Chapter XVIII: Part II: is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.” (5)

I will not trouble the Court with the first page of the report. If the Tribunal will turn to the second page:

“The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and
the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity
of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to
paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their
country and at the same time to prevent Allied intervention, it
was planned to capture all the more important towns along the
coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament
and other military and civilian people occupying important
positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could
be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new
government with Quisling as its head.”

The next paragraph was read by the learned British Attorney General in his speech and I will only refer to the last paragraph but one:

“The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns
along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight
losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser _Blücher_,
carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division,
technical staffs, and specialists who were to take over the
control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and
members of the Government and Parliament failed. In spite of the
surprise of the attack resistance was organized throughout the
country.”

That is a brief picture of what occurred in Norway.

What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the Royal Danish Government, a copy of which I hand in as Exhibit GB-94 and an extract from which is in Document D-628, which follows the C documents.

“Extracts from the memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude
towards Denmark”—before and during the occupation—“prepared by
the Royal Danish Government.

“On the 9th of April 1940 at 0420 hours”—in the morning that
is—“the German Minister appeared at the private residence of
the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air
Attaché of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a
telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary General
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4 o’clock the same
morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had positive
proof that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and
Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this
reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and
landing at various points in Zealand, including the port of
Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over
Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice.
It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance, as any
resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany
would guarantee Denmark territorial integrity and political
independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal
government of Denmark but wanted only to make sure of the
neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the
German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war . . . .

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the
allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was
completely without foundation; there was no possibility of
anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested
against the violation of Denmark’s neutrality which, according
to the German Minister’s statement, was in progress. The
Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not
give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the
King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the
German Minister knew as everybody else that the Danish Armed
Forces had orders to oppose violations of Denmark’s neutrality
so that fighting presumably had already taken place. In reply
the German Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent,
not least to avoid air bombardment.”

What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary, which the Tribunal will find in D-627, the document preceding the one which I have just read. That document, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-95. That dispatch reads:

“The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by
members of my staff, from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable
information subsequently received and are given below. Early in
the morning towards 5 o’clock three small German transports
steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor while a number of
airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery guarding the
harbor approach fired a warning shot at these planes when it was
seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this the
Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels
fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these
airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the
population to keep calm and co-operate with the Germans. I
enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a
bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of
detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers
landed with full equipment and marched to Kastellet, the old
fortress of Copenhagen and now barracks. The door was locked so
the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives and rounded
up all the Danish soldiers within together with the womenfolk
employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and it
appears that they were taken completely by surprise. One officer
tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur was shot
before they could get away. He died in hospital 2 days later.
After seizing the barracks a detachment was sent to Amalienborg,
the King’s palace, where they engaged the Danish sentries on
guard wounding three, one of them fatally . . . . Meanwhile a
large fleet of bombers flew over the city at low altitude.”

Then, the last paragraph of the dispatch reads:

“It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in
Jutland . . . . It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded
Jutland from the south at dawn on the 9th of April and were at
first resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties
. . . . The chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to
which the forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The
chief permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance,
motored into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th of April and
drove blithely past a sentry who challenged him in blissful
ignorance that this was not one of his own men. It took a
bullet, which passed through the lapels of his coat, to
disillusion him.”

The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish Governments spoke of the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of those two small countries.

I will close by drawing the Court’s attention to two documents which indicate the kind of territorial integrity and political independence the Nazi conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression. I will first draw the Court’s attention to an entry in Jodl’s diary, which is the last document in the book, on the last page of the book, the entry dated 19th April:

“Renewed crisis. Envoy Brauer”—that is the German Minister to
Norway—“is recalled. Since Norway is at war with us, the task
of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Führer’s opinion force
has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter Terboven will be given
a post. Field Marshal”—which, as the Court will see from the
other entries, is presumably a reference to the Defendant
Göring—“is moving in the same direction. He criticizes as
defect that we did not take sufficiently energetic measures
against the civilian population, that we could have seized
electrical plant, that the Navy did not supply enough troops.
The Air Force cannot do everything.”

