Chapter XXI: Section III: of the order deals with the relations with certain other (1)

countries, and states in part as follows—I am reading from Page 3 of the English translation:

“III. Regulations regarding Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Finland.

“9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be
made by the OKW together with the Foreign Office and according
to the wish of the respective high commands. In case it should
become necessary during the course of the operations to grant
special rights, applications for this purpose are to be
submitted to the OKW.”

The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is also on Page 3 of the English Translation:

“IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

“12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for troops,
no special authority is to be granted to the commander of the
German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure
the immediate protection of railroad transports against sabotage
and attacks.

“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,”—signed—

“Keitel.”

As was hinted in the original Barbarossa order, Directive Number 21, which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our Number C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files, and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry.

I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-136.

Although I shall refer to this document again later, I should like at present to read only an item which appears in the second paragraph of Item 142 on Page 19 of the English translation and which is in the text in a footnote on Page 26 in the German original. This item is dated 3 April 1941, and reads as follows:

“Balkan operation delay; Barbarossa now in about 5 weeks. All
measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be
stopped according to the Führer’s order.”

By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out to permit the Führer to definitely set D-Day as the 22d of June—more than 7 weeks away. Document Number 873-PS in our series is a top-secret report of a conference with the Chief of the Section “Landesverteidigung” of the “Wehrmacht Führungsstab” on April 30, 1941. I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-137.

I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this report:

“1) Timetable Barbarossa. The Führer has decided:

“Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop
movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations
the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.

“2) Proportion of actual strength in the Plan Barbarossa:

“Sector North, German and Russian forces approximately of the
same strength; Sector Middle, great German superiority; Sector
South, Russian superiority.”

Early in June, practically 3 weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

This timetable is Document Number C-39 in our series, and I offer it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-138.

This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered here was the third copy which was given to the High Command of the Navy; Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as follows:

“Top secret; Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; Nr. 44842/41
top military secret WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.); Führer’s headquarters;
for chiefs only, only through officer; 21 copies; I Op.
00845/41; received 6 June; no enclosures.

“The Führer has authorized the appended timetable as a
foundation for further preparations for Plan Barbarossa. If
alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces”—signed—
“Keitel.”

I shall not bother to read to you the distribution list which indicates where the 21 copies went.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it necessary that you should read all those preliminary matters at the head of these documents, “top secret,” “only through officer,” and then the various reference numbers and file information when you give identification of a document.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.

The next two pages of the document are in the form of a text outlining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General, Negotiations with friendly states, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Camouflage.

I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with seven columns headed from left to right at the top of each page: Date, Serial number, Army, Air Force, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most interesting among the items appearing on this chart . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first paragraph, for that seems to be important. There are two lines there.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The heading “General” on Page 2.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.

“1. General. The timetable for the maximum massing of troops in
the East will be put into operation on the 22d of May.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: Most interesting among the items appearing on this chart, in my opinion, are those appearing on Pages 9 and 10. These are at Page 8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9 it is provided in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Force—and I quote:

“Up to 1300 hours is latest time at which operation can be
cancelled.”

Under the column headed OKW appears the note that—and again I quote:

“Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or further confirmation of
start of attack by code word ‘Dortmund’.”

In the Remarks column appears the statement that:

“Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of
main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be
reckoned with.”

The second entry on Page 10 of the chart for the 22d of June, under Serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW, and provides as follows, under the heading:

“Invasion Day. H-Hour for the start of the invasion by the Army
and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces: 0330 hours.”

In the Remarks column, it states that:

“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting on the
part of the Air Force owing to weather.”

The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.

On 9 June 1941 the order of the Führer went out for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941, which was just 8 days before D-Day. This order is signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, and is C-78 in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-139.

I read from Page 1 the matter under the heading “Conference Barbarossa”:

“1. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of Army groups,
armies, and naval and air commanders of equal rank.

“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the
Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

“3. Timetable:

“a) 1100 hours, “Silver Fox”; b) 1200 hours-1400 hours, Army
Group South; c) 1400 hours-1530 hours, lunch party for all
participants in conference; d) from 1530 hours, Baltic, Army
Group North, Army Group Center, in this order.”

It is signed by Schmundt.

