Chapter XCIV (1)

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

From this time forward to the close of Alexander’s life—a period of about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see again.

Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these volumes—the first portion of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns (from his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persis, a period of four years, March 334 B. C., to March 330 B. C.), though not of direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial sceptre. He had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, destined, a century and a half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing.[429] Towards the kings of Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian kings, who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that ruler too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of his age; to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

[429] Compare the language addressed by Alexander to his weary
soldiers, on the banks of the Hyphasis (Arrian, v. 26), with that
which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Xerxes, when announcing
his intended expedition against Greece (Herodot. vii. 8).

But though the first four years of Alexander’s Asiatic expedition, in which he conquered the Western half of the Persian empire, had thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the Grecian cities—his last seven years, on which we are now about to enter, employed chiefly in conquering the Eastern half, scarcely touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers Jaxartes, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious arms over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with them, and placed him almost beyond their cognizance. To the historian of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be told, as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who, though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the battles of Issus and Arbêla.

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbêla to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent conquest—Persis proper. During all this time, Darius had remained at Ekbatana,[430] the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope, that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of satiation, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren East. As soon as he learnt that Alexander was in movement towards him, he sent forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern border of the Caspian sea. Himself, with the small force around him, followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city (7000 talents= £1,610,000 in amount), and passed through the Caspian Grates into the territory of Parthyênê. His only chance was to escape to Baktria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers, and angry disgust among many who remained.[431]

[430] I see no reason for doubting that the Ekbatana here meant
is the modern Hamadan. See a valuable Appendix added by Dr.
Thirlwall to the sixth volume of his History of Greece, in which
this question is argued against Mr. Williams.

Sir John Malcolm observes—“There can hardly be said to be any
roads in Persia; nor are they much required, for the use of wheel
carriages has not yet been introduced into that kingdom. Nothing
can be more rugged and difficult than the paths which have been
cut over the mountains by which it is bounded and intersected”
(ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 525).

In this respect, indeed, as in others, the modern state of Persia
must be inferior to the ancient; witness the description given by
Herodotus of the road between Sardis and Susa.

[431] Arrian, iii. 19, 2-9; iii. 20, 3.

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander entered it. How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we cannot say: in itself a long march, it had been farther prolonged, partly by the necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers called Parætakeni,[432] partly by rumors exaggerating the Persian force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana—the last capital stronghold of the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana his principal depôt; depositing in the citadel, under the care of Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 Macedonians, the accumulated treasures of his past conquests, out of Susa and Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000 talents = £41,400,000 sterling.[433] Parmenio was invested with the chief command of this important post, and of the military force left in Media; of which territory Oxodates, a Persian who had been imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.[434]

[432] Arrian, iii. 19, 5.

[433] Arrian, iii. 19, 14; Diodor. xvii. 80. Diodorus had before
stated (xvii. 66, 71) the treasure in Susa as being 49,000
talents, and that in Persepolis as 120,000. Arrian announces the
treasure in Susa as 50,000 talents—Curtius gives the uncoined
gold and silver alone as 50,000 talents (v. 8, 11). The treasure
of both places was transported to Ekbatana.

[434] Arrian, iii. 20, 4.

At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6000 Grecian mercenaries,[435] who had marched from Kilikia into the interior, probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to go home.[436] He distributed among them the sum of 2000 talents in addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses, which they sold before departure. The operations which he was now about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct native tribes, relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such as none but his Macedonian Companions would have been contented to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with large masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore for the first time established a regular Taxis, or division of horse-bowmen.[437]

[435] Curtius, v. 23, 12.

[436] Arrian, iii. 19, 10: compare v. 27, 7.

[437] Arrian, iii. 24, 1. ἤδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἱππακοντισταὶ ἦσαν
τάξις.

See the remarks of Rüstow and Köchly upon the change made by
Alexander in his military organization about this period, as soon
as he found that there was no farther chance of a large collected
Persian force, able to meet him in the field (Geschichte des
Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 252 _seq._).

The change which they point out was real,—but I think they
exaggerate it in degree.

Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern extremity of Media; by which Gates[438] was understood a mountain-pass, or rather a road of many hours’ march, including several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern side of the great range of Taurus towards Parthia. He marched with his Companion-cavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the bowmen—the greater part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it could—to Rhagæ, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which town he reached in eleven days, by exertions so severe that many men as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all speed, he learnt that Darius had already passed through the Caspian Gates. After five days of halt at Rhagæ, indispensable for his army, Alexander passed them also. A day’s march on the other side of them, he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanes and Antibêlus, who informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger of losing his life.[439]

[438] The passes called the Caspian Gates appear to be those
described by Morier, Fraser, and other modern travellers, as the
series of narrow valleys and defiles called Ser-Desch, Sirdari,
or Serdara Kahn,—on the southernmost of the two roads which
lead eastward from Teheran towards Damaghan, and thence farther
eastward towards Mesched and Herat. See the note of Mützel in his
edition of Curtius, v. 35, 2, p. 489; also Morier, Second Journey
through Persia, p. 363; Fraser’s Narrative of a Journey into
Khorasan, p. 291.

The long range of mountains, called by the ancients Taurus,
extends from Lesser Media and Armenia in an easterly direction
along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Its northern
declivity, covered by prodigious forests with valleys and
plains of no great breadth reaching to the Caspian, comprehends
the moist and fertile territories now denominated Ghilan and
Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan was known in
ancient times as Hyrkania, then productive and populous; while
the mountain range itself was occupied by various rude and
warlike tribes—Kadusii, Mardi, Tapyri, etc. The mountain range,
now called Elburz, includes among other lofty eminences the very
high peak of Demavend.

The road from Ekbatana to Baktra, along which both the flight of
Darius and the pursuit of Alexander lay, passed along the broken
ground skirting the southern flank of the mountain range Elburz.
Of this broken ground the Caspian Gates formed the worst and most
difficult portion.

[439] Arrian, iii. 20, 21.

The conspirators by whom this had been done, were Bessus, satrap of Baktria—Barsaentes, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia—and Nabarzanes, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Baktria, Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus, with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius, but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to reach Baktria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organize an energetic resistance, under their own joint command, for the defence of those eastern provinces—the most warlike population of the empire.[440] Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire, even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse. At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of gold—placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian troops,—and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they could; Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army in disgust, and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapuri bordering on Hyrkania towards the Caspian Sea.[441]

[440] Masistes, after the shocking outrage upon his wife by Queen
Amestris, was going to Baktria to organize a revolt: see Herodot.
ix. 113—about the importance of that satrapy.

[441] Arrian, iii. 21-23. Justin (xi. 15) specifies the name
of the place—Thara. Both he and Curtius mention the _golden
chain_ (Curtius, 34, 20). Probably the conspirators made use
of some chains which had formed a part of the ornaments of
the royal wardrobe. Among the presents given by Darius son
of Hystaspes to the surgeon Demokedes, there were two pairs
of golden chains—Δωρέεται δή μιν Δαρεῖος πεδέων χρυσέων δύο
ζεύγεσιν—Herodot. iii. 130: compare iii. 15. The Persian king and
grandees habitually wore golden chains round neck and arms.

On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius. At the head of his Companion-cavalry, his light-horse, and a body of infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days’ provisions for each man; leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant Bagistanes had quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander, notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped on the preceding day. Yet learning from deserters that his enemies had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired of overtaking them, unless he could find some shorter road. He was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through a waterless desert. Setting out by this road late in the day with his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-struck at the sudden appearance of their indefatigable conqueror, that they dispersed and fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment, Bessus and Barsaentes urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse, and accompany them in their flight. But he refused to comply. They were determined however that he should not fall alive into the hands of Alexander, whereby his name would have been employed against them, and would have materially lessened their chance of defending the eastern provinces; they were moreover incensed by his refusal, and had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which they were glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him mortally wounded, and then pursued their flight.[442] His chariot, not distinguished by any visible mark, nor known even to the Persian soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers. At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring, and is said to have received his last words; wherein he expressed thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself, was about to pass to so generous a conqueror. It is at least certain that he never lived to see Alexander himself.[443]

[442]

“Rarus apud Medos regum cruor; unaque cuncto
Pœna manet generi; quamvis crudelibus æque
Paretur dominis.” (Claudian. in Eutrop. ii. p. 478.)

Court conspiracies and assassinations of the prince, however were
not unknown either among the Achæmenidæ or the Arsakidæ.

[443] This account of the remarkable incidents immediately
preceding the death of Darius, is taken mainly from Arrian (iii.
21), and seems one of the most authentic chapters of his work.
He is very sparing in telling what passed in the Persian camp;
he mentions indeed only the communications made by the Persian
deserters to Alexander.

