Chapter XVI: Part II: is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.” (3)

COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If it please the Tribunal, with the consent of Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones, may I make an announcement to the Defense Counsel.

At 7:30 in the courtroom this evening, the remainder of the motion pictures which the United States will offer in evidence will be shown for the Defense Counsel. We urge that all of them come at 7:30.

DR. DIX: I believe I can say on behalf of all members of the Defense that they do not consider it necessary that the films be shown to them before the proceedings, that is, shown to them twice. We fully and with gratitude appreciate the courtesy and readiness to facilitate our work; but our evenings are very much taken up by the preparation of our cases and by the necessary consultations with our clients.

The question of films is on a level different from that of documents. Documents one likes to read in advance or simultaneously or later; but since we can hear and take note of the testimony of witnesses only during the main proceedings, we are, of course, to an even greater degree in a position and prepared to become acquainted with the films submitted as evidence only during the proceedings. We believe the Prosecution need not take the trouble of showing every film to us on some evening before it is shown again in the proceedings. We hope this will not be construed as, shall I say, a sort of demonstration in some respect, for the reason really is that our time is so fully taken up by our preparations that all superfluous work might well be spared both the Prosecution and us. I repeat and emphasize that we fully and gratefully appreciate the Prosecution’s manifest readiness to facilitate our work, and I ask that my words be understood in this light.

THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that you think it will be unnecessary for the defendants’ counsel to have a preview of the films, to see them before they are produced in evidence? Is that what you are saying?

DR. DIX: Yes, that is what I said.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am not sure that you were here when Dr. Dix began his observation; but I understand that what he says is that in view of the amount of preparation which the defendants’ counsel have to undertake, they do not consider it necessary to have a view of these films before they are produced in evidence, but at the same time he wishes to express his gratification at the co-operation of the Counsel for the Prosecution.

COL. STOREY: Very agreeable. It’s all right with us. We were doing it for their benefit.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When the Tribunal rose for the adjournment, I had just read the letter from M. Daladier to Hitler, of the 26th of August. On the 27th of August Hitler replied to that letter, and I think it unnecessary to read the reply. The sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the letter that he had received earlier in the week.

Those two letters are taken from the _German White Book_ which I put in evidence as GB-58, so perhaps the Tribunal would treat both those letters as of the same number. After that, nobody could say that the German Government could be in any doubt as to the position that was to be taken up by both the British and French Governments in the event of a German aggression against Poland.

But the pleas for peace did not end there. On the 24th of August President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and the President of the Polish Republic. I quote only the first few paragraphs of his letter:

“In the message which I sent you on April the 14th, I stated
that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it
in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that
impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made,
with goodwill on all sides, to find a peaceful and constructive
solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world
was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe
appears to be very near at hand indeed.

“To the message which I sent you last April I have received no
reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world
peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all
other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with
the hope that the war which impends, and the consequent disaster
to all peoples, may yet be averted.

“I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging
the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Governments of
Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any
positive act of hostility for a reasonable, stipulated period;
and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the
controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three
following methods:

“First, by direct negotiation; second, by the submission of
these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they
can both have confidence; third, that they agree to the solution
of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation.”

I think it is unnecessary to read any more of that letter. As I have already indicated to the Tribunal, the answer to that was the order to his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning.

That document is Exhibit TC-72, Number 124, which becomes GB-59.

I put in evidence also the next document, TC-72, Number 126, GB-60, which is the reply to that letter from the President of the Polish Republic, in which he accepts the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful methods suggested.

On the 25th of August, no reply having been received from the German Government, President Roosevelt wrote again:

“I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply
to the message which I addressed to Your Excellency and to him
last night.”

The text of the Polish reply is then set out.

“Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims
and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.

“In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it
plain that the Polish Government are willing, upon the basis set
forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has
arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by
direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.

“Countless human lives can yet be saved, and hope may still be
restored that the nations of the modern world may even now
construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier
relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will
agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the
Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too,
will accept.”

But, My Lord, Germany would not accept, nor would she accept the appeals by the Pope which appear in the next document.

I am sorry—the President of Poland’s reply, TC-72 becomes Number 127, GB-61.