There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they will report which I shall not read. The list includes, however, a large number of the members of the Defendant High Command and General Staff group as of that date. Among those to participate were, of course, the Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

I believe that the documents which I have introduced and quoted from are more than sufficient to establish conclusively the premeditation and cold-blooded calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Starting almost a full year before the commission of the crime, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all of that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German character. Although several of these defendants played specific parts in this military phase of the planning and preparation for the attack, it is natural enough that the leading roles were performed, as we have seen, by the military figures: the Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

Next, preparation for plunder—plans for the economic exploitation and spoliation of the Soviet Union.

Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning and preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to ensure that their aggression would prove economically profitable.

A little later in my presentation I shall discuss with the Tribunal the motives which led these conspirators to attack, without provocation, a neighboring power. I shall at that time show that the crime was motivated by both political and economic considerations. The economic basis, however, may be simply summarized at this point as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies which their neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To these defendants such a need was translated indubitably as a right, and they early began planning and preparing with typical care and detail to ensure that every bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression would be exploited to their utmost benefit.

I have already put into the record evidence showing that as early as August of 1940 General Thomas, the chief of the B Group Army, received a hint from the Defendant Göring about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R. which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. I also said at that time that I would later introduce evidence that in November 1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically informed by Göring of the planned operation in the East and preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation. Göring, of course, played the overall leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan.

Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning at Page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 2353-PS introduced earlier as Exhibit USA-35; the part I shall read is at Pages 10 and 11 of the English translation:

“In November 1940 the Chief of Wi Rü together with Secretaries
of State Körner, Neumann, Backe, and General Von Hanneken were
informed by the Reich Marshal of the action planned in the East.

“By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for
the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rü at
the end of 1940.

“The preliminary preparations for the action in the East
included first of all the following tasks:

“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian armament
industry, its location, its capacity, and its associate
industries.

“2. Investigation of the capacities of the different big
armament centers and their dependency one on the other.

“3. Determining the power and transport system for the industry
of the Soviet Union.

“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum
(crude oil).

“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament
industries in the Soviet Union.

“These points were concentrated in one big compilation, ‘War
Economy of the Soviet Union,’ and illustrated with detailed
maps.”—I am still quoting.—“Furthermore a card index was made
containing all the important factories in Soviet Russia and a
lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of
the German war economy organization.

“For the processing of these problems a task staff, ‘Russia,’
was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and
later on in charge of Major General Schubert. The work was
carried out according to the directives from the chief of the
office, respectively”—I suppose—“by the group of departments
for foreign territories”—Ausland—“with the co-operation of all
departments, economy offices, and any other persons possessing
information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative
activities an excellent collection of material was made which
proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the
operations and for administering the territories.”

That ends the quotation.

By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was needed, and so General Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference, classified top secret and dated 1 March 1941, was captured, and is our Document 1317-PS. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-140. The text of this memorandum reads as follows:

“The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be
drafted for the Reich Marshal.

“Essential Points:

“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich
Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the
Four Year Plan.

“2. The organization must include everything concerning war
economy, excepting only food which is said to be made already a
special mission of State Secretary Backe.

“3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent
of the military or civil administration. Close co-ordination,
but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.

“4. Scope of activities to be divided into two steps: a)
Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front
lines in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to
secure the removal of important goods; b) Administration of the
occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically
complementary districts.”

And then, on the bottom of Page 1:

“5. In view of the extended field of activity the term ‘war
economy inspection’ is to be used in preference to armament
inspection.

“6. In view of the great field of activity the organization must
be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly
numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of
seizing raw materials and taking over all important
exploitations. For the latter mission reliable persons from
German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning,
since successful operation from the beginning can only be
performed by the aid of their experience. (For example: lignite,
ore, chemistry, petroleum).

“After the discussion of further details Lieutenant Colonel
Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an
organization within a week.

“Close co-operation with the individual sections in the building
is essential. An officer must still be appointed for the Wi and
Rü with whom the operational staff can remain in constant
contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lieutenant Colonel
Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.

“Lieutenant General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the
second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are
ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to
report to the office chief at the end of the
week.—Signed—Hamann.”

Hamann, who signed the report, is listed among those attending as a captain and apparently the junior officer present, so presumably it fell naturally enough to Hamann to prepare the notes on the conference.

The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was organizing at the direction of Göring was clearly recognized by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March 1941. This order is Number 447-PS, and I have already offered it in evidence earlier as Exhibit USA-135. At that time I quoted the paragraph in the order in which it was stated that the Führer had entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the areas of operation and political administration to the Reich Marshal who in turn had delegated his authority to the Chief of the Wi Rü Amt.

