Chapter XCV (2)

[702] See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty,
fragments of the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenes,
published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a
recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From
Fragm. 14 (p. 38 of Mr. Babington’s edition) we may see that
the promises mentioned in the text were actually held out by
Harpalus—indeed we might almost have presumed it without positive
evidence. Hyperides addresses Demosthenes—ταύτας ὑπ...ις τῷ
ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἅρπαλον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἅπαντας
πρεσβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν
ἀποστροφήν· ~τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους~, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἧκον φέροντες εἰς
ταὐτὸ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους
ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχε, ~τούτους σύμπαντας~ οὐ μόνον ~κεκώλυκας
ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου~ τῇ συλλήψει τοῦ Ἁρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ....

From the language thus used by Hyperides in his accusation, we
are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus,
upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the
people when the case was first under discussion.

The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not
requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other
fragments, the conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though
highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the
whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.

[703] Pollux, x. 159.

[704] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, p. 531. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων
ὡρμημένων Ἁρπάλῳ βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυσσόντων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον,
ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος, ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πραγμάτων
Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός· ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου, καὶ σιωπῶντος
διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁ Δημοσθένης—Τί ποιήσουσιν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον
ἰδόντες, οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχνον ἀντιβλέπειν;

Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavored to corrupt, resisted of course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenes also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset.[705] Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed those who study his orations throughout, will find his counsels quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism. His prudence, on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his political position; for while it incensed Hyperides and the more sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonizing opponents.

[705] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch, Demosthen. 25.

The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenes and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favor. Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should be surrendered.[706] The like requisition was also addressed by the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no less than of Demosthenes. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian vengeance were now brought in such fearful proximity before the people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander; to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit a lenient sentence at his hands.[707] Now it was Demosthenes who moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of the money;[708] whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from Hyperides and the other Harpalian partisans, who denounced him as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenes, and every one else; for even those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the odium and dishonor of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one of his own companions.[709]

[706] Diodor. xvii. 108.

[707] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69. ἐὰν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ
(Alexander) πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ
τούτων ἀξιοῖ τὴν ἀληθείαν πυθέσθαι, etc.

[708] See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration
of Hyperides against Demosthenes. That it was _Demosthenes_ who
moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis,
we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who
delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen.
sect. 68, 71, 89)—~ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένης~, ὡς
δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς
τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἁρπάλου χρήματα.

Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 97-106) accuses Demosthenes of base
flattery to Alexander. Hyperides also makes the same charge—see
the Fragments in Mr. Babington’s edition, sect. 2. Fr. 11. p. 12;
sect. 3. Fr. 5. p. 34.

[709] Pausan. ii. 33, 4; Diodor. xvii. 108.

At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were passed, Demosthenes requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which the people had just resolved to impound.[710] Harpalus answered, 720 talents; and Demosthenes proclaimed this sum to the people, on the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents. Now it is said that Demosthenes did not at once communicate to the people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise and outcry were excited.[711] It was assumed that the missing half of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenes and Hyperides both included.

[710] This material fact, of the question publicly put to
Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of
Demosthenes, appears in the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 5, 7,
9, ed. Babington—καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκέλευσε ...
τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἅρπαλον ὁπόσα εἴη τὰ χρήματα τὰ
ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· ~ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο~ ὅτι ἑπτακόσια,
etc.

The term κατατομὴ (see Mr. Babington’s note) “designates a
broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically
arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with
them.”

[711] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenes
given by Photius (Cod. 265, p. 494) it is stated that only 308
talents were found.