They would not agree to those proposals, nor would they pay heed to the Pope’s appeal, which is TC-72, Number 139 on the same date, the 24th of August, which becomes GB-62. I do not think it is necessary to read that. It is an appeal in similar terms. And there is yet a further appeal from the Pope on the 31st of August, TC-72, Number 14, which becomes GB-63. It is 141; I beg your pardon. It is TC-72, Number 141. I think the printing is wrong in the Tribunal’s translation:

“The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations
may lead to a just pacific solution, such as the whole world
continues to pray for.”

I think it is unnecessary to read the remainder of that. If the Pope had realized that those negotiations to which he referred as the “pending negotiations” in the last days of August, which we are about to deal with now, were completely bogus negotiations, bogus insofar as Germany was concerned, and put forward, as indeed they were—and as I hope to illustrate to the Tribunal in a moment—simply as an endeavor to dissuade England either by threat or by bribe from meeting her obligations to Poland, then perhaps he would have saved himself the trouble in ever addressing that last appeal.

It will be seen quite clearly that those final German offers, to which I now turn, were no offers in the accepted sense of the word at all; that there was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They were just an attempt to make it rather easier to seize and conquer Poland than appeared likely if England and France observed the obligations that they had undertaken.

Perhaps I might, before dealing with the documents, summarize in a word those last negotiations.

On the 22d of August, as we have seen, the German-Soviet Pact was signed. On the 24th of August, orders were given to his armies to march the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish Governments had actually signed a formal pact of non-aggression and of mutual assistance. Until that time, it will be remembered, the position was that the Prime Minister had made a statement in the House and a joint communiqué had been issued—I think on the 6th of April—that they would in fact assist one another if either were attacked, but no formal agreement had been signed.

Now, on the 24th of August after those orders had been given by him, the news came that such a formal document had been signed; and the invasion was postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep England and France out of the war—not to end the war, not to cancel the war, but to keep them out.

And to do that, on the 25th of August, having postponed the invasion, Hitler issued a verbal communiqué to Sir Nevile Henderson which, as the Tribunal will see, was a mixture of bribe and threat with which he hoped to persuade England to keep out.

On the 28th of August Sir Nevile Henderson handed the British Government’s reply to that communiqué to Hitler. That reply stressed that the difference ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed and, indeed, any agreement come to should be guaranteed by other powers, which, of course, in any event would have been quite unacceptable to the German Reich.

As I say, one really need not consider what would have been acceptable and not acceptable because once it had been made clear—as indeed it was in that British Government’s reply of the 28th of August—that England would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German Government really had no concern with further negotiation but were concerned only to afford themselves some kind of justification and to prevent themselves appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that were being put forward.

On the 29th of August, in the evening at 7:15, Hitler handed to Sir Nevile Henderson the German Government’s answer to the British Government’s reply of the 28th. And here again in this document it is quite clear that the whole object of it was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. He agrees to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demands that those conversations must be based upon the return of Danzig to the Reich and also of the whole of the Corridor.

It will be remembered that hitherto, even when he alleged that Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, even then he had put forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone and the arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That was unacceptable then. To make quite certain, he now demands the whole of the Corridor; no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole thing must become German.

Even so, even to make doubly certain that the offer would not be accepted, he says:

“. . . on those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion;
but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a
plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to
be here in Berlin by Wednesday, the 30th of August 1939.”

This offer was made at 7:15 p.m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer had to be transmitted first to London, and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible to get authority to their Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed them no kind of opportunity for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Nevile Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum.

At midnight on the 30th of August at the time by which the Polish Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Nevile Henderson saw Ribbentrop; and I shall read to you the account of that interview, in which Sir Nevile Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening, and at which Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page document which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering to discuss.

On the following day, the 31st of August, Mr. Lipski saw Ribbentrop and could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers. When he did not—when he said he did not come with full powers, Ribbentrop said that he would put the position before the Führer. But, in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Führer by that time, because on the 31st of August—I am afraid I am unable to give you the exact time—but on the 31st of August, Hitler had already issued his Directive Number 1 for the conduct of the war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, the 1st of September. And on the evening of the 31st of August at 9 o’clock the German radio broadcast the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Nevile Henderson the night before, saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion but that, as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o’clock on the evening of the 31st of August was the first that the Poles had ever heard of the proposals, and the first, in fact, that the British Government or their representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to give a written copy, on the evening of the 30th.

After that broadcast at 9:15, perhaps when the broadcast was in its course, a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Nevile Henderson, for the first time.

