Chapter XCVII (2)

Agathokles placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites round him, to combat the Sacred Band; the command of his right he gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcely equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships’ crews were even without arms,—a deficiency, which Agathokles could only supply in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men, stationed in the rear, had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites. As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathokles tried to hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favorite of Athênê, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the sight.

The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made little or no impression; but the infantry of their right pressed the Greeks seriously. Especially Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him, behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death not only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno’s death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred Band, though fighting with unshaken valor, were left unsupported, attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathokles, who found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought for fettering their expected captives.[959]

[959] Diodor. xx. 12. The loss of the Carthaginians was
differently given—some authors stated it at 1000 men—others at
6000. The loss in the army of Agathokles was stated at 200 men.

This victory made Agathokles for the time master of the open country. He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars, constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships of his own remaining. Having fortified Tunês and established it as his central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast (Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns dependent on Carthage.[960]

[960] Diodor. xx. 17.

In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans,—nor the mixed race called Liby-Phœnicians, who inhabited the towns[961]—could be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance. They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and on their omissions of duty towards the gods. To the Tyrian Herakles, they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavored to make up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch, they also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship acceptable to that god required the sacrifice of young children, born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents had recently put a fraud upon the god, by surreptitiously buying poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for the public safety. The statue of Kronus,—placed with outstretched hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately underneath—was fed on that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably with 500, living children.[962] By this monstrous holocaust the full religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the god, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.

[961] Diodor. xx. 55.

[962] Diodor. xx. 14. ᾐτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὑτοῖς
ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύοντες τούτῳ
τῷ θεῷ τῶν υἱῶν τοὺς κρατίστους, ὕστερον ὠνούμενοι λάθρα παῖδας
καὶ θρέψαντες ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ ζητήσεως γενομένης,
εὑρέθησάν τινες τῶν καθιερουργημένων ὑποβολιμαῖοι γεγονότες·
τούτων δὲ λαβόντες ἔννοιαν, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς τείχεσιν
ὁρῶντες στρατοπεδεύοντας, ἐδεισιδαιμόνουν ὡς καταλελυκότες τὰς
πατρίους τῶν θεῶν τιμάς· διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἀγνοίας σπεύδοντες,
διακοσίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν
δημοσίᾳ· ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἑκουσίως ἑαυτοὺς ἔδοσαν,
οὐκ ἐλάττους ὄντες τριακοσίων· ἦν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀνδριὰς Κρόνου
χαλκοῦς, ἐκτετακὼς τὰς χεῖρας ὑπτίας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,
ὥστε τὸν ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παίδων ἀποκυλίεσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἴς τι
χάσμα πλῆρες πυρός. Compare Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. i.
21; Justin, xviii. 6, 12.

In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little
information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us),
one clause is not perfectly clear, respecting the three hundred
who are said to have voluntarily _given themselves up_. Diodorus
means (I apprehend) as Eusebius understood it, that these were
fathers who gave up _their children_ (not themselves) to be
sacrificed. The victims here mentioned as sacrificed to Kronus
were children, not adults (compare Diodor. xiii. 86): nothing
is here said about adult victims. Wesseling in his note adheres
to the literal meaning of the words, dissenting from Eusebius:
but I think that the literal meaning is less in harmony with the
general tenor of the paragraph. Instances of self-devotion, by
persons torn with remorse, are indeed mentioned: see the case of
Imilkon, Diodor. xiv. 76; Justin, xix. 3.

We read in the Fragment of Ennius—“Pœni sunt soliti suos
sacrificare puellos:” see the chapter iv. of Münter’s work,
Religion der Karthager, on this subject.

Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious obligation, the Carthaginians despatched envoys to Hamilkar in Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him to send a reinforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. They at the same time equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack Tunês. Agathokles had fortified that town, and established a strong camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis with success, granting to the inhabitants favorable terms. He then advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced the siege, with the assistance of a neighboring Libyan prince named Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathokles was engaged in the siege of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunês, drove his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the siege,—Agathokles left his main army before it, stole away with only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to an elevated spot—halfway between Adrumetum and Tunês, yet visible from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a prodigious number of fires.[963] The effect, of these fires, seen from Adrumetum on one side and from Tunês on the other, was, to produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging Tunês fancied that Agathokles with his whole army was coming to attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on capitulation.[964]

[963] Diodor. xx. 17. λάθρα προσῆλθεν ἐπί τινα τόπον ὀρεινὸν,
ὅθεν ~ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀδρυμητινῶν καὶ τῶν
Καρχηδονίων τῶν Τύνητα πολιορκούντων~· νυκτὸς δὲ συντάξας τοῖς
στρατιώταις ἐπὶ πολὺν τόπον πυρὰ καίειν, δόξαν ἐν εποίησε,
τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς
πορευόμενος, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκουμένοις, ὡς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἁδρᾶς
τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς συμμαχίαν παραγεγενημένης.

[964] Diodor. xx. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodorus
is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good
authorities before him in his history of Agathokles. If true,
it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the
site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at
Herkla— while Forbiger and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the
modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a
prodigious distance from Tunis. Other anthem have placed it at
Hamamat, more to the northward than Herkla, and nearer to Tunis.

Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist
with the narrative of Diodorus. Both the others are too distant.
Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth,
p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too
great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very
much more distant, and therefore out of the question.

Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently
to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, p.
142-154; Forbiger, Handb. Geog. p. 845). It is therefore probable
that the narrative of Diodorus is not true, or must apply to some
other place on the coast (possibly Neapolis, the modern Nabel)
taken by Agathokles, and not to Adrumetum.

By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathokles both relieved Tunês, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing his conquests yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus, with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance southward.[965] He also occupied and fortified the important position called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far distant from it; a point convenient for maritime communication with Sicily.[966]

[965] Diodor. xx. 17.

[966] Strabo, xvii. p. 834. Solinus (c. 30) talks of Aspis as
founded by the _Siculi_. Aspis (called by the Romans Clypea),
being on the eastern side of Cape Bon, was more convenient for
communication with Sicily than either Carthage, or Tunis, or
any part of the Gulf of Carthage, which was on the western side
of Cape Bon. To get round that headland is, even at the present
day, a difficult and uncertain enterprise for navigators: see
the remarks of Dr. Barth, founded partly on his own personal
experience (Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres,
i. p. 196). A ship coming from Sicily to Aspis was not under the
necessity of getting round the headland.

In the case of Agathokles, there was a further reason for
establishing his maritime position at Aspis. The Carthaginian
fleet was superior to him at sea; accordingly they could easily
interrupt his maritime communication from Sicily with Tunis, or
with any point in the Gulf of Carthage. But it was not so easy
for them to watch the coast at Aspis; for in order to do this,
they must get from the Gulf round to Cape Bon.

By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than 200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathokles became master along the eastern coast.[967] He next endeavored to subdue the towns in the interior, into which he advanced as far as several days’ march. But he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunês, that the Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches, he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians, but was now defeated and slain.[968] The Carthaginians, however, though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunês.

[967] Diodor. xx. 17. The Roman consul Regulus, when he invaded
Africa during the first Punic war, is said to have acquired,
either by capture or voluntary adhesion, two hundred dependent
cities of Carthage (Appian, Punica, c. 3). Respecting the
prodigious number of towns in Northern Africa, see the very
learned and instructive work of Mövers, Die Phönikier, vol.
ii. p. 454 _seqq._ Even at the commencement of the third Punic
war, when Carthage was so much reduced in power, she had still
three hundred cities in Libya (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). It must be
confessed that the name cities or towns (πόλεις) was used by some
authors very vaguely. Thus Posidonius ridiculed the affirmation
of Polybius (Strabo, iii. p. 162), that Tiberius Gracchus had
destroyed three hundred πόλεις of the Celtiberians; Strabo
censures others who spoke of one thousand πόλεις of the Iberians.
Such a number could only be made good by including large κῶμαι.

[968] Diodor. xx. 17, 18.

Meanwhile the affairs of Agathokles at Syracuse had taken a turn unexpectedly favorable. He had left that city blocked up partially by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition, Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received from Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa; yet also bringing the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth, and to spread abroad news that Agathokles had been destroyed with his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow ornaments,—an undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to Antander, and the ether authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favorable terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed to comply; but Erymnon the Ætolian insisted on holding out until they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8000 persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the mercy of Hamilkar, and his army without; who not only suffered them to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late calamitous expulsion, than from the grief of those who believed that their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathokles. Hamilkar had brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathokles, arrived from Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favor of darkness escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious position of Agathokles. There was no farther talk of capitulation; Hamilkar—having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously repulsed,—withdrew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of 5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.[969]

[969] Diodor. xx. 15, 16.