In this state of doubt, Demosthenes moved that the Senate of Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the presumed delinquents[712] fit to be indicted before the Dikastery; he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though Demosthenes is said to have called for it with some impatience. Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting only one who was recently married.[713] At length the report appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenes himself, charged with 20 talents—Demades charged with 6000 golden staters—and other citizens, with different sums attached to their names.[714] Upon this report, ten[715] public accusers were appointed to prosecute the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery. Among the accusers was Hyperides, whose name had not been comprised in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenes was brought to trial, first of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500 citizens,[716] who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state. Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison; but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Trœzen in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander.[717] What was done with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not know. It appears that Demades[718]—who was among those comprised, and who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenes, by both Hyperides and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died. Philokles and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their trial ended, does not appear.[719]

[712] That this motion was made by Demosthenes himself, is a
point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s.
5. 62, 84, etc.: compare also the Fragm. of Hyperides, p. 59, ed.
Babington.

Deinarchus, in his loose rhetoric, tries to put the case as
if Demosthenes had proposed to recognize the sentence of the
Areopagus as final and peremptory, and stood therefore condemned
upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted
sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted
afterwards; besides that, it is repugnant to the judicial
practice of Athens.

[713] Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv.
Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not
delivered until after an interval of six months. About their
delay and the impatience of Demosthenes see Fragm. Hyperides, pp.
12-33, ed. Babington.

[714] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperides
in Mr. Babington, p. 18.

[715] Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton, s. 6. Stratokles was one of
the accusers.

[716] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 108, 109.

[717] Plutarch, Demosth. 26.

[718] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 104.

[719] See the two orations composed by Deinarchus, against
Philokles and Aristogeiton.

In the second and third Epistles ascribed to Demosthenes (p.
1470, 1483, 1485), he is made to state, that he alone had
been condemned by the Dykastery, because his trial had come
on first—that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were
acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the
evidence against all was the same also—viz. nothing more than
the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who
hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe,
on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were
acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself.

This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenes—unquestionably the greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian antiquity,—is the most painful result of the debates respecting the exile Harpalus. Demosthenes himself denied the charge; but unfortunately we possess neither his defence, nor the facts alleged in evidence against him; so that our means of forming a positive conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the circumstances as far as we know them—there are several which go to show his innocence, and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenes take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenes was from the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote—that Demosthenes began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents, which Demosthenes accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers, and affected to have lost his voice; upon which the people, detecting this simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given, expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by indignant murmuring.[720] So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenes may indeed have been disabled by sore throat from speaking at some particular assembly; so far the story may be accurate; but that he desisted from opposing Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly not true; for we know from his accusers Deinarchus and Hyperides, that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander. In fact, Hyperides himself denounces Demosthenes, as having from subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his prospects.[721] Such direct and continued opposition is a conclusive proof that Demosthenes was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus. The only service which he rendered to the exile was, by refusing to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred; and probably the best Athenians, of all parties, were desirous of favoring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to hand over to a Macedonian executioner. Insofar as it was a crime not to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed as much by Phokion as by Demosthenes; and indeed more, seeing that Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important administrative duties—while Demosthenes was only an orator and mover in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same motion which decreed his arrest, decreed also the sequestration of his money, and thus removed it from his own control.[722]

[720] Plutarch, Demosth. 25: compare also Plutarch, Vit. X.
Oratt. p. 846; and Photius, Life of Demosth. Cod. 265, p. 494.

[721] See the fragment of Hyperides in Mr. Babington’s edition,
pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note),
insisting upon the prodigious mischief which Demosthenes had done
by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις) Harpalus.

[722] In the Life of Demosthenes apud Photium (Cod. 265), the
service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for
which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as
I have stated it in the text—Demosthenes first spoke publicly
against receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους
(~ὥς φασι~) λαβὼν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετετάξατο
(then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of
sentiment was manifested, which particular acts are described
as follows)—καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ προδοῦναι τὸν
ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, τά τε Ἁρπάλεια χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἔγραψεν
ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν ἀποσημηνάμενος.

That Demosthenes should first oppose the reception of
Harpalus—and then afterwards oppose the surrender of Harpalus
to Antipater’s requisition—is here represented as a change of
politics requiring the hypothesis of a bribe to explain it.
But it is in reality no change at all. The two proceedings are
perfectly consistent with each other, and both of them defensible.

