Chapter XCIII (2)

No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts of Darius for recovery were paralyzed by the capture of his family. Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, re-appearing in different places for operations of detail; but we shall find no farther resistance to Alexander and his main force, except from the brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a contempt, not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley, whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this (as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same, had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground unless there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether blind and childish;[288] nay, that faith, though overweening beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.[289] But it was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their effect.[290] Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

[288] See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxes—Herodot.
vii. 48; compare the speech of Achæmenes, vii. 236.

[289] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς δῆλος ἐγένετο (Darius) τοῖς
ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος (a remarkable expression
borrowed from Thucydides, iv. 34). Compare Arrian, ii. 6, 7.

[290] Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger
was asked by some of the Grecian Officers, whether he thought
that his brother Artaxerxes (who had as yet made no resistance)
would fight—“To be sure he will (was the reply) if he is the son
of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the
crown without fighting!” Personal cowardice, in a king of Persia
at the head of his army, seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i.
7, 9)

Happy was it for Memnon, that he did not live to see the renunciation of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the Ægean, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian Orontobates had received from the Macedonians in Karia,[291] was nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-Macedonian manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt in the island of Chios as the result of this news, Pharnabazus immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and to content himself with directing some operations in Krete, to be conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradates to Halikarnassus.[292] It appears, however, that he afterwards went to conduct the operations in Krete, and that he had considerable success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the Persians.[293] On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian synod, assembled at Corinth during the Isthmian festival, manifested their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath of gold.[294]

[291] Arrian, ii. 5, 8.

[292] Arrian, ii. 13, 4-8.

[293] Diodor. xvii. 48.

[294] Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to
mention this vote later, but it must evidently have been passed
at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.

With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through Kœle-Syria to the Phenician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feint of trying to convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the hands of the enemy.[295] There was captured a large treasure—with a prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury, belonging to the court and the grandees.[296] Moreover the prisoners made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor of Darius—the daughter of Darius’s brother Oxathres—the wives of Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and Barsinê, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian and Athenian, who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under arrest, but not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble name and parentage—Iphikrates, son of the great Athenian officer of that name.[297] The captive Iphikrates not only received his liberty, but was induced by courteous and honorable treatment to remain with Alexander. He died however shortly afterwards from sickness, and his ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his family at Athens.

[295] Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13. The words of Arrian
(ii. 15, 1)—ὀπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς Δαμασκὸν—confirm the statement of
Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the
town, but in the hands of fugitives who were conveying it away
from the town.

[296] A fragment of the letter from Parmenio to Alexander is
preserved, giving a detailed list of the articles of booty
(Athenæus, xiii. p. 607).

[297] Arrian, ii. 15, 5; Curtius, iii. 13, 13-16. There is some
discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, iii. 24, 7) as to
the names of the Lacedæmonian envoys.

I have already stated in a former volume[298] that the elder Iphikrates had been adopted by Alexander’s grandfather into the regal family of Macedonia, as the savior of their throne: probably this was the circumstance which determined the superior favor shown to the son, rather than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards the military genius of the father. The difference of position, between Iphikrates the father and Iphikrates the son, is one among the painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism; the father, a distinguished officer moving amidst a circle of freemen, sustaining by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family; the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his own security and the freedom of Greece.

[298] See above, in the History, Vol. X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 108; Vol.
X. Ch. lxxix. p. 251; and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 263. c. 13.

Alexander himself had consented to be adopted by Ada princess of
Karia as her son (Arrian, i. 23, 12).

Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced onward to Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he approached was Marathus, on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with that islet and some other neighboring towns, the domain of the Aradian prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving with his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the Ægean; but his son Strata, acting as viceroy at home, despatched to Alexander his homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him at once Aradus with the neighboring towns included in its domain. The example of Strato was followed, first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the queen and parent of all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent envoys to meet him and invite his approach.[299] Their sentiments were unfavorable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody and perfidious proceedings which (about eighteen years before) had marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.[300] Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the Ægean with the Persian admiral Autophradates, and formed a large proportion of his entire fleet.[301]

[299] Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.

