Chapter XVII: Part II: is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.” (4)

“Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been
laid down in other conventions in force between the contracting
parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of
such conventions.”

Then there follows in the remaining articles the establishment of the machinery for arbitration.

I would next refer to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and Denmark, which was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 31st of May 1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was 10 weeks after the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia. The Court will find that as Document TC-24 in the document book and it will now bear the Exhibit Number GB-77.

With the Court’s permission, in view of the identity of the signatory of that treaty, I would like to read the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2.

“The Chancellor of the German Reich and His Majesty, the King of
Denmark and Iceland, being firmly resolved to maintain peace
between Denmark and Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to
confirm this resolve by means of a treaty and have appointed as
their Plenipotentiaries: The Chancellor of the German Reich
. . . and His Majesty, the King of Denmark and Iceland . . . .”

Article 1 reads as follows:

“The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark shall in no case
resort to war or to any other use of force, one against the
other.

“Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be taken
by a third power against one of the contracting parties, the
other contracting party shall not support such action in any
way.”

Then Article 2 deals with the ratification of the treaty, and the second paragraph states:

“The treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the
instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a
period of 10 years from that date . . . .”

As the Tribunal will observe, the treaty is dated the 31st of May 1939. At the bottom of the page there appears the signature of the Defendant Ribbentrop. The Tribunal will shortly see that less than a year after the signature of this treaty the invasion of Denmark by the Nazi forces was to show the utter worthlessness of treaties to which the Defendant Ribbentrop put his signature.

With regard to Norway, the Defendant Ribbentrop and the Nazi conspirators were party to a similar perfidy. In the first instance I would refer to Document TC-30, which is the next document in the British Document Book 3 and which will bear the Exhibit Number GB-78. The Tribunal will observe that that is an assurance given to Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939. That, of course, was after the annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world; and this was presumably an attempt, now submitted by the Prosecution to be a dishonest attempt, to try to reassure the Scandinavian States. The assurance is in a speech by Hitler and reads:

“. . . I have given binding declarations to a large number of
states. None of these states can complain that even a trace of a
demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany.
None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend
that a request has ever been put to them by the German
Government or by German public opinion which was incompatible
with the sovereignty and integrity of their state.

“I was pleased that a number of European states availed
themselves of these declarations by the German Government to
express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality.
This applies to the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark,
_et cetera_.”

A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on the 2d of September 1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was the day after the Nazi invasion of Poland. The Court will observe the next document in British Document Book 3 is the Document TC-31, which will be Exhibit GB-79. That is an _aide-mémoire_ that was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on the 2d of September 1939. It reads:

“The German Reich Government are determined, in view of the
friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under
no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of
Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In
making this declaration, the Reich Government naturally expect
on their side that Norway will observe an unimpeachable
neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches
of Norwegian neutrality by any third party. Should the attitude
of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any
such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich
Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the
interest of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation
might dictate.”

There follows, finally, the further German assurance to Norway, which appears as the next document in the book, TC-32, which will be Exhibit GB-80. That is a speech by Hitler on the 6th of October 1939; and if the Court will observe Paragraph 2 at the top of the page, the extract from the speech reads as follows:

“Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any
today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression
pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they
did not feel themselves threatened in any way.”

Those are clear and positive assurances which Germany gave. The Court will see that violation of those assurances is charged in Paragraph XXII of Appendix C of the Indictment at Page 43. The Court will notice that there is a minor typographical error in the date of the first assurance which is alleged in the Indictment to have been given on the 3rd of September 1939. The Court will see from Document TC-31, which is Exhibit GB-79, that the assurance was in fact given on the 2d of September 1939.

Now those treaties and assurances were the diplomatic background to the brutal Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark, and the evidence which the Prosecution will now place before the Court will in my submission establish beyond reasonable doubt that these assurances were simply given to lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For we now know that as early as October 1939 these conspirators and their confederates were plotting the invasion of Norway, and the evidence will indicate that the most active conspirators in that plot were the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg.

