Chapter XIV: Part II: is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.” (1)

It might perhaps be more accurately described as “pre-March 1939 evidence,” and it will be with that part that I would now deal.

My Lord, it has been put to the Tribunal that the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation for further aggression, and I now—dealing with the early history of this matter—wish to draw the Court’s particular attention only to those parts of the evidence which show that even at that time, before the Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly prepared to fight England, Poland, and France, if necessary, to achieve those preliminary aims; that they appreciated the whole time that they might well have to do so. And, what is more, although not until after March 1939 did they commence upon their immediate and specific preparations for war against Poland, nevertheless, they had for a considerable time before had it in mind specifically to attack Poland once Czechoslovakia was completely theirs.

During this period also—and this happens throughout the whole story of the Nazi regime in Germany—during this period, as afterwards, while they are making their preparations and carrying out their plans, they are giving to the outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull them out of any suspicion of their real object.

The dates, I think—as the learned Attorney General said in addressing you yesterday—the dates in this case, almost more than the documents, speak for themselves. The documents in this book are arranged in the order in which I will refer to them, and the first that I would refer to is Document TC-70, which will go in as GB-25.

It is only interesting to see what Hitler said of the agreement with Poland when it was signed in January 1934:

“When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the
relations between the two countries seemed to me more than
unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing
differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom,
would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which, if
persisted in, might only too easily acquire the character of a
dangerous traditional enmity.”

I go down to the one but last paragraph.

“In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing
and prepared also to cultivate economic-political relations with
Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable
suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful co-operation.
It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this
same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been
enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with
its Polish neighbor.”

That was in 1934. Three years later, again on the 30th of January, speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said—this is Document PS-2368, which will be GB-26. I will, if I may, avoid so far as possible repeating passages which the Attorney General quoted in his speech the other day. The first paragraph, in fact, he quoted to the Tribunal. It is a short paragraph but perhaps I might read it now, but I will—dealing with this evidence—so far as possible avoid repetition:

“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension
and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the
European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland
which has worked out to the advantage of both sides . . . . True
statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them.
The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The
German nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to
my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and
the Polish State have also become a reality.”

That was on the 30th of January 1937.

On the 24th of June 1937 we have a top-secret order, C-175, which has already been put in as USA-69. It is a top-secret order issued by the Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, signed “Von Blomberg.” It has at the top, “Written by an officer . . . . Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it . . . are to be written by an officer.” So it is obviously highly secret. And with it is enclosed a directive for the unified preparation for war of the Armed Forces to come into force on the 1st of August 1937. The directive enclosed with it is divided into Part 1, “General Guiding Principles”; Part 2, “Likely Warlike Eventualities”; Part 3, “Special Preparations.”

The Tribunal will remember that the Attorney General quoted the opening passages:

“The general political position justifies the supposition that
Germany need not consider an attack from any side.”

It goes on—the second paragraph:

“The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little
by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation,
which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a
continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces to
counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military
exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they
occur.”

It then goes on to set out the preparations which are to be made, and I would particularly draw the Tribunal’s attention to Paragraph 2b:

“The further working on mobilization without public announcement
in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war
suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time.”

On the next page, under Paragraph 4:

“Special preparations are to be made for the following
eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike
entanglements with Red Spain.”

And thirdly, and this shows so clearly how they appreciated at that time that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve them in war:

“England, Poland, and Lithuania take part in a war against us.”

If the Tribunal would turn over to Part 2 of that directive, Page 5 of that document:

“For the treatment of probable warlike eventualities
(concentrations) the following suppositions, tasks, and orders
are to be considered as basic:

“1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West.

“Suppositions. In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium may
side with France, either at once or later, or not at all. It is
also possible that France may violate Belgium’s neutrality if
the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of
Luxembourg.”

I pass to Part 3, which will be found on Page 9 of that Exhibit, and I particularly refer to the last paragraph on that page under the heading “Special Case—Extension Red-Green”. It will be remembered that Red was Spain and Green was Czechoslovakia.