The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain the organizational set-up of the Economic Staff “Oldenburg.” Oldenburg was the code name given to this economic counterpart of Plan Barbarossa. A report of this conference is captured Document Number 1157-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-141. Section 1 of this memorandum deals with the general organization of Economic Staff Oldenburg as it had developed by this time, and I should like to read most of that section into the record. The report begins:

“Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours
on Tuesday, 29th April 1941.

“1. Welcome. Purpose of the meeting: Introduction to the
organizational structure of the economic section of the
undertaking Barbarossa-Oldenburg.

“As already known, the Führer, contrary to previous procedure,
has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand
of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal
with the overall direction of the economic administration in the
area of operations and in the areas under political
administration.

“The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an Economic
General Staff working under the director of the Economic
Armament Office (Chief, Wi Rü Amt).

“Under the Reich Marshal and the Economic General Staff the
supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is
the”—and then a heading—“Economic Staff Oldenburg for special
duties under the command of Lieutenant General Schubert. His
subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided, are: 5
economic inspectorates, 23 economic commands, and 12 district
offices which are distributed among important places within the
area of the economic command.

“These offices are used in the military rear area. The idea is
that in the territory of each army group an economic
inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander
of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will
supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.

“A distinction must be made between the military rear area and
the battle area proper on the one hand, and the rear area of the
army on the other hand. In the latter, economic matters are
dealt with by the Group IV Economy”—IV Wi—“of the Army
Headquarters Command, that is, the liaison officer of the
Economic Armament Office within the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces assigned to the Army Headquarters Command. For the battle
area he has attached to him technical battalions, reconnaissance
and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural
machinery, in particular, tractors and means of production.

“In the rear area of the Army situated between the battle and
the military rear area, Group IV Economy with the various field
commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of
the Economic Armament Office for the support of the specialists
of the Army Headquarters Command, who are responsible for
supplying the troops from the country’s resources and for
preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.

“While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates,
economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in
the locality.

“The new feature inherent in the organization under the command
of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal
with military industry but comprises the entire economic field.
Consequently all offices are no longer to be designated as
offices of the military industries or armaments but quite
generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, _et
cetera_.

“This also corresponds with the internal organization of the
individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down
to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into
three large groups, i. e. Group M, dealing with troop
requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization;
Group L, which concerns itself with all questions of feeding and
agriculture, and Group W, which is in charge of the entire field
of trade and industry, including raw materials and supplies;
further, questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy
property, commerce and exchange of commodities, and manpower
allocation.

“Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and
Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within
the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General Von
Hanneken.”

The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel and planning problems, and similar details, which I think it unnecessary to put into the record.

These documents portray vividly the coldly calculated method with which those Nazis prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage a wanton attack on a neighbor to whom they had pledged security, but they also intended to strip that neighbor of his food, his factories, and all his means of livelihood.

As I shall point out more fully later when I discuss the question of motivation, these men made their plans for plunder being fully aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT: This would be a good time to adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May the Tribunal please, I have been informed by the interpreters that I have been speaking at a great speed this morning, so I shall try to temper the speed.

Next, the politics of destruction; preparation for the political phase of the aggression. As I have already indicated and as I shall develop more fully later in this discussion, there were both economic and political reasons motivating the action of the conspirators in invading the Soviet Union. I have already discussed the extent of the planning and preparations for the economic side of the aggression. Equally elaborate planning and preparation were engaged in by the conspirators to ensure the effectuation of the political aims of their aggression. It is, I believe, sufficient at this point to describe that political aim as the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a powerful political factor in Europe and the acquisition of Lebensraum.

For the accomplishment of this purpose the Nazi conspirators selected as their agent the Defendant Rosenberg. As early as the 2d of April 1941 Rosenberg or a member of his staff prepared a memorandum on the U.S.S.R. This memorandum speculates on the possibility of a disagreement with the U.S.S.R. which would result in a quick occupation of an important part of that country. This memorandum then considers what the political goal of such occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal.

The memorandum is Number 1017-PS in our series, and I offer it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-142.

