius or Vardar, until the point
where the Erigon or Tscherna joins that river below Kuprili. Here
he would be among the Pæonians and Agrianes, on the east—and the
Dardani and Autariatæ, seemingly on the north and west. If he
then followed the course of the Erigon, he would pass through
the portions of Macedonia then called Deuripia and Pelagonia:
he would go between the ridges of the mountains, through which
the Erigon breaks, called Nidje on the south, and Babuna on the
north. He would pass afterwards to Florina, and not to Bitolia.

See Kiepert’s map of these regions—a portion of his recent map of
Turkey in Europe—and Griesbach’s description of the general track.

[65] Arrian, i. 5, 12.

[66] Arrian, i. 6, 3-18.

[67] Arrian, i. 6, 19-22.

Just as Alexander had completed this victory over Kleitus and the Taulantian auxiliaries, and before he had returned home, news reached him of a menacing character. The Thebans had declared themselves independent of him, and were besieging his garrison in the Kadmeia.

Of this event, alike important and disastrous to those who stood forward, the immediate antecedents are very imperfectly known to us. It has already been remarked that the vote of submission on the part of the Greeks to Alexander as Imperator, during the preceding autumn, had been passed only under the intimidation of a present Macedonian force. Though the Spartans alone had courage to proclaim their dissent, the Athenians, Arcadians, Ætolians, and others, were well known even to Alexander himself, as ready to do the like on any serious reverse to the Macedonian arms.[68] Moreover the energy and ability displayed by Alexander had taught the Persian king that all danger to himself was not removed by the death of Philip, and induced him either to send, or to promise, pecuniary aid to the anti-Macedonian Greeks. We have already noticed the manifestation of anti-Macedonian sentiment at Athens—proclaimed by several of the most eminent orators—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others; as well as by active military men like Charidemus and Ephialtes,[69] who probably spoke out more boldly when Alexander was absent on the Danube. In other cities, the same sentiment doubtless found advocates, though less distinguished; but at Thebes, where it could not be openly proclaimed, it prevailed with the greatest force.[70] The Thebans suffered an oppression from which most of the other cities were free—the presence of a Macedonian garrison in their citadel; just as they had endured, fifty years before, the curb of a Spartan garrison after the fraud of Phœbidas and Leontiades. In this case, as in the former, the effect was to arm the macedonizing leaders with absolute power over their fellow-citizens, and to inflict upon the latter not merely the public mischief of extinguishing all free speech, but also multiplied individual insults and injuries, prompted by the lust and rapacity of rulers, foreign as well as domestic.[71] A number of Theban citizens, among them the freest and boldest spirits, were in exile at Athens, receiving from the public indeed nothing beyond a safe home, but secretly encouraged to hope for better things by Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian leaders.[72] In like manner, fifty years before, it was at Athens, and from private Athenian citizens, that the Thebans Pelopidas and Mellon had found that sympathy which enabled them to organize their daring conspiracy for rescuing Thebes from the Spartans. That enterprise, admired throughout Greece as alike adventurous, skilful, and heroic, was the model present to the imagination of the Theban exiles, to be copied if any tolerable opportunity occurred.

[68] Arrian, i. 7, 5.

[69] Ælian, V. H. xii. 57.

[70] Demades, ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 14. Θηβαῖοι δὲ μέγιστον
εἶχον δεσμὸν τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων φρουρὰν, ὑφ᾽ ἧς οὐ μόνον τὰς
χεῖρας συνεδέθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν παῤῥησίαν ἀφῄρηντο....

[71] The Thebans, in setting forth their complaints to the
Arcadians, stated—ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας φιλίαν Θηβαῖοι
διαλῦσαι βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπανέστησαν, οὐδ᾽ ἐναντίον
τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδὲν πράξοντες, ~ἀλλὰ τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν
Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γινόμενα φέρειν οὐκέτι δυνάμενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν
δούλειαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὕβρεις ὁρᾷν τὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλεύθερα
σώματα γινομένας~.

See Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 13, the speech of Cleadas,
Justin, xi. 4; and (Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 20) compare
Livy, xxxix. 27—about the working of the Macedonian garrison at
Maroncia, in the time of Philip son of Demetrius.

[72] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, Fragm. ad fin.