Having thus summarized for the convenience, I hope, of the Tribunal, the timing of events during that last week, I would ask the Tribunal to refer briefly to the remaining documents in that document book. I first put in evidence an extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Göring, which was taken on the 29th of August 1945.

DR. STAHMER: As defense counsel for the Defendant Göring, I object to the use of this document which is an extract from testimony given by the Defendant Göring. Since the defendant is present here in court, he can at any time be called to the stand and give direct evidence on this subject before the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that your objection?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand the ground of your objection, in view of Article 15 (c) and Article 16 (b) and (c) of the Charter. Article 15 (c) provides that the Chief Prosecutors shall undertake, among others, the duty of “the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of the defendants”; and Article 16 provides that:

“In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the following
procedure shall be followed: . . . (b) During any preliminary
examination . . . of a defendant he shall have the right to give
any explanation relevant to the charges made against him; (c) A
preliminary examination of a defendant . . . shall be conducted
in, or translated into, a language which the defendant
understands.”

Those provisions of the Charter, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show that the defendants may be interrogated and that their interrogations may be put in evidence.

DR. STAHMER: I was prompted by the idea that when it is possible to call a witness, direct examination in court is preferable, since the evidence thus obtained is more concrete.

THE PRESIDENT: You certainly have the opportunity of summoning the defendant for whom you appear to give evidence himself, but that has nothing to do with the admissibility of his interrogation—his preliminary examination.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This extract is TC-90, which I put in as GB-64. I quote from the middle of the first answer. It is at the end of the 7th line. The Defendant Göring says there:

“On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland,
the Führer called me on the telephone and told me that he had
stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether
this was just temporary or for good. He said ‘No, I will have to
see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’”

THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not read the question before the answer?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I go back to the question:

“When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London
brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty, at the end of March or
the beginning of April 1939, was it not fairly obvious that a
peaceful solution was impossible?”—answer—“Yes, it seemed
impossible after my conviction”—I think that must be a bad
translation—“according to my conviction.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Continuing._] “. . . but not
according to the convictions of the Führer. When it was
mentioned to the Führer that England had given her guarantee to
Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Romania, but
then when the Russians took Bessarabia, nothing happened; and
this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At
this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The
guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of
the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to
Poland, the Führer called me on the telephone and told me that
he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then
whether this was just temporary, or for good. He said, ‘No, I
will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’
So, then I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be any
different within 4 or 5 days?’ At this same time—I do not know
whether you know about that, Colonel—I was in communication
with Lord Halifax by a special courier, outside the regular
diplomatic channels, to do everything to stop war with England.
After the guarantee, I held an English declaration of war
inevitable. I already told him in the spring of 1939, after
occupying Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on, if he
tried to solve the Polish question, he would have to count on
the enmity of England—1939, that is, after the Protectorate.

“Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign
against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed
by the end of August 1939?’

“Answer: ‘Yes.’

“Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order for the
campaign against Poland came sometime between the 15th and 20th
of August 1939, after the signing of the treaty with Soviet
Russia?’”—The dates obviously are wrong there.

“Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’

“Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign
was ordered for the 25th of August but on the 24th of August in
the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order
to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the
English Ambassador?’

“Answer: ‘Yes.’”

My only comment upon that document is in respect to the second paragraph where Göring is purporting not to want war with England. The Court will remember how it was Göring, after the famous speech of the 22d of August to his commanders-in-chief, who got up and thanked the Führer for his exhortation and assured him that the Armed Forces would play their part.

I omit the next document in the document book, which carries the matter a little further, and we go on to Hitler’s verbal communiqué, as it is called in the _British Blue Book_, that he handed to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th of August, after he had heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from meeting her obligations. He states in the first paragraph, after hearing the British Ambassador, that he is anxious to make one more effort to save war. In the second paragraph, he asserts again that Poland’s provocations were unbearable; and I quote Paragraph 2:

“Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these
Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more,
to do so in the interests of quiet and order and also in the
interests of European peace.

“The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The
British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the
least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At
the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and
incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would
be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last
war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts.”—One
sees the threats, veiled threats, appearing in this
paragraph—“Agreement with Russia was unconditional and
signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would
last a very long time. Russia and Germany would never again take
up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements
reached with Russia would also render Germany secure
economically for the longest possible period of war.

