Chapter XXII: Section III: of the order deals with the relations with certain other (2)

Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations with Germany but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive intentions toward any German territory. Our Document Number C-170, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-136, is as I have previously stated, a file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack. The entries in this file demonstrate conclusively the point I have just stated. It will, I think, be sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which include reports from the German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. I shall read the first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English translation; that is 4 June:

“Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia;
Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian
Government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict
with Germany.”

In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says:

“6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports . . . Russia will only
fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow
much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have
been made quietly—as far as can be recognized, only defensive.
Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best
possible relationship to Germany.”

The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June:

“From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow . . . all
observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are
responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to
avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the
Government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports
all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner,
support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty
with Germany proves the same thing.”

Now, that is the German Ambassador talking to you.

The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of them, however, appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these various reasons impelling the decision to attack may be said to fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative—the “Drang nach Osten” (or the drive to the East)—had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant the elimination of the powerful country to the east, which might constitute a threat to German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum; while on the economic side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going far beyond any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for military purpose. Undoubtedly the demands of the German war economy for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness on the economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent.

As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in _Mein Kampf_ where he stated, and I quote from Page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin English edition, as follows:

“There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special
examination the relation of Germany to Russia: (1) Here perhaps
we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German
foreign affairs; and (2) this question is also the touchstone
for the political capacity of the young National Socialist
movement to think clearly and to act correctly.”

And again at Page 654 of the same edition:

“And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath
the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up
where we broke off 600 years ago. We stop the endless German
movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the
land in the East. At long last we break off the colonial and
commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil
policy of the future.

“If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in
mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”

The political portion of this economy or purpose is clearly reflected in the stated purposes of the organization which the Defendant Rosenberg set up to administer the Occupied Eastern Territories. I have already discussed this material and need not repeat it now. In a speech, however, which he delivered 2 days before the attack to the people most interested in the problem of the East, Rosenberg re-stated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its inter-relationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short extract from that speech, which is Document Number 1058-PS and which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-147. The part I read is from Page 9 of the German text:

“The job of feeding the German people stands this year, without
a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims in the East;
and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will
have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people.
We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to
feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus
territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any
feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without
any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard
years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to
determine to what extent industries can still be maintained
there (wagon factories, _et cetera_). The consideration and
execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the
German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means
negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh
necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion
of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires
the strongest characters. Perhaps this decision will also be
approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but in a 100
years.”

As I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat Great Britain had served to strengthen them further in their belief of the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of Europe.

The economic motive for the aggression was brought out clearly in our discussion of the organization set up under Göring and General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of the territories they occupied. The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable; and if any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine regardless of the horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum, which bears our Number 2718-PS and which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit USA-32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi plans would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people by robbing them of their food.

Along the similar line, on June 20, 1941 General Thomas wrote a memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler’s present conception of the German economic policy concerning raw material. This policy expressed the almost unbelievably heartless theory that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This is our Document Number 1456-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-148. I should like to read the first two paragraphs.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is now in court. Will you stand up, please?

[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner rose in the dock._]

THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, you must now plead either guilty or not guilty.

ERNST KALTENBRUNNER: I plead not guilty. I do not believe that I have made myself guilty.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just put in evidence our Document 1456-PS as Exhibit USA-148. I now read from that document on Page 17:

“The following is a new conception of the Führer, which Minister
Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on
by Field Marshal Keitel:

“I. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our
autarkical endeavors. It is impossible to try to manufacture
everything we lack by synthetic procedures or other measures.
For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy
to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these
autarkical endeavors demand a tremendous amount of manpower, and
it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another
way. What one does not have but needs, one must conquer. The
commitment of men which is necessary for one single action will
not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the
running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must
therefore be to secure all territories which are of special
interest to us for the war economy by conquering them.

“At the time the Four Year Plan was established I issued a
statement in which I made it clear that a completely autarkical
economy is impossible for us because the need of men will be too
great. My solution, however, has always been directed to
securing the necessary reserves for missing stocks by concluding
economic agreements which would guarantee delivery even in
wartime.”

On this macabre note I come to the end of the story of this aggression. We have seen these conspirators as they planned, prepared, and finally initiated their wanton attack upon the Soviet Union. Others will carry on the tale and describe the horrible manner in which they waged this war of aggression and the countless crimes they committed in its wake. When I consider the solemn pledge of non-aggression, the base and sinister motives involved, the months of secret planning and preparation, and the unbelievable suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought—when I consider all of this, I feel fully justified in saying that never before—and, God help us, never again—in the history of relations between sovereign nations has a blacker chapter been written than the one which tells of this unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union. For those responsible—and they are here before you, the defendants in this case—it might be just to let the punishment fit the crime.