The charge therefore made against Demosthenes by his two accusers,—that he received money _from_ Harpalus,—is one which all the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole case. Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling the money, after it had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to judge. Demosthenes had moved, and the people had voted, that these treasures should be lodged in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis; a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the Athenian exchequer; and would be just as much out of the reach of Demosthenes as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put it in the recognized place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate process, of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there is no proof,—and in my judgment no probability,—that Demosthenes was at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of above £80,000—not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to the habits of Demosthenes. The officers of the Athenian treasury must have gone through this labor, providing the slaves or mules requisite for carrying so heavy a burthen up to the acropolis. Now we have ample evidence from the remaining Inscriptions, that the details of transfering and verifying the public property, at Athens, were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the acropolis,—answered by stating the amount which he had originally brought and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenes might surely repeat that statement immediately after him, without being understood thereby to bind himself down as guarantee for its accuracy. An adverse pleader, like Hyperides, might indeed turn a point in his speech[723]—“_You_ told the assembly that there were 700 talents, and now _you_ produce no more than half”—but the imputation wrapped up in these words against the probity of Demosthenes, is utterly groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury. Demosthenes could only learn it from them; and it might certainly be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given; but we neither know by whom, nor how soon.[724]

[723] Fragm. Hyperides, p. 7, ed. Babington—ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια
~φήσας~ εἶναι τάλαντα, ~νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ἀναφέρεις~;

In p. 26 of the same Fragments, we find Hyperides reproaching
Demosthenes for not having kept effective custody over the
person of Harpalus; for not having proposed any decree providing
a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or
prosecuted afterwards, the negligence of the ordinary jailers.
This is to make Demosthenes responsible for the performance of
_all_ the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct
of the treasurers and the jailers.

We must recollect that Hyperides had been the loudest advocate
of Harpalus, and had done all he could to induce the Athenians
to adopt the cause of that exile against Alexander. One of the
charges (already cited from his speech) against Demosthenes, is,
that Demosthenes prevented this from being accomplished. Yet
here is another charge from the same speaker, to the effect that
Demosthenes did not keep Harpalus under effective custody for the
sword of the Macedonian executioner!

The line of accusation taken by Hyperides is full of shameful
inconsistencies.

[724] In the Life of Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p.
846), the charge of corruption against him is made to rest
chiefly on the fact, that he did not make this communication to
the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνακομισθέντων
μεμηνυκὼς μήτε τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμελείαν, etc. The biography apud
Photium seems to state it as if Demosthenes did not communicate
the amount, _at the time_ when he proposed the decree of
sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict,
from the testimony of Hyperides.

Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending to refute the charge against Demosthenes. This conclusion will certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed by Deinarchus; which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and evidentiary matter, and running over all the life of Demosthenes for the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperides also was of the like desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the sums for which each of them is chargeable.[725] It appears to have been made _ex-parte_, as far as we can judge—that is, made without hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by Hyperides and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenes demanded, as every defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be proved by some positive evidence, Hyperides sets aside the demand as nothing better than cavil and special pleading.[726]

[725] Hyperid. Fragm. p. 18, ed. Babington. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις
πάσας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἁρπάλου, πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ
πεποίηται, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων· καὶ ~οὐδεμιᾷ προσγέγραφε,
δι᾽ ὅτι ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει~· ἀλλ᾽ ~ἐπικεφάλαιον~ γράψασα, ὁπόσον
ἕκαστος εἴληφε χρυσίον, τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ὀφειλέτω....

[726] Hyperid. Frag. p. 20, ed. Babingt. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες
τὸ χρυσίον, ~ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς, τὸ τὴν
βουλὴν σοῦ καταγνῶναι~ (see Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 46, and
the beginning of the second Demosthenic epistle).