Such was the feeling in Greece, during the long absence of Alexander on his march into Thrace and Illyria; a period of four or five months, ending at August 335 B. C. Not only was Alexander thus long absent, but he sent home no reports of his proceedings. Couriers were likely enough to be intercepted among the mountains and robbers of Thrace; and even if they reached Pella, their despatches were not publicly read, as such communications would have been read to the Athenian assembly. Accordingly we are not surprised to hear that rumors arose of his having been defeated and slain. Among these reports, both multiplied and confident, one was even certified by a liar who pretended to have just arrived from Thrace, to have been an eye-witness of the fact, and to have been himself wounded in the action against the Triballi, where Alexander had perished.[73] This welcome news, not fabricated, but too hastily credited, by Demosthenes and Lykurgus,[74] was announced to the Athenian assembly. In spite of doubts expressed by Demades and Phokion, it was believed not only by the Athenians and the Theban exiles there present, but also by the Arcadians, Eleians, Ætolians and other Greeks. For a considerable time, through the absence of Alexander, it remained uncontradicted, which increased the confidence in its truth.

[73] Arrian, i. 7, 3. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺς ὁ λόγος (of the death of
Alexander) καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν ἐφοίτα, ὅτι τε χρόνον ἀπῆν οὐκ ὀλίγον
καὶ ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀγγελία παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀφῖκτο, etc.

[74] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, ad fin. ἡνίκα Δημοσθένης
καὶ Λυκοῦργος τῷ μὲν λόγῳ παραταττόμενοι τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐνίκων
ἐν Τριβάλλοις, μόνον δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος νεκρὸν τὸν
Ἀλέξανδρον προέθηκαν ... ἐμὲ δὲ στυγνὸν καὶ περίλυπον ἔφασκον
εἶναι μὴ συνευδοκοῦντα, etc.

Justin, xi. 2. “Demosthenem oratorem, qui Macedonum deletas omnes
cum rege copias à Triballis affirmaverit, producto in concionem
auctore, qui in eo praelio, in quo rex ceciderit, se quoque
vulneratum diceret.”

Compare Tacitus, Histor. i. 34. “Vix dum egresso Pisone, occisum
in castris Othonem, vagus primum et incertus rumor, mox, ut _in
magnis mendaciis, interfuisse se quidam, et vidisse affirmabant_,
credulà famâ inter gaudentes et incuriosos.... Obvius in
palatio Julius Atticus, speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans,
occisum _à se_ Othonem exclamavit.”

It is stated that Alexander was really wounded in the head by a
stone, in the action with the Illyrians (Plutarch, Fortun. Alex.
p. 327).

It was upon the full belief in this rumor, of Alexander’s defeat and death, that the Grecian cities proceeded. The event severed by itself their connection with Macedonia. There was neither son nor adult brother to succeed to the throne: so that not merely the foreign ascendency, but even the intestine unity, of Macedonia, was likely to be broken up. In regard to Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Ætolia, etc., the anti-Macedonian sentiment was doubtless vehemently manifested, but no special action was called for. It was otherwise in regard to Thebes. Phœnix, Prochytes, and other Theban exiles at Athens, immediately laid their plan for liberating their city and expelling the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia. Assisted with arms and money by Demosthenes and other Athenian citizens, and invited by their partisans at Thebes, they suddenly entered that city in arms. Though unable to carry the Kadmeia by surprise, they seized in the city, and put to death, Amyntas, a principal Macedonian officer, with Timolaus, one of the leading macedonizing Thebans.[75] They then immediately convoked a general assembly of the Thebans, to whom they earnestly appealed for a vigorous effort to expel the Macedonians, and reconquer the ancient freedom of the city. Expatiating upon the misdeeds of the garrison and upon the oppressions of those Thebans who governed by means of the garrison, they proclaimed that the happy moment of liberation had now arrived, through the recent death of Alexander. They doubtless recalled the memory of Pelopidas, and the glorious enterprise, cherished by all Theban patriots, whereby he had rescued the city from Spartan occupation, forty-six years before. To this appeal the Thebans cordially responded. The assembly passed a vote, declaring severance from Macedonia, and autonomy of Thebes—and naming as Bœotarchs some of the returned exiles, with others of the same party, for the purpose of energetic measures against the garrison in the Kadmeia.[76]

[75] Arrian, i. 7, 1: compare Deinarchus cont. Demosthenes, s.
75. p. 53.

[76] Arrian, i. 7, 3-17.

