Chapter III: Front Matter (3)

“a. For the ‘armed war’ it is essential that the surprise
element, as the most important factor contributing to success,
be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already
in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action.
Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first 2 or
3 days which plainly demonstrates to hostile nations, eager to
intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military
situation and which, at the same time, will give nations with
territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene
immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention
by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected,
especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of
Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war
by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give
military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are
to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the
land operations within the first few days, a European crisis
will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of
all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

“b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate
Czechoslovakia by threats and wear down her power of resistance;
on the other hand issue directions to national groups for
support in the ‘armed war’ and influence the neutrals into our
way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination
of the date.

“4. Tasks of the Armed Forces. Armed Forces preparations are to
be made on the following basis:

“a. The mass of all forces must be employed against
Czechoslovakia.

“b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear
cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East
against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the
southern frontiers to be watched.

“c. The sections of the Army which can be rapidly employed must
force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and
must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the
certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with
the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed
in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly
employed cross the frontier at the appointed time, at the same
time as the penetration by the Air Force, before the enemy can
become aware of our mobilization. For this, a timetable between
Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW
and submitted to me for approval.

“5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.

“a. Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against
Czechoslovakia must not be endangered nor the initiative of the
Air Force be wasted by the inevitable time required for
transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail. Therefore it
is first of all essential to the Army that as many assault
columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise
attack by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition
of each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed
with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their
proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special
measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts
to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at
numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to
achieve a break-through, or to break them down from the rear.
For the success of this operation, co-operation with the
Sudeten-German frontier population, with deserters from the
Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops and
with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The
bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian
plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from
escaping . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all this detail?

MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into the transcript.

THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that before you pass from the document you ought to read the document on Page 15, which introduces it and which gives the date of it.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated:

“Berlin, 30 May 1938; copy of the fourth copy; Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces; most secret; access only through officer;
written by an officer. Signed Keitel; distributed to C-in-C
Army, C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Air Force.

“By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2,