Chapter XCII: Asiatic Campaigns of Alexander (2)

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander’s first invading army. There were however other accounts, the highest of which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry.[157] Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian officers,[158] was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Buonaparte on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army for thirty days. Nor had he even been able to bring together his auxiliaries, or complete the outfit of his army, without incurring a debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by his father Philip.[159] Though Plutarch[160] wonders at the smallness of the force with which Alexander contemplated the execution of such great projects, yet the fact is, that in infantry he was far above any force which the Persians had to oppose him;[161] not to speak of comparative discipline and organization, surpassing even that of the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.

[157] Diodor. xvii. 17. Plutarch (Alexand. 15) says that the
highest numbers which he had read of, were,—43,000 infantry with
5000 cavalry: the lowest numbers, 30,000 infantry with 4000
cavalry (assuming the correction of Sintenis, τετρακισχιλίους
in place of πεντακισχιλίους, to be well founded, as it probably
is—compare Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327).

According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M. p. 327), both Ptolemy and
Aristobulus stated the number of infantry to be 30,000; but
Ptolemy gave the cavalry as 5000, Aristobulus, as only 4000.
Nevertheless, Arrian—who professes to follow mainly Ptolemy and
Aristobulus, whenever they agree—states the number of infantry
as “not much more than 30,000; the cavalry as more than 5000”
(Exp. Al. i. 11, 4). Anaximenes alleged 43,000 infantry, with
5500 cavalry. Kallisthenes (ap. Polybium. xii. 19) stated
40,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. Justin (xi. 6) gives 32,000
infantry, with 4500 cavalry.

My statement in the text follows Diodorus, who stands
distinguished, by recounting not merely the total, but the
component items besides. In regard to the total of infantry, he
agrees with Ptolemy and Aristobulus: as to cavalry, his statement
is a mean between the two.

[158] Plutarch, Alexand. 15.

[159] Arrian, vii. 9, 10—the speech which he puts in the mouth of
Alexander himself—and Curtius, x. 2, 24.

Onesikritus stated that Alexander owed at this time a debt of 200
talents (Plutarch, Alex. 15).

[160] Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327; Justin, xi. 6.

[161] Arrian, i. 13, 4.

Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander’s army were native Macedonians. His intimate personal friend Hephæstion, as well as his body-guards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives of Pella: Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper Macedonia called Orestis;[162] Antipater with his son Kassander, Kleitus son of Drôpides, Parmenio with his two sons Philôtas and Nikanor, Seleukus, Kœnus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus,[163] Meleager, Peukestes, etc., all these seem to have been native Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war under Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater, especially, had occupied a high rank.

[162] Arrian, vi. 28, 6; Arrian, Indica, 18; Justin, xv. 3-4.
Porphyry (Fragm. ap. Syncellum, Frag. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p.
695-698) speaks of Lysimachus as a Thessalian from Kranon; but
this must be a mistake: compare Justin, xv. 3.

[163] Neoptolemus belonged, like Alexander himself, to the Æakid
gens (Arrian, ii. 27, 9).

Of the many Greeks in Alexander’s service, we hear of few in important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, was among his familiar companions; but the ablest and most distinguished of all was Eumenes, a native of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. Eumenes, combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of Philip and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued by Alexander in the post of chief secretary during the whole of that king’s life.[164] He conducted most of Alexander’s correspondence, and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the name of the Royal Ephemerides. But though his special duties were thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in the field. Occasionally entrusted with high military command, he received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In spite of these great qualities—or perhaps in consequence of them—he was the object of marked jealousy and dislike[165] on the part of the Macedonians,—from Hephæstion the friend, and Neoptolemus the chief armor-bearer, of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Eumenes as an unwarlike penman. The contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down on Greeks, is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of Alexander, as well as a new feature in history; retorting the ancient Hellenic sentiment in which Demosthenes, a few years before, had indulged towards the Macedonians.[166]

[164] Plutarch, Eumenes, c. 1; Cornelius Nepos, Eumen. c. 1.

[165] Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eum. 2, 3, 8, 10.

[166] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 19, respecting Philip—οὐ μόνον
οὐχ Ἕλληνος ὄντος, οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ~ἀλλ᾽ ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνος~,
ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίασθαι.

Compare this with the exclamations of the Macedonian soldiers
(called Argyraspides) against their distinguished chief Eumenes,
calling him Χεῤῥονησίτης ὄλεθρος (Plutarch, Eumenes, 18).