“The Führer had always wanted Anglo-German understanding. War
between England and Germany could at best bring some profit to
Germany, but none at all to England.”

Then we come to the bribe:

“The Führer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved
and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined,
after the solution of this problem, to approach England once
more with a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great
decisions; and in this case also, he will be capable of being
great in his action.”—and then, magnanimously—“He accepts the
British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its
continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich
at its disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which
are limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means . . . . His
obligations to Italy remain untouched.”

Again he stresses irrevocable determination never to enter into war with Russia. I quote the last two paragraphs:

“If the British Government would consider these ideas, a
blessing for Germany . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not read the first few lines of Paragraph 3?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes; I did summarize it—Paragraph 3:

“He also desired to express the irrevocable determination of
Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I quote the last two paragraphs:

“If the British Government would consider these ideas, a
blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might
result. If they reject these ideas, there will be war. In no
case will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it.
The Führer repeats that he himself is a man of far-reaching
decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last offer
. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn and then the matter can be investigated.

[_A recess was taken._]

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I had just finished reading the offer from Hitler to the British Government, which was TC-72, Number 68, and which becomes GB-65.

The British Government were not, of course, aware of the real object that lay behind that message; and, taking it at its face value and desirous to enter into discussions, they wrote back on the 28th of August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, and I quote from Paragraph 4:

“In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, a reasonable
solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and
should be effected by agreement between the two countries on
lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential
interests; and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of
April, the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these
interests to Poland.

“But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the
German Chancellor of the 22d of August, His Majesty’s Government
consider it essential for the success of the discussions, which
would precede the agreement, that it should be understood
beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by
other powers. His Majesty’s Government would be ready, if
desired, to make their contribution to the effective operation
of such a guarantee.”

I go to the last paragraph on that page, Paragraph 6:

“His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own
attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between
Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will
not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous
concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to
use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution
which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.”

That, of course, knocked the German hopes on the head. They had failed by their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing her obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out of their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving their face as much as possible. The last document becomes GB-66. And I put in also Sir Nevile Henderson’s account of that interview, TC-72, Number 75, which becomes GB-67.

During that interview, the only importance of it is that Sir Nevile Henderson again emphasized the British attitude and that they were determined in any event to meet their obligations to Poland. One paragraph I would quote, which is interesting in view of the letters that were to follow, paragraph 10:

“In the end I asked him two straight questions: ‘Was he willing
to negotiate directly with the Poles?’ and ‘Was he ready to
discuss the question of an exchange of population?’ He replied
in the affirmative as regards the latter, although there I have
no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a
rectification of frontiers. As regards the first, he said he
could not give me an answer until after he had given the reply
of His Majesty’s Government the careful consideration which such
a document deserved. In this connection he turned to Ribbentrop
and said, ‘We must summon Field Marshal Göring to discuss it
with him.’”

Then in the next paragraph, again Sir Nevile Henderson finally repeated to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation, so far as he was concerned.

I pass to the next document, which is TC-72, Number 78, which becomes GB-68.

The German reply, as I outlined before, was handed to Sir Nevile Henderson at 7:15 p.m. on the 29th of August. The reply sets out the suggestion submitted by the British Government in their previous note; and it goes on to say that the German Government are prepared to enter into discussion on the basis that the whole of the Corridor, as well as Danzig, are returned to the Reich. I quote particularly the next to the last paragraph on the first page of that document:

“The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the
revision of the Versailles Treaty, which has always been
recognized as being necessary, in regard to this territory,
namely: return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the
safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in
the territories remaining to Poland.”

It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that that right has been recognized for so long. On the 28th of April his demands consisted only of Danzig, of an Autobahn, and of the railway.

The Tribunal will remember the position which he is trying to get out of now. He is trying to manufacture justification by putting forth proposals which under no possible circumstances could either Poland or Great Britain accept. But, as I said before, he wanted to make doubly certain.

I go to the second page, and start with the third paragraph:

“The British Government attach importance to two considerations:
(1) That the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be
eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation; and (2)
that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it
would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded
in the economic and political sphere by means of international
guarantees.

“On this subject the German Government make the following
declaration:

“Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome,
they are, nevertheless, prepared to accept the English proposal
and to enter into direct discussion. They do so, as has already
been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made
upon them by the written statement received from the British
Government that they, too, desire a pact of friendship in
accordance with the general lines indicated to the British
Ambassador.”