The Court will see from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter Terboven that already by the 19th of April rule by Gauleiter had replaced rule by Norwegians.

The final document is Document C-41, which will be Exhibit GB-96, which is a memorandum dated the 3rd of June 1940 signed by Fricke, who, of course, has no connection with the Defendant Frick. Fricke was at that date the head of the operations division of the German naval war staff, a key appointment in the very nerve center of German naval operations. That is why, as the Tribunal noticed, he came to be initialing the important naval documents.

That memorandum is as I have said, dated 3rd June 1940 and relates to questions of territorial expansion and bases:

“These problems are pre-eminently of a political character and
comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it
is not the Navy’s province to answer, but they also materially
affect the strategic possibilities open—according to the way in
which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and
operation of the Navy.

“It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s
present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in
the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of states and
under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of
Greater Germany. If over and above this one extends these
strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not
continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural
geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other
an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the
war.

“The solution could perhaps be found among the following
possibilities:

“1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and northern France
acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied
and organized that they can in the future be considered as
German possessions.

“This solution will recommend itself for areas where the
severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy
and where a gradual germanizing of the territory appears
practicable.

“2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct
connection with Germany’s main body and which, like the Russian
solution in Hangö, remain permanently as an enclave in the
hostile state. Such areas might be considered possible around
Brest and Trondheim . . . .

“3) The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired
in this war should result in the existing population of these
areas feeling themselves and being politically, economically,
and militarily completely dependent on Germany. If the following
results are achieved—that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I
shall describe later) by means of the military measures for
occupation taken during the war, that French powers of
resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, armed
forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of
the question, that the smaller states such as the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which
will enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to
occupy these countries again—then in practice the same, but
psychologically much more, will be achieved.”

Then Fricke recommends:

“The solution given in 3), therefore, appears to be the proper
one—that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium and part of
northern and eastern France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark,
and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above.”

Then, the culminating paragraph of this report of Fricke reads as follows:

“Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will
make an extension of these demands possible.”

The submission of the Prosecution is that that and other documents which have been submitted to the Court tear apart the veil of the Nazi pretenses. These documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of Göring; they expose as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show the reality behind the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in treason like Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid the professional status of Keitel and of Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present that part of Count Two which relates to the allegations with regard to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In Charges II, III, IV, IX, XI, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XIX, and XXIII there are charges of violating certain treaties and conventions and violating certain assurances. So far as the treaties are concerned, some of them have been put in evidence already, and I will indicate that when I come to them. May I, before I come to the detail, remind the Tribunal of the history of these unfortunate countries, the Netherlands and Belgium; especially Belgium, which for so many centuries was the cockpit of Europe.

The independence of Belgium was guaranteed as the Tribunal will remember, in 1839 by the great European powers. That guarantee was observed for 75 years until it was shamelessly broken in 1914 by the Germans, who brought all the horrors of war to Belgium and all the even greater horrors of a German occupation of Belgium. History was to repeat itself in a still more shocking fashion some 25 years after in 1940 as the Tribunal already knows.

The first treaty which was mentioned in these charges is the Hague Convention of 1907. That has been put in by my learned friend, Sir David, and I think I need say nothing about it.

The second treaty is the Locarno Convention, the Arbitration and Conciliation Convention of 1925. My Lord, that was between Germany and Belgium. That was put in by Sir David. It is GB-15, and I think I need say nothing more about that.

Belgium’s independence and neutrality was guaranteed by Germany in that document.

My Lords, the next treaty is the Hague Arbitration Convention of May 1926 between Germany and the Netherlands. That Document I ought formally to put in. It is in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, which perhaps I may call RGB in the future for brevity; and it, no doubt, will be treated as a public document. But in my bundle of documents, which goes in the order in which I propose to refer to them, I think it is more convenient for the presentation of my case. That is the second or third document, TC-16.

THE PRESIDENT: It is Book 4, is it?

