Chapter XCV (1)

GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

Even in 334 B. C., when Alexander first entered upon his Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon such armed force for support. There existed among them no common idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except such as it suited Alexander’s purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the recollection of which Demosthenes was wont to appeal, in animating the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes Aristotle in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are “in the hands of the king.”[656] A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details of each city—“the streets and fountains which we are repairing and the battlements which we are whitening”, to use a phrase of Demosthenes[657]—the good management of the Athenian finances by the orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private disputes or politics of the past.

[656] Aristot. Physic. iv. 3. p. 210 a. 21. ἔτι ~ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ
τῶν Ἑλλήνων~, καὶ ὅλως ~ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ~.

[657] Demosthen. Olynthiac. iii. p. 36.

But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the first years of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment have become animated with an active spirit of self-emancipation, if he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered their own affairs with skill and vigor. I have already stated, that during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought rather to say, the Phenician fleet in the Persian service) had a decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was well aware.

During the winter of 334-333 B. C., Memnon with the Persian fleet appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean,[658] and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in Eubœa and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected death, and still more by Darius’s abandonment of the Memnonian plans, they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the immense Persian land-force. Even down to the eve of the battle of Issus, Demosthenes[659] and others (as has already been mentioned) were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B. C. to March or April 331 B. C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed extinct, and Darius was so paralyzed by the captivity of his family, that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in their gallant efforts of defence, without the least effort to save them. At length, in the spring of 331 B. C., the prospects again appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first, was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the interior, many weeks’ march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B. C.) came the catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.

[658] Arrian, ii. 1.

[659] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 552.

Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now a Macedonian garrison.[660] Moreover, besides that garrison, the Bœotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, etc., were themselves strongholds of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands.[661] In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.

[660] Vita Demosthenis ap. Westermann, Scriptt. Biograph. p.
301. φρουρὰν καταστήσαντος Ἀλέξανδρου ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις μετὰ τὸ
κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θηβαίους, etc.

[661] Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtes and Charidemus, the military citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtes perished at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the utmost gallantry; Charidemus suffered a more unworthy death from the shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained at Athens, such as Demosthenes and Lykurgus, were not generals or men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him, such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on behalf of Grecian freedom.

But it was not Demosthenes nor Lykurgus who now guided the general policy of Athens.[662] For the twelve years between the destruction of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demades were her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally opposite characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the favor of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained. Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian fleet, during Alexander’s first campaign in Asia; these, together with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him farther as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians generally.[663] There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip’s power was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by frequent presents to Demades, a man of luxurious and extravagant habits. But Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end, declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by Antipater, but even by Alexander.[664]

[662] “Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes
Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 331), Æschines and men of his stamp
are in full ascendency and affluence—I am impotent: there is
no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only
for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling
potentate.”

[663] Arrian, i. 29, 8.

[664] Plutarch, Phokion, 30.

It deserves particular notice, that though the macedonizing policy was now decidedly in the ascendent—accepted, even by dissentients, as the only course admissible under the circumstances, and confirmed the more by each successive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like Lykurgus and Demosthenes, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment, still held a conspicuous and influential position, though of course restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since Perikles. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city—multiplied the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples—enlarged, or constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian people.[665] The main cause of his firm hold upon the public mind, was, his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the parallel of Phokion.

[665] See the remarkable decree in honor of Lykurgus, passed by
the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death,
in the archonship of Anaxikrates, B. C. 307 (Plutarch,
Vit. X. Oratt. p. 852). The reciting portion of this decree,
constituting four-fifths of the whole, goes over the public
conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.

It seems that the twelve years of financial administration
exercised by Lykurgus, are to be taken probably, either from
342-330 B. C.—or four years later, from 338-326 B.
C. Boeckh leaves the point undetermined between the two.
Droysen and Meier prefer the earlier period—O. Müller the later.
(Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, also the second
edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p.
114-118).