Unfortunately for Thebes, none of these new Bœotarchs were men of the stamp of Epaminondas, probably not even of Pelopidas. Yet their scheme, though from its melancholy result it is generally denounced as insane, really promised better at first than that of the anti-Spartan conspirators in 380 B. C. The Kadmeia was instantly summoned; hopes being perhaps indulged, that the Macedonian commander would surrender it with as little resistance as the Spartan harmost had done. But such hopes were not realized. Philip had probably caused the citadel to be both strengthened and provisioned. The garrison defied the Theban leaders, who did not feel themselves strong enough to give orders for an assault, as Pelopidas in his time was prepared to do, if surrender had been denied.[77] They contented themselves with drawing and guarding a double line of circumvallation round the Kadmeia, so as to prevent both sallies from within and supplies from without.[78] They then sent envoys in the melancholy equipment of suppliants, to the Arcadians and others, representing that their recent movement was directed, not against Hellenic union, but against Macedonian oppression and outrage, which pressed upon them with intolerable bitterness. As Greeks and freemen, they entreated aid to rescue them from such a calamity. They obtained much favorable sympathy, with some promise and even half-performance. Many of the leading orators at Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others—together with the military men Charidemus and Ephialtes—strongly urged their countrymen to declare in favor of Thebes and send aid against the Kadmeia. But the citizens generally, following Demades and Phokion, waited to be better assured both of Alexander’s death and of its consequences, before they would incur the hazard of open hostility against Macedonia, though they seem to have declared sympathy with the Theban revolution.[79] Demosthenes farther went as envoy into Peloponnesus, while the Macedonian Antipater also sent round urgent applications to the Peloponnesian cities, requiring their contingents, as members of the confederacy under Alexander, to act against Thebes. The eloquence of Demosthenes, backed by his money, or by Persian money administered through him, prevailed on the Peloponnesians to refuse compliance with Antipater and to send no contingents against Thebes.[80] The Eleians and Ætolians held out general assurances favorable to the revolution at Thebes, while the Arcadians even went so far as to send out some troops to second it, though they did not advance beyond the isthmus.[81]

[77] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 11. See Volume X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 81 of
this History.

[78] Arrian, i. 7, 14.

[79] Diodor. xvii. 8.

[80] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14. s. 19. καὶ Ἀρκάδων ἡκόντων
εἰς εσθμὸν, καὶ τὴν μὲν παρὰ Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβείαν ἄπρακτον
ἀποστειλάντων, etc.

In the vote passed by the people of Athens some years afterwards,
awarding a statue and other honors to Demosthenes, these
proceedings in Peloponnesus are enumerated among his titles
to public gratitude—καὶ ὡς ἐκώλυσε Πελοποννησίους ἐπὶ Θήβας
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βοηθῆσαι, χρήματα δοὺς καὶ αὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας, etc.
(Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 850).

[81] Arrian, i. 10, 2; Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 634.

Here was a crisis in Grecian affairs, opening new possibilities for the recovery of freedom. Had the Arcadians and other Greeks lent decisive aid to Thebes—had Athens acted even with as much energy as she did twelve years afterwards during the Lamian war, occupying Thermopylæ with an army and a fleet—the gates of Greece might well have been barred against a new Macedonian force, even with Alexander alive and at its head. That the struggle of Thebes was not regarded at the time, even by macedonizing Greeks, as hopeless, is shown by the subsequent observations both of Æschines and Deinarchus at Athens. Æschines (delivering five years afterwards his oration against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having by his perverse backwardness brought about the ruin of Thebes. The foreign mercenaries forming part of the garrison of the Kadmeia were ready (Æschines affirms) to deliver up that fortress, on receiving five talents: the Arcadian generals would have brought up their troops to the aid of Thebes, if nine or ten talents had been paid to them—having repudiated the solicitations of Antipater. Demosthenes (say these two orators) having in his possession 300 talents from the Persian king, to instigate anti-Macedonian movements in Greece, was supplicated by the Theban envoys to furnish money for these purposes, but refused the request, kept the money for himself, and thus prevented both the surrender of the Kadmeia and the onward march of the Arcadians.[82] The charge here advanced against Demosthenes appears utterly incredible. To suppose that anti-Macedonian movements counted for so little in his eyes, is an hypothesis belied by his whole history. But the fact that such allegations were made by Æschines only five years afterwards, proves the reports and the feelings of the time—that the chances of successful resistance to Macedonia on the part of the Thebans were not deemed unfavorable. And when the Athenians, following the counsels of Demades and Phokion, refused to aid Thebes or occupy Thermopylæ—they perhaps consulted the safety of Athens separately, but they receded from the generous and Pan-hellenic patriotism which had animated their ancestors against Xerxes and Mardonius.[83]

[82] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarch. adv. Demosth. p.
15, 16. s. 19-22.