I now turn to the final phase of the detailed presentation of the aggressive-war part of the case: German collaboration with Italy and Japan, and aggressive war against the United States. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 7 under Section IV (F) of Count One, appearing at Pages 9 and 10 of the printed English text of the Indictment. The materials relating to this unholy alliance of the three fascist powers and to the aggressive war against the United States have been gathered together in a document book, marked with the letter “Q,” which I now submit to the Tribunal.

Before moving on to the subject matter of this tripartite collaboration, I should like to invite the attention of the Tribunal to the significance of this phase. In the course of the joint presentation by the British and American Prosecution in the past several days, we have seen the swastika carried forward by force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The elements of a conspiracy that I am now about to discuss project the Nazi plan upon a universal screen, involving the older world of Asia and the new world of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender ceremonies upon a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo.

The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November 1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy on 6 November 1937.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these official state documents in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The German text of these treaties—the original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy—is to be found in Volumes 4 and 5 of the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, respectively. The English translation of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25 November 1936 is contained in our Document 2508-PS; the English translation of the Protocol of Adherence by Italy of 6 November 1937 is contained in our Document 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included in the document books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal.

It is an interesting fact, especially in the light of the evidence I shall submit regarding the Defendant Ribbentrop’s active participation in collaboration with the Japanese, that Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany at Berlin even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister but simply Hitler’s special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On 27 September 1940 some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin, a 10-year military-economic alliance. Again I note that the Defendant Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister. The official German text of this pact, as well as the Japanese and Italian texts together with an English translation, is contained in our Document 2643-PS, which has been certified by the signature and seal of the United States Secretary of State. I now offer in evidence Document 2643-PS as Exhibit USA-149.

The Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and collaboration with, one another in the establishment of a New Order in Europe and East Asia. I should like to read into the record parts of this far-reaching agreement:

“The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a
condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the
world be given its own proper place. They have, therefore,
decided to stand together and to co-operate with one another in
their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe,
wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a
new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and
welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of
the three Governments to extend this co-operation to such
nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to
their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that
their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may
thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany,
Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows:

“Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of
Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in Europe.

“Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the
leadership of Japan in the establishment of a New Order in
Greater East Asia.

“Article 3. Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate in
their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to
assist one another with all political, economic, and military
means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a
power at present not involved in the European war or in the
Chinese-Japanese conflict.”

I now skip to the first sentence of Article 6.

“The present pact shall come into force immediately upon
signature and remain in force for 10 years from the date of its
coming into force.”

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to the world that the fascist leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to establish a New Order presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the ruthless Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria early in 1938. I might also comment that this fact introduces the Führerprinzip into world politics.

I should like to read in this connection a statement by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States, at the time of the signing of this Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the official United States publication, _Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941_, which has already been put in evidence as Exhibit USA-122. Mr. Hull’s statement is Number 184 therein. It is also our Document Number 2944-PS, and both the English text and a German translation thereof are included in the document books. I now quote a statement by the Secretary of State, 27 September 1940:

“The reported agreement of alliance does not, in view of the
Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation
which has existed for several years. Announcement of the
alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long
existed in effect, and to which this Government have repeatedly
called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of
conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has
been fully taken into account by the Government of the United
States, in the determining of this country’s policies.”

That ends the quotation.

I shall not attempt here to trace the relationships and negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. I shall note, however, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact. This is the record of the conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, which was referred to by the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. This document, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, is our Document Number 2195-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-150. I now quote the file memorandum:

“Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over
the following subjects:

“1) The Führer speech, which pleased him very much, especially
because it has been spiritually well founded in every respect.

“2) We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the
triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mold. He also
told me that, together with German
counter-espionage”—Abwehr—“he was undertaking long-range
projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating
from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization
was to become effective only in case of war.

“3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending 10
Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These
Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional
Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot at the
frontier.”

Whatever the beginning and the course of development of the fascist triplice, the Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and those with whom they contemplated war. In this the conspirators pursued a course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940 in fulfillment of her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back” by declaring war against France and Great Britain. These Nazi conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the world.

As I shall show, the nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration was aimed at various times were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. I shall deal with each of these nations in the order named.

At least as early as 23 February 1941—on the basis of documents available to us—these conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British Commonwealth. Again the figure of the Defendant Ribbentrop appears. On that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible.