Curtius (v. 27-34) gives the narrative far more vaguely and
loosely than Arrian, but with ample details of what was going on
in the Persian camp. We should have been glad to know from whom
these details were borrowed. In the main they do not contradict
the narrative of Arrian, but rather amplify and dilute it.

Diodorus (xvii. 73), Plutarch (Alexand. 42, 43), and Justin (xi.
15) give no new information.

Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for the express purpose of taking Darius alive. It would have been a gratification to his vanity to exhibit the Great King as a helpless captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword of his enemy, and spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all farther resistance in the extensive and imperfectly known regions eastward of the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither with their hands free, to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy as large a force as they could, against the Macedonian conqueror; who was obliged to follow them, if he wished to complete the subjugation of the empire. We can understand therefore that Alexander was deeply mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march, and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter find him manifesting against the satrap Bessus.

Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried with full pomp and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchres of Persis. The last days of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the magnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendor to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an impartial review will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was his own blindness—his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens whom he had himself exposed to captivity—lastly, what is still less pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders a defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had the greatest reason to denounce and despise him were his friends and his countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds for indulgence towards him than his conqueror; for whom he had kept unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself hardly less than impracticable.[444]

[444] Arrian (iii. 22) gives an indulgent criticism on Darius,
dwelling chiefly upon his misfortunes, but calling him ἀνδρὶ τὰ
μὲν πολέμια, εἴπερ τινὶ ἄλλῳ, μαλθακῷ τε καὶ οὐ φρενήρει, etc.

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant supplies from the neighboring region, the soldiers here received a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of Darius.[445] In the enjoyment and revelry universal throughout the army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet and in wine-drinking, to which he was always addicted when leisure allowed were now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most importance in Alexander’s conduct was, that he now began to feel and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne; to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the dress, of a Persian king.

[445] Curtius, vi. 5, 10; vi. 6, 15. Diodor. xvii. 74.
Hekatompylus was an important position, where several roads
joined (Polyb. x. 28). It was situated on one of the roads
running eastward from the Caspian Gates, on the southern flank
of Mount Taurus (Elburz). Its locality cannot be fixed with
certainty: Ritter (Erdkunde, part viii. 465, 467) with others
conceives it to have been near Damaghan; Forbiger (Handbuch der
Alten Geographie, vol. ii. p. 549) places it further eastward,
near Jai-Jerm. Mr. Long notes it on his map, as _site unknown_.

To many of Alexander’s soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared to be consummated and the war finished, by the death of Darius. They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues; but Alexander, assembling the select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived the ardor of all.[446] His first march was, across one of the passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania, the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea. Here he found no resistance; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernes, together with Nabarzanes, Artabazus, and other eminent Persians, surrendered themselves to him, and were favorably received. The Greek mercenaries, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic synod—required them to surrender at discretion; which they expressed their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be despatched to conduct them to him in safety.[447] The Macedonian Andronikus was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition into the mountains of the Mardi; a name seemingly borne by several distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and brave mountaineers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern slope of the range of Mount Elburz a few miles from the Caspian Sea (Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued them into all their retreats,—overcame them, when they stood on their defence, with great slaughter,—and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to sue for peace.[448]

[446] This was attested by his own letters to Antipater, which
Plutarch had seen (Plutarch, Alexand. 47). Curtius composes a
long speech for Alexander (vi. 7, 9).

[447] Arrian, iii. 23, 15.

[448] Arrian, iii. 24, 4. In reference to the mountain
tribes called Mardi, who are mentioned in several different
localities—on the parts of Mount Taurus south of the Caspian,
in Armenia, on Mount Zagros, and in Persis proper (see Strabo,
xi. p. 508-523; Herodot. i. 125), we may note, that the Nomadic
tribes, who constitute a considerable fraction of the population
of the modern Persian Empire, are at this day found under the
same name in spots widely distant: see Jaubert, Voyage en Arménie
et en Perse, p. 254.

From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction, he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was met by the Grecian mercenaries who came to surrender themselves, as well as by various Grecian envoys from Sparta, Chalkedon, and Sinôpe, who had accompanied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedæmonians under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkedon and Sinôpe to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the Hellenic synod. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition of Philip as leader of Greece—and those whose enlistment had been of later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the same pay as they had hitherto received.[449] Such was the untoward conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia; a system whereby the Persian monarchs, had they known how to employ it with tolerable ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an enemy as Alexander.[450]

[449] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 9. An Athenian officer
named Demokrates slew himself in despair, disdaining to surrender.