And then, to the last but one paragraph:

“For the rest, in making these proposals, the German Government
have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital
interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish
State.”

These letters really sound like the letters of some common swindler rather than of the government of a great nation.

“The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances
agree to accept the British Government’s offer of their good
offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary
with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on
Wednesday, the 30th August 1939.

“The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a
solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place
these at the disposal of the British Government before the
arrival of the Polish negotiator.”

That was at 7:15 in the evening of the 29th of August and as I have explained, it allowed little time in order to get the Polish Emissary there by midnight the following night. That document was GB-68.

The next document, Sir Nevile Henderson’s account of the interval, summarizes what had taken place; and I quote particularly Paragraph 4:

“I remarked that this phrase”—that is the passage about the
Polish Emissary being there by midnight the following
night—“sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks
both Herr Hitler and Herr Von Ribbentrop assured me that it was
only intended to stress the urgency of the moment when the two
fully mobilized armies were standing face to face.”

That was the interview on the evening of the 29th of August. The last document becomes GB-69.

Again the British Government replied, and Sir Nevile Henderson handed this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of the 30th of August at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. I need not read at length. The British Government reciprocate the desire for improved relations. They stress again that they cannot sacrifice the interest of other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the situation. They understand, they say, that the German Government accept the condition that the settlement should be subject to international guarantee. They make a reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward in their last letter and they are informing the Polish Government immediately; and lastly, they understand that the German Government are drawing up the proposals. That Document TC-72, Number 89, will be GB-70. For the account of the interview, we go to the next document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-72, Number 92, which becomes GB-71. It is not a very long document. It is perhaps worth reading in full:

“I told Herr Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s
Government found it difficult to advise the Polish Government to
accept the procedure adumbrated in the German reply and
suggested that he should adopt the normal contact, i.e. that
when German proposals were ready, to invite the Polish
Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to
his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations.
I added that if this basis afforded prospect of settlement, His
Majesty’s Government could be counted upon to do their best in
Warsaw to temporize negotiations.

“Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document which he
read out in German, aloud, at top speed. Imagining that he would
eventually hand it to me, I did not attempt to follow too
closely the 16 or more articles which it contained. Though I
cannot, therefore, guarantee the accuracy, the main points were
. . . .”—and I need not read out the main points.

I go to Paragraph 3:

“When I asked Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in
accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he
asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had
not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

“I observed that to treat the matter in this way meant that the
request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on the
30th of August constituted in fact an ultimatum, in spite of
what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he
denied, saying that the idea of an ultimatum was a figment of my
imagination. Why then, I asked, could he not adopt the normal
procedure and give me a copy of the proposals, and ask the
Polish Ambassador to call on him just as Hitler had summoned me
a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to the
Polish Government? In the most violent terms Ribbentrop said
that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted
that if the Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might
be different. I said that I would, naturally, inform my
Government so at once. Whereupon he said, while those were his
personal views, he would bring all that I had said to Hitler’s
notice. It was for the Chancellor to decide.

“We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Von
Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping
Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against the
Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly
surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler
himself had admitted to me yesterday.”

Nevertheless, Sir Nevile Henderson did not know at that time that Germany had also already given the orders to attack Poland some days before. The following day, the 31st of August at 6:30 in the evening, Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop. This document, the next Document TC-73, Number 112, becomes GB-72, and is a short account in a report to Mr. Beck:

“I carried out my instructions. Ribbentrop asked if I had
special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I
said, ‘No’. He then asked whether I had been informed that on
London’s suggestion the German Government had expressed their
readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish
Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to
have arrived on the preceding day, the 30th of August. I replied
that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion,
Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to
negotiate. He would communicate my _démarche_ to the
Chancellor.”

As I have indicated already, it was too late. The orders had already been given on that day to the German Army to invade.

I turn to C-126. It is already in as GB-45. Other portions of it were put in, and I refer now to the letter on the second page, for the order (most-secret order). It is signed by Hitler and is described as his “Directive Number 1 for the Conduct of the War,” dated 31st of August 1939. Paragraph 1:

“(1) Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by
peaceful means of a situation on the eastern frontier, which is
intolerable for Germany, are exhausted, I have determined on a
solution by force.