During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile Deinokrates, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already blockaded the harbor, and he now with his army, stated as 120,000 men, destroyed the neighboring lands, hoping to starve out the inhabitants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he occupied the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and the interior coast of the Great Harbor. From hence—probably under the conduct of Deinokrates and the other exiles, well-acquainted with the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main purpose, as that of Demosthenes during the Athenian siege, after he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of Nikias.[970] Even Demosthenes, though conducting his march with greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss. Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ.[971] The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at all practicable—seems to have been unskilfully conducted. It was attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked them vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on entering the city as a conqueror.[972] He did indeed take his evening meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent to Africa.[973]

[970] See Vol. VII. Ch. lx. p. 304 of this History.

[971] For a description of the fortifications added to Syracuse
by the elder Dionysius, see Vol. X. Ch. lxxxii. p. 499 of this
History.

[972] Diodor. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this
prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat
different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.

[973] Diodor. xx. 30. τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἁμίλκαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολωλότων
συγγενεῖς δεδεμένον ἀγαγόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δειναῖς αἰκίαις
κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀνεῖλον.

The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under Deinokrates and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the besieging army. At the same time, the Agrigentines, profiting by the depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly, proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathokles on the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus, who set himself with vigor to the task of expelling everywhere the mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and in conjunction with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their free governments.[974] Enna, Erbessus, Echetla,[975] Leontini, and Kamarina, were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathokles; while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway of the Carthaginians; and joined the Agrigentine confederacy. The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet; though the blockade was less efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than before.[976]

[974] Diodor. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων
ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν νῆσον, ἐνέπεσεν ὁρμὴ ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν.

[975] Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far
to the north-east of Agrigentum; Echetla is placed by Polybius
(i. 15) midway between the domain of Syracuse and that of
Carthage.

[976] Diodor. xx. 32.

The ascendency of Agathokles was thus rather on the wane in Sicily: but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin. On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their view in triumph; they made respectful prostration before it, but the sight was astounding and mournful to them.[977] While they were thus in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in the camp of Agathokles at Tunês, arising out of a drunken altercation between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus; which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army; who seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunês with its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak, immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer was at first so favorably entertained, that the envoys returned with confident hopes of success; when Agathokles, as a last resource, clothed himself in mean garb, and threw himself on the mercy of the soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their faces. With such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm, calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and promising unabated obedience for the future.[978] Agathokles gladly obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardor to attack forthwith the Carthaginians; who, expecting nothing less, were defeated with considerable loss.[979]

[977] Diodor. xx. 33. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, περιαλγεῖς γενόμενοι,
καὶ βαρβαρικῶς προσκυνήσαντες, etc.

[978] Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 29, of the
mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens, at
Ticinum.

“Postquam immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem
cœptabat, ipsum invadunt (milites), saxa jaciunt, fugientem
sequuntur.—Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum
tegebatur.” (Presently the feeling changes, by the adroit
management of Alphenus Varus, prefect of the camp)—then,
“silentio, patientia, postremo precibus et lacrymis, veniam
quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis
Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor: versi in lætitiam
(ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque
circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt.”

[979] Diodor. xx. 34.

In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only to turn the war to their own profit. Agathokles, leaving his son in command at Tunês, followed the Carthaginians into the interior with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless Agathokles felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an indecisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage. The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by Agathokles.[980]

[980] Diodor. xx. 39.

It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader that the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he could overcome—that though humbling and impoverishing her for the moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not be besieged except by means far superior to his.[981] We have already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before. He therefore resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrênê and despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.[982]

[981] Diodor. xx. 59. Ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν κίνδυνος, ἀπροσίτου
τῆς πόλεως οὔσης διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης
ὀχυρότητα.

[982] Diodor. xx. 40.