Beginning with the second paragraph it reads, under the subject “U.S.S.R.”;

“A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an
extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large
section of the U.S.S.R. It is very probable that military action
on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse
of the U.S.S.R. The occupation of these areas would then present
not so many military as administrative and economic
difficulties. Thus arises the first question:

“Is the occupation to be determined by purely military or
economic needs respectively, or is the laying of political
foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor
in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so,
it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to
be attained, for it will without doubt also have an effect on
military operations.

“If the political overthrow of the eastern empire, in the weak
condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of
military operations, one may conclude that:

“1) The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions.

“2) From the very beginning the treatment of individual sections
of territory should, in regard to administration as well as
economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are
striving to attain.

“3) Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas
such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for
the continuation of war against England, the maintenance of
production which this necessitates, and the great directives for
the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all
together in one place.

“It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the
arguments which follow only hold good, of course, once the
supplies from the area to be occupied, which are essential to
Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been
assured.

“Anyone who knows the East sees in a map of Russia’s population
the following national or geographical units:

“(a) Greater Russia, with Moscow as its center; (b) White
Russia, with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital; (c) Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania; (d) The Ukraine and the Crimea, with Kiev
as its center; (e) The Don area, with Rostov as its capital; (f)
The area of the Caucasus; (g) Russian Central Asia or Russian
Turkestan.”

The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or geographical units in some detail, and I shall not read those pages. At the end of the paper, however, the writer sums up his thoughts and briefly outlines his plan. I should like to read that portion into the record. It is at the bottom of Page 4 of the English translation under the heading “Summary”:

“The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from
the points briefly outlined here:

“(1) The creation of a central department for the occupied areas
of the U.S.S.R. to be confined more or less to war time. Working
in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it
would be the task of this department:

“(a) To issue binding political instructions to the separate
administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at
the time and the goal which is to be achieved;

“(b) To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from
all the occupied areas;

“(c) To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out
in main outline of, the primarily important questions for all
areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport,
and the production of oil, coal, and food.

“(2) The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the
separate administration areas, grouped together by race or by
reason of political economy for the carrying out of the totally
dissimilar tasks assigned to them.

“As against this, an administrative department regulating
matters in principle and to be set up on a purely economic
basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be
inadequate and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would
be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas,
dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede
the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being
run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent
it.

“The question therefore arises whether the opinions which have
been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be
taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing
the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy.
In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of
administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of
the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally
different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of
the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment from that which
has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that signed?

MR. ALDERMAN: It is not signed. No, Sir.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is it in the Defendant Rosenberg’s handwriting?

MR. ALDERMAN: It was in the Rosenberg file.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is there anything to indicate that he wrote it?

MR. ALDERMAN: No. I said it was evidently prepared by Rosenberg or under his authority. We captured the whole set of Rosenberg files, which constitutes really a large library.

It is evident that the “presently envisaged administration operating on a purely economic basis” to which this memorandum objects was the Economic Staff Oldenburg, which I have already described as having been set up under Göring and General Thomas.

Rosenberg’s statement—if this be his statement—of the political purpose of the invasion and his analysis of the achieving of it apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Führer order, dated 20 April 1941, Rosenberg was named commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the east European region. This order is part of the correspondence regarding Rosenberg’s appointment, which has been given the Number 865-PS in our series. I ask that this file, all relating to the same subject and consisting of four letters, all of which I shall read or refer to, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit USA-143.

The order itself reads as follows—it is the first item on the English translation of 865-PS:

“I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my commissioner for the
central control of questions connected with the east European
region. An office, which is to be furnished in accordance with
his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the
carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him. The
necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich
Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.

“Führer’s headquarters, 20th April 1941. The Führer, signed,
Adolf Hitler; Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery,
signed, Dr. Lammers.”

This particular copy of the Führer’s order was enclosed in a letter which Dr. Lammers wrote to the Defendant Keitel requesting his co-operation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a deputy to work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows—it is on the stationery of the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 21 April 1941. I omit the salutation:

“Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Führer’s decree of the
20th of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter
Alfred Rosenberg as his commissioner for the central control
connected with the east European region. In this capacity
Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for
the probable emergency with all speed. The Führer wishes that
Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the
closest co-operation of the highest Reich authorities, receive
information from them, and summon the representatives of the
highest Reich authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee
the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be
undertaken, for the time being, only those of the highest Reich
authorities should be informed on whose co-operation
Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. They are: The
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan”—that is Göring—“the Reich
Minister of Economics, and you yourself”—that is
Keitel—“Therefore, may I ask you in accordance with the
Führer’s wishes to place your co-operation at the disposal of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the carrying out of the task imposed
upon him. It is recommended in the interests of secrecy that you
name a representative in your office with whom the office of the
Reichsleiter can communicate and who, in addition to your usual
deputy, should be the only one to whom you should communicate
the contents of this letter.