MR. ROBERTS: It is Book 4, My Lord. This is the Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands signed at The Hague in May 1926. Your Lordships have the document; perhaps I need read only Article I:

“The contracting parties”—those are the Netherlands and the
German Reich—“undertake to submit all disputes of any nature
whatever which may arise between them which it has not been
possible to settle by diplomacy and which have not been referred
to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be dealt with
by arbitration or conciliation as provided.”

And then, My Lords, there follow all the clauses which deal merely with the machinery of conciliation, which are unnecessary for me to read. May I just draw attention to the last article, Article 21, which provides that the Convention shall be valid for 10 years, and then shall remain in force for successive periods of 5 years until denounced by either party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany at all.

I put that document in as Document TC-16, which will be Exhibit GB-97; and a certified copy is put in and a translation for the Court.

As the Tribunal already knows, in 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact was made at Paris, by which all the powers renounced recourse to war. That is put in as GB-18, and I need not, I think, put it in or refer to it again.

Then the last treaty—all of which, of course, belong to the days of the Weimar Republic—is the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Luxembourg executed in 1929. That is Document TC-20 in the bundle. It is two documents further on than the one the Tribunal has last referred to. That is the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg signed at Geneva in 1929. May I just read the first few words of Article 1, which are familiar:

“The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means
in accordance with the present treaty all disputes of any nature
whatever which may arise between them and which it may not be
possible to settle by diplomacy.”

And then there follow the clauses dealing with the machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes, which follow the common form.

My Lord, those were the treaty obligations. May I put in that last treaty, TC-20, which will be Exhibit GB-98.

My Lord, those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933; and as you have heard from my learned friend, Hitler adopted and ratified the obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic with regard to the treaties which had been entered into. My Lord, nothing more occurred to alter the position of Belgium until in March 1936. Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, announced, of course, the resumption of conscription, and so on. And Hitler on the 7th of March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the obligations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact; the reason given being the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. Sir David has dealt with that and has pointed out that there was no legal foundation for this claim to be entitled to renounce obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was, of course, left in the air in the sense that it had entered itself into various obligations under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations acknowledged; and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of Germany to observe the pact, had been renounced.

And so My Lord, on the 30th of January 1937, perhaps because Hitler realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler, in the next document in the bundle, TC-33 and 35, which I hand in and which will be Exhibit GB-99, gave the solemn assurance—he used the word “solemn”—to Belgium and to the Netherlands. That has already been read by the Attorney General and so I don’t want to read it again. But the Tribunal will see that it is a full guarantee. In April of 1937 in a document which is not before the Court, France and England released Belgium from her obligations under the Locarno Pact. It is a matter of history and it does occur in an exhibit, but it hasn’t been copied. Belgium, of course, gave guarantees of strict independence and neutrality; and France and England gave guarantees of assistance should Belgium be attacked. And it was because of that that Germany on the 13th of October 1937—in the next document—gave a very clear and unconditional guarantee to Belgium—Document TC-34, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit GB-100—the German declaration of the 13th of October 1937, which shows the minutes:

“I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the
following communication to Your Excellency:

“The German Government have taken cognizance with particular
interest of the public declaration in which the Belgian
Government define the international position of Belgium. For
their part they have repeatedly given expression, especially
through the declaration of the Chancellor of the German Reich in
his speech of the 30th of January 1937, to their own point of
view. The German Government have also taken cognizance of the
declaration made by the British and French Governments on the
24th of April 1937.”

That is a document to which I have previously referred.

“Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of
Locarno may still take some time and being desirous of
strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the
German Government regard it as appropriate to define now their
own attitude towards Belgium. To this end they make the
following declaration:

“First: The German Government have taken note of the views which
the Belgian Government have thought fit to express. That is to
say, (a) of the policy of independence which they intend to
exercise in full sovereignty; (b) of their determination to
defend the frontiers of Belgium with all their forces against
any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian territory from
being used for purposes of aggression against another state as a
passage or as a base of operation by land, by sea, or in the
air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an efficient
manner to this purpose.