To Kyrênê and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (i. e. the five neighboring Grecian towns, Kyrênê, its port Apollonia, Barka, Teucheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this history has already been devoted.[983] Unfortunately information respecting them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The Libyan tribes, useful as neighbors, servants, and customers,[984] were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B. C. we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes, and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse during the Athenian siege.[985] About 401 B. C. (shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again so hard pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them. This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among the citizens of Kyrênê, a large proportion of them perished.[986] Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Greco-Libyan Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis, was divided between Kyrênê (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni, ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[987] We cannot doubt that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrênê and Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant and often lucrative—though not always friendly.

[983] See Vol. IV. Ch. xxvii. p. 29-49.

[984] See Isokrates, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of
Kyrênê as a spot judiciously chosen for colonization; the natives
near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbors
and slaves.

[985] Thucyd. vii. 50.

[986] Pausan. iv. 26; Diodor. xiv. 34.

[987] Strabo, xvii. p. 836; Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. p. 126.

In the year 331 B. C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt, the inhabitants of Kyrênê sent to tender presents and submission to him, and became enrolled among his subjects.[988] We hear nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander’s life (324 B. C. to 323 B. C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrênê and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander (proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B. C., and directing that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by force. To this end they invited from Krete an officer named Thimbron; who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krete, with the treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries, brought over from Asia by that satrap.[989] Thimbron willingly carried over his army to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality in Libya. He landed near Kyrênê, defeated the Kyrenean forces with great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to pay 500 talents,—to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia. While he plundered the merchants in the harbor, he proclaimed his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage.[990] His schemes were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named Mnasikles; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of Kyrênê as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrênê itself, but was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid them, Thimbron moved his quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasikles contrived to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his soldiers. Thimbron’s fleet could not be long maintained without a harbor. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water, were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed by storms.[991]

[988] Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodor. xvii. 49.
It is said that the inhabitants of Kyrênê (exact date unknown)
applied to Plato to make laws for them, but that he declined. See
Thrige, Histor. Cyrênês, p. 191. We should be glad to have this
statement better avouched.

[989] Diodor. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, De Rebus; post
Alexandr. vi. apud Photium, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.

[990] Diodor. xviii. 19.

[991] Diodor. xvii. 20.

The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field, and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This reinforcement again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their side also thought it necessary to obtain succor, partly from the neighboring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But, on this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of success; he pressed both Kyrênê and the harbor so vigorously, that famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens. The oligarchical men, expelled by the more popular party, sought shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron; some at the court of Ptolemy in Egypt.[992]

[992] Diodor. xviii. 21.

I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron, worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikydes, governor for Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and placed under the government of Ophellas.[993]

[993] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92; Diodor.
xviii. 21; Justin, xiii. 6, 20.

It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrênê, an interesting portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city, a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B. C. 312) the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt,[994] Kyrênê passed once more under the vice-royalty of Ophellas.[995]

[994] Diodor. xix. 79. Οἱ Κυρηναῖοι ... τὴν ἄκραν
περιεστρατοπέδευσαν, ὡς αὔτικα μάλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλοῦντες, etc.

[995] Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas “rex Cyrenarum;” but it
is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as
Thrige (Hist. Cyrênês, p. 214) supposes. The expression in
Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), Ὀφέλλᾳ τῷ ἄρξαντι Κυρήνης, does not
necessarily imply an independent authority.

To this viceroy Agathokles now sent envoys, invoking his aid against Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience. He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife, Euthydikê,—a lineal descendant from Miltiades the victor of Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens. In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage, the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered. Agathokles (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that island in conjunction with an African dominion. To Ophellas,[996] such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on the look out for aggrandizement towards the west, and had sent an exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa, even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar.[997] Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land, the season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to be afterwards acquired;[998] the conquest of which was known to have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer. To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation of Agathokles. Having learnt in the service of Alexander not to fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He undertook an expedition from Kyrênê on the largest scale. Through his wife’s relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much favor. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas, or to enrol themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the victories of Agathokles—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed possessions, and the maritime position, of her citizens—was a prize well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not well informed of the intervening difficulties.[999]

[996] Diodor. xx. 40.

