Chapter IV: Section II: , of the directive on the unified preparations for war (1)

of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937, (Ob. d. W)”—with some
symbols, including “Chefsache” (top secret)—“(two-front war
with main effort on the Southeast—strategic concentration
Green) is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution
must be assured as from 1 October 1938 at the latest.
Alterations in other parts of the directives must be expected
during the next week.

“By order of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
signed, Keitel.

“Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff.”

In line with the suggestion of the presiding Justice, I shall omit the detailed instructions which are set out for action by the Luftwaffe and by the Navy, and I turn next to the last paragraph of the directive, which will be found on Page 19 of the English version:

“In war economy it is essential that in the field of the
armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made
possible through increased supplies. In the course of
operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of
the total war—economic strength—by rapidly reconnoitering and
restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of
Czechoslovakian industrial and factory installations, insofar as
military operations permit, can be of decisive importance to
us.”

In other words, the Nazi conspirators, 4 months before the date of their planned attack, were already looking forward to the contribution which the Czech industrial plant would make to further Nazi war efforts and economy.

And the final paragraph of this directive, Paragraph 7, on Page 19:

“All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by
OKW. They will be made, in agreement with, and according to, the
requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their
effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force as
to time and locality.

“Signed Adolf Hitler.

“Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff.”

Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive was prepared and initialed by the Defendant Keitel. This is Item 14 at Pages 27 to 32 of the Big Schmundt file. It did not supersede the 30 May directive. I shall read the third and fifth paragraphs on Page 28 of the English translation, and the last paragraph on Page 29:

“The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own
free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political
intentions. I am determined as from 1 October 1938 to use to the
full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.”

Then skipping a paragraph:

“However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia
only if I am firmly convinced, as in the case of the occupation
of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria, that
France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.”

And then skipping to the last paragraph on the 29th page:

“The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself
will be issued by me from time to time.”

“K”—initial of Keitel, and—“Z”—initial of Zeitzler.

The second and third parts of this directive contain general directions for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of the possibility that during the execution of the Fall Grün (or Case Green) France or England might declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules which follow this draft in the original have not been translated into English. These schedules, which constitute Item 15 in the Schmundt file, give a timetable of specific measures for the preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated action.

Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in General Jodl’s diary, our Document Number 1780-PS and United States Exhibit Number 72, from which I quoted portions during the Austrian presentation. I now quote from three entries in this diary written in the spring of 1938. Although the first entry is not dated it appears to have been written several months after the annexation of Austria, and here I read under the heading on Page 3 of the English translation:

“Later undated entry:

“After annexation of Austria the Führer mentions that there is
no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria had to be
digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will
have to be carried out energetically. They will have to be newly
prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because
of the annexation of Austria. State of preparation, see
Memorandum L-1-A of 19 April, reported to the Führer on 21
April.

“The intention of the Führer not to touch the Czech problem as
yet will be changed because of the Czech strategic troop
concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat
and without the slightest cause for it. Because of Germany’s
self-restraint the consequences lead to a loss of prestige for
the Führer, which he is not willing to take once more.
Therefore, the new order is issued for Green on 30 May.”

And then the entry, 23 May:

“Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Führer. . . . Further
conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the
Führer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June,—see inclosures (War
Diary).”

Then the entry of 30 May:

“The Führer signs directive Green, where he states his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions
of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an
immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on
D-Day”—X-Tag—“combined with aerial penetration by the Air
Force.

“Further details are derived from directive for strategic
concentration of the Army. The whole contrast becomes acute once
more between the Führer’s intuition that we must do it this
year, and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet,
as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are
not as yet equal to them.”

During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also engaged in planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further expansion of the Reich.

I now offer in evidence Document R-150, as United States Exhibit 82. This is a top-secret document dated 2 June 1938, issued by Air Group Command 3, and entitled “Plan Study 1938, Instruction for Deployment and Combat, ‘Case Red.’”

“Case Red” is the code name for action against the Western Powers if need be. Twenty-eight copies of this document were made, of which this is number 16. This is another staff plan, this time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe in the event of war with France. It is given significance by the considerable progress by this date of the planning for the attack on Czechoslovakia.

I quote from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation, referring to the various possibilities under which war with France may occur. You will note that they are all predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict.

“France will either (a) interfere in the struggle between the
Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of Case Green, or (b)
start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia. (c) It is
possible but not likely that France will begin the fight while
Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.”

And then, reading down lower on the page under the heading “Intention”:

“Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of Case
Green or whether she makes the opening move of the war
simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the
German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army,
first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.”

By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was being carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the direction of the Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attaché in Prague reconnoitered the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia south of Upper Silesia for suitable landing grounds.

I offer in evidence Document 1536-PS as Exhibit USA-83, a report of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938. This was a top-secret document for general officers only, of which only two copies were made.

Attached as an enclosure was the report of Major Moericke, the German Attaché in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. I quote the first four paragraphs of the enclosure:

“I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to
reconnoiter the land in the region Freudenthal-Freihermersdorf
. . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Page 3 of the document?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. “. . . for landing possibilities.

“For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal
with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in
Prague.

“I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me
to Macholdt, particularly about my official position.

“I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to
Freudenthal taking precautions against being observed.”

By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia compelled the issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum, entitled “Extended Case Green”; in other words, an estimate of possible action by the Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia.

I now offer this document in evidence, Number 375-PS as Exhibit USA-84. This is a top-secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe, General Staff, dated Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the assumption that Great Britain and France would declare war on Germany during Case Green, this study contains an estimate of the strategy and air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date for Case Green. I quote the first two sentences of the document. That is under the heading “Initial Political Situation”:

“The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the
Case Green. It is presumed that France will decide upon war only
if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely
assured.”

Now, knowledge of the pending or impending action against Czechoslovakia was not confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich and the Nazi Party. During the summer Germany’s allies, Italy and Hungary, were apprised by one means or another of the plans of the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence Document 2800-PS as Exhibit USA-85. This is a captured document from the German Foreign Office files, a confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938. At the bottom is a handwritten note headed “For the Reichsminister only”, and the Reichsminister was the Defendant Ribbentrop. I now read this note. I read from the note the third and fourth paragraphs:

“Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the
Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He
also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take
perhaps a 2 months’ holiday now which he could not do later on.

“Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments, Attolico
mentioned that the Romanian Government had refused to grant
application for leave to its Berlin Minister.”

THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off for 10 minutes?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a month later Mussolini sent a message to Berlin asking that he be told the date on which Case Green would take place. I offer in evidence Document Number 2791-PS as Exhibit USA-86, a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with Ambassador Attolico. This note is signed “R” for Ribbentrop and dated 23 August 1938. I now read two paragraphs from this memorandum:

“On the voyage of the _Patria_ Ambassador Attolico explained to
me that he had instructions to request the notification of a
contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from
the German Government.

“In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against
Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in 6
months, or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him that
the German Government, in case of an increasing gravity of the
situation or as soon as the Führer made his decision, would
notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible.
In any case, the Italian Government will be the first one who
will receive such a notification.”

THE PRESIDENT: You did not tell us what the initial was, did you?

MR. ALDERMAN: The initial “R” for Ribbentrop, and the date 23 August 1938.

Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date of the pending attack. I offer Document Number 2792-PS as Exhibit USA-87—another German Foreign Office memorandum, and from that document I read three paragraphs under the heading “R. M. 251.”

“Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to
communicate the following:

“He had received another written instruction from Mussolini
asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of
action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such
notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order ‘to be able
to take in due time the necessary measures on the French
frontier.’ Berlin, 27 August 1938; ‘R’”—for Ribbentrop, and
then:

“N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
démarche, that I could not impart any date to him; that,
however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be
informed of any decision. Berlin, 2 September 1938.”

Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was from the first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. You will recall that in early March 1938 Defendants Keitel and Ribbentrop had exchanged letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi plan. At that time the decision was in the negative, but by mid-August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade Hungary to join in the attack.

From August 21 to 26 Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers visited Germany. Inevitably there were discussions of the Czechoslovak question. I now offer Document 2796-PS as Exhibit USA-88. This is a captured German Foreign Office account signed by Von Weizsäcker of the conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and a Hungarian Delegation consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S. S. _Patria_ on 23 August 1938. In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian attitude in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested that such an attack would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary.

The Hungarians, with the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop’s statement and said that whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. I now quote from this document the first two paragraphs:

“While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Führer and the
Regent of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion, the
Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya were in conference with Von
Ribbentrop. Von Weizsäcker also attended the conference.

“Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: Point 1, the
negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente; and 2, the
Czechoslovakian problem.”

Then I skip two paragraphs and read the fifth paragraph:

“Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary’s attitude would be if the
Führer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech
provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two
kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured
if Hungary marches towards the north and perhaps the east;
moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and one
to two more years time for its development should be allowed.

“Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the
Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the
pincers of the Axis Powers. Romania alone would therefore not
move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England
would not recklessly risk her empire. She knew our newly
acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the
above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted
since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop
repeated that, ‘Whoever desires revision must exploit the good
opportunity and participate.’

“The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the
question of Von Ribbentrop as to what purpose the desired
General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was
brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory
of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict.
The clear political basis for such a conflict—the time of a
Hungarian intervention—was not obtained.

“In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy
in his talk with the Führer. He wished not to hide his doubts
with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put on
record Hungary’s intention to participate. The Hungarian
Ministers were, and remained even later, more skeptical since
they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary
with its unprotected flanks.

“When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Führer in the
afternoon he was very relieved when the Führer explained to him
that in regard to the situation in question he demanded nothing
of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted
to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as
well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs he
would have no objections.”

I think perhaps that sentence, “Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well,” is perhaps as cynical a statement as any statesman has ever been guilty of.

By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that, in the event of a German-Czech conflict, Hungary would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October. I now offer in evidence Document Number 2797-PS as Exhibit USA-89, another captured German Foreign Office memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938. You will note that the English mimeographed translation bears the date 29 August. That is incorrect; it should read 25 August. I read the last paragraph from that document, or the last two:

“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness in case of a
German-Czech conflict Von Kanya mentioned several days ago that
his country would need a period of one to two years in order to
develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary.

“During today’s conversation Von Kanya corrected this remark and
said that Hungary’s military situation was much better. His
country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to
take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year.”—Signed
with an illegible signature which probably is that of
Weizsäcker.

The account of the German-Hungarian conference again finds its corroboration in General Jodl’s diary, Document Number 1780-PS, from which I have already several times read. The entry in that diary for 21 to 26 August on Page 4 of the English version of the document reads as follows:

“Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent. Accompanied by the
Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the War
Minister Von Raatz.

“They arrived with the idea that in the course of a great war
after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old
State of Hungary can be re-established. They leave with the
understanding that we have neither demands from them nor claims
against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second
provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If
they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

“Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator
between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe
that when the issue arises a period of 48 hours would be
indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.”

The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff conference on 6 September.

I quote again from Jodl’s diary, the entry for 6 September, beginning at the end of that same page:

“Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a
conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.
Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the
Führer, especially his order not to give any hint on the exact
moment. The same with OAI, General Von Stülpnagel.”

It is somewhat interesting to find a high-ranking general giving a briefing on such political matters.

Then we come to final actual preparations for the attack. With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to technical details, the timing of “X-days,” questions of mobilization, questions of transport and supplies.

On 26 August the Defendant Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled, “Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.” This is Item 17 at Pages 37 and 38 of the English translation of the Schmundt file on Case Green, our Number 388-PS.

I should like to invite the special attention of the Tribunal to this memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the complicity of the OKW and of Defendant Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in bare outline the deceit, the barbarity, the completely criminal character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch.

I ask leave to read this document in full:

“Chief Section L; for chiefs only; written by General Staff
officer; top secret; note on progress of report; Berlin, 24
August 1938; access only through officer; 1 copy.

“Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.

“The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by
surprise at their peacetime airports justifiably leads them to
oppose measures taken in advance of the X-Order and to demand
that the X-Order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1
to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming known to
Czechoslovakia on that day.

“The Army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It
intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus
3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and rapid
working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands
that the X-Order be given to the Army not later than 1400 on X
minus 1.

“To this the following must be said:

“‘Operation Green’”—or Aktion Grün—“will be set in motion by
means of an ‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany
provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact
time for this incident is of the utmost importance.”—I call
special attention to that sentence—“The fixing of the exact
time for this incident is of the utmost importance.

“It must come at a time when the over-all meteorological
conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into
action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of
it”—news of this prepared incident—“to reach us on the
afternoon of X minus 1.

“It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the
X-Order at 1400 on X minus 1.

“On X minus 2 the Navy, Army, and Air Force will merely receive
an advance warning.

“If the Führer intends to follow this plan of action, all
further discussion is superfluous.

“For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for
which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise
appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely
essential advance measures must be given in good time and
camouflaged with the help of numerous maneuvers and exercises.

“Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether
all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy
territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure
from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

“Even a warning of diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air attack, although the
consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming
victims of such an attack (that is the death of representatives
of friendly or confirmed neutral powers).

“If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be
considered desirable for the incident, then the following day
cannot be X-Day, but it must be the day after that.

“In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be
done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and
that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the
incident (X-Fall).

“It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great
interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be
informed of the Führer’s intentions in good time—insofar as the
Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the
incident.

“I request that the Führer’s decision be obtained on these
points.”—Signed—“J”—(Jodl).

In handwriting, at the bottom of the page of that document, are the notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August. There follows Jodl’s initials once more.

On 3 September Keitel and Von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These will be found as Item 18 at Pages 39 and 40 of the Document Number 388-PS. I shall read the first three short paragraphs of these minutes:

“Colonel General Von Brauchitsch reports on the exact time of
the transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘Grün’. Field
units to be transferred on 28 September. From here will then be
ready for action. When X-Day becomes known field units carry out
exercises in opposite directions.

“Führer has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march
away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.”—Then there is
a question mark.—“OKH must know when X-Day is by 1200 noon, 27
September.”

You will note that Von Brauchitsch reported that field troops would be transferred to the proper areas for Case Green on 28 September and would then be ready for action. You will also note that the OKH must know when X-Day is by 12 noon on 27 September.

During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility, and I quote, “of drawing in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt further noted, and here I read the final sentence from Page 40 of the English transcript:

“The Führer gives orders for the development of the Western
fortifications: Improvement of advance positions around Aachen
and Saarbrücken; construction of 300 to 400 battery positions
(1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.”

Five days later General Stülpnagel asked Defendant Jodl for written assurance that the OKH would be informed 5 days in advance about the impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the co-ordination of ground and air operations at the start of the attack. I now read the 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary, Page 5 of the English translation of Document 1780-PS.

“General Stülpnagel, OAI, asks for written assurance that the
Army High Command will be informed 5 days in advance if the plan
is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all
meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only
for 2 days in advance and that therefore the plans may be
changed up to this moment (X-Day minus 2)”—or as the German
puts it—“X-2 Tag.”

“General Stülpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders
whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned.
It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere
decisively. It gradually seems as if the Führer would stick to
his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion.
It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that . . .
Italy is reserved.”

Now, this is Jodl talking:

“I must admit that I am worrying, too, when comparing the change
of opinion about political and military potentialities,
according to directives of 24 June ’37, 5 November ’37, 7
December ’37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements. In spite of
that, one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will
do everything they can to apply pressure on us. We must pass
this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the
art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only
possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of
officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it
circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

“1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of High Command
of Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force.
(Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg, and
myself). We agree about the promulgation of the X-Day
order”—X-Befehl—“(X-1, 4 o’clock) and pre-announcement to the
Air Force (X-Day minus 1”—X minus 1 day—“7 o’clock). The ‘Y’
time has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach
flight of one hour.”

Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with Defendant Keitel and Generals Von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nuremberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined this conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt’s minutes on this conference are Item 19 in the large Schmundt file, on Pages 41 to 43 of Document 388-PS.

In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German armies being committed to the attack, the 2d, the 10th, the 12th and the 14th German Armies. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations, which should be taken into account as the attack developed. I shall quote only four paragraphs, beginning with the summary of General Von Brauchitsch’s remarks, on the bottom of Page 42:

“General Oberst Von Brauchitsch: ‘Employment of motorized
divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria
and the difficulties in getting other divs’”—that is for
divisions—“‘ready to march into the area at the right time. In
the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of September,
if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by
relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army
Command II.’

“The Führer: ‘Does not see why workers have to return home as
early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on
mobilization day. Also the railroad cars will stand around
unnecessarily later on.’

“General Keitel: ‘Workers are not under the jurisdiction of
district commands in the West. Trains must be assembled.’