[83] See Herod. viii. 143. Demosthenes in his orations frequently
insists on the different rank and position of Athens, as compared
with those of the smaller Grecian states—and of the higher and
more arduous obligations consequent thereupon. This is one grand
point of distinction between his policy and that of Phokion. See
a striking passage in the speech De Coronâ, p. 245. s. 77; and
Orat. De Republ. Ordinand. p. 176. s. 37.

Isokrates holds the same language touching the obligations of
Sparta,—in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus.
“No one will quarrel with Epidaurians and Phliasians, for looking
only how they can get through and keep themselves in being. But
for Lacedæmonians, it is impossible to aim simply at preservation
and nothing beyond—by any means, whatever they may be. If we
cannot preserve ourselves with honor, we ought to prefer a
glorious death.” (Isokrates, Orat. vi. Archid. s. 106.)

The backward and narrow policy, which Isokrates here proclaims
as fit for Epidaurus and Phlius, but not for Sparta—is precisely
what Phokion always recommended for Athens, even while Philip’s
power was yet nascent and unsettled.

The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awe-striking event—Alexander arriving in person at Onchêstus in Bœotia, at the head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was furnished by his arrival at Onchêstus. No one could at first believe the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander, the son of Aëropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.[84]

[84] Arrian, i. 7, 9.

In this incident we may note two features, which characterized Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement, and no less remarkable favor of fortune. Had news of the Theban rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant Triballi,—or even when embarrassed in the difficult region round Pelion,—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save the Kadmeia. But he learnt it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march into Greece without going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon (or of the river Devol), near which Alexander’s last victories were gained, his road lay southward, following downwards in part the higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the regions called Eordæa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied by the Epirots called Tymphæi and Parauæi, were on the right. On the seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambunian mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinna. Six days more brought him to the Bœotian Onchestus.[85] He was already within Thermopylæ, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march, or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylæ by a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B. C., against the Phokians.

[85] Arrian, i. 7. 6. See, respecting this region, Colonel
Leake’s Travels in Northern Greece, ch. vi. p. 300-304; ch.
xxviii. p. 303-305, etc.; and for Alexander’s line of march, the
map at the end of the volume.

His arrival, in itself a most formidable event, told with double force on the Greeks from its extreme suddenness. We can hardly doubt that both Athenians and Thebans had communications at Pella—that they looked upon any Macedonian invasion as likely to come from thence—and that they expected Alexander himself (assuming him to be still living, contrary to their belief) back in his capital before he began any new enterprise. Upon this hypothesis—in itself probable, and such as would have been realized if Alexander had not already advanced so far southward at the moment when he received the news[86]—they would at least have known beforehand of his approach, and would have had the option of a defensive combination open. As it happened, his unexpected appearance in the heart of Greece precluded all combinations, and checked all idea of resistance.

[86] Diodorus (xvii. 9) incorrectly says that Alexander came back
unexpectedly from _Thrace_. Had this been the fact, he would have
come by Pella.

Two days after his arrival in Bœotia, he marched his army round Thebes, so as to encamp on the south side of the city; whereby he both intercepted the communication of the Thebans with Athens, and exhibited his force more visibly to the garrison in the Kadmeia. The Thebans, though alone and without hope of succor, maintained their courage unshaken. Alexander deferred the attack for a day or two, in hopes that they would submit; he wished to avoid an assault which might cost the lives of many of his soldiers, whom he required for his Asiatic schemes. He even made public proclamation,[87] demanding the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders Phœnix and Prochytes, but offering to any other Theban who chose to quit the city, permission to come and join him on the terms of the convention sworn in the preceding autumn. A general assembly being convened, the macedonizing Thebans enforced the prudence of submission to an irresistible force. But the leaders recently returned from exile, who had headed the rising, warmly opposed this proposition, contending for resistance to the death. In them, such resolution may not be wonderful, since (as Arrian[88] remarks) they had gone too far to hope for lenity. As it appears however that the mass of citizens deliberately adopted the same resolution, in spite of strong persuasion to the contrary,[89] we see plainly that they had already felt the bitterness of Macedonian dominion, and that sooner than endure a renewal of it, sure to be yet worse, coupled with the dishonor of surrendering their leaders—they had made up their minds to perish with the freedom of their city. At a time when the sentiment of Hellas as an autonomous system was passing away, and when Grecian courage was degenerating into a mere instrument for the aggrandizement of Macedonian chiefs, these countrymen of Epaminondas and Pelopidas set an example of devoted self-sacrifice in the cause of Grecian liberty, not less honorable than that of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, and only less esteemed because it proved infructuous.