Hyperid. p. 16, ed Babingt. Καὶ ~συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλὴν~,
προκλήσεις προτιθεὶς, καὶ ~ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν
ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοὶ ὁ δοὺς, καὶ πῶς; τελευταῖον δ᾽
ἴσως ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ εἰ ἐχρήσω τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον
παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν~.

This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favor
of the defendant,—and a still stronger presumption against the
accuser. Compare Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 6, 7.

The biographer apud Photium states that Hyperides and four other
orators procured (κατεσκεύασαν) the condemnation of Demosthenes
by the Areopagus.

One farther consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenes, Alexander died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenes was then recalled; received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of Alkibiades; took a leading part in the management of the war; and perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser Hyperides.

Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenes, countenances the conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.

There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active support from the Athenians was matter of life and death, distributed various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his views,—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperides himself, as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest recipients.[727] Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass, though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian case. When the tide of sentiment turned—when fear of Macedonian force became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover, the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no more than 350 were forthcoming.[728] It was indispensable that some definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenes himself was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the Areopagites.

[727] The biographer of Hyperides (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt.
p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself
unbribed; the comic writer Timokles names Hyperides along with
Demosthenes and others as recipients (ap. Athenæ. viii. p. 342).

[728] See this point urged by Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69, 70.

Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent in the investigation of facts—and if it had been, the report when published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is, that their time was passed quite as much in party-discussions as in investigating facts; that dissentient parties were long in coming to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling out Demosthenes as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and embodying Demades also, by way of compromise, in the same list of delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious. I have already observed that Demosthenes was at that time unpopular with both the reigning parties: with the philo-Macedonians, from long date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians, because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.

Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It leaves Demosthenes innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion; but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable; while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure of dangers from without, worked upon by party-intrigues within.[729]

[729] We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian
admiral Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves
of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom
his master had corrupted; and that Demosthenes was _not_ among
them. As far as this statement goes, it serves to exculpate
Demosthenes. Yet I cannot assign so much importance to it as
Bishop Thirlwall seems to do. His narrative of the Harpalian
transactions is able and discriminating (Hist. vol. vii. ch. 56.
p. 170 _seqq._).

During the half-year and more which elapsed between the arrival of Harpalus at Athens, and the trial of Demosthenes, one event at least of considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nicanor to the great Olympic festival held in this year, with a formal letter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall all its citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus: “King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities—We have not been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not recall you of their own accord.”[730]

[730] Diodor. xix. 8.

It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders farther, to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan and Arcadian cities;[731] and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but restitution of their properties.[732]

[731] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington.

[732] Curtius, x. 2, 6.

That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the hellenic world. Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander, were sure to look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities, and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant obedience; but both the Athenians and Ætolians are said to have refused to execute the order.[733] It is one evidence of the disgust raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenes is severely reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theôry or sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.[734]

[733] Curtius, x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodorus (xviii. 8)—that
the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks, except
the Athenians and Ætolians—cannot be credited. It was popular,
doubtless, with the exiles themselves, and their immediate
friends.

[734] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 81; compare Hyperid. Fragm. p.
36, ed. Babington.

In the winter or early spring of 323 B. C. several Grecian cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them; but we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect.[735] There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during this winter and spring (323 B. C.). The disbanded soldiers out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tænarus; where Leosthenes, an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the command of them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with the Ætolians.[736] Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance of the troops who had accompanied him over.

[735] Diodor. xvii. 113.

[736] Diodor. xvii. 111: compare xviii. 21. Pausanias (i. 25, 5;
viii. 52, 2) affirms that Leosthenes brought over 50,000 of these
mercenaries from Asia into Peloponnesus, during the lifetime of
Alexander, and against Alexander’s will. The number here given
seems incredible; but it is probable enough that he induced some
to come across.—Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance
was prepared by the Athenians and Ætolians against Alexander
himself during the latter months of his life, in reference to the
mandate enjoining recall of the exiles. He seems to overstate the
magnitude of their doings, before the death of Alexander.