“The military political starting point used as a basis for
concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either
England, Poland, or Lithuania . . . join the side of our
opponents. Thereupon our military position would deteriorate to
an unbearable, even hopeless extent. The political leadership
will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral,
above all England and Poland.”

Thereafter, it sets out the conditions which are to be the basis for the discussion. Before I leave that document, the date will be noted: June 1937; and it shows clearly that at that date anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England, and Poland, and France, and were perfectly prepared to do so, if they had to. On the 5th of November 1937—the Tribunal will remember—Hitler held his conference in the Reich Chancellery, the minutes of which have been referred to as the Hossbach notes. I refer to only one or two lines of that document to draw the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler said in respect to England, Poland, and France. On Page 1 of that Exhibit, the middle of the page:

“The Führer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is the
security and preservation of the nation and its propagation.
This is consequently a problem of space.’”

He then went on, you will remember, to discuss what he described “participation in world economy,” and at the bottom of Page 2 he said:

“The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the
securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times
has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of
nations.”

And at the end of that first paragraph on Page 3:

“The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has
proved that every space expansion can be effected only by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable. Neither formerly, nor today, has space been found
without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the
proprietor.”

My Lord, it is clear that that reference was not only . . .

THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] It has been read already.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My object was only to try to collect, so far as England and Poland were concerned, the evidence that had been given. I would welcome in actual fact if the Tribunal thought that it was unnecessary, I would welcome the opportunity to . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would wish you not to read anything that has been read already.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I would pass then to the next document in that part of your document book. I put that document in. It was referred to by the Attorney General in his address yesterday, and it shows that on the same date the Hossbach meeting was taking place, a communiqué was being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador’s audience with Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the conversation that it was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulties because of the Danzig question. That Document is TC-73. I put it in as GB-27. On the 2d of January . . .

THE PRESIDENT: That hasn’t been read before, has it?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the Attorney General in his opening.

THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2d of January 1938 some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Führer. This document was one of the German Foreign Office documents of which a microfilm was captured by Allied troops when they came into Germany. It is headed, “Very confidential—personal only,” and is called, “Deductions on the Report, German Embassy, London, regarding the Future Form of Anglo-German Relations”:

“With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a
_status quo_ in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a
military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an
agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British
politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that
has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will
Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate
camps and will they march once more against each other one day?
To answer this question, one must realize the following:

“A change of the _status quo_ in the East in the German sense
can only be carried out by force. As long as France knows that
England, which so to speak, has taken on a guarantee to aid
France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for
her eastern allies is probable, in any case, always possible,
and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies
then even if England does not want war. England, believing she
must defend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in
automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between
England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who
could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way
of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows, therefore,
that war between Germany and England on account of France can be
prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s
forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common
victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby
France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-French
coalition would never tolerate.

“This position would arise for instance if England, through
insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by
a superior coalition of powers, for example, Germany, Italy,
Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places,
would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in
Europe.”

The next page goes on to discuss the possibilities of a strong partnership between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from my quotation to the next page where the writer is summarizing his ideas.

Paragraph 5:

“Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.

“1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to
the protection of the interests of our friends.

“2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted
tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a
tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the
winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours
directly or indirectly.

“Close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats of the
three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we
confront England, be it in a settlement or in war. England is
going to be a hard and astute opponent in this game of
diplomacy.

“The particular question whether, in the event of a war by
Germany in Central Europe . . .”—I am afraid the translation of
this is not very good—“The particular question whether, in the
event of a war by Germany in Central Europe, France, and thereby
England, would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the
time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military
considerations which cannot be gone into here.”

And whoever it was that wrote that document appears to be on a fairly high level, because he concludes by saying:

“I should like to give the Führer some of these points of view
verbally:”

That document is GB-28.

Well, I am afraid that the next two documents have gotten into your books in the wrong order. If you would refer to 2357-PS which is the one following our L-43—it will be remembered that document to the Führer which I have just read was dated the 2d of January 1938.