The total of public money, recorded by the Inscription as having
passed through the hands of Lykurgus in the twelve years, was
18,900 talents = £4,340,000, or thereabouts. He is said to have
held, besides, in deposit, a great deal of money entrusted to him
by private individuals. His official duties as treasurer were
discharged, for the first four years, in his own name: during the
last eight years, in the names of two different friends.

As to Demosthenes, he did not hold any such commanding public appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel during the past. The proof of this is to be found in one very significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon’s motion for crowning Demosthenes, was instituted by Æschines, and official entry made of it, before the death of Philip—which event occurred in August 336 B. C. Yet Æschines did not venture to bring it on for trial until August 330 B. C., after Antipater had subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even at that advantageous moment, when the macedonizers seemed in full triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion and Demades were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant sentiment of the people went with Demosthenes and Lykurgus. In fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or deporting two-thirds of the citizens.[666] It seems however that the anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to Alexander, between 334 and 330 B. C. Ktesiphon accepted a mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death of her husband Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenes stands accused of having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B. C. This assertion of Æschines, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general prudence of Demosthenes as to his known and formidable enemy.[667]

[666] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

[667] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 635) mentions this mission of
Ktesiphon to Kleopatra. He also (in the same oration, p. 550)
charges Demosthenes with having sent letters to Alexander,
soliciting pardon and favor. He states that a young man named
Aristion, a friend of Demosthenes, was much about the person of
Alexander, and that through him the letters were sent. He cites
as his authority the seamen of the public Athenian vessel called
_Paralus_, and the Athenian envoys who went to Alexander in
Phenicia in the spring or summer of 331 B. C. (compare
Arrian, iii. 6, 3). Hyperides also seems to have advanced the
like allegation against Demosthenes—see Harpokration, v. Ἀριστίων.

The fragments of the oration of Hyperides in defence of
Euxenippus (recently published by Mr. Churchill Babington),
delivered at some period during the reign of Alexander, give
general evidence of the wide-spread feeling of jealous aversion
to the existing Macedonian ascendancy. Euxenippus had been
accused of devotion to Macedonia; Hyperides strenuously denies
it, saying that Euxenippus had never been in Macedonia, nor ever
conversed with any Macedonian who came to Athens. Even boys at
school (says Hyperides) know the names of the corrupt orators, or
servile flatterers, who serve Macedonia—Euxenippus is not among
them (p 11, 12).

It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian movements now took rise.

In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes at Chæroneia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned. Their king Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians against Philip and the Thebans,—had afterwards withdrawn himself from Central Greece to assist the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a battle against the Messapians.[668] He was succeeded by his son Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same denial on Alexander’s nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be dedicated in the temple of Athênê, he expressly proclaimed in the inscription, that they were dedicated “by Alexander and the Greeks, _excepting the Lacedæmonians_.”[669] Agis took the lead in trying to procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards the close of summer 333 B. C., a little before the battle of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men and money for intended action in Peloponnesus.[670] At that moment, they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known, they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes; which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself master of Krete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Krete, he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in Peloponnesus, he organized some demonstrations, which Alexander sent Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331 B. C.[671] At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval mastery of the Ægean, had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably Amphoterus recovered Krete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis in Peloponnesus.

[668] Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.

[669] Arrian, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan. vii. 10, 1.

[670] Arrian, ii. 13, 4.

[671] Arrian, iii. 6, 4; Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 1, 39. It
is to this war in Krete, between Agis and the Macedonian party
and troops, that Aristotle probably alludes (in the few words
contained, Politica, ii. 7, 8), as having exposed the weakness of
the Kretan institutions—see Schneider’s note on the passage. At
least we do not know of any other event, suitable to the words.