The Norwegian invasion is, in one respect, not a typical Nazi aggression in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he thought Norway strategically important and because he coveted glory for his Navy, Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway which he sought to develop.

As the Tribunal will shortly see, in the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling the Defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent, the very personification of perfidy.

The evidence as to the early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade Norway is found in a letter which the Defendant Raeder wrote on the 10th of January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official German naval historian.

I put in this letter, the document C-66, which will be Exhibit GB-81, and which the Court will find further on in this book of documents. I should explain that in this book of documents the documents are inserted in the numerical order of the series to which they belong and not in the order of their submission to the Court. I am trusting that that will be a more convenient form of bundling them together than to set them down in the order of presentation.

THE PRESIDENT: 66?

MAJOR JONES: C-66. It is headed, “Memorandum to Admiral Assmann; for his own information; not to be used for publication.”

The Court will observe that the first page deals with Barbarossa. If the Tribunal turns to the next page headed “(b) Weserübung,” the Tribunal will find from documents which I shall shortly be submitting to the Court that Weserübung was the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.

I will omit the first sentence. The document which, as I have said, is a communication from the Defendant Raeder to Assmann reads as follows:

“During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October
1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a
detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an
occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this
letter on to C/SKL”—which is the Chief of Staff of the Naval
War Staff—“for their information and prepared some notes based
on this letter . . . for my report to the Führer, which I made
on the 10th of October 1939, since my opinion was absolutely
identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that time SKL was
more dubious about the matter. In these notes I stressed the
disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would
have for us: Control of the approaches to the Baltic,
outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on
Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for
us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast: Outlet to the North
Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the
years 1917-18. Naturally, at the time, only the coast and bases
were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the
course of our correspondence, thought that Narvik could be
excluded . . . . The Führer saw at once the significance of the
Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated
that he wished to consider the question himself.”

I will pause in the reading of that document at that point and return to it later so that the story may be revealed to the Court in a chronological order.

That report of Raeder, in my submission, shows that the whole evolution of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good example of the participation of the German High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors.

This letter, an extract from which I have just read, has revealed that Raeder reported to Hitler on the 10th of October 1939 . . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that report?

MAJOR JONES: The report, C-66, was made in January 1944 by the Defendant Raeder to Assmann, who was the German naval historian, and so, presumably, was for the purposes of history.

Before Raeder’s report of 10 October 1939 was made to the Führer, Raeder got a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On the 3rd of October Raeder made out the questionnaire to which I now invite the Court’s attention. It is Document C-122 and the Court will find it next but one to C-66 in the document book. That will now be Exhibit GB-82.

That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed “Gaining of Bases in Norway (extract from War Diary)” and bears the date of the 3rd of October 1939. It reads:

“The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff”—who was the Defendant
Raeder—“considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as
soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval Operations Staff
on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the
north. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain
bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and
Germany, with the basic aim of improving our strategic and
operational position. The following questions must be given
consideration:

“(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

“(b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will
if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

“(c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?

“(d) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases
or have they already decisive advantages suitable for supply
position?”

Then there follows in parenthesis:

“The Commander of the U-boat Fleet”—which is a reference, of
course, to the Defendant Dönitz—”. . . considers such harbors
already extremely useful as equipment and supply bases at which
Atlantic U-boats can call temporarily.”

And then Question (e):

“What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war
at sea in gaining bases in north Denmark, e.g. Skagen?”

There is, in our possession, a document C-5, to find which it will be necessary for the Court to go back in the document book to the first of the C exhibits. This will be Exhibit GB-83.

This is a memorandum written by the Defendant Dönitz on Norwegian bases. It presumably relates to the questionnaire of the Defendant Raeder which, as I have indicated, was in circulation at about that time. The document is headed, “Commander of the U-boat Fleet; Operations Division,” and is marked “most secret.” The subject is “Base in Norway.”