“(2) The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance
with the preparations made for Case White with the alterations
which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it
has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

“Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

“The date of attack: 1st of September 1939; time of attack:
4:45”—inserted in red pencil—“this time also applies to the
operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

“(3) In the West it is important that the responsibility for the
opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England
and France. At first, purely local action should be taken
against insignificant frontier violations.”

There it sets out the details of the order which, for the purpose of this Court, it is unnecessary to read. That evening at 9 o’clock the German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which they were so willing to enter into discussions with the Polish Government. It sets out the proposals at length. It will be remembered that by this time neither Sir Nevile Henderson nor the Polish Government nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of them, and it is indeed a document which is tempting to read—or to read extracts of it simply as an exhibition or an example of pure hypocrisy. I refer to the second paragraph Document TC-72, Number 98, exhibit GB-39:

“Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able
to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding
available to the British Government by the time the Polish
negotiator arrived in Berlin.”

Now, we have heard the manner in which they did that. They then say that:

“Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of authorized
Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich
received of their readiness for an understanding was the news of
the Polish mobilization; and only toward 12 o’clock on the night
of the 30th of August 1939, did they receive a somewhat general
assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement
of negotiations.

“Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the
Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary
conditions for informing His Majesty’s Government of the views
of the German Government as regards a possible basis for
negotiation, since His Majesty’s Government themselves had
pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop gave the British
Ambassador, on the occasion of the presentation of the last
British note, precise information as to the text of the German
proposals which will be regarded as a basis of negotiation in
the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary.”

And, thereafter, they go on to set out the story, or rather their version of the story, of the negotiations over the last few days.

I pass to the next but one document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-54, which becomes GB-73. On the 1st of September when his armies were already crossing the frontier and the whole of the frontier, he issued this proclamation to his Armed Forces:

“The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly
relations as aimed at by me, want to force the issue by way of
arms.

“The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror
and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation,
which cannot be tolerated by a great power, show that Poland is
no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an
end to these mad acts, I can see no other way but from now
onwards to meet force with force.

“The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up
the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the
resuscitated German people.

“I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of
the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the
last.

“Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the
representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.

“Long live our people and the Reich.”

And so we see that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He had afforded them their propagandistic justification; and at that time, anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards. “The victor shall not be asked later on, whether he told the truth or not.” Might is what counts—or victory is what counts and not right.

On that day, the 1st of September, when news came of this violation of Polish ground, the British Government in accordance with their treaty obligations sent an ultimatum to the German Government in which they stated—I quote from the last paragraph:

“I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the
German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government
satisfactory assurances that the German Government have
suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared
promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without
hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland.”

By the 3rd of September no withdrawal had taken place, and so at 9 o’clock—the document, TC-72, Number 110, I have just referred to will be GB-74—at 9 o’clock on the 3rd of September, a final ultimatum was handed to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. I quote from the third paragraph:

“Although this communication was made more than 24 hours ago, no
reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been
continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honor to
inform you that, unless not later than 11 o’clock British summer
time today, the 3rd of September, satisfactory assurances to the
above effect have been given by the German Government and have
reached His Majesty’s Government in London, a state of war will
exist between the two countries as from that hour.”

And so it was that at 11 o’clock on the 3rd of September a state of war existed between Germany and England and between Germany and France. All the appeals to peace, all the appeals to reason we now see completely stillborn; stillborn when they were made. Plans, preparations, intentions, determination to carry out this assault upon Poland, had been going on for months, for years before. It mattered not what anybody but the German Government had in mind or whatever rights anybody else but the German nation thought they had; and, if there is any doubt left at all after what we have seen, I would ask you to look at two more documents.

If you would look at the last document first of all, in your document book—1831-PS, which becomes GB-75. Even now on the 3rd of September, Mussolini offers some chance of peace.

We have here a telegram. It is timed 6:30 hours, and I am afraid I am unable to say whether that is 6:30 in the morning or evening; but it is dated the 3rd of September, and I quote:

“The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the
Duce’s order the following copy for the Führer and Reich
Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:

“‘Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every
decision to the Führer, that it still has a chance to call a
conference with France, England, and Poland on the following
basis:

“‘1. An armistice which would leave the army corps where they
are at present’”—and it will be remembered that on the 3rd of
September they had advanced a considerable way over the
frontier—“‘2. calling a conference within 2 or 3 days;—“‘3.
solution of the Polish-German controversy would be certainly
favorable for Germany as matters stand today.