In October 331 B. C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander’s force, it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement, during the spring of 330 B. C., must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed war with Macedonia,[672] and therefore incurred little additional risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters to cast back upon Greece small hands of soldiers who had hitherto found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy in Macedonia.[673] An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.[674] Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet be anticipated.[675]

[672] Alexander, as soon as he got possession of the Persian
treasures at Susa (about December 331 B. C.), sent a
large remittance of 3000 talents to Antipater, as means for
carrying on the war against the Lacedæmonians (Arrian, iii. 16.
17). The manifestations of Agis in Peloponnesus had begun in
the spring of 331 B. C. (Arrian, iii. 6, 4); but his
aggressive movements in Peloponnesus did not assume formidable
proportions until the spring of 330 B. C. At the date
of the speech of Æschines against Ktesiphon (August 330 B.
C.), the decisive battle by which Antipater crushed the
forces of Agis had only recently occurred; for the Lacedæmonian
prisoners were only _about to be sent_ to Alexander to learn
their fate (Æsch. adv. Kt. p. 524). Curtius (vii. 1, 21) is
certainly mistaken in saying that the contest was terminated
before the battle of Arbela. Moreover, there were Lacedæmonian
envoys, present with Darius until a few days before his death
(July 330 B. C.), who afterwards fell into the hands
of Alexander (Arrian iii. 24, 7); these men could hardly have
known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the
victory of Antipater to have taken place about June 330 B.
C.—and the Peloponnesian armament of Agis to have been got
together about three months before (March 330 B. C.).

Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. App. c. 4. p. 234) discusses the chronology
of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory.
He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no
necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander
(Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15) as proving close coincidence of time
between the battle of Arbela and the final defeat of Agis.

[673] Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after
the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs
and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plutarch, Agesilaus,
15.

[674] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 553. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς
ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθειστήκει, etc.

[675] Diodor. xvii. 62; Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 35.

Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush of success appeared in attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans (except Pellênê), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously, was the stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself at Athens in favor of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion and Demades, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution.[676] Even Demosthenes himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging, could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against Alexander—though he seems to have indulged in the expression of general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad policy.[677] Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially, fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated. Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who, though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost 3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained either at Issus or at Arbela; a plain proof that Agis and his companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage worthy of the best days of Sparta.

[676] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.

[677] This is what we make out, as to the conduct of Demosthenes,
from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 553.

It is however difficult to believe, what Æschines insinuates,
that Demosthenes boasted of having himself got up the
Lacedæmonian movement—and yet that he made no proposition or
suggestion for countenancing it. Demosthenes can hardly have
lent any positive aid to the proceeding, though of course his
anti-Macedonian feelings would be counted upon, in case things
took a favorable turn.

Deinarchus (_ut suprà_) also accuses Demosthenes of having
remained inactive at this critical moment.

The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that all submitted to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those among their leading men who had advised the war.[678] But he would not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians, without special reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy.[679] We are told that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at Baktra;[680] what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.

[678] Curtius, vi. 1, 15-20; Diodor. xvii. 63-73. After the
defeat, a suspensive decree was passed by the Spartans, releasing
from ἀτιμία those who had escaped from the battle—as had been
done after Leuktra (Diodor. xix. 70).

[679] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524.

[680] Curtius, vii. 4, 32.

The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander’s accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; both ended miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever. Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal. The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability (so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylæ; whose renown stands higher, only because the cause in which he fell ultimately triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great military powers of Greece which will appear presently, when we come to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.

Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the Athenians might probably have declared in his favor; and although no independent position could have been permanently maintained against so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable. In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the macedonizing statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents, and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually manifest; so that the reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies of Demosthenes to offer a favorable opportunity for ruining and dishonoring him.

To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable accusation of Æschines against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown to Demosthenes—and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenes, on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn or winter of 337-336 B. C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote of public honor in favor of Demosthenes, and had obtained the probouleuma or preliminary acquiescence of the senate; it was in the same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that Æschines attacked the proposition under the Graphê Paranomôn, as illegal, unconstitutional, mischievous, and founded on false allegations.[681] More than six years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation; yet Æschines had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the same honor upon Demosthenes,[682] and had been indicted under the Graphê Paranomôn; but with such signal ill-success, that their accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the Dikasts, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of the Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited Æschines; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon’s motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under the Graphê Paranomôn), his indictment was grounded on special circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of Demosthenes; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand publicly dishonored both as citizen and as politician. Unless this latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschines gained nothing by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenes might have forced Æschines to the alternative of either dropping his indictment or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge, which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B. C. when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenes with several other citizens.