Then there are set out “suppositions,” “advantages and disadvantages,” and, over one page, “conclusions”. I am proposing to read the last paragraph, III:

“The following is therefore proposed:

“(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:

“a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen,
provisions;

“b) Repair opportunities for normal overhaul work after an
encounter;

“c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews;

“d) Flak protection, L.A. antiaircraft armament, patrol and M/S
units.

“(2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in
Narvik as an alternative.”

That is a Dönitz memorandum.

Now, as the Tribunal saw in the report of Raeder to Assmann, in October 1939, Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression and had not yet committed himself to it, although, as the Tribunal will see very shortly, Hitler was most susceptible to any suggestions of aggression against the territory of another country.

The documents will show that the Defendant Raeder persevered in pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a powerful ally in the Defendant Rosenberg.

The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a political weapon are now unhappily proven historical facts, but should proof be required of that statement it is found in the remarkable document which I now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Document 007-PS, which is after the TC and D series in the document book. That will be Exhibit GB-84.

That is headed on Page 1, “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party”—Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP—“from 1933 to 1943.” It reads:

“When the Foreign Affairs Bureau”—Aussenpolitisches Amt—“was
established on the 1st of April 1933, the Führer directed that
it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency; but
should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and
suggestions.

“Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted
by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the
newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to
internal conditions in the Soviet Union as well as to the
effects of world Bolshevism, primarily in other European
countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated
groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting
Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on nations and states
bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand those nations and
states constituted an insulating ring encircling the Bolshevist
neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of German
living space and took up a flanking position towards the Western
Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired
influence by one means or another”—and the Court will shortly
see the significance of that phrase—“the bureau was compelled
to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the
completely different living conditions, the ties of blood and
intellect, and historical dependence of the movements observed
by the bureau in those countries.

“In Scandinavia a progressively more outspoken pro-Anglo-Saxon
attitude based on economic considerations had become more
dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the bureau put
the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations
with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic
Society in Lübeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of
this society were attended by many outstanding personalities,
especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely
political co-operation in Sweden and Denmark, an association
based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very
close relations, which led to further consequences, were
established with its founder.”

If the Court will turn to the end of the main part of the statement which is 4 pages forward—in the intervening pages, I may say, there is an account of the activity of Rosenberg’s bureau in various parts of Europe, and indeed of the world, which I am not proposing to call the Tribunal’s attention to at this stage—but if the Tribunal will look at the last paragraph of the main body of the report which bears the signature of the Defendant Rosenberg, the last two sentences read:

“With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task
as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections
in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.”

If the Tribunal will turn to the annex to the document, which is on the next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what “exploitation of personal connections” involved.

Annex I to the document is headed, “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.” It is headed, “The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway during the War Years 1939-40,” and it reads:

“As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in
Scandinavia only Nasjonal Samling, led in Norway by the former
Minister of War and retired major, Vidkun Quisling, deserved
serious political attention. This was a fighting political group
possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic community. Naturally
all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent by any
means its success among the population. The bureau maintained
constant relation with Quisling and attentively observed the
attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class,
which had been taken in tow by the English. From the beginning
it appeared probable that without revolutionary events which
would stir the population from their former attitude no
successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected.
During the winter 1938-39 Quisling was privately visited by a
member of the bureau. When the political situation in Europe
came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the
convention of the Nordic Society in Lübeck in June. He expounded
his conception of the situation and his apprehensions concerning
Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically
decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area and to
the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the
Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German
Reich and Great Britain.

“Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to
the Marshal of the Reich, Göring, for aero-strategical reasons,
Quisling was referred to State Secretary Körner by the bureau.
The Staff Director of the bureau handed the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Führer . . . .”

In a later part of the document, which I shall read at a later stage of my presentation of the evidence, if I may, the Court will see how Quisling came into contact with Raeder. The Prosecution’s submission with regard to this document is that it is another illustration of the close interweaving between the political and the military leadership of the Nazi State, of the close link between the professional soldiers and the professional thugs.