Such was the general position of affairs, when Alexander died at Babylon in June 323 B. C. This astounding news, for which no one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favorable prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus:[737] Alexander had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands. Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various subject neighbors.[738]

[737] A striking comparison made by the orator Demades (Plutarch,
Apophthegm. p. 181).

[738] See Frontinus, Stratagem, ii. 11, 4.

No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to organize a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenes was then in exile; but Leosthenes, Hyperides and other orators of the same party, found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a strenuous feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition on the part of Phokion and his partisans.[739] The rich men for the most part took the side of Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200 quadriremes, and 40 triremes should be equipped; that all Athenians under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation.[740] Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects, still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his functions as one of the generals.[741] But Pytheas, Kallimedon, and others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.

[739] Plutarch, Phokion, 23. In the Fragments of Dexippus, there
appear short extracts of two speeches, seemingly composed by
that author in his history of these transactions; one which he
ascribes to Hyperides instigating the war, the other to Phokion,
against it (Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 668).

[740] Diodor. xviii. 10. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent
the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenes. He seems to
fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents
which he had carried away from Asia; but it is certain, that no
more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the
Athenian assembly—and of these only half were really forthcoming.
Moreover, Diodorus is not consistent with himself, when he says
afterwards (xviii. 19) that Thimbron, who killed Harpalus in
Krete, got possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries,
and carried them over to Kyrênê in Africa.

[741] It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if
true) must be referred—The Athenians were eager to invade Bœotia
unseasonably; Phokion, as general of eighty years old, kept
them back, by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and
upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head
(Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 818).

Leosthenes, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tænarus, and passed across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards Thermopylæ and Thessaly, he met with favor and encouragement almost everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Athamantes, and Dolopes; by most of the Malians, Œtæans, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis; by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises were also held out of co-operation from various Illyrian and Thracian tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Trœzenians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa.[742] These adhesions were partly procured by Hyperides and other Athenian envoys, who visited the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round in like matter to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenes, then living as an exile in Peloponnesus.

[742] Diodor. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

To Demosthenes the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to the harbor to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full of impassioned emotion, Demosthenes poured forth his gratitude for having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiades on returning from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted by force. His fine could not be remitted, consistently with Athenian custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter; and his execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the fine.[743]

[743] Plutarch, Demosth. 27.

What part Demosthenes took in the plans or details of the war, we are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on, under the military command of Leosthenes. The confederacy against Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that which had resisted Xerxes in 480 B. C. Nevertheless, the name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Platæa, Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and in Megalopolis; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had been macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander’s orders in the preceding summer;[744] for we find no mention made of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a considerable land-force to join Leosthenes at Thermopylæ; a citizen force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries besides. But the resolute opposition of the Bœotian cities hindered them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenes himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his army, attacked the Bœotian troops, gained a complete victory, and opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster, including Ætolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater, who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry—and with a fleet of 110 ships of war co-operating on the coast.[745]

[744] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington. καὶ
περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων ... we do
not know what was done to these district confederacies, but it
seems that some considerable change was made in them, at the time
when Alexander’s decree for restoring the exiles was promulgated.

[745] Diodor. xviii. 13.

Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the energetic movements of Leosthenes. Still less was he prepared for the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, etc., soliciting reinforcements; but in the mean time, though inferior in numbers, he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenes. In the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia; so that no resource was left to him except the fortified town of Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came from Asia. Leosthenes immediately commenced the siege of Lamia, and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to storm the town; but its fortifications were strong, with a garrison ample and efficient—so that he was repulsed with considerable loss. Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding, and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other cities except congratulations and thanksgivings.[746] Phokion, on hearing the confident language of those around him remarked—“The stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly, but I fear we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course.”[747] At this critical moment, Leosthenes, in inspecting the blockading trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days.[748] A funeral oration in his honor, as well as in that of the other combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperides, on whom the people devolved that duty in preference to Demosthenes.