[681] Among the various documents, real or pretended, inserted in
the oration of Demosthenes De Coronâ, there appears one (p. 266)
purporting to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another
(p. 243) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Æschines. I
have already stated that I agree with Droysen in mistrusting all
the documents annexed to this oration; all of them bear the name
of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of
them do not fit the place in which they appear. See my preceding
Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxix. p. 424; Ch. xc. p. 456-486.

We know from the statement of Æschines himself that the motion
of Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenes to
be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city; and
that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon
Chærondas (June 337 B. C.—see Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p.
421-426). We also know that the accusation of Æschines against
Ktesiphon was preferred before the assassination of Philip,
which took place in August 336 B. C. (Æschin. ib. p.
612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with
the probouleuma which followed upon it) must have occurred some
time during the autumn or winter of 337-336 B. C.—that
the accusation of Æschines must have been handed in shortly
after it—and that this accusation cannot have been handed in
at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 243—the month
Elaphebolion of the archon Chærondas, which would be anterior to
the appointment of Demosthenes. Moreover, whoever compares the
so-called motion of Ktesiphon, as it stands inserted Demosth. De
Coronâ, p. 266, with the words in which Æschines himself (Adv.
Ktesiph. p. 631. ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐποιήσω, see also
p. 439) describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it
cannot be genuine.

[682] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 253, 302, 303, 310. He says (p.
267-313) that he had been crowned _often_ (πολλάκις) by the
Athenians and other Greek cities. The crown which he received on
the motion of Aristonikus (after the successes against Philip at
Byzantium and the Chersonesus, etc. in 340 B. C.) was
the _second_ crown (p. 253)—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 848.

In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenes enjoying the inchoate honor of a complimentary vote from the senate, Æschines intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to trial, under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities also.[683] Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry his resentment still farther, Æschines could now urge that Athens was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of Demosthenes,[684] and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and bitter harangue, Æschines first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held by Demosthenes at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at large into the whole life and character of Demosthenes, to prove him unworthy of such an honor, even if there had been no formal grounds of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenes into four periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B. C., between Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out of the next ensuing war in 341-340 B. C.—the third, ending with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time following.[685] Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the conduct of Demosthenes as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly, and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander, at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and intrepid opposition to them.[686]

[683] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 294.

[684] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 645. διαβέβληται δ᾽ ἡμῶν ἡ
πόλις ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων ~περὶ τοὺς νῦν καιρούς~·
δόξετε δ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ~ὁμογνώμονες εἶναι τοῖς
παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην~· ἐὰν δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτου
πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆμον τῶν αἰτιῶν.—Compare with this, the
last sentence of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, where he
puts up a prayer to the gods—ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην
ἀπαλλαγὴν ~τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων~ δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.

The mention by Æschines (immediately before) of the Pythian
games, as about to be celebrated in a few days, marks the date of
this judicial trial—August, 330 B. C.

[685] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 443.

[686] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 449, 456, 467, 551.

That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been driven from her independent and even presidential position into the degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time when Demosthenes first began political life—was a fact but too indisputable. Æschines even makes this a part of his case; arraigning the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenes as the cause of so melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public compliment or no better plea than a series of public calamities.[687] Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenes prior to the battle of Chæroneia, Æschines proceeds to the more recent past, and contends that Demosthenes cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all highly favorable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the first was, when Alexander first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis in Peloponnesus.[688] On neither of these occasions did Demosthenes call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to Æschines) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.

[687] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 526, 538, 541.

[688] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551-553.

I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the last-mentioned charges advanced by Æschines, there is enough of known fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before us, to appreciate him as an accuser of Demosthenes. The victorious career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by Æschines, presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian patriot, to involve his country in warfare against so formidable an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against Demosthenes, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenes does not notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground, that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired, by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and the barbaric world—in which Athens has been engulfed along with others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who helped to aggrandize Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor indeed so well.[689]

[689] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 311-316.