The Defendant Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his collaboration with Rosenberg; and I will invite the Court’s attention once more to Document C-66, which is Exhibit GB-81. In the page headed “Weserübung,” the second paragraph of the Raeder report reads as follows:

“In the further developments, I was supported by Commander
Schreiber, Naval Attaché in Oslo, and the M-Chief personally—in
conjunction with the Rosenberg organization. Thus we got in
touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in the
beginning of December and were taken to the Führer by me—with
the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg . . . .”

I will later draw the attention of the Tribunal to the developments in December.

The details of the manner in which the Defendant Raeder did make contact personally with Quisling are not very clear. But I would draw the Court’s attention to the Document C-65, which precedes . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?

MAJOR JONES: With your Lordship’s permission, I would like to revert to that in a later stage in my unfolding of the evidence.

In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit GB-85, we have a report of Rosenberg to Raeder in which the full extent of Quisling’s preparedness for treachery and his potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed to the Defendant Raeder.

Paragraph 1 of that report deals with matters which I have already dealt with in reading Rosenberg’s statement, 007-PS. But if the Court will look at the second paragraph of Exhibit GB-85, C-65, it reads as follows:

“The reasons for a _coup_, on which Quisling made a report,
would be provided by the fact that the Storthing”—that is to
say the Norwegian parliament—“had, in defiance of the
constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which
is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains
in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister
of War the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed
me the original of a letter which he had received only a short
time previously from the commanding officer in Narvik, Colonel
Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the
fact that if things went on as they were going at present,
Norway was finished.”

If the Court will turn to the next page of that document, the last two paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot to overthrow the government of his own country, by the traitor Quisling in collaboration with the Defendant Rosenberg, will be indicated to the Court.

“A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of
a _coup_ and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians
to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a
purpose, being allotted their exact tasks and provided with
experienced and die-hard National Socialists who are practiced
in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with
all speed to Norway where details would then require to be
further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to
be taken over forthwith, and at the same time, the German Fleet
together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go
into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian
Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo.
Quisling has no doubts that such a _coup_, having been carried
out with instantaneous success, would immediately bring him the
approval of those sections of the army with which he at present
has connections; and thus it goes without saying that he has
never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the King
is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an
accomplished fact.”

How wrong Quisling was in that anticipation was shown, of course, by subsequent developments. The last sentence reads:

“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required
which accord with German calculations.”

The Tribunal may think that there are no words in the whole vocabulary of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that degree of treachery.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?

MAJOR JONES: That document does not bear a date.

THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 December 1945 at 1000 o’clock._]

FIFTEENTH DAY
Friday, 7 December 1945

_Morning Session_

MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon when the Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of the Nazi conspiracy against Norway at which the activities of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg converged. And the Court will remember that I submitted in evidence Document C-65, which was a report from the Defendant Rosenberg to Raeder regarding Quisling and ending with the infamous words, “Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations.”

The Court has already received in evidence and has heard read material parts of Document C-66, which was the report of Raeder to Admiral Assmann which disclosed how, in December of 1939, the Defendant Raeder did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin.

I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for the purpose of the record, will be Exhibit GB-86. The Court will observe that that is a report by Raeder of a meeting of the Naval Staff with Hitler on the 12th of December 1939, at 1200 hours, in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler.

The report is headed “Norwegian Question,” and the first sentence reads:

“Commander-in-Chief, Navy”—who of course was the Defendant
Raeder—“has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the
impression of being reliable.”

And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a statement of Quisling’s views, views with which the Court is by now familiar because of my reading of extracts from the Document 007-PS; but I draw the Court’s attention to the fourth paragraph in Document C-64, beginning:

“The Führer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that
he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg
once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a
long while. Commander-in-Chief, Navy”—that is, of course,
Raeder—“suggests that if the Führer forms a favorable
impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with
Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation:
(a) By peaceful means—that is to say, German forces summoned by
Norway; (b) to agree to do so by force.”

That was the 12th of December, the meeting at which Raeder made this report to Hitler.