On the 20th of January 1938 Hitler spoke in the Reichstag.

THE PRESIDENT: February, the document said.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon—February 1938. That is 2357-PS, and will be GB-30. In that speech he said:

“In the fifth year following the first great foreign political
agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification
to be able to state that in our relations with the state, with
which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has
there been a _détente_, but in the course of these years there
has been a constant improvement in relations. This good work,
which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has
stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations
finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and
appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new
commissioner, the most dangerous spot from this point of view of
European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The
Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and
both the City of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And
so the way to friendly understanding has been successfully
paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today,
in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers, succeeded
in finally taking the poison out of the relations between
Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere,
friendly co-operation.

“To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone
unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for
the task which is ahead of us—peace.”

I turn back to the next—to the document which was in your document books, the one before that, L-43, which will be GB-29. This is a document to which the Attorney General referred yesterday. It is dated the 2d of May 1938, and is entitled “Organizational Study of 1930.” It comes from the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said to be:

“The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly
conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization
of the Air Force. The result gained is termed ‘Distant
Objective.’ From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in
the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942. This will be
called ‘Final Objective 1942.’ This in turn yields what is
considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of
the staffs of the Air Force group commands, air Gaue, air
divisions, _et cetera_.”

The table of contents, the Tribunal will see, is divided into various sections, and Section I is entitled “Assumptions.” If the Tribunal will turn over to the next page one finds the assumption under the heading “Assumptions I, frontier of Germany, see map, Enclosure 1.”

The Tribunal sees a reproduction of that map on the wall and it will be seen that on the 2d of May 1938, the Air Force were envisaging Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all coming within the bounds of the Reich. The original map is here attached to this file and if the Tribunal will look at the original exhibit, it will be seen that this organizational study has been prepared with the greatest care and thoroughness, with a mass of charts attached as appendices.

I would refer also to the bottom of the second page, to the Tribunal’s copy of the translation:

“Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of
the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I:

1) Attack forces: Principal adversaries: England, France,
Russia.”

And it then goes on to say if all the 144 Geschwader are employed against England, they must be concentrated in the western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that by making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down to the last corner.

THE PRESIDENT: It is perhaps involved in the map. I think perhaps you should refer to the organization of the Air Force, with group commands at Warsaw and Königsberg.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged. Under the paragraph “Assumptions,” Sub-heading 2, “Organization of the Air Force in Peacetime,” seven group commands:

1-Berlin, 2-Brunswick, 3-Munich, 4-Vienna, 5-Budapest, 6-Warsaw, and 7-Königsberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. And lastly, in connection with that document, on Page 4 of the Tribunal’s translation, the last paragraph:

“The more the Reich grows in area, and the more the Air Force
grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have
locally bound commands . . . .”

I emphasize only the opening, “The more the Reich grows in area, and the more the Air Force grows in strength . . .” Now I would say one word on that document. The original, I understand, is signed by an officer who is not at the top rank in the Air Force and I, therefore, don’t want to overemphasize the inferences that can be drawn from it, but it is submitted that it at least shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that date.

The Tribunal will remember that in February 1938 the Defendant Ribbentrop succeeded Von Neurath as Foreign Minister. We have another document from that captured microfilm, which is dated the 26th of August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and it is addressed to him as “the Reich Minister via the State Secretary.” It is a comparatively short document and one that I will read in whole:

“The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem,
might easily, but must not, lead to a conflict with the
Entente.”—TC-76 becomes GB-31—“Neither France nor England is
looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps
leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct
foreign interference and through internal signs of
disintegration due to her own faults, suffer the fate she
deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step
by step, and would have to lead to a loss of power in the
remaining territory, by means of a plebiscite and an annexation
of territory.

“The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any
immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and
not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly.
Germany cannot fix any definite time when this fruit could be
plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the
desired developments.”

I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can leave out the intervening lines, Paragraph 5.

THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph, “For this purpose . . .”?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “For this purpose the slogan emanating
from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten
Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to
be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the
choice of nationality is being withheld from these Germans will
do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical
process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may
not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate
of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet
be clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely
sealed.