“Second: The German Government consider that the inviolability
and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western
Powers. They confirm their determination that in no
circumstances will they impair this inviolability and integrity,
and that they will at all times respect Belgian territory
except, of course, in the event of Belgium’s taking part in a
military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in
which Germany is involved.

“Third: The German Government, like the British and French
Governments, are prepared to assist Belgium should she be
subjected to an attack or to invasion.”

And then, on the following page:

“The Belgian Government have taken note with great satisfaction
of the declaration communicated to them this day by the German
Government. They thank the German Government warmly for this
communication.”

My Lord, may I pause there to emphasize that document. There in October of 1937 is Germany giving a solemn guarantee to this small nation of its peaceful aspiration towards her and its assertion that the integrity of the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her and Belgium and the other Western Powers.

You have before you to try the leaders of the German Government and the leaders of the German Armed Forces. One doesn’t have to prove, does one, that every one of those accused must have known perfectly well of that solemn undertaking given by his government? Every one of these accused in their various spheres of activity—some more actively than the others—were party to the shameless breaking of that treaty two and a half years afterwards, and I submit that on the ordinary laws of inference and justice all those men must be fixed as active participators in that disgraceful breach of faith which brought misery and death to so many millions.

Presumably it will be contended on the part, for instance, of Keitel and Jodl that they were merely honorable soldiers carrying out their duty. This Tribunal, no doubt, will inquire what code of honor they observe which permits them to violate the pledged word of their country.

That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders and to the High Command of Germany can be seen by the next document, which is Document PS-375 in the bundle. It is already an exhibit, USA-84, and has been referred to many times already. May I just refer—or remind the Tribunal—to one sentence or two. The document comes into existence on the 25th of August 1938 at the time when the Czechoslovakian drama was unfolding, and it was uncertain at that time whether there would be war with the Western Powers. It is top secret, prepared by the 5th section of the General Staff of the German Air Force. The subject: “Extended Case Green—Estimate of the Situation.” Probably the more correct words would be: “Appreciation of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.” Apparently some staff officer had been asked to prepare this appreciation. In view of the fact that it has been read before, I think I need only read the last paragraph which is Paragraph H and it comes at the bottom of Page 6, the last page but one of the document. Now H, “Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy”. This, you see, was an appreciation addressed by an Air Force staff officer. So these are requests to the Army and Navy. And then if one turns over the page, Number 4:

“Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent
an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is
held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the
conditions under which an occupation of this area could be
carried out and how long it would take. And in this case it
would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great
Britain.”

The point that the Prosecution desires to make on that document is that it is apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this, and assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German nation and the High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the fact that Germany had given her word not to invade Holland or Belgium. They are recommending it as a militarily advantageous thing to do, strong in the knowledge that if the commanders and the Führer agree with that view treaties are to be completely ignored. Such, I repeat, was the honor of the German Government and of their leaders.

Now in March of 1939 as has been proved, the remainder of Czechoslovakia was peacefully annexed; and then came the time for further guarantees in the next document, the assurances—TC-35 and 39—which were given to Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939.

Those have been read by my learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones. They bear the number GB-78. I need not read them again.

There is also a guarantee to Luxembourg, which is on the next page, TC-42 (a). That was given in the same speech by Hitler in the Reichstag where Hitler was dealing with a communication from Mr. Roosevelt who was feeling a little uneasy on the other side of the Atlantic as to Hitler’s intentions. May I, before I read this document, say that I believe the Tribunal will be seeing a film of the delivery by Hitler of this part of this speech; and you will have the privilege of seeing Hitler in one of his jocular moods, because this was greeted and was delivered in a jocular vein. And you will see in the film that the Defendant Göring who sits above Hitler in the Reichstag appreciates very much the joke, the joke being this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany could possibly go to war with any of its neighbors—and that was the point of the joke that everybody appears to have appreciated very much.

Now, if I may read this document:

“Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an
assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the
territory or possessions of the following independent nations
and above all that they will not march into them. And he goes on
to name the following as the countries in question:

“Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia,
Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.

“Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the
case of the countries listed firstly, whether they feel
themselves threatened and secondly, and particularly, whether
this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result
of a démarche by them or at least with their consent.

“The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the
form of a blunt rejection. Actually this counter-question of
mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations
listed, since they are not at present in possession of their
liberty (as for instance Syria) but are occupied by the military
forces of democratic states and therefore deprived of all their
rights.

“Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany
have received much more binding assurances and above all much
more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his
peculiar telegram.”

You will see that although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is suggesting in the presence, certainly, of the accused Göring as being quite absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling against her neighbors. But the hollow falsity of that and the preceding guarantee is shown by the next document. May I put this document, TC-42 (a) in as Exhibit GB-101.

The next document (L-79) which is Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May has been referred to many times and is Exhibit USA-27. Therefore I need only very shortly remind the Tribunal of two passages. First of all, on the first page it is interesting to see who was present: The Führer, Göring, Admiral Raeder, Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, and various others who are not accused. Colonel Warlimont was there. He, I understand, was Jodl’s deputy.

Well now, the purpose of the conference was an analysis of the situation. Then may I refer to the third page down at the bottom. The stencil number is 819:

“What will this struggle be like?”

And then these words:

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

Then, at the bottom:

“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee.”

There is that decision made, “Declarations of neutrality must be ignored,” and there is the Grand Admiral present, and there is the Air Minister and Chief of the German Air Force, and there is General Keitel present. They all appear, and all their subsequent actions show that they acquiesced in that: Give your word and then break it. That is their code of honor. And you will see that at the end of the meeting, the very last page—the stencil number is 823—Field Marshal Göring asked one or two questions.

There was the decision of the 23rd of May. Is it overstating the matter to submit that any syllable of guarantee, any assurance given after that is just purely hypocrisy, is just the action—apart from the multiplicity of the crimes here—of the common criminal?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, I think we would like you so far as possible to confine yourself to the document.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord, then we go to the 22d of August, 798-PS. That has already been put in and is Exhibit USA-29. My Lord, that was Hitler’s speech of the 22d of August. It has been read and re-read. I, My Lord, refer only to one passage, and that is at the bottom of the second page:

“Attack from the west from the Maginot Line: I consider this
impossible.

“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well
as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available
means.”

My Lord, I desire to emphasize the next sentence:

“England and France will not violate the neutrality of these
countries.”

Then I desire to comment: I ask Your Lordship to bear that sentence in mind, that correct prophecy, when remembering the excuses given for the subsequent invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands.

My Lord, the next documents are TC-36, 40, and 42. Those are three assurances. Number 36 is by the Ambassador of Germany to the Belgian Government:

“In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am
expressly instructed by the head of the German Reich to transmit
to Your Majesty the following communication:

“Though the German Government are at present doing everything in
their power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at
issue between the Reich and Poland, they nevertheless desire to
define clearly here and now the attitude which they propose to
adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become
inevitable.

“The German Government are firmly determined to abide by the
terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October
13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no
circumstances impair the inviolability and integrity of Belgium
and will at all times respect Belgian territory. The German
Government renew this undertaking, however, in the expectation
that the Belgian Government for their part will observe an
attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no
violations on the part of a third power, but that on the
contrary, she will oppose it with all the forces at her
disposal. It goes without saying that if the Belgian Government
were to adopt a different attitude the German Government would
naturally be compelled to defend their interests in conformity
with the new situation thus created.”

My Lord, may I make one short comment on the last part of that document? I submit it is clear that the decision having been made to violate the neutrality, as we know, those last words were put in to afford some excuse in the future.

That document will be Exhibit GB-102.

My Lord, TC-40, the next document, is a similar document communicated to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the same day, the 26th of August 1939. Subject to the Tribunal’s direction, I don’t think I need read it. It is a public document in the German document book, and it has exactly the same features.

That will be Exhibit GB-103.

Then My Lords, TC-42, the next document (Exhibit GB-104) is a similar document relating to Luxembourg. That is dated the 26th of August, the same day. I am not certain; it has two dates. I think it is the 26th of August. My Lords, that is in the same terms a complete guarantee with the sting in the tail as in the other two documents. Perhaps I need not read it.

My Lords, as the Tribunal knows, Poland was occupied by means of the lightning victory; and in October German Armed Forces were free for other tasks. The first step that was taken so far as the Netherlands and Belgium are concerned is shown by the next document, which is, I think, in as GB-80; but the two central portions refer to Belgium and the Netherlands. It is the next document in Your Lordships’ bundle: Number 4.

THE PRESIDENT: TC-32?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. It begins with TC-32, and then if you go to the next one, My Lords will see TC-37 on the same page—and then TC-41; both 37 and 41 refer to this matter. Now, this is a German assurance on the 6th of October 1939:

“Belgium.

“Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I
tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any
revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any
demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in
Belgium as a threat.”

My Lord, there is a similar assurance to the Netherlands—the next part of the document:

“The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional
friendship with the Netherlands. It has not taken over any
existing differences between the two countries and has not
created any new ones.”

I submit it is impossible to overemphasize the importance of those assurances of Germany’s good faith.

My Lord, the value of that good faith is shown by the next document which is of the very next day, the 7th of October. Those two guarantees were the 6th of October. Now we come to Document 2329-PS dated the 7th of October. It is from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, and it is addressed to his Army groups. He said, third paragraph:

“The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.

“At the same time Army Group B has to make all preparations
according to special orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and
Belgian territory if the political situation so demands.”

“If the political situation so demands”—the day after the guarantee!

It is quite clear from the next document. I put in the last document; that bears an original typewritten signature of Von Brauchitsch, and it will be Exhibit GB-105.

My Lord, the next document is in two parts. Both are numbered C-62. The first part is dated the 9th of October 1939, 2 days after the document I have read. My Lord, that was all read by the Attorney General in opening down to the bottom of Paragraph (b). Therefore, I won’t read it again. May I remind the Tribunal just of one sentence.

“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This attack must be
carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible.”

In the next paragraph, may I just read six words:

“The object of this attack is . . . to acquire as great an area
of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as possible.”

That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the three accused: The Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Göring. That appears from the distribution.

I will hold that document over and will put that other one in with it.

My Lord, the next document is the 15th of October 1939. It is from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It is signed by Keitel in what is to some of us his familiar red pencil signature, and it is again addressed to Raeder and Göring and to the General Staff of the Army.

Now that also has been read by the Attorney General; may I just remind the Tribunal that at the bottom of the page:

“It must be the object of the Army’s preparations to occupy—on
receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland in the
first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas”—or Meuse—“line”.

The second paragraph deals with taking possession of the West Frisian Islands.

It is clear, in my submission, beyond discussion that from that moment the decision to violate the neutrality of these three countries had been made. All that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no hint that Germany’s word was about to be broken again. Otherwise these small countries might have had some chance of combining among themselves and with their neighbors.

It will be Exhibit GB-106.

Well, the next document is a Keitel directive. It is Document 440-PS (Exhibit GB-107). It, again, is sent to the Supreme Command of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and it gives details of how the attack is to be carried out. I want to read only a very few selected passages. Paragraph 2 on the first page:

“Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended
against Holland may be carried out without a special order when
the general attack will start.

“The attitude of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be anticipated
ahead of time.”

And then may I comment here: Would Your Lordship note this as a German concession?

“Wherever there is no resistance the entry should carry the
character of a peaceful occupation.”

Then Paragraph (b) of the next paragraph:

“At first the Dutch area including the West Frisian Islands
. . . is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.”

The next two paragraphs, I need not read them, deal with action against the Belgian harbor; and in Paragraph 5):

“The 7th Airborne Division”—they were parachutists—“will be
committed for the airborne operation after the possession of
bridges across the Albert Canal”—which is in Belgium as the
Court knows—“is assured.”