If the Court will now look at Document C-66, which is Raeder’s record of these transactions for the purpose of history, the Court will observe, in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the section of C-66 headed “(b) Weserübung,” these words:

“. . . thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came
to Berlin at the beginning of December, and were taken to the
Führer by me with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”

And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page:

“At the crucial moment R”—presumably Rosenberg—“hurt his foot,
so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the 14th
December.”

That is, of course, Raeder’s note; and it indicates the extent of his contact in this conspiracy. The report continues:

“On the grounds of the Führer’s discussion with Quisling and
Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December 1939, the
Führer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian
operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.

“Until that moment the naval operations staff had taken no part
in the development of the Norwegian question and continued to be
somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations which were
undertaken by Captain Krancke in the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces were founded, however, on a memorandum of the naval
war staff.”

The Court may well think that the note of the Defendant Raeder referring to the crucial moment was an appropriate one because the Court will see that on that day, the 14th of December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS, which is further on in the document book and which the Court will remember is Rosenberg’s report on the activities of his organization—it is after the “D” documents—if the Court will turn to about 10 lines from the bottom of the first page of Annex I dealing with Norway, the Court will see that there were further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December; and I am going to read now the section beginning:

“As a result of these steps Quisling was granted a personal
audience with the Führer on the 16th of December, and once more
on the 18th of December. In the course of this audience the
Führer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a
completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of
Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theater of war and
to draw still other nations into the conflict.”

As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of the case, here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part in these operations.

The report continues:

“Should the enemy attempt”—there is a mis-translation here—“to
extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further
throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he
would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking.
In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity,
the Führer promised Quisling financial support of this movement,
which is based on Greater Germanic ideology. Military
exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the
special military staff which transmitted special missions to
Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political
exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs”—that is to say, by Ribbentrop’s
organization—“the Minister for Foreign Affairs”—that is to
say, Ribbentrop—“being kept continuously informed by the
Foreign Affairs Bureau”—which, of course, was Rosenberg’s
organization.

“Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison
with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was
assigned to the Naval Attaché in Oslo . . . . Orders were given
that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.”

Here again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs.

The information that is available to the Prosecution as to the events of January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to consider a letter of Keitel’s, Document C-63, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-87. The Court will observe that that is an order—a memorandum—signed by the Defendant Keitel dated the 27th of January 1940. It is marked “Most secret, five copies; reference, Study ‘N’;”—which was another code name for the Weserübung preparations—“access only through an officer.” It is indicated that “C-in-C of the Navy”—that is to say, the Defendant Raeder—“has a report on this.” The document reads:

“The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes
that Study ‘N’ should be further worked on under my direct and
personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the
general war policy. For these reasons the Führer has
commissioned me to take over the direction of further
preparations.

“A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces headquarters for this purpose, and this represents
at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff.”

Then, at the end of the memorandum:

“All further plans will be made under the cover name
Weserübung.”

I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision.

Prior to this date, the 27th of January 1940, the planning of the various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation. The issuance of this directive of Keitel’s on the 27th January 1940 was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for this Norwegian adventure, and turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and co-ordinated plans for the Norwegian operation.

The Court will observe that from January onward the operational planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal channels.

And now I would refer the Court to some entries in the diary of the Defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations progressed. That is Document Number 1809-PS, which will be for the purposes of the record Exhibit GB-88. That, the Court will observe, is the last document in the document book.

There is a slight confusion in the order in which the entries are set out in the diary because the first three pages relate to entries which will be dealt with in another part of the case.

I invite the Court’s attention to Page 3 of these extracts from Jodl’s diary beginning at the bottom February the 6th. The entry under the date line of February the 6th 1940 starts, “New idea: Carry out ‘H’ and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war.”

I would like to repeat that entry if I may be permitted to do so. “New idea: Carry out ‘H’ and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war.”

The next entry to which I invite the Court’s attention is the entry of the 21st of February.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean, to “carry out ‘H’”?

MAJOR JONES: That is a reference to another code word, “Hartmut,” which the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document. That is another code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation.