Though Alexander has been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army was already assembled under the Persian satraps within a few days’ march of Abydos. Since the reconquest of Egypt and Phenicia, about eight or nine years before, by the Persian king Ochus, the power of that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. The Persian successes in Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries, under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general Mentor; who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the eunuch Bagôas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only ample presents, but also the appointment of military commander on the Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard.[167] He procured the recall of his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, and had found shelter with Philip.[168] He farther subdued, by force or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic coast; among them, the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle, and master of the strong post of Atarneus.[169] These successes of Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B. C. He, and his brother Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other parts of Thrace;[170] that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing to facilitate Philip’s intended invasion of Asia, was seized and sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens, soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.[171]

[167] See, in reference to these incidents, my last preceding
volume, Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 441 _seq._

[168] Diodor. xvi. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius
mentions also Manapis, another Persian exile, who had fled from
Ochus to Philip.

[169] Diodor. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of
Athens, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodor. xiii. 64. It had
been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of
Hermeias—Isokrates. Compare also Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s.
167.

[170] Letter of Alexander, addressed to Darius after the battle
of Issus, apud Arrian, ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the
Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of
Perinthus), are here alluded to.

[171] Demosthenes, Philippic. iv. p. 139, 140; Epistola Philippi
apud Demosthen. p. 160.

Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B. C., he died, poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, who placed upon the throne Arses, one of the king’s sons, killing all the rest. After two years, however, Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to death also, together with all his children; thus leaving no direct descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the brothers of Artaxerxes Memnon), who had acquired glory, in a recent war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable champion of the enemy’s army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him to drink the deadly draught himself.[172] In spite of such murders and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards reproached to Darius[173]—the authority of Darius seems to have been recognized, without any material opposition, throughout all the Persian empire.

[172] Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22.

[173] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B. C. 336, when Philip was organizing the projected invasion of Persia, and when the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already making war in Asia—Darius prepared measures of defence at home, and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.[174] On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful Alexander.[175] Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during the first months of Alexander’s reign, when the latter might have been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Bœotia, satisfied Darius that the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for defence. The Phenician fleet was ordered to be equipped: the satraps in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the seaboard, was furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under his separate command.[176]

[174] Diodor. xvii. 7.

[175] Arrian, ii. 14, 11.

[176] Diodor. xvii. 7.

We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events, during the nineteen months between Alexander’s accession and his landing in Asia (August 336 B. C., to March or April 334 B. C.) We learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of Adramyttium[177]) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to content himself with a rich booty from the district around.[178] The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanê; while Kallas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhœteium.[179]

[177] Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν
τὴν Μέμνονος ἔπεμψεν—which doubtless means this region, conquered
by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus.

[178] Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.

[179] Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near
Magnesia between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4).

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the region north-east of the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334 B. C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander’s designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations.

At the time of Alexander’s landing, a powerful Persian force was already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Arsites the Phrygian satrap, supported by several other leading Persians—Spithridates (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Pharnakes, Atizyes, Mithridates, Rhomithres, Niphates, Petines, etc. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valor. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians, Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, etc.[180] In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number,[181] composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and 100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodorus, the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.

[180] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5.

[181] Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.

Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbors.[182]

[182] Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in
Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority
of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly
both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon’s policy;
which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less
effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the
offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the retreat and
destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly
have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander,
and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian
generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon’s
ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of
the irresistible Persian fleet.

I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus,
because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too
exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all
allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either
certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian;
he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric,
which contrasts favorably both with Diodorus and with Curtius;
but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.

Had this plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander’s military superiority, and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonorable, insinuating that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity was farther strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsites, in whose territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house in it to be burnt.[183] Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus—“of not being able to procure a dinner in his own country”.[184] The proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.

[183] Arrian, i. 12, 18.

[184] Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 1, 33.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the Iliad, and immortalized by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Skêpsis,[185] and flows northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth: near the point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus offering obstruction to an enemy’s attack. The Persians, marching forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city situated between Priapus and Parium.[186]

[185] Strabo, xiii. p. 602. The rivers Skamander, Æsepus, and
Granikus, all rise from the same height, called Kotylus. This
comes from Demetrius, a native of Skepsis.

[186] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19. Οἱ βάρβαροι, τὴν ὑπώρειαν
κατειλημμένοι, etc. “prima congressio in campis Adrastiis fuit.”
Justin, xi. 6: compare Strabo, xiii. p. 587, 588.

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbê (where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkôtê, on the second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermôtus; receiving on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From Hermôtus (the fourth day from Arisbê) he marched direct towards the Granikus, in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river, he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping during the night.

In Alexander’s array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the central body. The six Taxeis or divisions, of which it consisted, were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Kœnus, Amyntas son of Andromenes, Philippus, Meleager, and Kraterus.[187] Immediately on the right of the phalanx, were the hypaspistæ, or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light horse or lancers, the Pæonians, and the Apolloniate squadron of Companion-cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokrates, all under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly the full body of Companion-cavalry, the bowmen, and the Agrianian darters, all under Philôtas (son of Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right.[188] The left flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians, under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus, son of Menelaus—lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas, whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its flank—for there was no recognized centre under a distinct command. On the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank. The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithres—the Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the centre, under Arsites and Spithridates—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenes, with their divisions.[189] The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute the passage of the river.

[187] Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name
of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations are proposed.
The words ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ξυμπάσης τάξεως seem to prove
that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager,
and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three
others (Perdikkas, Kœnus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while
the words ἐπὶ δὲ, ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου appear wrongly
inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished
officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his
τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the
τάξεις,—once again in counting from the left.

[188] Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with
thirteen squadrons (ἴλαι) of cavalry. Whether this total includes
all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cavalry—we
cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).

[189] Diodor. xvii. 19.

In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each other in anxious silence.[190] There being no firing or smoke, as with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander himself on the Macedonian right from the splendor of his armor and military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanor of those around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their own left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—(the squadron of Apollonia, of which Sokrates was captain—commanded on this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippus) supported by the light horse or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ.[191] He then himself entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian cavalry.[192] Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under the like precautions.

[190] Arrian, i. 14, 8. Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφότερα τὰ στρατεύματα,
ἐπ᾽ ἀκροῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφεστῶτες, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον ὀκνεῖν ἡσυχίαν
ἦγον· καὶ σιγὴ ἦν πολλὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων.

[191] Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας mean the same
cavalry as those who are called (in 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἱππέας,
under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus.

[192] Arrian, i. 14, 10. Αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δέξιον
κέρας ... ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν,
ᾗ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ
κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀνυστὸν, τῇ φάλαγγι
προσμίξῃ αὐτοῖς.

Apparently, this passage λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ᾗ
παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which
follows describing the purpose to be accomplished.

I cannot think that the words imply a movement _in échelon_,
as Rüstow and Köchly contend (Geschichte des Griechischen
Kriegswesens, p. 271)—nor a crossing of the river against the
stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of
others.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others down at the water’s-edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain. Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with increased fervor on both sides. He was himself among the foremost, and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander with those around him, gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line, overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the level ground with comparative facility.[193] Indeed no cavalry could possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.

[193] Arrian, i. 15, 5. Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself)
ξυνειστήκει μάχη καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ᾽ ἄλλαις τῶν
τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἤδη.

These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete
Arrian’s description of the battle had before been. Dwelling
almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements
of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of
the army, and nothing at all about the left half of it under
Parmenio. We discover from these words that _all_ the τάξεις of
the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander’s half, but also the
three in Parmenio’s half) passed the river nearly at the same
time, and for the most part, with little or no resistance.

Here again, as at the water’s edge, Alexander was foremost in personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus, one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridates, and laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the Persian leaders, Rhœsakes, who struck him a blow on the head with his scymetar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakes through the body with his pike.[194] Meanwhile a third Persian leader, Spithridates, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand and scymetar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment, Kleitus son of Dropides—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted arm of Spithridates and severed it from the body, thus preserving Alexander’s life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridates, rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his armor, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian cavalry also fought with vigor and success;[195] and the light-armed foot, intermingled with Alexander’s cavalry generally, did great damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun, speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the Macedonians.

[194] Arrian, i. 15, 6-12; Diodor. xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16.
These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.

[195] Diodor. xvii. 21.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardor of pursuit, calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention.[196] He brought up his phalanx and hypaspistæ to attack them in front, while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the dead bodies.[197]

[196] Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on
seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with
Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.

[197] Arrian, i. 16, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on
the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with
2000 cavalry; and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.

In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain. But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander, was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridates, Rhœsakes, and Spithridates, whose names have been already mentioned,—but also Pharnakes, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanes satrap of Kappadokia, Atizyes, Niphates, Petines, and others; all Persians of rank and consequence. Arsites, the satrap of Phrygia, whose rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon’s advice, escaped from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from anguish and humiliation.[198] The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry, though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in Arrian’s account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was either left in the field, or could be afterwards reassembled in Asia Minor.

[198] Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small. Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain; of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on the side of Alexander.[199] It is only the number of killed; that of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265.[200] If this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But when we add farther the contest with the infantry, the smallness of the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only 2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian) were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly affirms that they resisted with desperate valor, and that most of the Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be brought within the statement of Arrian.[201]

[199] Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.

[200] Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the
proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above
what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p.
273) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of
wounded to killed is from 8:1 to 10:1.

[201] Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexand. 16. Aristobulus
(apud Plutarch. _l. c._) said that there were slain, among the
companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four
persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian’s
statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.

After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus, to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service. The dead bodies were honorably buried, those of the enemy as well as of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported to Macedonia, there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be dedicated to Athênê in the acropolis with this inscription—“Alexander son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedæmonians (_present these offerings_), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting Asia.”[202] Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing his own self-aggrandizing impulse under the name of a supposed Pan-hellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful, as strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.

[202] Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.

The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsites and the other satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskilfully fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service, was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was fought only by the Persian cavalry;[203] the infantry was left to be surrounded and destroyed afterwards.

[203] Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an
ἱππομαχία (i. 17, 10 and elsewhere).

The battle was fought in the Attic month Thargelion: probably the
beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees who perished, realizing almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxes, and the Chorus, in the Persæ of Æschylus,[204] after the battle of Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed foremost into the _mélée_, but killed two of these grandees with his own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now, must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon the imagination of contemporaries.

[204] Æschylus, Pers. 950 _seqq._

Several of the neighboring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and were permitted to occupy their lands under the same tribute as they had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighboring Grecian city of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio to attack Daskylium, the stronghold and chief residence of the satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein. The whole satrapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander’s power, and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf, levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before.[205] He himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction towards Sardis—the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long blockade,[206] which would have allowed time for the arrival of the fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrines. The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure Were delivered up to him without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there were not in Asia any Persian governors of courage and fidelity such as had been displayed by Maskames and Boges after the repulse of Xerxes from Greece.[207] Alexander treated Mithrines with courtesy and honor, granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally, with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by Mithrines was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated. He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and Nikias, collector of tribute.[208] The freedom granted to the Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them from paying the usual tribute.

[205] Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.

[206] About the almost impregnable fortifications and position
of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15-18; Herod. i. 84. It held out
for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (B. C. 216),
and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the
defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.

[207] Herodot. vii. 106, 107.

[208] Arrian, i. 17, 5-9; Diodor. xvii. 21.

From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aëropus, who had been promoted in place of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus—the two principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison (Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus, with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the harbor, and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator in the agora.[209] Some of the party, though abandoned by their garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance, restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an honorable and prudent moderation.[210]

[209] Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus,
which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no
information: nor are we told who Heropythus was or under what
circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been
interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of
the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander’s invasion.

[210] Arrian, i. 17, 10-13.

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions of surrender from the two neighboring inland cities, Magnesia and Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000 foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry; while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison as an instrument of Persian supremacy—to place the government in the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute. He himself—after taking part in a solemn festival and procession to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle array—marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor proceeding thither by sea.[211] He expected probably to enter Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town, though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet,[212] four hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained seamen, was approaching.

[211] Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.

[212] Arrian, i. 18, 10-13.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus;[213] and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the battle. Whether the towns in Memnon’s principality of Atarneus had attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia, that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders to this effect were presently sent down by that prince;[214] but at the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.

[213] Diodor. xvii. 22.

[214] Diodor. xvii. 23.

It came too late to aid in the defence of Miletus. Three days before its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which commanded the harbor of that city. Alexander found the outer portion of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported 4000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and obliged to take moorings under the neighboring promontory of Mykalê. Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea, Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition, affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons, Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships, Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land-operations.[215] This part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability, is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does, not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the ancient world.

[215] Arrian, i. 18, 9-15; i. 20, 2.

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus, repudiating with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named Glaukippus—that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbor, blocked up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening demonstrations from the water’s edge; while he himself brought up his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield. Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbor, and there prepared to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of capitulation, and received them into his own service.[216] To the surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city, while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.

[216] Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.

The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighboring promontory of Mykalê, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus. At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then afford, was nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated that by concentrating all his efforts on land-operations, especially against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and ensure that country to himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.[217]

[217] Arrian, i. 20, 1-4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time,
the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24),
that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to
Halikarnassus by sea. This would only have exposed them to be
captured by the Persian fleet. We shall see that Alexander
reorganized his entire fleet during the ensuing year.

Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of Miletus—including the Ionic and Æolic cities and the principality of Memnon—had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his march southward from Miletus, towards Karia, and especially towards Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family, who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions, adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many years earlier, under Mausôlus and Artemisia, the powerful princes of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning family intermarried with each other: Mausôlus and his wife Artemisia were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of Idrieus, his widow Ada, was expelled from Halikarnassus and other parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still preserved some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobates, warmly espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of resistance against the invader.[218]

[218] Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodor. xvii. 24; Strabo, xiv. p.
657.

But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian fleet had repaired thither from Miletus; Memnon, now invested by Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was there in person. There was not only Orontobates with many other Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by Ephialtes, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and twenty-two feet deep,[219] had been still farther strengthened under the prolonged superintendence of Memnon;[220] lastly, there were two citadels, a fortified harbor, with its entrance fronting the south, abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines. The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea at once, as at Miletus, he could make his approaches only from the land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the Persian ships with their numerous crews.

[219] Arrian, i. 20, 13.

[220] Arrian, i. 20, 5. ξύμπαντα ταῦτα Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρὼν ἐκ
πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει, etc.