[87] Diodor. xvii. 9; Plutarch. Alexand. 11.

[88] Arrian, i. 7, 16.

[89] Diodor. xvii. 9.

In reply to the proclamation of Alexander, the Thebans made from their walls a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of his officers Antipater and Philotas, and inviting every one to join them, who desired, in concert with the Persian king and the Thebans, to liberate the Greeks and put down the despot of Hellas.[90] Such a haughty defiance and retort incensed Alexander to the quick. He brought up his battering engines and prepared everything for storming the town. Of the murderous assault which followed, we find different accounts, not agreeing with each other, yet not wholly irreconcilable. It appears that the Thebans had erected, probably in connection with their operations against the Kadmeia, an outwork defended by a double palisade. Their walls were guarded by the least effective soldiers, metics and liberated slaves; while their best troops were bold enough to go forth in front of the gates and give battle. Alexander divided his army into three divisions; one under Perdikkas and Amyntas, against the outwork—a second, destined to combat the Thebans who sallied out—and a third, held in reserve. Between the second of these three divisions, and the Thebans in front of the gates, the battle was so obstinately contested, that success at one time seemed doubtful, and Alexander was forced to order up his reserve. The first Macedonian success was gained by Perdikkas,[91] who, aided by the division of Amyntas and also by the Agrianian regiment and the bowmen carried the first of the two outworks, as well as a postern gate which had been left unguarded. His troops also stormed the second outwork, though he himself was severely wounded and borne away to the camp. Here the Theban defenders fled back into the city, along the hollow way which led to the temple of Herakles, pursued by the light troops, in advance of the rest. Upon these men, however, the Thebans presently turned, repelling them with the loss of Eurybotas their commanding officer and seventy men slain. In pursuing these bowmen, the ranks of the Thebans became somewhat disordered, so that they were unable to resist the steady charge of the Macedonian guards and heavy infantry coming up in support. They were broken, and pushed back into the city; their rout being rendered still more complete by a sally of the Macedonian garrison out of the Kadmeia. The assailants being victorious on this side, the Thebans who were maintaining the combat without the gates were compelled to retreat, and the advancing Macedonians forced their way into the town along with them. Within the town, however, the fighting still continued; the Thebans resisting in organized bodies as long as they could; and when broken, still resisting even single-handed. None of the military population sued for mercy; most of them were slain in the streets; but a few cavalry and infantry cut their way out into the plain and escaped. The fight now degenerated into a carnage. The Macedonians with their Pæonian contingents were incensed with the obstinate resistance; while various Greeks serving as auxiliaries—Phokians, Orchomenians, Thespians, Platæans,—had to avenge ancient and grievous injuries endured from Thebes. Such furious feelings were satiated by an indiscriminate massacre of all who came in their way, without distinction of age or sex—old men, women, and children, in houses and even in temples. This wholesale slaughter was accompanied of course by all the plunder and manifold outrage with which victorious assailants usually reward themselves.[92]

[90] Diodor. xvii. 9.

[91] The attack of Perdikkas was represented by Ptolemy, from
whom Arrian copies (i. 8, 1), not only as being the first
and only attack made by the Macedonian army on Thebes, but
also as made by Perdikkas _without orders from Alexander_,
who was forced to support it in order to preserve Perdikkas
from being overwhelmed by the Thebans. According to Ptolemy
and Arrian, therefore, the storming of Thebes took place both
without the orders, and against the wishes, of Alexander; the
capture moreover was effected rapidly with little trouble to
the besieging army (ἡ ἅλωσις δι᾽ ὀλίγου τε καὶ ~οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ τῶν
ἑλόντων~ ξυνενεχθεῖσα, Arr. i. 9, 9): the bloodshed and pillage
was committed by the vindictive sentiment of the Bœotian allies.

Diodorus had before him a very different account. He affirms that
Alexander both combined and ordered the assault—that the Thebans
behaved like bold and desperate men, resisting obstinately and
for a long time—that the slaughter afterwards was committed by
the general body of the assailants; the Bœotian allies being
doubtless conspicuous among them. Diodorus gives this account at
some length, and with his customary rhetorical amplifications.
Plutarch and Justin are more brief; but coincide in the same
general view, and not in that of Arrian. Polyænus again (iv. 3
12) gives something different from all.