[450] See a curious passage on this subject, at the end of the
Cyropædia of Xenophon.

After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward with his united army through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with its river now known as Herirood. Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria, came to him near the border, to a town named Susia,[451] submitted, and was allowed to retain his satrapy; while Alexander, merely skirting the northern border of Aria, marched in a direction nearly east towards Baktria against the satrap Bessus, who was reported as having proclaimed himself King of Persia. But it was discovered, after three or four days, that Satibarzanes was in league with Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the chief city of Aria.[452] His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that the Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanes was obliged to escape. A few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern Seiestan), where he found no resistance—the satrap Barsaentes having sought safety among some of the Indians.[453]

[451] Arrian, iii. 25, 3-8. Droysen and Dr. Thirlwall identify
Susia with the town now called Tûs or Toos, a few miles
north-west of Mesched. Professor Wilson (Ariana Antiqua, p.
177) thinks that this is too much to the west, and too far from
Herat: he conceives Susia to be Zuzan, on the desert side of the
mountains west of Herat. Mr. Prinsep (notes on the historical
results deducible from discoveries in Afghanistan, p. 14)
places it at Subzawar, south of Herat, and within the region of
fertility.

Tûs seems to lie in the line of Alexander’s march, more than
the other two places indicated; Subzawar is too far to the
south. Alexander appears to have first directed his march from
Parthia to Baktria (in the line from Asterabad to Baikh through
Margiana), merely touching the borders of Aria in his route.

[452] Artakoana, as well as the subsequent city of Alexandria in
Ariis, are both supposed by Wilson to coincide with the locality
of Herat (Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 152-177).

There are two routes from Herat to Asterabad, at the south-east
corner of the Caspian; one by Schahrood which is 533 English
miles; the other by Mesched, which is 688 English miles (Wilson,
p. 149).

[453] Arrian, iii. 25; Curtius, vi. 24, 36. The territory of the
Drangi, or Zarangi, southward from Aria, coincides generally with
the modern Seistan, adjoining the lake now called Zareh, which
receives the waters of the river Hilmend.

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenio the second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the eastern satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding the great depôt and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself. His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor, had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself, a short time before;[454] the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high rank of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

[454] Arrian, iii. 25, 6; Curtius, iv. 8, 7; vi. 6, 19.

A revelation came to Philotas, from Kebalinus, brother of a youth named Nikomachus, that a soldier, named Dimnus of Chalastra, had made boast to Nikomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person, under vows of secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander, inviting him to become an accomplice.[455] Nikomachus, at first struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a few names; all of which he presently communicated to his brother Kebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the facts to Philotas, entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected to do this for two days; upon which Kebalinus began to suspect him of connivance, and caused the revelation to be made to Alexander through one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus was immediately arrested, but ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any declaration.[456]

[455] Curtius, vi. 7, 2. “Dimnus, modicæ apud regem auctoritates
et gratiæ, exoleti, cui Nicomacho erat nomen, amore flagrabat,
obsequio uni sibi dediti corporis vinctus.” Plutarch, Alex. 49;
Diodor. xvii. 79.

[456] Curt. vi. 7, 29; Plutarch, Alex. 49. The latter says that
Dimnus resisted the officer sent to arrest him, and was killed by
him in the combat.

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, every thing rested on the testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas, demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had heard. Philotas replied, that the source from which it came was too contemptible to deserve notice—that it would have been ridiculous to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as Nikomachus, recounting the foolish boasts addressed to him by a lover. Alexander received, or affected to receive, the explanation, gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him with his usual familiarity.[457]

[457] Curtius, vi. 7, 33. “Philotas respondit, Cebalinum quidem
scorti sermonem ad se detulisse, sed ipsum tam levi auctori nihil
credidisse—veritum, ne jurgium inter amatorem et exoletum non
sine risu aliorum detulisset.”

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken criticisms on the pretended divine paternity,—-coupled with boasts, that he and his father Parmenio had been chief agents in the conquest of Asia,—had neither been forgotten nor forgiven. These, and other self-praises, disparaging to the glory of Alexander, had been divulged by a mistress to whom Philotas was attached; a beautiful Macedonian woman of Pydna, named Antigonê, who, having first been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral Autophradates, was afterwards taken amidst the spoils of Damascus by the Macedonians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigonê, respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander, and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired her to take secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report them from time to time to himself.[458]

[458] Plutarch, Alexand. 48.