“‘This idea, which originated from the Duce, has its foremost
exponent in France.

“‘Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already
securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany
has had already her “moral satisfaction.” If she would accept
the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at
the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect
of being universal and of extremely long duration.’”

But, My Lord, perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all Germany’s aims were; and, of course, the offer was turned down in the illuminating letter which Hitler was to write in reply. I refer you back to the document before that. It is still part of the same Exhibit GB-75.

THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, the “GB” references you give are not on the documents at all; they are the exhibit numbers themselves, which are to be put on the document after they have been put in.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. That is correct. They will be put in by the Court, of course.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you try to make clear the references which are on the document so that the Tribunal could find the document itself?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. The last document was 1831-PS, and it is the very last one in the document book. That is the one I have just referred to—the telegram from Mussolini. The document to which I am about to refer is the one before last in the Tribunal’s book but it has the same number on it as the last because it forms part of the same exhibit.

THE PRESIDENT: I think if you would just explain the system in which the exhibits are numbered, it would help us.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The exhibits are numbered at the present moment before they are put in evidence with a variety of serial numbers, such as “PS”, “TC”, “L” and other letters. There is no significance attached to that at all. It depends on whom they have been found by and what files they have come from. When the documents are put in as exhibits, they are marked by the Court with a court number. The documents put in by the United States representatives were all prefixed with the letters “USA.” The documents which have been put in by the British prosecutors have all been prefixed with the letters “GB.” If it would be of any assistance to members of the Tribunal, I will have their document books marked up this evening with the new court numbers that have been put upon them by the Court officials, during the course of the day.

THE PRESIDENT: We will talk about that later.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If there is any document missing from any of these books, I have a copy.

THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 1831-PS?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, that is GB-75.

“Duce:

“I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation,
I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition that
there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that
the conference would be successful. Because for the last 2 days
the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid
advance in Poland, it would have been impossible to devaluate
the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues.
Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found if
England would not have been determined to wage war under all
circumstances. I have not given in to the English because, Duce,
I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more
than one-half a year or a year. Under these circumstances I
thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was
better for resistance. At present the superiority of the German
Armed Forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all the fields that
the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt
whether this fast success could have been achieved in 1 or 2
years. England and France would have armed their allies to such
an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German
Armed Forces could not have become so apparent any more. I am
aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter is one for life and
death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am
also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and
that one has to choose, after cold deliberation, the moment for
resistance in such a way that the probability of success is
guaranteed; and I believe in this success, Duce, with the
firmness of a rock. Recently you have given me the kind
assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few
fields. I acknowledge this in advance, with sincere thanks. But
I believe also—even if we march now over different roads—that
fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany
were destroyed by the Western Democracies, the Fascist Italy
would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always
aware of this community of the future of our two governments and
I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in
Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside,
of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man
on unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of
great operational considerations. The northern Polish Army,
which is in the Corridor, has already been completely encircled
by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender.
Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily
achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The
superiority of our Air Force is complete, although scarcely
one-third of it is in Poland. In the West, I will be on the
defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the
moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with
the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all
your assistance which you have given to me in the past; and I
ask you not to deny it to me in the future.”

That completes the evidence which I propose to offer upon this part of the case in respect of the war of aggression against Poland, England, and France, which is charged in Count Two.

MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, in the early hours of the morning of the 9th of April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. It is my duty to present to the Tribunal the Prosecution’s evidence which has been prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Major Hinely, with regard to these brutal wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances. With the Court’s permission I would like, first of all, to deal with the treaties and agreements and assurances that were in fact violated by these two invasions of Norway and Denmark.

The invasions were, of course, in the first instance violations of the Hague Convention and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. My learned friend, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, has already dealt with those matters in the course of his presentation of the evidence. In addition to these general treaties, there were specific agreements between Germany and Norway and Denmark. In the first instance there was the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on 2 June 1926. The Court will find that treaty, TC-17, on the first page of British Document Book Number 3; and to that exhibit it may be convenient to give the Number GB-76. I am proposing to read only the first article of that treaty, which is in these terms:

“The contracting parties undertake to submit to the procedure of
arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present
treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise
between Germany and Denmark, and which it has not been possible
to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring
with the consent of both parties, before the Permanent Court of
International Justice.