I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech De Coronâ in a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian oratory. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history; a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world, against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in my last preceding volume. Demosthenes here passes them in review, replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B. C., (or the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defence of his whole public life,[690] he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed that portion of it which is perhaps the most honorable to him—the early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the first to descry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip’s aggrandizement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic precautions against it; in spite of apathy and murmurs from older politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the peace of 346 B. C., Demosthenes vindicates his own share in the antecedents of that event against the charges of Æschines, whom he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which I have already tried to elucidate, in my last volume. Passing next to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with the disaster of Chæroneia—Demosthenes is not satisfied with simple vindication. He re-asserts this policy as matter of pride and honor, in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having manifested a Pan-hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake; Demosthenes swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Platæa and Salamis.[691] To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity aggravated by dishonor.

[690] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 227. μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίου
~παντός~, ὡς ἔοικε, λόγον διδόναι τήμερον καὶ τῶν κοινῇ
πεπολιτευμένων, etc.

[691] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 297. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ
ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων
ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι—οὐ μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι
προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς
παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας, etc., the oath
so often cited and admired.

Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenes to his rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been appointed by his countrymen to deliver the usual public oration over the warriors slain at Chæroneia. That speech is now lost, but it probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action, of every Greek city as well as of every Greek citizen, was now cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force; there still remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of Philip at Chæroneia—in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded either to repudiate Demosthenes, or to disclaim sympathy with his political policy. How much art and ability was employed, to induce them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschines is enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions wherein the fame of Demosthenes was involved, the Dikasts had given a verdict unfavorable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and even honorably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness of mind in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic, and Pan-hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the minds of his hearers; and that amidst the many general allegations of corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the Dikastery.

The indictment now preferred by Æschines against Ktesiphon only procured for Demosthenes a new triumph. When the suffrages of the Dikasts were counted, Æschines did not obtain so much as one fifth. He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmæ. It appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine, and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander’s life (at the time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander’s death.[692]

[692] See the various lives of Æschines—in Westermann, Scriptores
Biographici, pp. 268, 269.

We cannot suppose that Æschines was unable to pay the fine of 1000 drachmæ, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens. We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenes in his own defence,—delivered with all his perfection of voice and action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise, and contemptuous bitterness towards his rival—must have been inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of Æschines became themselves angry with him for having brought the indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been that the vote of the Senate which he indicted, was brought forward and passed in the public assembly; and that Demosthenes must have received a public coronation.[693] In no other way, under the existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenes have obtained so emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such a mortification was insupportable to Æschines. He became disgusted with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils, the successful oration of his rival, De Coronâ. Of course it excited a burst of admiration. “What, if you had heard the beast himself speak it!”—exclaimed Æschines.

[693] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 315. ἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν
ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μήδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν
ἀνωμολόγημαι—σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει,
κινδυνεύεις δὲ εἴτε δεῖ σε ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ᾽ ἤδη πεπαῦσθαι
μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, etc.

Yet Æschines had become opulent, according to Demosthenes, p. 329.

From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant, we have to pass to another trial—a direct accusation brought against him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B. C., to January 324 B. C.), during which we have no information about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander’s march into Baktria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory order filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast, at Cape Tænarus in Laconia.

It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B. C.), that Harpalus the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers.[694] While satrap, he had invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses, Pythionikê and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached, and whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments to her memory; one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in Kilikia,—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before her, and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and Syria.[695] To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship.[696] Moreover he had consigned to Charikles, son-in-law of Phokion, the task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honor of Pythionikê; with a large remittance of money for the purpose.[697] The profit or embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the good will of Charikles—a man very different from his father-in-law, the honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it convenient to quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B. C., he had already acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and protection in that city.[698]

[694] Diodor. xvii. 108. He states the treasure brought out of
Asia by Harpalus as 5000 talents.