To me it appears that the narrative of Diodorus is (in its
basis, and striking off rhetorical amplifications) more credible
than that of Arrian. Admitting the attack made by Perdikkas,
I conceive it to have been a portion of the general plan of
Alexander. I cannot think it probable that Perdikkas attacked
without orders, or that Thebes was captured with little
resistance. It was captured by _one_ assault (Æschines adv.
Ktesiph. p. 524), but by an assault well-combined and stoutly
contested—not by one begun without preparation or order, and
successful after hardly any resistance. Alexander, after having
offered what he thought liberal terms, was not the man to shrink
from carrying his point by force; nor would the Thebans have
refused those terms, unless their minds had been made up for
strenuous and desperate defence, without hope of ultimate success.

What authority Diodorus followed, we do not know. He may have
followed Kleitarchus, a contemporary and an Æolian, who must have
had good means of information respecting such an event as the
capture of Thebes (see Geier, Alexandri M. Historiarum Scriptores
ætate suppares, Leips. 1844, p. 6-152; and Vossius, De Historicis
Græcis. i. x. p. 90, ed. Westermann). I have due respect for the
authority of Ptolemy, but I cannot go along with Geier and other
critics who set aside all other witnesses, even contemporary,
respecting Alexander, as worthy of little credit, unless where
such witnesses are confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus. We must
remember that Ptolemy did not compose his book until after he
became king of Egypt, in 306 B. C.; nor indeed until
after the battle of Ipsus in 301, according to Geier (p. 1);
at least twenty-nine years after the sack of Thebes. Moreover,
Ptolemy was not ashamed of what Geier calls (p. 11) the “pious
fraud” of announcing, that two speaking serpents conducted the
army of Alexander to the holy precinct of Zeus Ammon (Arrian,
iii. 3). Lastly, it will be found that the depositions which are
found in other historians, but not in Ptolemy and Aristobulus,
relate principally to matters discreditable to Alexander. That
Ptolemy and Aristobulus _omitted_, is in my judgment far more
probable, than that other historians _invented_. Admiring
biographers would easily excuse themselves for refusing to
proclaim to the world such acts as the massacre of the Branchidæ,
or the dragging of the wounded Batiz at Gaza.

[92] Arrian, i. 8; Diodor. xvii. 12, 13.

More than five hundred Macedonians are asserted to have been slain, and six thousand Thebans. Thirty thousand captives were collected.[93] The final destiny of these captives, and of Thebes itself, was submitted by Alexander to the Orchomenians, Platæans, Phokians, and other Grecian auxiliaries in the assault. He must have known well beforehand what the sentence of such judges would be. They pronounced, that the city of Thebes should be razed to the ground: that the Kadmeia alone should be maintained, as a military post with Macedonian garrison: that the Theban territory should be distributed among the allies themselves: that Orchomenus and Platæa should be rebuilt and fortified: that all the captive Thebans, men, women, and children, should be sold as slaves—excepting only priests and priestesses, and such as were connected by recognized ties of hospitality with Philip or Alexander, or such as had been _proxeni_ of the Macedonians; that the Thebans who had escaped should be proclaimed outlaws, liable to arrest and death, wherever they were found; and that every Grecian city should be interdicted from harboring them.[94]

[93] Diodorus (xvii. 14) and Plutarch (Alexand. 11) agree in
giving the totals of 6000 and 30,000.

[94] Arrian, i. 9; Diodor. xvii. 14.

This overwhelming sentence, in spite of an appeal for lenity by a Theban[95] named Kleadas, was passed by the Grecian auxiliaries of Alexander, and executed by Alexander himself, who made but one addition to the excepting clauses. He left the house of Pindar standing, and spared the descendants of the poet. With these reserves, Thebes was effaced from the earth. The Theban territory was partitioned among the reconstituted cities of Orchomenus and Platæa. Nothing, except the Macedonian military post at the Kadmeia, remained to mark the place where the chief of the Bœotian confederacy had once stood. The captives were all sold, and are said to have yielded 440 talents; large prices being offered by bidders from feelings of hostility towards the city.[96] Diodorus tells us that this sentence was passed by the general synod of Greeks. But we are not called upon to believe that this synod, subservient though it was sure to be when called upon to deliberate under the armed force of Alexander, could be brought to sanction such a ruin upon one of the first and most ancient Hellenic cities. For we learn from Arrian that the question was discussed and settled only by the Grecian auxiliaries who had taken part with Alexander;[97] and that the sentence therefore represents the bitter antipathies of the Orchomenians, Platæans, etc. Without doubt, these cities had sustained harsh and cruel treatment from Thebes. In so far as they were concerned, the retribution upon the Thebans was merited. Those persons, however, who (as Arrian tells us) pronounced the catastrophe to be a divine judgment upon Thebes for having joined Xerxes against Greece[98] a century and a half before,—must have forgotten that not only the Orchomenians, but even Alexander of Macedon, the namesake and predecessor of the destroying conqueror, had served in the army of Xerxes along with the Thebans.