The entry of February 21st in Jodl’s diary reads:

“Führer has talked with General Von Falkenhorst and charges him
with preparation of Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly.
Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces.”

Then the next entry, on the next page . . .

THE PRESIDENT: “Weser Exercise”—is that Norway too?

MAJOR JONES: That is Norway too, My Lord, yes. That is a translation of “Weserübung.”

The entry on the next page, under the date of February the 28th:

“I propose first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Führer that
Case Yellow”—which as the Court knows is the code name for the
invasion of the Netherlands—“and Weser Exercise”—the invasion
of Norway and Denmark—“must be prepared in such a way that they
will be independent of one another as regards both time and
forces employed. The Führer completely agrees, if this is in any
way possible.”

So that the Court will observe that the new idea of February the 6th that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved had been abandoned by February the 28th.

The next entry is of February the 29th—I am not troubling the Court with further entries of the 28th of February, which relate to the forces to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark. February 29th, the second paragraph:

“Führer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen
and a plan elaborated in detail showing how individual coastal
batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, Chief
of Land Defense, instructed to make out immediately the order of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and Chief ‘WZ’ to make out a
similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff.”

And there for the moment, I will leave the entries in Jodl’s diary and refer the Court to the vital Document C-174, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-89. The Court will see from that document that it is Hitler’s operation order to complete the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of the 1st of March 1940, and it is headed, “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; most secret.” Then, “Directive for Case Weserübung”:

“The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the
making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and
Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces—Weser Exercise.
This operation should prevent British encroachment on
Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore
base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start
line against Britain.”

The second part of Paragraph 1 reads:

“In view of our military and political power in comparison with
that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the
Weser Exercise will be kept as small as possible. The numerical
weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise
execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the
operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which
is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian
States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the
governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary,
demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the
necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be
met with, all military means will be used to crush it.”

There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page:

“I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the
operation against Denmark and Norway the commanding general of
the 21st Army Corps, General Von Falkenhorst.”

Paragraph 3:

“The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway
must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations
must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy
seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply
immediately our own counter measures.

“It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as
the western opponents should be taken by surprise by our
measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and
of readiness, drafting, and embarkation of the troops, must be
made with this factor in mind.

“In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept
secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
fictitious objectives.”

Then Paragraph 4 on the next page, “The Occupation of Denmark,” which is given the code name of “Weserübung Süd”:

“The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of
Fünen immediately after occupation of Zealand.

“Added to this, having secured the most important places, the
group will break through as quickly as possible from Fünen to
Skagen and to the east coast.”

Then there follow other instructions with regard to the operation. Paragraph 5:

“Occupation of Norway, ‘Weserübung Nord’”:

“The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most
important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

“The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the
transport by sea of the landing troops.”

And there follows a reference to the part of the Air Force, and I would like particularly to draw the Court’s attention to that reference. This is Paragraph 5 on Page 3 of Hitler’s directive:

“The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will
ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air
warfare against Britain.”

I am underlining that entry at this stage because I shall be referring to it in connection with a later document.

Whilst these preparations were being made and just prior to the final decision of Hitler . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw our attention to the defendant by whom it was initialed, Frick, on the first page of that document.

MAJOR JONES: That is an initial by Fricke. That is a different person altogether. That is a high functionary in the German Admiralty and has no connection with the defendant who is before the Tribunal.

As I was saying, My Lord, while these decisions were being made reports were coming in through Rosenberg’s organization from Quisling; and if the Court will again turn for the last time to Document 007-PS, which is Rosenberg’s report, the Tribunal will observe the kind of information which Rosenberg’s organization was supplying at this time. The third paragraph, “Quisling’s reports”—that is in Annex I in Rosenberg’s report, the section dealing with Norway, Page 6 on my copy—referring to the second page of the annex, the paragraph beginning with:

“Quisling’s reports transmitted to his representative in
Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers in Norway, with tacit consent
of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January.
These increasingly better substantiated communications were in
sharpest contrast to the view of the German Legation in Oslo
which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian
Nygardsvold Cabinet and was convinced of that government’s
intention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in
Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany
maintained closest relations with him; he therefore succeeded in
gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the
Nygardsvold Cabinet and in listening to the Cabinet members’
true views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the
bureau”—Rosenberg’s bureau—“which conveyed the news to the
Führer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the
16th to 17th February English destroyers attacked the German
steamer _Altmark_ in Jössingfjord.”