“Von Brauchitsch: ‘235,000 men RAD (Labor Service) will be
drafted, 96 construction battalions will be distributed (also in
the East). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.’”

From this day forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the intricate planning which is required before such an attack. On 11 September Defendant Jodl conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of international law and of exploiting those of the Czechs. I read the 11 September entry in the Jodl diary at Page 5 of the English translation of 1780-PS:

“In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Hahnke, for
the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent
common tasks. These joint preparations for
refutation”—Widerlegung—“of our own violations of
international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the
enemy, were considered particularly important.”

This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L, that is, Jodl’s section of the OKW.

I now offer in evidence Document C-2 as Exhibit USA-90, which is a carbon copy of the original, signed in pencil. Seven copies of this captured document, as it shows on its face, were prepared and distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office.

In this study anticipated violations by Germany of international law in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counterpropaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. It is a highly interesting top-secret document and with a glance at the original you can see the careful form in which the study of anticipated violations of international law and propagandists refutations thereof were set out.

The document is prepared in tabular form, in which the anticipated instances of violation of international law are listed in the left hand column. In the second column are given specific examples of the incidents. In the third and fourth column the position to be taken toward these incidents, in violation of international law and in violation of the laws of warfare, is set forth.

The fifth column, which in this document unfortunately is blank, was reserved for the explanations to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. I first quote from the covering letter:

“Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the
violations of international law which may be expected on the
part of fighting troops.

“Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, Columns
c-1 and c-2 had to be filled in directly therefore, for the time
being.

“The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in an
opinion so that a final version may be drawn up.

“The same is requested of the Foreign Office.

“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

“By order”—signed—“Bürckner.”

I am sorry that I perhaps cannot take the time to read extensively from this document. I shall confine myself to reading the first 10 hypothetical incidents for which justification must be found from the second column, Column b of the table:

“First: In an air raid on Prague the British Embassy is
destroyed.

“Second: Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.

“Third: The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.

“Fourth: On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas,
the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.

“Fifth: Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are
caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of an important
bridge, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered
looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.

“Sixth: Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed
to do road work or to load munitions, and so forth.

“Seventh: For military reasons it is necessary to requisition
billets, foodstuffs, and fodder from the Czech population. As a
result, the latter suffer from want.

“Eighth: Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily
evacuated to the rear area.

“Ninth: Churches are used for military accommodations.

“Tenth: In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over
Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with
Czech aircraft.”

From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW. This top-secret order . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the classification with reference to gas?

MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps I should, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: It is number 4.

MR. ALDERMAN: Incident number 4?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: Well, number 4 was the supposed incident. “On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.” Under the column, “Attitude of International Law Group”:

“According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40
states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison
gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances
is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the
reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas
warfare.”

Then, under the column headed “Justification by the Laws of War”:

“If the assertion, that the opponent—in this case the
Czechs—used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by
the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible,
the firing of gas projectiles is justified, and it must be given
out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first
to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly
important to furnish this proof. If the assertion is unfounded
or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented
only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the
same way as the Italians did in the Abyssinian war. In this
case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must
also be proved.”

From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW . . .

THE PRESIDENT: There is another short passage which seems to be material.

MR. ALDERMAN: I was very much tempted to read the whole document.

THE PRESIDENT: The justification of number 10.

MR. ALDERMAN: Number 10 was, “In course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft.”

Under the heading, “Attitude of the International Law Group”:

“According to Article 1 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 18
October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is not to be
violated. A deliberate violation by flying over this territory
is a breach of international law if the neutral powers have
declared an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes
fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of
international law, provided that this action is not expressly
permitted.”

Now, under the heading, “Justification by the Laws of War,” is this:

“An attempt at denials should first be made; if this is
unsuccessful a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds
of miscalculation of position) to the Polish Government and
compensation for damage guaranteed.”

I had referred to an order issued by Hitler on 10 September 1938 from Nuremberg, bringing the German Labor Service under the OKW. This top-secret order, of which 25 copies were made, is Item 20 in the Schmundt file, Page 44. I will read that order:

“1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the
Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

“2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this
organization in conjunction with the Reich Labor Leader
(Reichsarbeitsführer) and on assignments from time to time to
the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Where
questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final
decision in accordance with my instructions.

“3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to
the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

“Signed, Adolf Hitler.”