The report of that conference, our Document 1834-PS, has already been offered in connection with the presentation of the case on aggression against the Soviet Union as Exhibit USA-129. A part of it has already been read into the record and I now intend to read other portions. I shall again come back to this document when dealing with the German-Japanese collaboration as regards the United States.

As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers for their strictly confidential and purely personal information with the further note that—and I quote:

“These statements are of fundamental significance for
orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in
early spring 1941.”

I shall now quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation of 1834-PS, to the end of the first paragraph on that page, and then skip to the last three sentences of the second paragraph:

“Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign
Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.

“After particularly cordial mutual greetings the RAM (Reich
Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been
proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in
the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in
the West these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the
RAM)”—that is Ribbentrop—“regretted that the alliance between
Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the
ambassador for many years already, had come into being only
after various detours; but public opinion in Japan had not been
ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are
together now.”

Then, skipping:

“Now that the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded,
Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the
Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of
its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the
situation in this respect?”

Ribbentrop, thereafter in the conference, proceeded to shape the argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and U-boat warfare by Germany against England, he said—and I now quote the last two sentences in Paragraph 4, on Page 2, of the English translation:

“Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape
overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution,
however, depends on various factors, above all on weather
conditions.”

And then skipping and picking up at the first full paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation, I quote the Defendant Ribbentrop again:

“The Führer will beat England wherever he encounters her.
Besides, our strength is not only equal but superior to a
combined English-American air force at any time. The number of
pilots at our disposal is unlimited. The same is true of our
airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned,
ours always has been superior to the English—to say nothing
about the American—and we are on the way to enlarge even this
lead. Upon order of the Führer the antiaircraft defense, too,
will be greatly reinforced. Since the Army has been supplied far
beyond its requirements and enormous reserves have been piled
up—the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the
immense stock of material—production now will be concentrated
on submarines, airplanes, and antiaircraft guns.

“Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won
today, militarily, economically, and politically. We have the
desire to end the war quickly, and to force England to sue for
peace soon. The Führer is vigorous and healthy, fully convinced
of victory, and determined to bring the war as quickly as
possible to a victorious close. To this end the cooperation with
Japan is of importance. However, Japan, in her own interest,
should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s
key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would
thus secure her position in the Far East, a position which she
could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for
quick action:

“1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the
center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser warfare,
_et cetera_). The effect upon the morale of the British people
would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick
ending of the war.

“2) A surprise intervention by Japan is bound to keep America
out of the war. America, which at present is not yet armed and
would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks west of
Hawaii, could then less likely do this. If Japan would otherwise
respect the American interests, there would not even be the
possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige
to make war plausible to the Americans. It is very unlikely that
America would declare war if she then would have to stand by
helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America
being able to do anything about it.

“3) In view of the coming New World Order it seems to be in the
interest of Japan also to secure for herself, even during the
war, the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time
of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed entirely with this
line of thought and said that he would do everything to carry
through this policy.”

I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop’s argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless he suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and that the moment was propitious for Japan’s entry. Then referring to the spoils of the conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent of that statement I read to you earlier from the Führer, that “those who wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking.”

Continuing Ribbentrop’s argument to show the real nature of the German-Japanese alliance, I shall now read the top two paragraphs on Page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS:

“The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was
Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the
Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had
been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of
influence in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has
brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great
advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the
Far East (Indo-China). England, too, was considerably weakened;
Japan had been able to close unsteadily on Singapore. Thus,
Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the
future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical
situation, we should have to carry the main burden of the final
battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia
should arise, we should have to carry the main burden also in
this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find
herself confronted by a world coalition within a short time. We
would all be in the same boat. The fate of both nations would be
determined for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy.
The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A
defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese
imperialistic idea.

“Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and
emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep her
imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the
great problems which would arise after the war for the parties
of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in
Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a
bold solution. Thereby no over-centralization should take place;
but a solution should be found on a basis of parity,
particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich
Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of
trade should take place between the two spheres of influence on
a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the
leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East Asian sphere of
interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for
example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements
directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere
as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and
make trade agreements with the independent countries within the
Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China,
_et cetera_. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres,
each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with
regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with
this thought.”

In the document I have just quoted from we have seen the instigation to war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. I shall return to him again in this connection.

I now wish to show, however, the participation of the so-called military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of further wars of aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Document Number C-75 as Exhibit USA-151.