“I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of
this letter.

“Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, signed, Dr. Lammers.”

In the next letter Keitel writes Lammers acknowledging receipt of his letter and telling of his compliance with the request. Keitel also writes Rosenberg telling him of the action he has taken. Now, the letter to Dr. Lammers—I shall read the text:

“Dear Reich Minister:

“I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Führer’s decree in
which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his
commissioner for the central control of questions connected with
the east European region. I have named General of the Artillery
Jodl, head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my
permanent deputy, and Major General Warlimont as his deputy to
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”

And the letter to Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the same date:

“The head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the
Führer’s decree, by which he has appointed you his commissioner
for the central control of questions connected with the east
European region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl,
head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and his deputy,
Major General Warlimont, with the solving of these questions as
far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now
I ask you, as far as your office is concerned, to deal with them
only.”

Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler Rosenberg began building his organization, conferring with the various ministries, issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were crowded with documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose, I believe that the citation of a small number which are typical should be sufficient for the Tribunal and the record. All of those I shall now discuss were found in the Defendant Rosenberg’s files.

Our document numbered 1030-PS is a memorandum, dated 8 May 1941, entitled, “General Instructions for all Reich Commissioners in the Occupied Eastern Territories.” I offer that in evidence as Exhibit USA-144.

In these instructions to his chief henchmen Rosenberg outlines the political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second and third paragraphs of the English translation, which appear on Page 2 of the German, the following remarks appear:

“The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free
the German Reich from the ‘grossrussisch’ pressure for centuries
to come. This does not only correspond with German interests but
also with historical justice, for Russian imperialism was in a
position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression
almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again.
Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign
against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the
reconstruction of a great Russian empire, no matter of what
kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various
nationalities against Moscow and Leningrad have to be
scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has
been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to
correspond to the Leader’s political testament as laid down in
his book, that now the military and political threat in the East
shall be eliminated forever.

“Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its
historical and racial conditions into Reich commissions each of
which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich
Commission Eastland”—Ostland—“including White Ruthenia, will
have the task to prepare, by way of development into a
Germanized protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with
Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in
alliance with Germany, and Caucasia with the contiguous northern
territories a federal state with a German plenipotentiary.
Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future.
These general viewpoints are explained in the following
instructions for each Reich commissioner. Beyond that there are
still a few general considerations which possess validity for
all Reich commissioners.”

The fifth paragraph of the English translation, Page 7 of the German, presents a fascinating rationalization of a contemplated robbery. It reads:

“The German people have achieved, in the course of centuries,
tremendous accomplishments in the eastern European area. Nearly
all its land and houses were confiscated without
indemnification; hundreds of thousands (in the south on the
Volga) starved or were deported or, as in the Baltic
territories, deprived of the fruits of their cultural work
during the past 700 years. The German Reich must proclaim the
principle that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories
the former German assets are the property of the people of
Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former
individual proprietors, where the German Reich may reserve the
right (assuming that it has not already been done during
resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of
compensation and restitution of this national property will be
subject to different treatment by each Reich commission.”

Document Number 1029-PS in our series is an “Instruction for a Reich Commissioner Ostland.” It is typical of the type of instruction which was issued to each of the appointed commissioners (or Kommissars), and is amazingly frank in outlining intentions of the Nazi conspirators toward the country they intended to occupy in the course of their aggression. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit USA-145. I should like to read into the record the first three paragraphs. It begins:

“All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly been
in close relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old
history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the
races living there in a European direction and has in spite of
all Russian threats added this region to the living space of
Greater Germany.

“The aim of a Reich commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and White Ruthenia”—last words added in pencil—“must be to
strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate and then
transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by
germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic
races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must
become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater
Germany.