[95] Justin, xi. 4.

[96] Diodor. xvii. 14; Justin, xi. 4: “pretium non ex ementium
commodo, sed ex inimicorum odio extenditur.”

[97] Arrian, i. 9, 13. Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου ξυμμάχοις,
οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέτρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι,
ἔδοξε, etc.

[98] Arrian, i. 9, 10. He informs us (i. 9, 12) that there were
many previous portents which foreshadowed this ruin: Diodorus
(xvii. 10) on the contrary, enumerates many previous signs, all
tending to encourage the Thebans.

Arrian vainly endeavors to transfer from Alexander to the minor Bœotian towns the odium of this cruel destruction—unparalleled in Grecian history (as he himself says), when we look to the magnitude of the city; yet surpassed in the aggregate by the subversion, under the arms of Philip, of no less than thirty-two free Chalkidic cities, thirteen years before. The known antipathy of these Bœotians was invoked by Alexander to color an infliction which satisfied at once his sentiment, by destroying an enemy who defied him—and his policy, by serving as a terrific example to keep down other Greeks.[99] But though such were the views which governed him at the moment, he came afterwards to look back upon the proceeding with shame and sorrow. The shock to Hellenic feeling, when a city was subverted, arose not merely from the violent extinction of life, property, liberty, and social or political institutions—but also from the obliteration of legends and the suppression of religious observances, thus wronging and provoking the local gods and heroes. We shall presently find Alexander himself sacrificing at Ilium,[100] in order to appease the wrath of Priam, still subsisting and efficacious, against himself and his race, as being descended from Neoptolemus the slayer of Priam. By his harsh treatment of Thebes, he incurred the displeasure of Dionysus, the god of wine, said to have been born in that city, and one of the principal figures in Theban legend. It was to inspirations of the offended Dionysus that Alexander believed himself to owe that ungovernable drunken passion under which he afterwards killed Kleitus, as well as the refusal of his Macedonian soldiers to follow him farther into India.[101] If Alexander in after days thus repented of his own act, we may be sure that the like repugnance was felt still more strongly by others; and we can understand the sentiment under which, a few years after his decease, the Macedonian Kassander, son of Antipater, restored the destroyed city.

[99] Plutarch, Alex. 11. ἡ μὲν πόλις ἥλω καὶ διαρπασθεῖσα
κατεσκάφη, τὸ μὲν ὅλον προσδοκήσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πάθει
τηλικούτῳ ἐκπλαγέντας καὶ πτήξαντας ἀτρεμήσειν, ἄλλως δὲ καὶ
καλλωπισαμένου χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν.

[100] Arrian, i. 11, 13. To illustrate farther the feeling of
the Greeks, respecting the wrath of the gods arising from the
discontinuance of worship where it had been long continued—I
transcribe a passage from Colonel Sleeman’s work respecting the
Hindoos, whose religious feelings are on so many points analogous
to those of the Hellênes:—

“Human sacrifices were certainly offered in the city of Saugor
during the whole Mahratta government, up to the year 1800—when
they were put a stop to by the local governor, Assa Sahib, a very
humane man. I once heard a learned Brahmin priest say, that he
thought the decline of his (Assa Sahib’s) family and government
arose from this innovation. ‘There is (said he) no sin in not
offering human sacrifices to the gods, where none have been
offered; _but where the gods have been accustomed to them, they
are very naturally annoyed when the rite is abolished, and visit
the place and the people with all kinds of calamity_.’ The priest
did not seem to think that there was anything singular in this
mode of reasoning: perhaps three Brahmin priests out of four
would have reasoned in the same manner.” (Sleeman, Rambles and
Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. xv. p. 130).

[101] Plutarch, Alex. 13: compare Justin, xi. 4; and Isokrates ad
Philipp. (Or. v. s. 35), where he recommends Thebes to Philip on
the ground of pre-eminent worship towards Herakles.

It deserves notice, that while Alexander himself repented of
the destruction of Thebes, the macedonizing orator at Athens
describes it as a just, though deplorable penalty, brought by the
Thebans upon themselves by reckless insanity of conduct (Æschines
adv. Ktesiph. p. 524).