It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming confidence, had for at least eighteen months, ever since his conquest of Egypt and perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the suborned and secret communications of a treacherous mistress.[459] Some of the generals around Alexander—especially Kraterus, the first suborner of Antigonê—fomented these suspicions, from jealousy of the great ascendency of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanor, so as to have made many enemies among the soldiers.[460] But whatever may have been his defects on this head—defects which he shared with the other Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and presents[461]—his fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval; and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There was not a tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition had been made known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus, and the other enemies of Philotas, worked so effectually as to inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander into fierce rancor. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death of Philotas,—and on the death of Parmenio besides.[462]

[459] Plutarch, Alexand. 48, 49. Πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ~ἐκ
πάνυ πολλῶν χρόνων~ ἐτύγχανε διαβεβλημένος (Philotas).... Ὁ μὲν
οὖν Φιλώτας ἐπιβουλευόμενος οὕτως ἠγνόει, καὶ συνῆν τῇ Ἀντιγόνῃ
πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ μεγαλαυχίαν ῥήματα καὶ λόγους κατὰ τοῦ
βασιλέως ἀνεπιτηδείους προϊέμενος.

Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus recognized these previous
communications made to Alexander against Philotas in Egypt, but
stated that he did not believe them (Arrian, iii. 26, 1).

[460] Plutarch, Alexand. 40-48; Curtius, vi. 11, 3.

[461] Phylarchus, Fragment. 41. ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xii. p.
539; Plutarch, Alexand. 39, 40. Even Eumenes enriched himself
much; though being only secretary, and a Greek, he could not
take the same liberties as the great native Macedonian generals
(Plutarch, Eumenes, 2).

[462] Plutarch, Alexand. 49; Curtius, vi. 8.

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and distant command—required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation from the army; according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised. Alexander not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing with him just as usual.[463] In the middle of the night, Philotas was arrested while asleep in his bed,—put in chains,—and clothed in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak, before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organized by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and Parmenio—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus, who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and unmeaning; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his purpose.[464]

[463] Curtius, vi. 8, 16. “Invitatus est etiam Philotas
ad ultimas sibi epulas et rex non cœnare modo, sed etiam
familiariter colloqui, cum eo quam damnaverat, sustinuit.”

[464] Arrian, iii. 26, 2. Λέγει δὲ Πτολεμαῖος εἰσαχθῆναι εἰς
Μακεδόνας Φιλώταν, καὶ κατηγορῆσαι αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρῶς Ἀλέξανδρον, etc.
Curtius, vi. 9, 13; Diodorus, xvii, 80.

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself—revelations of his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends. Amyntas, and even Kœnus, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused.[465] They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him, and ardent sympathy with the king’s danger. Philotas was heard in his defence, which though strenuously denying the charge, is said to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages; while a degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable insolence of Philotas, who always (he said) treated the soldiers with contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough well-founded) was no way connected with the charge of treason against the king, it harmonized fully with the temper of the assembly, and wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal pages began the cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear the parricide in pieces.[466]

[465] Curtius, vi. 9, 30.

[466] Curtius, vi. 11, 8. “Tum vero universa concio accensa
est, et a corporis custodibus initium factum, clamantibus,
discerpendum esse parricidam manibus eorum. Id quidam Philotas,
qui graviora supplicia metueret, haud sane iniquo animo audiebat.”

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion, they determined to extort from him a confession such as would justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against his father Parmenio—whom there was as yet nothing to implicate. Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the torture. Hephæstion, Kraterus, and Kœnus—the last of the three being brother-in-law of Philotas[467]—themselves superintended the ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself too was at hand, but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness, indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by his side in so many battles.[468] All who stood by were enemies, and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted,[469] cruel in the extreme and long-continued, wrung from him at last a confession, implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death; and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by Nikomachus, were slain also—apparently by being stoned, without preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him. Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.[470]

[467] Curtius, vi. 9, 30; vi. 11, 11.