This document is a top-secret order signed by the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW and entitled, “Basic Order Number 24 regarding Collaboration with Japan.” It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop’s conference with Oshima that I have just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. We have turned up two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten notations, presumably made by the recipients. C-75, the document I have introduced, is copy Number 2 of the order distributed to the naval war staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy number 4, designed for the Wehrmacht Führungsstab (the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces). The head of this Operations Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy Number 4 was found in the OKW files at Flensburg. It is our Document Number 384-PS, and was referred to by the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. I shall not burden the Tribunal and the record by introducing two identical copies of the same order.

Basic Order Number 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration with Japan. I shall, therefore, propose to read it in its entirety, some two pages of English translation:

“The Führer has issued the following order regarding
collaboration with Japan:

“1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three
Power Pact to induce Japan, as soon as possible, _to take active
measures in the Far East_”—The underscoring is in the original
document—“Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and
the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of
America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she
intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for
Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on
the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will
create particularly favorable political and military
prerequisites for this.”

Then there is a marginal note, “Slightly exaggerated.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any idea when that marginal notation was put in?

MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this copy of the order.

THE PRESIDENT: By whom?

MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the order, which was the naval war staff.

“2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to
strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means
available. For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of
the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous
manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German
war and combat experience, and for assistance in military
economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable,
but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations.
Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests
which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions for himself.

“3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties
is the responsibility of the Naval High Command. This will be
subject to the following guiding principles:

“a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as
forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the
United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no
political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which
would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese
intentions.

“b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile
warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong
Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every
opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be
exploited.

“c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that
Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it
needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United
States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even
after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital
importance to Germany.

“d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the
Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of
war of the three powers.

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
entry of the United States into the war cannot be
prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
(Australia). A date for the beginning of operational discussions
cannot yet be fixed.

“4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with
the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with
as equally concern the three participating powers. These will
include primarily the problems of economic warfare. The working
out of the details is the responsibility of the main commission
with the co-operation of the Armed Forces High Command.

“5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the
Barbarossa operations.”

It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

If the Tribunal will glance at the distribution list, you will see that it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed Forces High Command: Joint Operation Staff, Intelligence divisions, and to the chief of foreign affairs, simultaneously for the Foreign Office.

It appears from what I have just read that the Nazis’ cardinal operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other British far eastern bases. I shall pass over, for the moment, other references to the United States in Basic Order Number 24 and take up that point later.

I now wish to refer to our Document Number C-152, which has already been introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB-122. This document is the top-secret record of a meeting on 18 March 1941, about 2 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24; a meeting attended by Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel, and the Defendant Jodl. We are concerned only with Paragraph 11 in this phase, where Raeder, then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (tie-up
of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
against Japan; inferiority of the United States Fleet in
comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
preparations for this action; but according to all declarations
made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany
proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore,
concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act
immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic
questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved
(Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
possible.”

The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the second sentence in that paragraph:

“Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but
according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she
will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England.”

Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the contract.

I now turn to further efforts by the Defendant Ribbentrop to induce the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On the 29th of March 1941 he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. A report of their conversations found in the German Foreign Office archives is contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-152.

Relevant portions of this document have been translated into English. I shall now read from the top of Page 1 of the English translation:

“The RAM”—that is Ribbentrop—“resumed, where they had left
off, the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s
impending talks with the Russians in Moscow. He expressed the
opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole
situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too
far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing
was certain, however, namely that Germany would strike
immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to
give Matsuoka this positive assurance so that Japan could push
forward to the south on Singapore without fear of possible
complications with Russia. The largest part of the German Army
was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich anyway and fully
prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however,
believed that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to
war. Should Germany, however, enter into a conflict with Russia,
the U.S.S.R. would be finished off within a few months. In this
case Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid
than ever, if she wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently,
she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of
possible fears of Russia.

“He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would
develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify
his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM)
wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case that a conflict with
Russia was at least within the realm of possibility. In any
case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon
his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was
impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a
conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
considered possible.”

I now skip five pages of the German text and continue directly with the English translation:

“Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view
of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by
submarines based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of
the British Mediterranean and home fleets, he had again
discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder. The latter had
stated that the British Navy during this year would have its
hands so full in the English home waters and in the
Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single
ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the
United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother
about them at all.

“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very
low estimate of the threat from the British Navy. It also held
the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it
would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it
was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with
their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might
perhaps be dragged out to 5 years. This possibility caused
considerable worry in Japan.