“This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be
recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is
unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of
boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and
northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact is”—I put in an
“is” because I think it is obviously left out of the copy that I
have in front of me.—

“The fact is that after the liquidation of the Czech question,
it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in
turn.

“But the later this assumption sinks in in international
politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however,
it is important for the time being, to carry on the German
policy, under the well-known and proved slogans of ‘the right to
autonomy’ and ‘racial unity.’ Anything else might be interpreted
as pure imperialism on our part, and provoke resistance by the
Entente at an earlier date and more energetically than our
forces could stand up to.”

That was on the 26th of August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was leading up to a Munich settlement. While at Munich, or rather a day or two before the Munich Agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On the 26th of September he said—I think Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has just read this document to the Tribunal. I’ll refer to only two lines of it:

“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved, there will be no more territorial problems
for Germany in Europe.”

And again, the last document in your book, which is another extract from that same speech, I will not read to the Tribunal unless the Tribunal desire, because the Attorney General did quote it in full in his address yesterday. These two documents are already in, TC-28 as GB-2, and TC-29, which is the second extraction of that same speech, as GB-32.

My Lord, I would refer the Tribunal to one more document under this part which has already been put in by my American colleagues. It is C-23, now USA-49, and which appears before TC-28 in your document book. The particular passage of that exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter from Admiral Carls, which appears at the bottom of the second page. It is dated some time in September, with no precise date, and is entitled, “Opinion on the ‘Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England.’ There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.” Again, the Attorney General quoted the remainder of that letter yesterday, which the Tribunal will remember.

“If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire a
position of security as a world power she needs not only
sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval
communications and secure access to the ocean.”

That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich Agreement in September 1938.

The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and had intended, and as a result, they were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or elsewhere, but Your Lordships heard this morning, when Mr. Alderman dealt in his closing remarks with the advantages that were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, what Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions, that Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack on Poland. It is, of course, obvious now that they intended and indeed had taken the decision to proceed against Poland as soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. We know now, from what Hitler said in talking to his military commanders at a later date. The Tribunal will remember the speech where he said that from the first, he never intended to abide by the Munich Agreement but that he had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland after September 1938, they did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig. Until—as the Tribunal will see—until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March, no pressure was put on; but immediately after the Sudetenland had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was to lead eventually to their excuse, or so-called justification for their attack on that country.

If the Tribunal would turn to Part 3. . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 December at 1000 hours._]

FOURTEENTH DAY
Thursday, 6 December 1945

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request from the defendants’ counsel that the Trial should be adjourned at Christmas for a period of 3 weeks. The Tribunal is aware of the many interests which must be considered in a trial of this complexity and magnitude, and, as the Trial must inevitably last for a considerable time, the Tribunal considers that it is not only in the interest of the defendants and their counsel but of every one concerned in the Trial that there should be a recess. On the whole it seems best to take that recess at Christmas rather than at a later date when the Prosecution’s case has been completed. The Tribunal will therefore rise for the Christmas week and over the 1st of January, and will not sit after the session on Thursday, the 20th of December, and will sit again on Wednesday, the 2d of January.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff, to note the American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of the defendants.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the Tribunal will return to Part III of that document book in which I included the documents relating to the earlier discussions between the German and Polish Governments on the question of Danzig. Those discussions, the Tribunal will remember, started almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, and started, in the first place, as cautious and friendly discussions until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March of the following year.

I would refer the Tribunal to the first document in that part, TC-73, Number 44. That is a document taken from the official _Polish White Book_, which I put in as Exhibit GB-27 (a). It gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on the 24th of October, where Ribbentrop saw Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Germany:

“In a conversation of the 24th of October, over a luncheon at
the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present,
Von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement
of issues between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion
of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the
retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would
agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and a
railway line across Pomorze (northern part of the corridor). In
exchange Von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an
extension of the Polish-German Agreement to 25 years and a
guarantee of Polish-German frontiers.”