[468] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

[469] Curtius, vi. 11, 15, “Per ultimos deinde cruciatus, utpote
et damnatus et inimicis in gratiam regis torquentibus, laceratur.
Ac primo quidam, quanquam hinc ignis, illinc verbera, jam non ad
quæstionem, sed ad pœnam, ingerebantur, non vocem modo, sed etiam
gemitus habuit in potestate; sed postquam intumescens corpus
ulceribus flagellorum ictus nudis ossibus incussos ferre non
poterat”, etc.

[470] Curtius, vi. 11, 20.

It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas; and to kill him, moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depôt at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the Companions named Polydamas; a particular friend, comrade, or _aide de camp_, of Parmenio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life hung by a thread; so that Polydamas entered the king’s presence in extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a swift and confidential message to Ekbatana, ordering his execution. Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed in his hands, addressed to Parmenio; one from Alexander himself, conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other, signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these, Polydamas received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to Parmenio at Ekbatana; proclaiming Parmenio guilty of high treason, and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction. He promised even more than was demanded—too happy to purchase this reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest road across the desert of Khorasan, and arrived at Ekbatana on the eleventh day—a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to traverse.[471] Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge of Parmenio, he delivered his despatch to Kleander, with whom he concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio, while walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked out by Alexander’s order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in the perusal, he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the remaining officers,—the last even after life had departed.[472]

[471] Strabo, xv. p. 724; Diodor. xvii. 80; Curtius, vii. 2,
11-18.

[472] Curtius, vii. 2, 27. The proceedings respecting Philotas
and Parmenio are recounted in the greatest detail by Curtius; but
his details are in general harmony with the brief heads given by
Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus—except as to one material
point. Plutarch (Alex. 49), Diodorus (xvii. 79, 80), and Justin
(xii. 5), also state the fact in the same manner.

Ptolemy and Aristobulus, according to the narrative of Arrian,
appear to have considered that Philotas was really implicated in
a conspiracy against Alexander’s life. But when we analyze what
they are reported to have said, their opinion will not be found
entitled to much weight. In the first place, they state (Arrian,
iii. 26, 1) that the _conspiracy of Philotas had been before made
known to Alexander while he was in Egypt_, but that he did not
then believe it. Now eighteen months had elapsed since the stay
in Egypt; and the idea of a conspiracy going on for eighteen
months is preposterous. That Philotas was in a mood in which he
might be supposed likely to conspire, is one proposition; that
he actually did conspire is another; Arrian and his authorities
run the two together as if they were one. As to the evidence
purporting to prove that Philotas did conspire, Arrian tells us
that “the informers came forward before the assembled soldiers
and convicted Philotas with the rest by other _indicia_ not
obscure, _but chiefly by this_—that Philotas confessed to
have heard of a conspiracy going on, without mentioning it
to Alexander, though twice a day in his presence”—καὶ τοὺς
μηνυτὰς τοῦ ἔργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξαι Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς
ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ~ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ~
ὅτι αὐτὸς Φιλώτας πεπύσθαι μὲν—συνέφη, etc. What these other
_indicia_ were, we are not told; but we may see how slender was
their value, when we learn that the non-revelation admitted by
Philotas was stronger than any of them. The non-revelation,
when we recollect that Nikomachus was the _only_ informant
(Arrian loosely talks of μηνυτὰς, as if there were more), proves
absolutely nothing as to the complicity of Philotas, though
it may prove something as to his indiscretion. Even on this
minor charge, Curtius puts into his mouth a very sufficient
exculpation. But if Alexander had taken a different view, and
dismissed or even confined him for it, there would have been
little room for remark.

The point upon which Arrian is at variance with Curtius, is,
that he states “Philotas with the rest to have been shot to
death by the Macedonians”—thus, seemingly contradicting, at
least by implication, the fact of his having been tortured.
Now Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin, all concur with Curtius in
affirming that he was tortured. On such a matter, I prefer their
united authority to that of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. These two
last-mentioned authors were probably quite content to believe
in the complicity of Philotas upon the authority of Alexander
himself; without troubling themselves to criticise the proofs.
They tell us that Alexander vehemently denounced (κατηγορῆσαι
ἰσχυρῶς) Philotas before the assembled soldiers. After this, any
mere shadow or pretence of proof would be sufficient. Moreover,
let us recollect that Ptolemy obtained his promotion, to be one
of the confidential _body guards_ (σωματοφύλακες), out of this
very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post
of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian, iii. 27. 11).