“For certain cattle-raising products the Baltic region was a
land of surplus; and the Reich commissioner must endeavor to
make this surplus once more available to the German people and,
if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of
germanizing or resettling, the Estonian people are strongly
germanized to the extent of 50 percent by Danish, German, and
Swedish blood, and can be considered as a kindred nation. In
Latvia the section capable of being assimilated is considerably
smaller than in Estonia. In this country stronger resistance
will have to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale
will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be
reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the immigration of
racial Germans is called for in order to promote very extensive
germanization (on the East Prussian border).”

Skipping a paragraph, the next paragraph is also interesting and reads as follows:

“The task of a Reich commissioner with his seat of office in
Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one.
A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights,
built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant
influx of German blood together with Swedish elements was a
predominantly germanized land, is to be established as a mighty
German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are
available everywhere; and the German Reich will be able to
guarantee the right to a later settlement to all those who have
distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of
those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who
fought in the Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought
on in the hour of despair, and delivered Baltic civilization
from Bolshevism. For the rest the solution of the colonization
problem is not a Baltic question but one which concerns Greater
Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.”

These two directives are, I think, sufficiently typical of the lot to show the Tribunal the extent of the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped would be achieved thereby. However, on 28 June 1941, less than a week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of his activities since his appointment on the 20th of April. One might almost think he had so meticulously recorded his activities in order to be of assistance to this prosecution.

This report is numbered 1039-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-146. To me the most interesting things about this report are its disclosures concerning the number of these defendants who worked with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression and the extent to which practically all of the ministries and offices of both state and Party are shown to have been involved in this operation. The report was found in the Defendant Rosenberg’s files; and although it is rather long, it is of sufficient importance in implicating persons, groups, and organizations, that it must, I believe, be read in full in order that it may be made part of the record. It is headed, “Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Territories”:

“Immediately after the notification of individual supreme Reich
offices regarding the Führer’s Decree of 20.4.41 a conference
with the Chief of the OKW”—Armed Forces High Command—“took
place”—That is the Defendant Keitel—“After presentation of the
various political aims in the proposed Reich commissions and
presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of
the OKW explained that reservation”—UK-Stellung—“would be too
complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried
out best by direct assignment”—Abkommandierung—“by command of
the Chief of the OKW. General Field Marshal Keitel then issued
an appropriate command which established the basis for the
coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer
General Jodl and Major General Warlimont. The negotiations which
then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern
territory including personal needs”—relative to, I suppose it
is—“were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in
collaboration with officials of my office.

“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that
under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no
way deal with any representatives of the people of the east
European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military
intelligence required it and then to name persons to me who
could count as political personalities, over and above the
military intelligence, in order to arrange for their eventual
commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my
wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants
would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed
in accordance with my indications.

“Later on I informed General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and
Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political
conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we
agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme
Commander of the Army, respectively to the Chief Quartermaster,
and to the Army groups for questions relative to political
configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has
been done.

“Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of
Economics”—Reichswirtschaftsminister—“Funk”—the Defendant
Funk—“who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerial
Director Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then
held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic
intentions of the Economic Operational Staff East. In this
connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State
Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director
Riecke, General Schubert, and others.

“Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as
regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few
problems regarding the general relationship of the proposed
Reich ministry toward the Four Year Plan are still open and will
be subject, after submission, to the decision of the Führer. In
principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an
economic department in my office; economics would rather be
handled substantially and practically by the Reich
Marshal”—that is the Defendant Göring—“and the persons
appointed by him. However, the two responsible department heads,
namely, Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial
economy and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economy, would
be placed in my office as permanent liaison men to co-ordinate
here political aims with the economic necessities in a
department which would still have to unite with other persons
for such co-ordinating work, depending on labor conditions as
they may arise later on (political leadership of labor unions,
construction, _et cetera_).

“After notification of the Reich Foreign Minister, the latter
appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my
office. For the requested representation in the political
department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr.
Leibbrandt), the Foreign Ministry released Consul General Dr.
Bräutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian,
and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations, which if necessary
will be placed before the Führer, are under way with the Foreign
Office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its
representatives to the future Reich commissioners (or
Kommissars).

“The Propaganda Ministry”—that is Goebbels—“appointed State
Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete
agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all
political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, _et
cetera_, would be made in my office; a great number of
substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the
papers prepared by the Propaganda Ministry would be modified
here, if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda
will undisputedly be subject to the Reich Ministry of Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda. For the sake of closer
co-operation the Propaganda Ministry assigns yet another person
directly under my department, ‘Enlightenment and Press,’ and in
addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these
activities have been going on for some time, and without
attracting attention to my office in any way this co-ordination
on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.