I do not think I need read the following lines. I go to the last but one paragraph:

“Finally, I said to Von Ribbentrop that I could see no
possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free
City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the
substance of this conversation to you.”

I would emphasize the submission of the Prosecution as to this part of the case and that is that the whole question of Danzig was, indeed, as Hitler has himself said, no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, a so-called justification, not for the seizure of Danzig, but for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland, and we see it starting now. As we progress with the story it will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi Government were really aiming at—only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would provide some kind of justification for walking into the rest of Poland.

I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken from the _Polish White Book_, TC-73, Number 45, which will be GB-27 (b). TC-73 will be the _Polish White Book_, which I shall put in later. That document sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German Government in reply to the suggestion put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on the 24th of October. I need not read the first page. The history of Polish-German relationship is set out, and the needs of Poland in respect of Danzig are emphasized. I turn to the second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph 6:

“In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish
Government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: The
right of the German population of the city and the surrounding
villages to freedom of life and development, and the fact that
in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is
connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the
majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely
bound up with Poland.”

It then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the existing statute, and I pass to Paragraph 7:

“Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and
desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a
friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich,
the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of
Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bilateral
Polish-German agreement. This agreement should guarantee the
existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of
national and cultural life to its German majority, and also
should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the
complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government
must state that any other solution, and in particular any
attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must
inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form
of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of
Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.”

And then finally in Paragraph 8:

“In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am
ready to have final conversations personally with the governing
circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you
should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that
my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would
be dangerous for the future.”

The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from the German point of view. They had put forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable, and the Polish Government had warned the Nazi Government that it would be. They had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which is exactly what the German Government had hoped. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been accomplished.

Shortly afterward, within a week or so of that taking place, after the Polish Government had offered to enter into discussions with the German Government, we find another top-secret order, issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by the Defendant Keitel. It goes to the OKH, OKM, and OKW and it is headed, “The First Supplement to the Instruction Dated the 21st of October 1938”:

“The Führer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies
mentioned in the instructions of that date of 21 October 1938,
preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of
Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise . . . .

“The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition
is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a
politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.”

We remember, of course, that at that moment the remainder of Czechoslovakia had not been seized and therefore they were not ready to go to war with Poland. That document does show how the German Government answered the proposal to enter into discussions. That is C-137 and will become GB-33.

On the 5th of January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. It is unnecessary to read the first part of that document, which is the next in the Tribunal’s book, TC-73, Number 48, which will become GB-34. In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offers to answer any questions. He says he has always followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discusses the Danzig question and emphasizes that in the German view it must sooner or later return to Germany. I quote the last but one paragraph of that page:

“Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult
problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s suggestion he did not
see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish
opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest
spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this
matter.

“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this
problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite
new, some new form, for which he used the term Körperschaft,
which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the
German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In
addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be
quite at ease, there would be no _faits accomplis_ in Danzig,
and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of
the Polish Government.”

The Tribunal will remember that in the very last document we looked at, on the 24th of November, orders had already been received, or issued, for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise; yet here he is assuring the Polish Foreign Minister that there is to be no _fait accompli_ and he can be quite at his ease.

I turn to the next step, Document TC-73, Number 49, which will become GB-35, conversation between Mr. Beck and Ribbentrop, on the day after the one to which I have just referred between Beck and Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the last conversation took place in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very obliged to you. No, I did not. As I say, it was on the next day, the 6th of January. The date in actual fact does not appear on the copy I have got in my book. It does appear in the _White Book_ itself.

“Mr. Beck asked Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas
previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German
statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today, for the first
time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the
Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw
no possibility whatever of agreement.”

I emphasize this last paragraph:

“In answer Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not
seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards
Poland was still a desire for the further building up of
friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of
clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and
interests of the two parties concerned.”

The Defendant Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, some fortnight or three weeks later, he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of which an extract is set out in PS-2530, which will become GB-36:

“In accordance with the resolute will of the German national
leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly
relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing
agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German
foreign policy. The political foresight and the principles
worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take
the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all
other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of
events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard
to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of
both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the
future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual
relations.”