Four days later, on 14 September, Defendant Keitel issued detailed instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is Item 21 in the Schmundt file, at Page 45 in the English translation. I do not think I need read the order.

There is another order issued by the Defendant Jodl on 16 September, Item 24, at Page 48 in the Schmundt file. I think I need only read the heading or title of that:

“Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for maneuvers with
Wehrmacht. Effective 15 September the following units will be
trained militarily under direction of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army.”

Two further entries in the Defendant Jodl’s diary give further indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just 2 weeks before the anticipated X-Day.

I now read the answers for the 15th and 16th September, at Pages 5 and 6 of the English translation of the Jodl diary.

“15 September: In the morning, conference with Chief of Army
High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Force,
the question was discussed as to what could be done if the
Führer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid
development of the situation.

“16 September: General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700
hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference
between Chamberlain and the Führer. The next conference will
take place on the 20th or 21st in Godesberg.

“With consent of the Führer, the order is given in the evening
by the Armed Forces High Command, to the Army High Command, and
to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the v.G.a.D. along the
Czech border.”—That I understand to have reference to the
reinforced border guard.

“In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have
empty rolling stock kept in readiness, clandestinely; for the
strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be
transported starting 28 September.”

The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available, to which General Jodl referred, appears as Item 22, at Page 47 of the Schmundt file. In this order the Defendant Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to continue work on the Western fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. I quote the first four paragraphs of this order:

“The Reichsbahn (the railroads) must provide trains of empty
trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of
mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all
others.

“Therefore the trainloads for the limes job”—I understand the
“limes job” to have reference to defense fortification in the
West—“will have to be cut down after September 17 and those
goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.

“The Supreme Command of the Army (Fifth Division of the Army
General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with
the authorities concerned.

“However, in accordance with the Führer’s directive, every
effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as
large quantities as feasible, even after 20 September 1938, and
this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue
the important work on the limes.”

The penultimate stage of the aggression begins on 18 September. From that date until the 28th a series of orders was issued advancing preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file and I shall not take the time of the Tribunal by attempting to read all of it.

On the 18th the commitment scheduled for the five participating Armies, the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th, was set forth. That is Item 26 in the Schmundt file at Page 50 of the English translation. Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five divisions in the West to protect the German rear during Case Green, and I refer to Item 31 in the Schmundt file at Page 13—I beg your pardon, it is Page 55, I had a misprint. I might refer to that. It is a “most-secret” order, Berlin, 27 September 1938, 1920 hours; 45 copies of which this is the 16th:

“The Führer has approved the mobilization, without warning, of
the five regular West divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 33d, and
35th). The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment
in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by the
workers of the Todt organization.

“It is left to the OKH to assemble as far as possible, first of
all the sections ready to march and, subsequently, the remaining
sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the
Western fortifications.”—Signed—“Jodl.”

THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to adjourn.

We will meet again at 2 o’clock.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, my attention has been called to the fact that I misread a signature on one of the documents to which I adverted this morning. It is Item 31 of the Schmundt minutes. I read the name “Jodl” as being the signature on that item. I should have read Keitel.

In the course of presenting details of the documents which are being offered in evidence, I think it would be well to pause for a moment, and recall the setting in which these facts took place. The world will never forget the Munich Pact, and the international crisis which led to it. As this crisis was developing in August and September of 1938, and frantic efforts were being made by the statesmen of the world to preserve the peace of the world, little did they know of the evil plans and designs in the hearts and the minds of these conspirators.

What is being presented to the Tribunal today is the inside story, in their own words, underlying the Pact of Munich. We are now able to spread upon the pages of history the truth concerning the fraud and deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in achieving for their own ends, the Pact of Munich as a stepping stone towards further aggression. One cannot think back without living again through the dread of war, the fear of war, the fear of world disaster, which seized all peace-loving persons. The hope for peace which came with the Munich Pact was, we now see, a snare and a deceit—a trap, carefully set by the defendants on trial. The evil character of these men who were fabricating this scheme for aggression and war is demonstrated by their own documents.

Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe about the time of day at which the attack should be launched. Conference notes initialed by the Defendant Jodl, dated 27 September, reveal the difference in views. These notes are Item 54, at Page 90 in the translation of Document 388-PS. I shall read these first three paragraphs as follows: The heading is:

“Most secret; for chiefs only; only through officers.

“Conference notes; Berlin, 27 September 1938; 4 copies, first
copy. To be filed Grün.

“Co-ordinated Time of Attack by Army and Air Force on X-Day.

“As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a
co-ordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on 1 X-Day.

“The Army wishes to attack at dawn, that is, about 0615. It also
wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night,
which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

“Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. These
could change the time of attack and also limit the area of
operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance,
would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to
low ceiling in Bavaria.”

Then I’ll skip to the last two paragraphs on Page 91:

“Thus it is proposed:

“Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the Air
Force—at the time desired by the Army (0615), and permission
for limited operations to take place before then; however, only
to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

“The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.”

The initial at the end of that order is “J” meaning, I think clearly, Jodl.

On the same date, 27 September, the Defendant Keitel sent a most-secret memorandum to the Defendant Hess, and the Reichsführer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is Item 32 in the Schmundt files at Page 56 of the English translation. I read the first four paragraphs of this message.

“As a result of the political situation the Führer and
Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed
Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by
issuing the mobilization (X) order, or corresponding code words.

“Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is
necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to
the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are
connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order,
the advance measures or special code names.

“The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be
met (even if the code word has not been previously issued)
immediately and without being referred to higher authority.

“OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate
instructions to this effect, so that the mobilization of the
Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.”

Then I skip to the last paragraph:

“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that
all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken
by Party organizations or Police units, as a result of the
political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of
time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can
it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in
practice.

“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel.”

Two additional entries from the Defendant Jodl’s diary reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all of their preparations for an attack, even during the period of negotiations which culminated in the Munich Agreement. I quote the answers in the Jodl diary for 26 and 27 September, from Page 7 of the translation of Document 1780-PS. 26 September . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the dates of the visits of Mr. Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement? Perhaps you can give it later on.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. ALDERMAN: The agreement of the Munich Pact was the 29th of September, and this answer then was 3 days before the Pact, the 26th of September:

“Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army
High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the
advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet
necessary and because the Führer does not intend to march in
before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech
frontier need be given on the 27th only.

“Fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at
the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda
transmissions.

“Question by Ausland whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave
and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command: ‘Yes.’

“1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs
General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations
and about the Führer’s opinion. In no case will X-Day be before
the 30th.

“It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn
into military engagements because of false reports, before
Prague replies.

“A question of Stumpf about Y-Hour results in the reply that on
account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of
the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the
dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent
early fogs.

“The Führer has to make a decision as to which of the
Commanders-in-Chief is to have priority.

“The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has
to proceed. The Führer has not made any decision as yet about
commitment against Prague.

“2000 hours: The Führer addresses the people and the world in an
important speech at the Sportpalast.”

Then the entry on 27 September:

“1320 hours: The Führer consents to the first wave of attack
being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the
assembly area by 30 September.”

The order referred to by General Jodl was also recorded by the faithful Schmundt, which appears as Item 33 at Page 57 of the file. I’ll read it in its entirety. It is the order which brought the Nazi Army to a jumping-off point for the unprovoked and brutal aggression:

“28.9.38.; most secret; memorandum.

“At 1300 hours 27 September the Führer and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from
their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

“The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or seven
divisions) must be ready to begin the action against Grün on 30
September, the decision having been made 1 day previously by
1200 noon.

“This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major
Schmundt”—pencil note by Schmundt.

At this point, with the Nazi Army poised in a strategic position around the borders of Czechoslovakia, we shall turn back for a moment to examine another phase of the Czech aggression. The military preparations for action against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out _in vacuo_.

They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to promote civil disobedience in the Czechoslovak State. Using the techniques they had already developed in other uncontested ventures underhandedly, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money, propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the Nazis focused their attention on the persons of German descent living in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the northwest and south. I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to Document Number 998-PS and offer it in evidence as an exhibit.

This exhibit is entitled, “German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” and is the Czechoslovak Government’s official report for the prosecution and trial of the German major war criminals. I believe that this report is clearly included within the provisions of Article 21, of the Charter, as a document of which the Court will take judicial notice. Article 21 provides:

“The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also
take judicial notice of official governmental documents and
reports of the United Nations, including the accounts and
documents of the committees set up in the various Allied
countries for the investigation of war crimes and the records
and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United
Nations.”