The Tribunal will remember that that is a reference to the action by the British destroyer _Cossack_ against the German naval auxiliary vessel _Altmark_ which was carrying 300 British prisoners captured on the high seas to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of the British Delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that was being made by the _Altmark_ of Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality and the action taken by _H.M.S. Cossack_ which was restricted to rescuing the 300 British prisoners on board—no attempt being made to destroy the _Altmark_ or to capture the armed guards on board of her—was fully justified under international law.

Now the Rosenberg report which I interrupted to give that statement of the British view on the _Altmark_ episode—the Rosenberg report continues:

“The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted
the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived
at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such
assumption was confirmed by reports of Chief of Section Scheidt,
who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling.
But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo
championed the opposite view and went on record as believing in
the good intentions of the Norwegians.”

And so the Tribunal will see that the Nazi Government preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl’s diary, which is the last document in the document book. I will refer the Court to the entry of the 3rd of March.

“The Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a
swift entry into N”—which is Norway—“with strong forces.

“No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid
acceleration of the attack necessary.”

Then the last entry on March the 3rd:

“Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow
with a few days interval.”

So that the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Countries; and the Court will observe from those entries of March 3 that by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of a Norwegian aggression.

The next entry in Jodl’s diary of the 5th of March:

“Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about Weser
Exercise; Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till
now. Won’t listen to anyone and wants to show that all
preparations so far made are worthless.

“Result:

“(a) Stronger forces to Narvik; (b) Navy to leave ships in the
ports (_Hipper_ or _Lützow_ in Trondheim); (c) Christiansand can
be left out at first; (d) six divisions envisaged for Norway;
(e) a foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen also.”

Then the next entry to which I desire to draw the Court’s attention is the entry of the 13th of March, which the Court may think is one of the most remarkable in the whole documentation of this case:

“Führer does not give order yet for ‘W.’”—Weser Exercise—

“He is still looking for justification.”

The entry of the next day, the 14th of March, shows a similar pre-occupation on the part of Hitler with seeking justification for this flagrant aggression. It reads:

“English keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 submarines;
doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent
operations by Germans. Führer has not yet decided what reason to
give for Weser Exercise.”

And then I would like the Court to look at the entry for the 21st of March, which by inadvertence has been included in the next page at the bottom of Page 6:

“Misgivings of Task Force 21 . . .”

The Court has seen from documents that I have put in already that Task Force 21 was Falkenhorst’s force, which was detailed to conduct this invasion.

“Misgivings of Task Force 21 about the long interval between
taking up readiness positions at 0530 hours and closing of
diplomatic negotiations. Führer rejects any earlier negotiations
as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If
resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political
plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken and
even exaggerate them.”

Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The next entry, if the Court will turn to Page 5, of the 28th of March, the third sentence:

“Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the
Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the
other three commanders are worrying about matters which are none
of their business. Krancke sees more disadvantages than
advantages.

“In the evening the Führer visits the map room and roundly
declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the
Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will
have to remain occupied by naval forces.”

There the Court will observe that Jodl, as ever, is the faithful collaborator of Hitler.

Then April the 2d:

“1530 hours. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force,
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General Von Falkenhorst with
the Führer. All confirm preparations completed. Führer orders
carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April the 9th.”

Then the last entry in the next page, the 4th of April:

“Führer drafts the proclamations. Pieckenbrock, Chief of
Military Intelligence I, returns with good result from the talks
with Quisling in Copenhagen.”

Until the very last the treachery of Quisling continued most active.