At the time, however, the effect produced by the destruction of Thebes was one of unmitigated terror throughout the Grecian cities. All of them sought to make their peace with the conqueror. The Arcadian contingent not only returned home from the Isthmus, but even condemned their leaders to death. The Eleians recalled their chief macedonizing citizens out of exile into ascendency at home. Each tribe of Ætolians sent envoys to Alexander, entreating forgiveness for the manifestations against him. At Athens, we read with surprise that on the very day when Thebes was assaulted and taken, the great festival of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, with its multitudinous procession of votaries from Athens to Eleusis, was actually taking place, at a distance of two days’ march from the besieged city. Most Theban fugitives who contrived to escape, fled to Attica as the nearest place of refuge, communicating to the Athenians their own distress and terror. The festival was forthwith suspended. Every one hurried within the walls of Athens,[102] carrying with him his movable property into a state of security. Under the general alarm prevalent, that the conqueror would march directly into Attica, and under the hurry of preparation for defence,—the persons both most alarmed and most in real danger were, of course, Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Charidemus, and those others who had been loudest in speech against Macedonia, and had tried to prevail on the Athenians to espouse openly the cause of Thebes. Yet notwithstanding such terror of consequences to themselves, the Athenians afforded shelter and sympathy to the miserable Theban fugitives. They continued to do this even when they must have known that they were contravening the edict of proscription just sanctioned by Alexander.

[102] Arrian, i. 10, 4.

Shortly afterwards, envoys arrived from that monarch with a menacing letter, formally demanding the surrender of eight or ten leading citizens of Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, Polyeuktus, Mœroklês, Diotimus,[103] Ephialtes, and Charidemus. Of these the first four were eminent orators, the last two military men; all strenuous advocates of an anti-Macedonian policy. Alexander in his letter denounced the ten as the causes of the battle of Chæroneia, of the offensive resolutions which had been adopted at Athens after the death of Philip, and even of the recent hostile proceedings of the Thebans.[104] This momentous summons, involving the right of free speech and public debate at Athens, was submitted to the assembly. A similar demand had just been made upon the Thebans, and the consequences of refusal were to be read no less plainly in the destruction of their city than in the threats of the conqueror. That even under such trying circumstances, neither orators nor people failed in courage—we know as a general fact; though we have not the advantage (as Livy had in his time) of reading the speeches made in the debate.[105] Demosthenes, insisting that the fate of the citizens generally could not be severed from that of the specific victims, is said to have recounted in the course of his speech, the old fable—of the wolf requiring the sheep to make over to him their protecting dogs, as a condition of peace—and then, devouring the unprotected sheep forthwith. He, and those demanded along with him, claimed the protection of the people, in whose cause alone they had incurred the wrath of the conqueror. Phokion on the other hand—silent at first, and rising only under constraint by special calls from the popular voice—contended that there was not force enough to resist Alexander, and that the persons in question must be given up. He even made appeal to themselves individually, reminding them of the self-devotion of the daughters of Erechtheus, memorable in Attic legend—and calling on them to surrender themselves voluntarily for the purpose of perverting public calamity He added, that he (Phokion) would rejoice to offer up either himself, or his best friend, if by such sacrifice he could save the city.[106] Lykurgus, one of the orators whose extradition was required, answered this speech of Phokion with vehemence and bitterness; and the public sentiment went along with him, indignantly repudiating Phokion’s advice. By a resolute patriotism highly honorable at this trying juncture, it was decreed that the persons demanded should not be surrendered.[107]

[103] The name of Diotimus is mentioned by Arrian (i. 10, 6),
but not by Plutarch; who names Demon instead of him (Plutarch,
Demosth. c. 23) and Kallisthenes instead of Hyperides. We know
nothing about Diotimus, except that Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p.
264) alludes to him along with Charidemus, as having received
an expression of gratitude from the people, in requital for a
present of shields which he had made. He is mentioned also, along
with Charidemus and others, in the third of the Demosthenic
epistles, p. 1482.

[104] Arrian, i. 10, 6; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 847. ἐξῄτει
αὐτὸν (Demosthenes) ἀπειλὼν εἰ μὴ δοίησαν. Diodor. xvii. 15;
Plutarch, Demosth. 23.

[105] Livy; ix. 18. “(Alexander), adversus quem Athenis, in
civitate fractâ Macedonum armis, cernente tum maxime prope
fumantes Thebarum ruinas, concionari libere ausi sint homines,—id
quod ex monumentis orationum patet”, etc.

[106] Plutarch, Phokion, 9-17; Diodor. xvii. 15.

[107] Diodor. xvii. 15. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τοῦτον μὲν (Phokion) τοῖς
θορύβοις ἐξέβαλε, προσάντως ἀκούων τοὺς λόγους.