How little Ptolemy and Aristobulus cared to do justice to any one
whom Alexander hated, may be seen by what they say afterwards
about the philosopher Kallisthenes. Both of them affirmed
that the pages, condemned for conspiracy against Alexander,
deposed against Kallisthenes as having instigated them to the
deed (Arrian, iv. 14, 1). Now we know, from the authority of
Alexander himself, whose letters Plutarch quotes (Alexand. 55),
that the pages denied the privity of any one else—maintaining
the project to have been altogether their own. To their great
honor, the pages persisted in this deposition, even under extreme
tortures—though they knew that a deposition against Kallisthenes
was desired from them.

My belief is, that Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Justin,
are correct in stating that Philotas was tortured. Ptolemy and
Aristobulus have thought themselves warranted in omitting this
fact, which they probably had little satisfaction in reflecting
upon. If Philotas was not tortured, there could have been no
evidence at all against Parmenio—for the only evidence against
the latter was the extorted confession of Philotas.

The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Kleander, admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander’s written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs of reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio’s body. Even this was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king’s displeasure. At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was sent to Alexander.[473]

[473] Curtius, vii. 2, 32, 33.

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed on this occasion a personal rancor worthy of his ferocious mother Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past services.[474] When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas, and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio,—we feel how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalized. It is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who had shared with Parmenio the favor and confidence of Philip as well as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings, and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities to himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with the transactions.[475] Hence Alexander, opening and examining the letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting them off from the remaining army.[476] Instead of appointing any substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry, he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the command of one and Kleitus to that of the other.[477]

[474] Contrast the conduct of Alexander towards Philotas and
Parmenio, with that of Cyrus the younger towards the conspirator
Orontes, as described in Xenophon, Anabas. i. 6.

[475] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

[476] Curtius, vii. 2, 36; Diodor. xvii. 80; Justin, xii. 5.

[477] Arrian, iii. 27, 8.

The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing Drangiana, Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ; the modern Seiestan, Afghanistan, and the Western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna on the north, Kandahar or Kelat on the south, and Furrah in the west. He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered severely from cold and privation.[478] Near the southern termination of one of the passes of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east of the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad Caucasum, where he planted 7000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others as colonists.[479] Towards the close of Winter he crossed over the mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh; a march of fifteen days through regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Baktria.

[478] Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geography, compare Wilson’s
Ariana Antiqua, p. 173-178. “By perambulator, the distance from
Herat to Kandahar is 371 miles; from Kandahar to Kabul, 309:
total 688 miles (English).” The principal city in Drangiana
(Seiestan) mentioned by the subsequent Greek geographers is,
Prophthasia; existing seemingly before Alexander’s arrival. See
the fragments of his _mensores_, ap. Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex.
Magn. p. 135; Pliny, H. N. vi. 21. The quantity of remains
of ancient cities, still to be found in this territory, is
remarkable. Wilson observes this (p. 154).

[479] Arrian, iii. 28, 6; Curtius, vii. 3, 23; Diodor. xvii. 83.
Alexandria in Ariis is probably Herat; Alexandria in Arachosia
is probably Kandahar. But neither the one nor the other is
mentioned as having been founded by _Alexander_, either in
Arrian or Curtius, or Diodorus. The name Alexandria does not
prove that they were founded by him; for several of the Diadochi
called their own foundations by his name (Strabo, xiii. p.
593). Considering how very short a time Alexander spent in
these regions, the wonder is, that he could have found time to
establish those foundations which are expressly ascribed to him
by Arrian and his other historians. The authority of Pliny and
Steph. Byzant. is hardly sufficient to warrant us in ascribing
to him more. The exact site of Alexandria ad Caucasum cannot be
determined, for want of sufficient topographical data. There
seems much probability that it was at the place called Beghram,
twenty-five miles north-east of Kabul—in the way between Kabul
on the south side of the Hindoo-Koosh, and Anderhab on the north
side. The prodigious number of coins and relics, Greek as well as
Mohammedan, discovered by Mr. Masson at Beghram, supply better
evidence for identifying the site with that of Alexandria ad
Caucasum, than can be pleaded on behalf of any other locality.
See Masson’s Narrative of Journeys in Afghanistan, etc., vol.
iii. ch. 7. p 148 _seqq._

In crossing the Hindoo-Koosh from south to north Alexander
probably marched by the pass of Bamian, which seems the only one
among the four passes open to an army in the winter. See Wood’s
Journey to the Oxus, p 195.