[300] Diodor. xvi. 45.

[301] Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20, 1. Curtius, iv. 1, 6-16.

While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius, asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another. Darius farther attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had begun the wrong against Persia,—that Alexander had continued it—and that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply, Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxes. He then alleged various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having instigated the assassination of Philip, as well as the hostilities of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. “Now (continued he), by the grace of the gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps, next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me, and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you; otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be.”[302]

[302] Arrian, ii. 14; Curtius, iv. i. 10; Diodor. xvii. 39. I
give the substance of this correspondence from Arrian. Both
Curtius and Diodorus represent Darius as offering great sums
of money and large cessions of territory, in exchange for the
restitution of the captives. Arrian says nothing of the kind.

This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with himself, even on the part of other kings—every thing short of submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis[303]) which of the two should be master of Asia.

[303] Arrian, ii. 12, 9.

The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be recalled; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him, one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied, that even Alexander’s energy and ability might hardly have proved sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander’s march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbors, if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports, except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian, was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family, yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.[304]

[304] Curtius, iv. 1, 20-25; Justin, xi. 10. Diodorus (xvii. 47)
tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon;
which is highly improbable.

With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre; the most powerful among the Phenician cities, though apparently less ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together with a golden wreath of honor; announcing formally that the Tyrians were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.[305] In reply, he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents, and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Herakles. The Phenician god Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Herakles, and was thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle.[306] The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all other points, they would obey Alexander’s orders.[307] They added that his wish to sacrifice to Herakles might be accomplished without entering their city, since there was in Palætyrus (on the mainland over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow strait) a temple of that god yet more ancient and venerable than their own.[308] Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took note only of the point refused,—Alexander dismissed the envoys with angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.[309]

[305] Arrian. iii 15, 9. ὡς ἐγνωκότων Τυρίων πράσσειν, ὅ,τι ἂν
ἐπαγγέλλῃ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.

[306] Curtius (_ut suprà_) adds these motives: Arrian asserts
nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius
represents what is likely to have been the real fact and real
feeling of Alexander.

It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with
rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true
that Arrian falls into the opposite extreme—squeezing out _his_
narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton.

[307] Arrian, ii. 16, 11.

[308] Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent
and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians, is not noticed by
Arrian.

[309] Arrian, ii. 16, 11. τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις πρὸς ὀργὴν ὀπίσω
ἀπέπεμψεν, etc. Curtius, iv. 2, 5. “Non tenuit iram, cujus
alioqui potens non erat”, etc.

Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the Tyrians as foolish wilfulness,[310] have not fully considered how much the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force armed and in battle army.[311] We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at Tyre to Herakles—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as in fact it was, after the town had been taken.[312] The Tyrians were thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure it from a new master. It was in fact hazarding their all; submitting at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians promised everything short of submission to military occupation, we see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without the necessity of besieging the town. The great value of Phenician cities consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and gave to them the command of the sea.[313] Had Alexander required that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia, nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between the two belligerents, as if the contest were still undecided.[314] Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands, prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy and intelligent communities of the ancient world.

[310] Diodorus, xvii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι, βουλομένου τοῦ βασιλέως
τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Τυρίῳ θῦσαι, προπετέστερον διεκώλυσαν αὐτὸν τῆς εἰς
τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδου.

[311] Arrian, i. 18, 4.

[312] Arrian, ii. 24, 10.

[313] This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his
address to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre
(Arrian, ii. 17, 3-8).

[314] Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtius says (iv. 2, 2), “Tyros
facilius _societatem_ Alexandri acceptura videbatur, quam
_imperium_.” This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians
as greater than the fact warrants. They did not refuse the
_imperium_ of Alexander, though they declined compliance with one
extreme demand.

Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of
Jerusalem, by entering the town on the Sabbath, under pretence of
offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).

Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the mainland;[315] the channel between the two being shallow towards the land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls, the loftiest portion of which, on the side fronting the mainland, reached a height not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity and base.[316] Besides these external fortifications, there was a brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms, machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.

[315] Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of Tyre at the present day
presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of
Alexander’s time.

[316] Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8.

It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against the formidable arm of Alexander; and against Alexander as he then stood, they might have held out successfully; for he had as yet no fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The question turned upon the Phenician and Cyprian ships, which were for the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the Ægean under the Persian admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all the Phenician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate, to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This could hardly have failed to happen if he had treated the Tyrians with decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had made them his enemies.

What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradates in the Ægean, when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other Phenician cities; next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his ships for the defence of his own city;[317] the Sidonian and Aradian ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradates without Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did), had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander, as the interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not improbably have been retained on that side in the struggle. Lastly, the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phenician brethren, if ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be nowise hearty as his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingencies, though ultimately they all turned out in favor of Alexander, were in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid resolution of the Tyrians; who were farther encouraged by promises of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.[318]

[317] Azemilchus was with Autophradates when Alexander declared
hostility against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was in Tyre when
it was captured (Arrian, ii. 24, 8).

[318] Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodor. xvli. 40,
41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the
Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only
refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary
to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this sending
of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he
found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify
the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover it is not conformable to
Alexander’s temperament, after what had passed between him and
the Tyrians.

Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet; the Sidonian and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the half mile channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into his service laboring hands by thousands from the neighborhood; he had stones in abundance from Palætyrus, and wood from the forests in Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardor and perseverance, under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome, even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts, the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel to the city wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole. So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were burnt,—the outer wood-work which kept the mole together was torn up in many places,—and a large part of the structure came to pieces.[319]

[319] Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodor. xvii. 42; Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.

Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also to begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth and strength, for the purpose of carrying more towers abreast in front, and for better defence against lateral attacks. But it had now become plain to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the sea, no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town. Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus to reconstruct the mole and build new engines, he himself repaired to Sidon, for the purpose of assembling as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in requisition the ships of the Phenician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and Aradus, now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left the Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders; while not long afterwards, the princes of Cyprus came thither also, tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war.[320] He was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near the ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been fulfilled; since by successful operations on land, he had conquered and brought into his power a superior Persian fleet.[321]

[320] Arrian. ii. 20, 1-4; Curtius, iv. 2, 14. It evinces how
strongly Arrian looks at everything from Alexander’s point of
view, when we find him telling us, that that monarch _forgave_
the Phenicians and Cyprians for their adherence and past service
in the Persian fleet, considering that they had acted under
compulsion.

[321] Arrian, i. 18, 15. In the siege of Tyre (four centuries
earlier) by the Assyrian monarch Salmaneser, Sidon and other
Phenician towns had lent their ships to the besieger (Menander
apud Joseph. Antiq. Jud. ix. 14, 2).

Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of eleven days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and hazard.[322] On returning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbor of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within, struck with surprise and consternation; having not before known that their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander, having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight, immediately caused their two harbors to be blocked up and watched; that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians—that on the south, towards Egypt, by the Phenicians.[323]

[322] Arrian, ii. 20, 5; Plutarch, Alexander, 24.

[323] Arrian, ii. 20, 9-16; Curtius, iv. 3, 11.

From this time forward, the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted upon it to batter the walls: movable towers were rolled up to take them by assault; attack was also made from seaward. Yet though reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed obstinate bravery, and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon, that none of Alexander’s engines could make any breach in it; but on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large breach having been made in this south-wall, he assaulted it with two ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he himself commanded in one and Admêtus in the other. At the same time he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders. Himself and his two ships having been rowed close up to the breach in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck, upon which he and Admêtus rushed forward with their respective storming-parties. Admêtus got upon the wall, but was there slain; Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the same time, his ships also forced their way into the two harbors, so that Tyre came on all sides into his power.[324]

[324] Arrian, ii. 23, 24; Curtius, iv. 4, 11; Diodor. xvii. 46.

Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate, the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege, as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter in the temple of Hêraklês were spared by Alexander from respect to the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred, and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror.[325] But the greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in their hands; while 2000 of them who survived, either from disabling wounds, or from the fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the sea-shore by order of Alexander.[326] The females, the children, and the slaves, were sold to the slave-merchant. The number sold is said to have been about 30,000: a total rather small, as we must assume slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously sent away to Carthage.[327]

[325] Curtius, iv. 4, 15.

[326] This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by
Diodorus (xvii. 46). It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps
may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see
no ground for disbelieving it.

[327] Arrian, iv. 24, 9; Diodorus, xvii. 46.

Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated his much-desired sacrifice to Herakles. His whole force, land and naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more costly hecatomb had never been offered to that god, when we consider that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege, and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his former worshippers. What the loss of the Macedonians had been, we cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400, which must be greatly beneath the truth; for the courage and skill of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodigious period of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to accomplish it sooner.[328]

[328] The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by
the fact, that in spite of this total destruction, Tyre again
rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).

Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents, with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates, as ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should become his son-in-law as well as his ally. “If I were Alexander (said Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into farther peril.”—“So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio; but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer.” His answer to Darius was to this effect—“I want neither your money nor your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose to marry your daughter, I _shall_ marry her—whether you give her to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any act of friendship.”[329] Alexander might spare the submissive and the prostrate; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and his language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.

[329] Arrian, ii. 25, 5; Curtius, iv. 5. The answer is more
insolent in the naked simplicity of Arrian, than in the pomp
of Curtius. Plutarch (Alexand. 29) both abridges and softens
it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54)—and
represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after
Alexander’s return from Egypt.

Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he undertook any farther expedition into the interior of the Persian empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold;[330] and Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet in the Ægean, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160 sail.[331] During the summer of 332 B. C., while Alexander was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos invited them and ensured their success; those of Chios attempted to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonides and others, with a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town, and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within. Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers, and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the capture—was entrapped into the harbor, and made prisoner. There remained only Mitylênê, which was held for the Persians by the Athenian Chares, with a garrison of 2000 men; who, however, seeing no hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands, and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.[332]

[330] Arrian, ii. 17, 4.

[331] Curtius, iv. 5, 14.

[332] Curtius, iv. 5, 14-22; Arrian, iii. 2, 4-8.

These successes were in full progress, when Alexander himself directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and encircled with a high wall; but its main defence was derived from the deep sands immediately around it, as well as from the mud and quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgment was confirmed by the Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen to have triumphed.[333]

[333] Arrian, ii. 26, 5. Οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυντο,
ἄπορον εἶναι βίᾳ ἑλεῖν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὕψος τοῦ χώματος· ἀλλ᾽
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐδόκει αἱρετέον εἶναι, ὅσῳ ἀπορώτερον· ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ
τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἑλεῖν
αἰσχρὸν εἶναί οἱ, λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Δαρεῖον.

About the fidelity, and obstinate defensive courage, shown more
than once by the inhabitants of Gaza—see Polybius, xvi. 40.

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall, for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This external mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall, when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulder, by a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander had predicted—giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall into his hands.[334] During the treatment of his wound, he ordered the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea; and caused his mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work, the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad[335]; the loose sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have been considerable—though doubtless thousands of laborers would be pressed in from the circumjacent country.[336]

[334] Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12-18; Plutarch,
Alexand. 25.

[335] Arrian, ii. 27, 5. ~χῶμα~ χωννύναι ~ἐν κύκλῳ παντόθεν~
τῆς πόλεως. It is certainly possible, as Droysen remarks
(Gesch. Alex. des Grossen, p. 199), that παντόθεν is not to be
interpreted with literal strictness, but only as meaning in _many
different portions_ of the walled circuit.

Yet if this had been intended, Arrian would surely have said
χώματα in the plural, not χῶμα.

[336] Diodorus (xvii. 48) states the whole duration of the siege
as two months. This seems rather under than over the probable
truth.

Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the Walls were breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still farther breaching the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions manifested hardly less ardor, and the town was at length taken. Its gallant defenders resisted, with unabated spirit, to the last; and all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed to give quarter.

One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince or governor himself, the eunuch Batis; who, having manifested the greatest energy and valor, was taken severely wounded, yet still alive. In this condition he was brought by Leonatus and Philôtas into the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and fury. The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and labor, and undergone so many repulses before he succeeded,—that the palm of honor belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to the multitude of victors. To such disappointment, which would sting Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that he had himself incurred great personal risk and received a severe wound. Here was ample ground for violent anger; which was moreover still farther exasperated by the appearance of Batis—an eunuch—a black man—tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish—and doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible circumstances, repulsive to eyes familiar with Grecian gymnastics, contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch. After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the hanging of the 2000 surviving combatants; here, to discharge the pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single captive, upon whom therefore he resolved to inflict a punishment as novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of this brave man, yet surviving, was tied with cords to the tail of a chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army.[337] Herein Alexander, emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor Achilles, copied the ignominious treatment described in the Iliad as inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.[338]

[337] Curtius, iv. 6, 25-30; Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p.
123-125—with the citation there given from Hegesias of Magnesia.
Diodorus (xvii. 48, 49) simply mentions Gaza in two sentences,
but gives no details of any kind.

Arrian says nothing about the treatment of Batis, nor did he
probably find anything about it in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. There
are assignable reasons why they should pass it over in silence,
as disgraceful to Alexander. But Arrian, at the same time, says
nothing inconsistent with or contradicting the statement of
Curtius; while he himself recognizes how emulous Alexander was of
the proceedings of Achilles (vii. 14, 7).

The passage describing this scene, cited from the lost author
Hegesias by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, as an example of bad
rhythm and taste, has the merit of bringing out the details
respecting the person of Batis, which were well calculated to
disgust and aggravate the wrath of Alexander. The bad taste of
Hegesias as a writer does not diminish his credibility as a
witness.

[338] Arrian. vii. 14, 7.

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from the neighborhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town for the Macedonians.[339]

[339] Arrian, ii. 27. 11. About the circumstances and siege of
Gaza see the work of Stark, Gaza and die Philistäische Küste, p.
242, Leip. 1852.

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine mouths,[340] were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October 332 B. C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakes, the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching conqueror. Seven days’ march brought Alexander and his army from Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of Hephæstion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to welcome him.[341] He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by land. The satrap Mazakes surrendered himself, with all the treasure in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian god Apis; to which he added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most distinguished artists.

[340] Diodor. xvii. 48; Josephus, Antiq. xi. 4.

[341] Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius iv. 7, 1, 2; Diodor. xvii. 49.

From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to Kanôpus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the lake Mareôtis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population, as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city.[342] Perceiving soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent mainland. The gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites of numerous temples to Grecian gods as well as Egyptian.[343] It was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The site of the place, between the sea and the Lake Mareôtis, was found airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce. The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good harbors for ships coming by sea, on a coast harborless elsewhere; while the Lake Mareôtis, communicating by various canals with the river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the interior.[344] As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by transporting to them in mass the population of the neighboring town of Kanôpus, and probably of other towns besides, by the intendant Kleomenes.[345]

[342] Curtius, iv. 8, 1-4; Plutarch, Alexand. 26.

[343] Arrian, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8, 2-6; Diodor. xvii. 52.

[344] Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other authors however speak of the
salubrity of Alexandria less favorably than Strabo: see St.
Croix, Examen des Hist. d’ Alexandre, p. 287.

[345] Pseudo-Aristotle, Œconomic. ii. 32.

Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes. It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future. He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen beyond mediocrity.[346]

[346] Arrian, iii. 5, 4-9. Tacitus (Annal. i. 11) says about
Egypt under the Romans—“provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ
fecundam, superstitione et lasciviâ discordem et mobilem, insciam
legum, ignaram magistratuum”, etc. Compare Polybius ap. Strabon.
xvii. p. 797.