[997] From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we
learn this fact—that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of
Northern Africa, to the straits of Gibraltar, and round the old
Phenician settlements on the western coast of modern Morocco.
Some eminent critics (Grosskurd among them) reject the reading in
Strabo—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀφέλα (or Ὀφέλλα) περιπλοῦ, which is sustained by
a very great preponderance of MSS. But I do not feel the force of
their reasons; and the reading which they would substitute has
nothing to recommend it. In my judgment, Ophellas, ruling in the
Kyrenaica and indulging aspirations towards conquest westward,
was a man both likely to order, and competent to bring about, an
examination of the North African coast. The knowledge of this
fact may have induced Agathokles to apply to him.

[998] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. ap. Photium, Cod. 92. Αἴγυπτον
μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λιβύην, καὶ τὴν ἐπέκεινα ταύτης τὴν πολλὴν, καὶ ὅ,τι
περ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις δ᾽ ὅριον ἐπικτήσηται πρὸς δυομένου ἡλίου,
Πτολεμαίου εἶναι.

[999] Diodor. xx. 40. πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προθύμως ὑπήκουσαν εἰς
τὴν στρατείαν· οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ἔσπευδον
κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἐλπίζοντες τήν τε κρατίστην τῆς Λιβύης
κατακληρουχήσειν, καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι διαρπάσειν πλοῦτον.

As to the great encouragement held out to settlers, when a new
colony was about to be founded by a powerful state, see Thucyd.
iii. 93, about Herakleia Trachinia—πᾶς γάρ τίς, Λακεδαιμονίων
οἰκιζόντων, θαρσαλέως ᾔει, βέβαιαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν.

Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrênê, some even with wives and children. The total number is stated at 10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well appointed army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen days the post of Automalæ—the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[1000] From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and almost without water (with the exception of particular points of fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time, all his provisions were exhausted; he passed through the territory of the natives called Lotophagi, near the lesser Syrtis; where the army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there abounded.[1001] Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathokles in the Carthaginian territory; With what abatement of number, we do not know, but his loss must have been considerable.[1002]

[1000] Diodor. xx. 41.

[1001] Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iv. 3. p. 127, ed. Schneider.

The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians
concerned in the expedition.

[1002] Diodor. xx. 42. See the striking description of the
miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops
after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 382-940:—

“Vadimus in campos steriles, exustaque mundi.
Quà nimius Titan, et raræ in fontibus undæ,
Siccaque letiferis squalent serpentibus arva,
Durum iter.”

The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer
than two months; probably Diodorus speaks only of the more
distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὴν
ὁδοιπορίαν πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνας κακοπαθήσαντες, etc. (xx. 42).

Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he had accepted. Agathokles at first received him with the warmest protestations of attachment, welcoming the new-comers with profuse hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the confidence and favorable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn it to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced Philotas before them. Agathokles then at once called them to arms, set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathokles at length succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts, partly by intimidation: for this unfortunate army, left without any commander of fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into his service.[1003] He thus found himself (like Antipater after the death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still, since they could be of no service to Agathokles—were put by him on board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered at sea,—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a few only reached Syracuse.[1004] Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean expedition of Ophellas; one of the most commanding and powerful schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from any Grecian city.

[1003] Diodor. xx. 42; Justin. xxii. 7.

[1004] Diodor. xx. 44.

It would have fared ill with Agathokles, had the Carthaginians been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet worse with Carthage, had Agathokles been in a position to attack her during the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same time, within her walls by the general Bomilkar.[1005] This traitor (as has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render himself despot, and had been watching for a favorable opportunity. Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathokles—he had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard. Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers, retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 4000 mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting city: dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in the great market-place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded and paralyzed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their defence against the assailants, combatted them in the streets and poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar himself; who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone severe tortures.[1006]

[1005] Diodor. xx. 43.

[1006] Diodor. xx. 44; Justin, xxii. 7. Compare the description
given by Appian (Punic. 128), of the desperate defence made by
the Carthaginians in the last siege of the city, against the
assault of the Romans, from the house-tops and in the streets.

Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them for some time against their enemy without; while Agathokles on the other hand, reinforced by the army from Kyrênê, was stronger than ever. So elate did he feel, that he assumed the title of King;[1007] following herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death. Agathokles, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west of the city. He attacked Utica,—the second city next to Carthage in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles around the Gulf on land.[1008] The Uticans had hitherto remained faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection elsewhere.[1009] Agathokles marched into their territory with such unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the south-east of Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city), that he seized the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who had not yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed their walls, attaching in front of his battering engines the three hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles of defence, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken resolution; but Agathokles found means to force an entrance through a weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants, armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica, which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment.[1010] The Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock, did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that Agathokles, firmly established in Tunês as a centre of operations, extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great privations.[1011] He even occupied and fortified strongly a place called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts within a short distance both east and west of her gates.[1012]

[1007] There are yet remaining coins—Ἀγαθοκλέος Βασιλέως—the
earliest Sicilian coins that bear the name of a prince
(Humphreys, Ancient Coins and Medals, p. 50).

[1008] Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polyb. i. 73.

[1009] Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that the inhabitants
of Utica and of Hippu-Akra (a little further to the west than
Utica), remained faithful to Carthage throughout the hostilities
carried on by Agathokles. This enables us to correct the passage
wherein Diodorus describes the attack of Agathokles upon Utica
(xx. 54)—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ~ἀφεστηκότας~, ἄφνω δὲ
αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει προσπεσών, etc. The word ~ἀφεστηκότας~ here is
perplexing. It must mean that the Uticans had revolted _from
Agathokles_; yet Diodorus has not before said a word about the
Uticans, nor reported that they had either joined Agathokles,
or been conquered by him. Everything that Diodorus has reported
hitherto about Agathokles, relates to operations among the towns
east or south-east of Carthage.

It appears to me that the passage ought to stand—ἐπὶ μὲν
Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ~οὐκ ἀφεστηκότας~, _i. e._ from Carthage;
which introduces consistency into the narrative of Diodorus
himself, while it brings him into harmony with Polybius.

[1010] Diodor. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise
called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the
northernmost point of Africa), Agathokles is said to have got the
better in a naval battle—ναυμαχία περιγενόμενος. This implies
that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even
in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica.

[1011] Diodor. xx. 59.

[1012] Appian distinctly mentions this place _Hippagreta_ as
having been fortified by Agathokles—and distinctly describes
it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot
therefore be the same place as Hippu-Akra (or Hippo-Zarytus);
which was considerably further from Carthage than Utica was.

In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the opportunity favorable for retrieving his diminished ascendency in Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men, leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging his father’s conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range of interior Numidia, capturing Tokæ, Phellinê, Meschelæ, Akris, and another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra—and enriching his soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition, endeavoring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltinê, and compelled to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as gods.[1013]

[1013] Diodor. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to attempt to identify
the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our
topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second
Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius; Tokæ may
be Tucca Terebinthina, in the south-eastern region or Byzakium.

The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both in vigor and in provident combinations, against the common enemy. They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus, leaving a sufficient guard at Tunês, marched to meet them, distributing his army in three divisions also; two, under himself and Æschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno, contriving to surprise the division of Æschrion, gained a complete victory, wherein Æschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he entrapped by simulated flight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a neighboring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished, from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.[1014]

[1014] Diodor. xx. 59, 60.

By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army, Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to concentrate his force in Tunês, calling in nearly all his outlying detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phenician cities, and rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathokles, now detached themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals established fortified camps round Tunês, so as to restrain the excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up his harbor. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties that he would come to the rescue.[1015]

[1015] Diodor. xx. 61.

The career of Agathokles in Sicily, since his departure from Africa, had been checkered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his arrival in the island,[1016] his generals Leptines and Demophilus had gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This disaster was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous city-government with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the presidency of Agrigentum.[1017] The outlying cities confederate with Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the attacks of Leptines, animated and fortified by the recent arrival of his master Agathokles. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaloidion, on or near the northern coast of Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was repulsed with loss. At Apollonia,[1018] he was also unsuccessful in his first attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town. To avenge his loss, which had been severe, he massacred most of the citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.[1019]

[1016] Diodor. xx. 56. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ, τῆς ~μάχης ἄρτι~
γεγενημένης, καταπλεύσας τῆς Σικελίας εἰς Σελινοῦντα, etc.

[1017] Diodor. xx. 56. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκραγαντῖνοι ταύτῃ τῇ συμφορᾷ
περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τὴν καλλίστην ἐπιβολὴν, τῶν δὲ
συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.

[1018] Apollonia was a town in the interior of the island,
somewhat to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii. 43).

[1019] Diodor. xx. 56.