[695] See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus
addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and
before his flight to Athens—Theopomp. Fragm. 277, 278, ed. Didot,
ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 586-595. Theopompus speaks in the present
tense—~καὶ ὁρᾷ~ (Harpalus) ὑπὸ τοῦ λάου προσκυνουμένην (Glykera),
etc. Kleitarchus stated these facts, as well as Theopompus
(Athenæ. ibid.).

[696] Athenæus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satirical
drama called Agên, represented before Alexander at Susa, in the
Dionysiac festival or early months of 324 B. C.

[697] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikæarchi
Fragment. 72. ed. Didot.

Plutarch’s narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply
that Harpalus gave this money to Charikles _after_ his arrival at
Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had
been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch
treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on
it; but both Dikæarchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and
magnificent.

[698] Curtius, x. 2, 1.

The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic freedom. Such is the color of the case, as presented in the satiric drama called Agên, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B. C. Such news, connecting itself in Alexander’s mind with the recent defeat of Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries, incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.[699] But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of Harpalus.[700]

[699] Curtius, x. 2, 1. “Igitur triginta navibus Sunium
transmittunt” (Harpalus and his company), “unde portum urbis
petere decreverunt. His cognitis, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque
juxta infestus, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus
petiturus.” Compare Justin, xiii. 5, 7—who mentions this hostile
intention in Alexander’s mind, but gives a different account of
the cause of it.

The extract from the drama _Agên_ (given in Athenæus, xiii.
p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of
Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery,
with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it,—to
enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present
privations and future ruin:—

A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians) δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον,
ἱκανὸν ἐδείπνουν· ~νῦν δὲ~, τὸν χέδροπα μόνον
καὶ τὸν μάραθον ~ἔσθουσι~, πυροὺς δ᾽ οὐ μάλα.

B. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἅρπαλον
αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάττονας
σίτου παραπέμψαι, καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι.

A. Γλυκέρας ὁ σῖτος οὗτος ἦν· ἔσται δ᾽ ἴσως
αὐτοῖσιν ~ὀλέθρου~ κοὐκ ἑταίρας ἀῤῥαβών.

I conceive this drama Agên to have been represented on the banks
of the _Choaspes_ (not the _Hydaspes_—see my note in the Chapter
immediately preceding, p. 240), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia
of 324 B. C. It is interesting as a record of the
feelings of the time.

[700] Nevertheless the impression, that Alexander was intending
to besiege Athens, must have prevailed in the army for several
months longer, during the autumn of 324 B. C. when
he was at Ekbatana. Ephippus the historian, in recounting the
flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ekbatana, mentions the
rhodomontade of a soldier named Gorgus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ
Ἀλέξανδρον Ἄμμωνος υἱὸν στεφανοῖ χρυσοῖς τρισχιλίοις, ~καὶ ὅταν
Ἀθήνας πολιορκῇ~, μυρίαις πανοπλίαις καὶ ταῖς ἴσαις καταπέλταις
καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς (Ephippus
ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 538. Fragment. 3. ed. Didot).

The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the rumors first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philokles was instructed to adopt precautions for defence of the harbor.[701] But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krete or to Tænarus, solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we are told to upwards of 700 talents, or more than £160,000. We must recollect that he was already favorably known to the people by large presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship. He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would raise the standard of liberation.[702] To many Athenian patriots, more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men like Charikles, who were already in his interest. His cause was espoused by Hyperides,[703] an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and an orator second only to Demosthenes. There seems good reason for believing that at first, a strong feeling was excited in favor of taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the idea of war with Alexander.[704]

[701] Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. 1. φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς
τὸν Πειραῖα καταπλεῦσαι, στατηγὸς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὴν
Μουνυχίαν κεχειροτονημένος, etc. Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton,
s. 4. ὃς παρ᾽ Ἁρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾔσθεθ᾽ ἥκειν
καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν, etc.