[746] Plutarch, Phokion, 23, 24.

[747] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23; Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p.
803.

[748] Diodor. xviii. 12, 13.

The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and one who combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic counsels. But during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenes had displayed military genius and ardor along with Panhellenic purposes. His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity. The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous army of Greeks, who after the battle, easily persuaded themselves that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenes, the Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended.[749] When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate, Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name Phokion had been made and rejected.[750] But during this interval there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to keep the army together; so that the precious moments for rendering the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers to surrender at discretion[751]—with which condition he refused to comply.

[749] Diodor. xviii. 13-15.

[750] Plutarch, Phokion, 24.

[751] Diodor. xviii. 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade, and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigor and success. Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over Leonnatus, who was himself slain;[752] and the Macedonian phalanx having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up with the troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground, out of the reach of cavalry.[753]

[752] Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodor. xviii. 14, 15: compare
Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1.

[753] Diodor. xviii. 15.

During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly, it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the Athenian fleet under Eetion, near the islands called Echinades, at the mouth of the Achelous, on the western Ætolian coast. The Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up the losses sustained.[754] Our information is not sufficient to reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through Œniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the Ætolians;[755] and perhaps this may have been the reason why the Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.

[754] Diodor. xviii. 15.

[755] Diodor. xviii. 8.

In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Panhellenic liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia, still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties, hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army of Antiphilus in Thessaly became much thinned,[756] though still remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow under Kraterus.

[756] Diodor. xviii. 17.

In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go back to June 323 B. C., the period of Alexander’s death, and to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.

On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except a child named Herakles, by his mistress Barsinê. Roxana, one of his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amidst the uncertainties of the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married to be entrapped and assassinated along with her sister.[757] There was, however, at Babylon, a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia, there were Olympias, Alexander’s mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynanê,[758] another sister, widow of Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him); all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the deceased conqueror, in the scramble now opened for power.

[757] Plutarch, Alexand. 77.

[758] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister; among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philôtas; Pamphylia, Lykia, and the greater Phrygia, to Antigonus; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenes; Media, to Pithon. The eastern satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.

In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to Antipater and Kraterus.[759] We thus find the Grecian cities handed over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.

[759] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. _ut supra_; Diodor. xviii.
3, 4; Curtius, x. 10; Dexippus, Fragmenta ap. Photium, Cod. 82,
ap. Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 667, ed. Didot (De Rebus post
Alexandrum).

All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants, administering portions of an empire one and indivisible, under Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority, bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort of vizir,[760] and Seleukus, commander of the Horse Guards. No one at this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the other chiefs, he represented the imperial family, and the integrity of the empire, contending against severality and local independence. In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most effective auxiliary was Eumenes of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathes (who had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to transfer it to Eumenes, to whom it had been allotted in the general scheme of division.[761]

[760] Arrian and Dexippus—De Reb. post Alex. _ut supra_: compare
Diodor. xviii. 48.

[761] Diodor. xviii. 16.

At the moment of Alexander’s death, Kraterus was in Kilikia, at the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. He had been directed to conduct them home into Macedonia, with orders to remain there himself in place of Antipater, who was to come over to Asia with fresh reinforcements. Kraterus had with him a paper of written instructions from Alexander, embodying projects on the most gigantic scale; for western conquest—transportation of inhabitants by wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe—erection of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and Macedonia, etc. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for any one but Alexander to think of.[762] Kraterus and Antipater had each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not venturing to exclude either. Amidst the conflicting pretensions of these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering upon the Hellespont, and had received propositions from Kleopatra at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him (through Hekatæus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after the defeat preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his co-operation against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra.[763] This scheme remained unexecuted, because (as has been already related) Leonnatus was slain in his first encounter with the Greeks. To them, his death was a grave misfortune; to Antipater, it was an advantage which more than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous rival.

[762] Diodor. xviii. 4.

[763] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.