“Thorough discussions took place with Reich Minister Ohnesorge
concerning future transmission of communication and setting up
of all technical necessities in future occupied territories;
with Reich Minister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with
Reich Minister Frick”—that is the Defendant Frick—“(State
Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of
numerous necessary officials for the commissions. According to
the present estimate there will be four Reich commissions as
approved by the Führer. I shall propose to the Führer for
political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of
general commissions (24), main commissions (about 80), and
regional commissions (over 900). A general commission would
correspond to a former general government; a main commission to
a main government.

“A regional commission contains three or four
districts”—Kreise—“In view of the huge spaces that is the
minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil
government or administration. A portion of the officials has
already been requested on the basis of the above-named command
of the Chief of the OKW.”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, speaking for myself I don’t understand why it is necessary to read this document in full. You have already shown that there was a plan for dividing Russia up into a number of commissions.

MR. ALDERMAN: Quite true. I should like merely to point out two of three other individual defendants who are referred to in this document and as to whom the document shows that they were in immediate complicity with this whole scheme. The first of those, about three paragraphs further down, the Reich Youth Leader—that is the Defendant Baldur Von Schirach. Then of course Gruppenführer SS Heydrich, about the next paragraph . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is not a defendant.

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. His organization is, however, if the Tribunal please, charged as a criminal organization.

In the next paragraph, the Defendant Ministerial Director Fritzsche, who worked under Goebbels.

Without a long discussion of further evidence I might summarize the individual implication in this fashion. Those of the individual defendants now on trial which this report personally involves are Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Göring, Ribbentrop, Frick, Schirach, and Fritzsche. The organizations involved by this report include the following:

OKW, OKH, OKM, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Economics, Reich Foreign Ministry, Propaganda Ministry, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Communications, the Reich Physicians’ Union, Ministry of Munitions and Armaments, Reich Youth Leadership, Reich Organization Leadership, German Labor Front, the SS, the SA, and the Reich Press Chief.

At a later stage in the Trial, and in other connections, I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider that that document with which I have just been dealing be considered a part of the record to the extent that it involves these individuals.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you can treat it as all being in evidence.

MR. ALDERMAN: At a later stage in the Trial and in other connections, evidence will be introduced concerning the manner in which all of this planning and preparation for the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a political factor was actually carried out. The planned execution of intelligentsia and other Russian leaders was, for example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection as a European power.

Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans; and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world Hitler issued a proclamation on the day of the attack. The text of this statement has already been brought to the Tribunal’s attention by my British colleagues, and I should like merely to refer to it in passing here by quoting therefrom this one sentence, “I have therefore today decided to give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.”

This announcement told the world that the die had been cast—the plans darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. These conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared this war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it.

That brings us to the consideration of the motives for the attack. Before going into the positive reasons I should like first to point out that not only was Germany bound by a solemn covenant not to attack the U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the invasion in 1941 the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward territories of the German Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of “Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy,” which is our Document Number 2353-PS and which I put in evidence earlier as Exhibit USA-35, that insofar as the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of 11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries thereunder up to the very end.

Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made quickly and well; and since the food and raw materials being thus delivered were considered essential to the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about complying with their obligations under that agreement. At Page 315 of his book Thomas says, and I read from Page 9 of the English translation:

“Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as
preparations for the campaign in the East were already under
way.”

By that, clearly he speaks of German deliveries to Russia, not as to what the Russians delivered.

“The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned right up
to the start of the attack; even during the last few days
transports of india-rubber from the Far East were completed by
express transit trains.”

Again at Page 404 this author brings this point out even more forcefully when he states—and I shall read the first paragraph on Page 14 of the English translation:

“In addition to the Italian negotiations until June 1941, the
negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of
attention.

“The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage
German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany
must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only
made grain deliveries when the Germans delivered orders placed
by the Russians and since, in the case of the individual firms,
these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill
orders for the German Armed Forces, it was necessary for the Wi
Rü office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with
German firms in order to co-ordinate Russian orders with those
of the Germans from the standpoint of priority. In accordance
with the wishes of the Foreign Office German industry was
instructed to accept all Russian orders even if it were
impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for
manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large
deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed
to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance
Commission, then however, to make such a detour during its
transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered
over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.”