And even so, the Nazi Government must have been still anxious that the Poles were beginning to sit up—Your Lordship will remember the expression “sit up” used in the note to the Führer—and to assume they would be the next in turn, because on the 30th of January Hitler again spoke in the Reichstag, 30th of January 1939, and gave further assurances of their good faith.

That document, that extract, was read by the Attorney General in his address, and therefore, I only put it in now as an exhibit. That is TC-73, Number 57, which will become GB-37.

That, then, brings us up to the March 1939 seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

If the Tribunal will now pass to the next part, Part IV, of that document book, I had intended to refer to three documents where Hitler and Jodl were setting out the advantage gained through the seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will remember that Mr. Alderman, in his closing remarks yesterday morning, dealt very fully with that matter showing what advantages they did gain by that seizure and showing on the chart that he had on the wall the immense strengthening of the German position against Poland. Therefore, I leave that matter. The documents are already in evidence, and if the Tribunal should wish to refer to them, they are found in their correct order in the story in that document book.

As soon as that occupation had been completed, within a week of marching into the rest of Czechoslovakia, the heat was beginning to be turned on against Poland.

If the Tribunal would pass to Document TC-73, which is about half way through that document book—it follows after Jodl’s lecture, which is a long document—TC-73, Number 61. It is headed: “Official Documents concerning Polish-German Relations.” This will be GB-38.

On the 21st of March Mr. Lipski again saw Ribbentrop and the nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that that had been held a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden:

“I saw Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to
call in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their
entirety.

“He complained about our press, and the Warsaw students’
demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.”

I think I can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which commences with “further”:

“Further, Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at
Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler
put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in
exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig into
the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations
between you and him in Warsaw”—that is, between him, of course,
and Mr. Beck—“He said that there had been further conversations
between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had
pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these
suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an
unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had
received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his
suggestions. Ribbentrop had talked to the Chancellor, only
yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favor of
good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a
thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual
relations. Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression
that difficulties arising between us were also due to some
misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The problem needed to
be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion, our two States
were dependent on each other.”

I think it unnecessary that I should read the next page. Briefly, Ribbentrop emphasizes the German argument as to why Danzig should return to the Reich, and I turn to the first paragraph on the following page:

“I stated”—that is Mr. Lipski—“I stated that now, during the
settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no
understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already
hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our
disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But
in regard to Slovakia, the position was far worse. I emphasized
our community of race, language, and religion, and mentioned the
help we had given in their achievement of independence. I
pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that
the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich
had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being
directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question
was a serious blow to our relations.

“Ribbentrop reflected for a moment, and then answered that this
could be discussed.

“I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation
between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might
go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk the matter over.
He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the
Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was
rejecting all his offers.

“Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his
conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Ribbentrop
answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter’s
return from Rome, and that they had discussed the Memel
question, which called for a solution.”

That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It was not very long before the world knew what the solution to Memel was. On the next day German Armed Forces marched in.

If the Tribunal would turn over—I think the next document is unnecessary—turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39.

As a result of these events, not unnaturally, considerable anxiety was growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish Government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking conversations with each other.

On the 31st of March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons, and he explained that as a result of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments—I quote from the last but one paragraph of his statement:

“As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding
with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the
position of His Majesty’s Government in the meantime, before
those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the
House that during that period, in the event of any action which
clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish
Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their
national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves
bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their
power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to
this effect.

“I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make
it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as
do His Majesty’s Government.”

On the 6th of April, a week later, a formal communiqué was issued by the Anglo-Polish Governments which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her support should she, Great Britain, be attacked. I need not read it all. In fact, I need not read any of it. I put it in. It is TC-72, Number 18. I put it in as GB-40.

The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain were feeling at that time appear to have been well justified. During the same week, on the 3rd of April, the Tribunal will see in the next document an order signed by Keitel. It emanates from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3rd of April 1939. Its subject is: “Directive for the Armed Forces 1939-40”:

“‘Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed
Forces for 1939-40’ is being reissued.

“Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued
in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

“Part II, Case White”—which is the code name for the operation
against Poland—“Part II, Case White, is attached herewith. The
signature of the Führer will be appended later.

“The Führer has added the following directives to Case White:

“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation
can be carried out at any time from 1st of September 1939
onwards.”—This is in April, the beginning of April.

“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to
draw up a precise timetable for Case White and to arrange by
conferences the synchronized timings among the three branches of
the Armed Forces.

“3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the
details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the
1st of May.”

That document, as the Tribunal will see on the following page under the heading “Distribution”, went to the OKH, OKM, OKW.

THE PRESIDENT: Are those words at the top part of the document, or are they just notes?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They are part of the document.

THE PRESIDENT: Directives from Hitler and Keitel, preparing for war.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon; no, they are not. The document starts from under the words “Translation of a document signed by Keitel.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The first words being “top-secret.”

If the Tribunal will look at the second page, following after “Distribution”, it will be seen that there follows a translation of another document, dated the 11th of April, and that document is signed by Hitler:

“I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the
Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with
these for the conduct of the war.”—No question about
war—“conduct of the war.”

“Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be
prepared for the following eventualities:

“I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and
protection against surprise air attacks;

“II. Case White;

“III. The Annexation of Danzig.

“Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military
authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike
development.” Again that document goes to the OKH, OKM, OKW.

On the next page of the copy the Tribunal have, the translation of Annex I is set out, which is the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich, and I would quote from Paragraph (2) under “Special Orders”:

“Legal Basis. It should be anticipated that a state of defense
or a state of war, as defined in the Reich defense law of the
4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and
demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be
based on the laws valid in peacetime.”

My Lord, that document is C-120. It becomes GB-41. It contains some other later documents to which I shall refer in chronological order.

The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by the Anglo-Polish communiqué of the 6th of April, was seized upon by the Nazi Government to urge on, as it were, the crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland.

On the 28th of April the German Government issued a memorandum in which they alleged that the Anglo-Polish Declaration was incompatible with the 1934 agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement.

I would only quote three short passages, or four short passages, from that document. It is TC-72, Number 14. It becomes GB-42. Some of these passages are worth quoting, if only to show the complete dishonesty of the whole document on the face of it:

“The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British
declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations
recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According
to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish
Government and the British Government a temporary understanding,
to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement, which will
provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great
Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two
states being directly or indirectly threatened.”

Thereafter, the document sets out in the next three paragraphs the history of German friendship towards Poland. I quote from the last paragraph, Paragraph 5, on that page:

“The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish
Government with the British Government is in such obvious
contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago
that the German Government can take note only with surprise and
astonishment of such a violent and fundamental reversal of
Polish policy.

“Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may
be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement
is intended as a regular pact of alliance which, by reason of
its general sense and of the present state of political
relations, is directed exclusively against Germany. From the
obligation now accepted by the Polish Government, it appears
that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active
part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of
aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect
Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against
the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934
declaration.”

I think I can omit Paragraph 6. Paragraph 7:

“The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to
accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to
be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third
power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government.
In view of this, the German Government are obliged to conclude
that the Polish Government do not at present attach any
importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by
means of direct, friendly discussion with the German Government.
The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path, traced out
in 1934, to the shaping of German-Polish relations.”

All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable.

The document goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st, which the German Government had made; the return of Danzig, the Autobahn, the railway, the promise by Germany of the 25 years’ guarantee, and I go down to the last but one paragraph on Page 3 of the Exhibit, under the heading (1):

“The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the
opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just
settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of
Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent
strengthening of the friendly, neighborly relations between the
two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German
proposals made with this object.

“At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to
another state, political obligations which are not compatible
either with the spirit, the meaning, or the text of the
German-Polish declaration of the 26th of January 1934. Thereby,
the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this
declaration null and void.”