The Prosecution has in its possession a large number of operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, but I propose only to draw the Court’s attention to two of them to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and the deception that was used by the defendants and their confederates in the course of that aggression. I would now draw the Court’s attention to Document C-115, which for the purpose of the record will be Exhibit GB-90. First of all I will draw the Court’s attention to the second paragraph, “General Orders,” with a date, “4th of April 1940”:

“The barrage-breaking vessels”—Sperrbrecher—“will penetrate
inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fjord disguised as
merchant steamers.

“Challenge from coastal signal stations and look-outs are to be
answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers.
I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the
operation before zero hour.”

Then the next entry is an order for reconnaissance forces dated the 24th of March 1940, “Behavior during entrance into the harbor.” The third paragraph is the part to which I wish to draw the Court’s attention:

“The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as
possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be
answered in English. In answer to questions a text with
something like the following content will be chosen:

“‘Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.’

“Challenges to be answered, with names of British warships:

“_Köln_—_H.M.S. Cairo; Königsberg-_-_H.M.S. Calcutta;
Bremse_—_H.M.S. Faulkner; Karl Peters_—_H.M.S. Halcyon;
Leopard_—British destroyer; _Wolf_—British destroyer;
S-boats—British motor torpedo boats.

“Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be
illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke screen.”

And then finally the next order dated the 24th of March 1940, Annex 3, “From Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces; most secret.” Next page, page two:

“Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our
own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of
passing craft. To challenge in case of the _Köln_—‘_H.M.S.
Cairo_’; then to order to stop—‘(1) Please repeat last signal,
(2) Impossible to understand your signal’; in case of a warning
shot—‘Stop firing, British ship, good friend’; in case of an
inquiry as to destination and purpose—‘Going Bergen, chasing
German steamers.’”

Then I would draw the Court’s attention to Document C-151, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-91, which is a Dönitz order in connection with this operation. If the Court will observe, it is headed:

“Top secret, Operation Order—‘Hartmut.’ Occupation of Denmark
and Norway.

“This order comes into force on the code word Hartmut. With its
coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking
part lose their validity.

“The day and hour are designated as Weser-Day and Weser-Hour,
and the whole operation is known as Weser Exercise.

“The operation ordered by the code word has as its objective the
rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously
Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land
side.”

And there is at the end of that paragraph another contribution by Dönitz to this process of deception:

“The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British
flag until the troops have landed except, presumably, at
Narvik.”

The Tribunal now knows as a matter of history that on the 9th of April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun a German memorandum was handed to the Governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action; and I would like to draw the Court’s attention to Document TC-55, Exhibit GB-92. That is at the beginning of the book of documents—the sixth document of the book. I am not proposing to read the whole of that memorandum; I have no doubt the defending counsel will deal with any parts which they consider relevant to the defense. The Court will observe that it is alleged that England and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of international law and that Britain and France were making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway and that the Government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation.

The memorandum states—and I would now draw the Court’s attention to Page 3 of the memorandum to the paragraph just below the middle of the page beginning “The German Troops”:

“The German troops, therefore, do not set foot on Norwegian soil
as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use
of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations
against England as long as it is not forced to do so by measures
taken by England and France; German military operations aim much
more exclusively at protecting the north against proposed
occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces.”

In connection with that statement I would remind the Court that in his operation order of the 1st of March Hitler had then given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That is the 1st of March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on the 9th of April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark, the Court may think, are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat. They read:

“The Reich Government thus expect that the Royal Norwegian
Government and the Norwegian people will respond with
understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to
them. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all
possible means by the German forces employed, and would
therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal
Norwegian Government are therefore requested to take all
measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of
the German troops can take place without friction and
difficulty. In the spirit, of the good German-Norwegian
relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declare
to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention
of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and
political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the
future.”

What the Nazis meant by the protection of the Kingdom of Norway was shown by their conduct on the 9th of April. I now refer the Court to Document TC-56, which will be Exhibit GB-93, which is a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces. It is at the beginning of the document book, the last of the TC documents.