And then in Paragraph 6) (b) Luxembourg is mentioned. It is mentioned in Paragraph 5) as well. The signature is “Keitel,” but that is typed. It is authenticated by a staff officer.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that document in?

MR. ROBERTS: GB-107, My Lord.

Then the next document is C-10 (Exhibit GB-108) and it is dated the 28th of November 1939. That is a signature of Keitel in his red pencil and it is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It deals with the fact that if a quick break-through should fail north of Liége—I think, My Lord, only machinery for carrying out the attack.

Paragraph 2) shows clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of “the occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing,” and the “taking of one or more of the Meuse crossings between Namur and Dinant.”

That will be 108.

My Lord, the documents show that from November until March of 1940 the High Command and the Führer were waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That was the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

My Lord, the next document, C-72, consists of 18 documents which range in date from the 7th of November until the 9th of May 1940. They are certified photostats I put in and they are all signed either by Keitel personally or by Jodl personally, and I don’t think it is necessary for me to read them. The Defense, I think, have all had copies of them, but they show that successively A-Day is being postponed for about a week, having regard to the weather reports. That will be Exhibit GB-109.

My Lord, on the 10th of January 1940, as the Attorney General informed the Tribunal, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in possession, but they were only partially successful. And the next document I offer is Document TC-58 (a); it will be Exhibit GB-110. The original is a photostat certified by the Belgian Government which, of course, came into possession of the original.

My Lord, I can summarize it. They are orders to the Commander of the 2d Air Force Fleet (Luftflotte) clearly for offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. One looks at the bottom of the first page. It deals with the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the Liége-Antwerp Line with its main force, its lighter forces in front of the Meuse-Schelde Canal. Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch Army; and then if you turn over the page Number 3, you see that the German western army directs its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle with the strongest possible airforce support through the Belgian-Luxembourg region.

My Lord, I think I need read no more. The rest are operational details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland.

My Lord, the next document I think is rather out of place for my purpose. My learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, put in Jodl’s diary, which is GB-88, and I desire to refer very, very briefly to some extracts which are printed first in bundle Number 4.

If one looks at the entry for the 1st of February 1940 and then some lines down . . .

THE PRESIDENT: 1809-PS?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that’s right, My Lord, and GB-88.

THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t got the GB numbers on the documents.

MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry, My Lord, it’s my mistake.

If Your Lordship will look about eight lines down it says, “1700 hours General Jeschonnek”—and then:

“1) Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have
to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute
force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.

“2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent
action against the Dutch Air Force.”

My Lord, I think the rest I need not read; it is operational detail.

“2d February”—I refer again to Jodl’s entry under “a” as to “landings can be made in the center of The Hague.”

If Your Lordship will turn over the page—I omit February the 5th—you come to 26th February:

“Führer raises the question whether it is better to undertake
the Weser Exercise before or after Case Yellow.”

And then on the 3rd of March, the last sentence:

“Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow
with a few days’ interval.”

And then My Lord, there is an entry to which I desire to call Your Lordship’s attention, on May the 8th, that is, 2 days before the invasion—the top of the page:

“Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs,
evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures. According
to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked
for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.”

My Lord, may I make two short comments on that? The first is that the Germans are rather objecting because the Dutch are actually making some preparations to resist their invasion: “Alarming news” as they wrote. The second point is that Jodl is there recording that the Dutch according to their intelligence reports are still adhering properly to their neutrality. But I need not read any more of the diary extracts.

My Lord, that is the story except for the documents which were presented to Holland and to Belgium and to Luxembourg after the invasion was a _fait accompli_, because as history now knows at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th of May these three small countries were violently invaded with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning was given to them by Germany and no complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of any neutrality before this action was taken.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a convenient place to break off until 2 o’clock.

MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship pleases.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, when the Court adjourned I had just come to the point at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th of May 1940 when the Germans invaded these three small countries without any warning—a violation which, the Prosecution submits, it is clear from the documents had been planned and decided upon months before.

My Lord, before I close this part of the case, may I refer to three documents in conclusion. My Lord, the invasion having taken place at 4:30 in the morning in each of the three countries, the German Ambassadors called upon representatives of the three governments some hours later and handed in a document which was similar in each case and which is described as a memorandum or an ultimatum. My Lord, an account of what happened in Belgium is set out in our Document TC-58, which is about five documents from the end of the bundle. It is headed, “Extract from Belgium—The Official Account of What Happened 1939-1940,” and I hand in an original copy, certified by the Belgian Government, which is Exhibit GB-111.

My Lord, might I read short extracts? I read the third paragraph:

“From 4:30 a.m. information was received which left no shadow of
doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the
east. At 5 o’clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands’
airdromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of
German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the
Jemelle station.”

My Lord, then I think I can go to two paragraphs lower down:

“At 8:30 a.m. the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began
to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak”—that is the Belgian
Minister—“stopped him: ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I
will speak first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the
Belgian Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army
has just attacked our country. This is the second time in 25
years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a
neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps
even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no
note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the
Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium
has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by
her on October 13th 1937 and renewed spontaneously at the
beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany
for which there is no justification whatever will deeply shock
the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held
responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself.
Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished.’”

Then I think I shall omit the next paragraph: “The Ambassador read the note . . . .” And in the last paragraph:

“In the middle of this communication M. Spaak, who had by his
side the Secretary-General, interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me
the document,’ he said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a
task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to
pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had
just made.”

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read what the Ambassador read.

MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry. I was thinking of the next document I was going to read. I read the last paragraph on the first page:

“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought:

“‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to
make the following declaration:

“‘In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and
Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making
preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the
Reich are compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three
countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose the
Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the
greatest size so that resistance of any kind will be useless.
The Government of the Reich guarantee Belgium’s European and
colonial territory as well as her dynasty on condition that no
resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium
will risk the destruction of her country and the loss of her
independence. It is, therefore, in the interests of Belgium that
the population be called upon to cease all resistance and that
the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make
contact with the German Military Command.’”

My Lord, the so-called ultimatum handed in some hours after the invasion had started is Document TC-57, which is the last document but three in the bundle. It is the document I handed in and it becomes Exhibit GB-112. My Lord, it is a long document and I will read to the Tribunal such parts as the Tribunal thinks advisable:

“The Reich Government”—it begins—“have for a long time had no
doubts as to what was the chief aim of British and French war
policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other
countries and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and
mercenary troops for England and France.

“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy
Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new
front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last
minute action which upset this project. Germany has furnished
documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.

“Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia
miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war
expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the
retreat . . . from Norway was still going on, the English Prime
Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in
Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead
with the transfer of the full weight of her Navy to the
Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on
the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center
of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over
the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before
their own people and before the world, and partly to make it
appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of
war against Germany.

“In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the
Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another
purpose. It was nothing but a diversion maneuver in grand style
to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next
English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government have long
been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully
prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the
West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region
of the Ruhr.

“Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of
Belgium and Holland, it being, of course, understood that these
two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England
and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.

“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, do you think it is necessary to read this in full?

MR. ROBERTS: No, I don’t. I was going to summarize these charges. If your Lordship would be good enough to look at the bottom of the first page, you will see the so-called ultimatum complaining of the hostile expressions in the Belgian and Netherlands press; and then, My Lord, in the second paragraph over the page there is an allegation of the attempts of the British Intelligence to bring a revolution in Germany with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands.

Then, My Lord, in Paragraph 3 reference is made to military preparation of the two countries; and in Paragraph 4 it is pointed out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian-German frontier.

A complaint is made in regard to Holland in Paragraph 5 that British aircraft have flown over the Netherlands’ country.

There are, My Lord, other charges made against the neutrality of these two countries although no instances are given. I don’t think I need refer to anything on Page 3 of the document.