“The RAM replied that America could not do anything against
Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this
reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on
active measures against Japan. For while on the one hand he
could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand
there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan;
for the American President, of course, this would mean a
considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate
rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

“In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing
everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as
if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of
England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his
attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words
and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He
assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British,
but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American
elements in Japan just so long, until one day he would suddenly
open the attack on Singapore.

“In this connection Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based
on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against
Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow.
(‘Nothing succeeds like success,’ the RAM remarked.) He followed
here the example expressed in the words of a famous Japanese
statesman addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese war: ‘You open fire, then the nation will be
united.’ The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all,
as an Oriental, he believed in the fate which would come,
whether you wanted it or not.”

I then skip again in the German text, and continue with what appears in the English translation:

“Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in
the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to
him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written
promise of assistance.

“The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions
with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of
Singapore in order that the Führer—who probably must be
considered the greatest expert on military questions at the
present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack
against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would
be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their
European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of
dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British
Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would be forced to
disappear from Singapore immediately.

“Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.

“The RAM replied that here, too, the Führer had developed new
methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions,
such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could
make available to the Japanese.

“Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger
expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his,
were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval forces would need 3
months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign
Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could
stave off any danger which threatened from America for 6 months.
If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time
and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year,
the situation with America would become extremely critical; and
he did not know as yet how to meet it.

“If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East
Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on
this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be
brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

“The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the
Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of
Singapore.”

On the 5th of April, about a week after the conference from whose minutes I have just quoted, Ribbentrop again met with Matsuoka and again pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war. The notes of this conference, which were also found in the German Foreign Office archives, are contained in our Document 1882-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-153. I shall read a few brief extracts from these notes, starting with the third paragraph on Page 1 of the English translation:

“In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now awakened
and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action
quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich
Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to
accept a risk in this connection just as the Führer had done
successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the
proclamation of sovereignty of armament and with the resignation
from the League of Nations.”

I now skip several pages of the German text and continue on with the English translation.

“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich
would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient
traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which
in its time was the only dominant power on the European
continent.

“In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized
the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him
from his trips:

“1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year,
the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede
it, if she had not collapsed before then, and America would also
have to resign herself to this fact.

“2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and
Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the
long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far
East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

“3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it
would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry
into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than
in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity, which
would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national
objectives of Japan—a chance which would make it possible for
her to play a really leading role in East Asia.”

Here again, in the portion just quoted, we see Ribbentrop pursuing the same track I have previously noted. Germany has already won the war for all practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end. But Japan had better get the positions she wants during the war.

I also invite the Tribunal’s attention to Ribbentrop’s assurances, expressed in the quotation I read from 1877-PS previously, that Japan likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the conflict. The references to the weaknesses of the United States, scattered throughout the quotations I have read, were also an ingredient in this brew which was being so carefully prepared and brought to a boil.

I should like to introduce one more document on the part of the case dealing particularly with exhortation of the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. This is our Document 1538-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-154. This document is a top-secret report, dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo to the Intelligence Division of the OKW. I wish merely to call attention, at this point, to the last sentence in the paragraph numbered 1, wherein it is stated—I quote: “The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.”

I shall return to this document later. I point out here, however, the fact which appears from the sentence I have just read, that the German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered.

Next, exhortations by the Nazis to Japanese aggression against the U.S.S.R.

I invite the Tribunal’s attention, at this point, to the language of the Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote, beginning with the eighth line from the top of the page:

“The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would
weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at war and
those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi
conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a ‘new order of things’.”

The evidence I have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations with particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We now turn to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a “stab in the back” on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again the Defendant Ribbentrop appears as the central figure.

For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order Number 24 regarding collaboration with Japan, the conspirators had been preparing Fall Barbarossa, the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order Number 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.”

In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The report of this conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been introduced as Exhibit USA-152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal’s attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English translation of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible.

Whatever conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in April of 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941 Ribbentrop dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo. The telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce as Exhibit USA-155. I quote from numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is the first paragraph of the English translation:

“Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Foreign
Minister for conveying the cable report of the Japanese
Ambassador in Moscow. It would be convenient if we could keep on
receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I should
like to say I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the
Japanese policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister; first of
all because the present Japanese Government would really act
inexcusably toward the future of their nation if they would not
take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as
well as to secure for all time its expansion to the south and
settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the
Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse—a
report which coincides with our own observations as far as we
are able to judge the present war situation—it is simply
impossible that Japan should not settle the matter of
Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military
preparations are completed.”

Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1 of the English translation—the sentence beginning “However . . .”: