Chapter XCI (3)

On the motion of Demades, an embassy was sent to Alexander, deprecating his wrath against the ten, and engaging to punish them by judicial sentence, if any crime could be proved against them. Demades, who is said to have received from Demosthenes a bribe of five talents, undertook this mission. But Alexander was at first inexorable; refusing even to hear the envoys, and persisting in his requisition. It was only by the intervention of a second embassy, headed by Phokion, that a remission of terms was obtained. Alexander was persuaded to withdraw his requisition, and to be satisfied with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, the two anti-Macedonian military leaders. Both of them accordingly, and seemingly other Athenians with them, passed into Asia, where they took service under Darius.[108]

[108] Arrian, i. 10, 8; Diodor. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Phokion, 17;
Justin, xi. 4; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 26.

Arrian states that the visit of Demades with nine other Athenian
envoys to Alexander, occurred _prior_ to the demand of Alexander
for the extradition of the ten citizens. He (Arrian) affirms
that immediately on hearing the capture of Thebes, the Athenians
passed a vote, on the motion of Demades, to send ten envoys,
for the purpose of expressing satisfaction that Alexander had
come home safely from the Illyrians, and that he had punished
the Thebans for their revolt. Alexander (according to Arrian)
received this mission courteously, but replied by sending a
letter to the Athenian people, insisting on the surrender of the
ten citizens.

Now both Diodorus and Plutarch represent the mission of Demades
as _posterior_ to the demand made by Alexander for the ten
citizens; and that it was intended to meet and deprecate that
demand.

In my judgment, Arrian’s tale is the less credible of the two.
I think it highly improbable that the Athenians would by public
vote express satisfaction that Alexander had punished the Thebans
for their revolt. If the macedonizing party at Athens was strong
enough to carry so ignominious a vote, they would also have been
strong enough to carry the subsequent proposition of Phokion—that
the ten citizens demanded should be surrendered. The fact, that
the Athenians afforded willing shelter to the Theban fugitives,
is a farther reason for disbelieving this alleged vote.

It was indeed no part of Alexander’s plan to undertake a siege of Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw, that his demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax.

Phokion returned to Athens as the bearer of Alexander’s concessions, thus relieving the Athenians from extreme anxiety and peril. His influence—already great and of long standing, since for years past he had been perpetually re-elected general—became greater than ever, while that of Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators must have been lowered. It was no mean advantage to Alexander, victorious as he was, to secure the incorruptible Phokion as leader of the macedonizing party at Athens. His projects against Persia were mainly exposed to failure from the possibility of opposition being raised against him in Greece by the agency of Persian money and ships. To keep Athens out of such combinations, he had to rely upon the personal influence and party of Phokion, whom he knew to have always dissuaded her from resistance to the ever-growing aggrandizement of his father Philip. In his conversation with Phokion on the intended Asiatic expedition, Alexander took some pains to flatter the pride of Athens by describing her as second only to himself, and as entitled to the headship of Greece, in case any thing should happen to him.[109] Such compliments were suitable to be repeated in the Athenian assembly: indeed the Macedonian prince might naturally prefer the idea of Athenian headship to that of Spartan, seeing that Sparta stood aloof from him, an open recusant.

[109] Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Plutarch, Alexand. 13.

The animosity of Alexander being appeased, Athens resumed her position as a member of the confederacy under his imperial authority. Without visiting Attica, he now marched to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he probably received from various Grecian cities deputations deprecating his displeasure, and proclaiming their submission to his imperial authority. He also probably presided at a meeting of the Grecian synod, where he would dictate the contingents required for his intended Asiatic expedition in the ensuing spring. To the universal deference and submission which greeted him, one exception was found—the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, who resided at Corinth, satisfied with a tub for shelter, and with the coarsest and most self-denying existence. Alexander approached him with a numerous suite, and asked him if he wished for anything; upon which Diogenes is said to have replied,—“Nothing, except that you would stand a little out of my sunshine.” Both the philosopher and his reply provoked laughter from the bystanders, but Alexander himself was so impressed with the independent and self-sufficing character manifested, that he exclaimed,—“If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes.”[110]

[110] Plutarch, Alex. 14.

Having visited the oracle of Delphi, and received or extorted from the priestess[111] an answer bearing favorable promise for his Asiatic schemes, he returned to Macedonia before the winter. The most important permanent effect of his stay in Greece was the reconstitution of Bœotia; that is, the destruction of Thebes, and the reconstitution of Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa, dividing between them the Theban territory; all guarded and controlled by a Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. It would have been interesting to learn some details about this process of destruction and restitution of the Bœotian towns; a process not only calling forth strong manifestations of sentiment, but also involving important and difficult questions to settle. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know anything beyond the general fact.

[111] Plutarch, Alex. 14.

Alexander left Greece for Pella in the autumn of 335 B. C., and never saw it again.

It appears, that during this summer, while he was occupied in his Illyrian and Theban operations, the Macedonian force under Parmenio in Asia had had to contend against a Persian army, or Greek mercenaries, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian. Parmenio, marching into Æolis, besieged and took Grynium; after which he attacked Pitanê, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege. Memnon even gained a victory over the Macedonian force under Kallas in the Troad, compelling them to retire to Rhœteum. But he failed in an attempt to surprise Kyzikus, and was obliged to content himself with plundering the adjoining territory.[112] It is affirmed that Darius was engaged this summer in making large preparations, naval as well as military, to resist the intended expedition of Alexander. Yet all that we hear of what was actually done implies nothing beyond a moderate force.

[112] Diodor. xvi. 7.