Chapter IX: Section II: , of the directive on the unified preparations for war (6)

In early March, with the date for the final march into Czechoslovakia already close at hand, Fifth Column activity moved into its final phase. In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork of the events of 14 and 15 March.

I now offer in evidence Document 2826-PS as Exhibit USA-111. This is an article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann Frank, published in the publication _Böhmen and Mähren_, the official periodical of the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, edition May 1941, Page 179.

This is an article written by one of the Nazi leaders in Czechoslovakia at the moment of Germany’s greatest military successes. It is a boastful article and reveals with a frankness rarely found in the Nazi press both the functions which the FS and the SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organizations. It is a long quotation.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going on with this tomorrow, Mr. Alderman?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take the whole day?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, not more than an hour and a half.

THE PRESIDENT: And after that the British prosecutors will go on?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]

THIRTEENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 December 1945

_Morning Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose yesterday afternoon, I had just offered in evidence Document 2826-PS, Exhibit USA-111. This was an article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann Frank, published in _Böhmen und Mähren_ (or _Bohemia and Moravia_), the official periodical of the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the issue of March 1941, at Page 79. It is an article which reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS had, and shows the pride which the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organizations. I read from that article, under the heading “The SS on March 15, 1939”:

“A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable
without political troops. To these are allotted the special task
of being the advance guard of the political will and the
guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German
folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state.
Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized
its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes”—or, in German,
“Freiwilliger Selbstschutz”, called FS for short.—“This troop
was trained especially in accordance with the principles of the
SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time.
The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of
protecting the homeland actively, if necessary. It stood up well
in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall
crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland,
arms in hand.

“After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau the tasks of the FS
were transferred essentially to the German student organizations
as compact troop formations in Prague and Brünn, aside from the
isolated German communities which remained in the Second
Republic. This was also natural because many active students
from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the SS. The student
organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other
Germans, during, the crisis of March 1939 . . . .

“In the early morning hours of 15 March, after the announcement
of the planned entry of German troops, German men had to act in
some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events,
either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in
Brünn, or by corresponding instructions of the police president.
In some Czech offices men had likewise, in the early hours of
the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of
political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in
order to prevent foolish destruction . . . . How significant the
many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the
competent German agencies follows from the fact that many of the
men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were
admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even
through the Reich leader of the SS himself or through SS Group
Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were
thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS
. . . .

“Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had
marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had
assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here
placed themselves at once at their further disposition and
became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators.”

I now ask the Court to take judicial notice under Article 21 of the Charter of three official documents. These are identified by us as Documents D-571, D-572, and 2943-PS. I offer them in evidence, respectively, D-571 as Exhibit USA-112; D-572, Exhibit USA-113; and 2943-PS, which is the _French Official Yellow Book_, at Pages 66 and 67, as Exhibit USA-114.

The first two documents are British diplomatic dispatches, properly certified to by the British Government, which gave the background of intrigue in Slovakia—German intrigue in Slovakia. The third document, 2943-PS or Exhibit USA-114, consists of excerpts from the _French Yellow Book_, principally excerpts from dispatches signed by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939. I expect to draw on these three dispatches rather freely in the further course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and therefore, it may not be necessary to read them at length into the transcript. In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian Government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Foreign Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czechoslovak Government as an excuse for intervention. On the following day, March 11, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. I quote from Document D-571, which is USA-112. That is the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British Government.

“Herr Bürckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German generals came
at about 10 o’clock in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of
March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress in Bratislava and told
the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence
of Slovakia. When M. Sidor, the Prime Minister, showed
hesitation, Herr Bürckel took him on one side and explained that
Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czechoslovakia
definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her
independence, because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest
himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Bürckel for this
information, but said that he must discuss the situation with
the Government at Prague.”

A very strange situation that he should have to discuss such a matter with his own Government, before obeying instructions of Herr Hitler delivered by five German generals and Herr Bürckel and Herr Seyss-Inquart.

Events went on moving rapidly, but Durcansky, one of the dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from German offices in Engerau across the Danube into Slovakia, where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guards to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak Government; and, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed Prime Minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna.

At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what the Nazi leaders like to call the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were progressing with what to them must have been very satisfying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close co-ordination. All during the process of the Fall Grün (or Case Green) of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in this new attack. Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, was again greatly flattered by this invitation.

I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS as Exhibit USA-115. This is a letter the distinguished Admiral of Hungary, a country which, incidentally, had no navy, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, and which we captured in the German Foreign Office files.

“Your Excellency, my sincere thanks.

“I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this headwater
region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the
life of Hungary.”—I suppose he needed some headwaters for the
non-existent navy of which he was admiral.

“In spite of the fact that our recruits have been serving for
only 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager
enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On
Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take
place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday.”—He
doesn’t like to use big words; “big blow” is sufficient.

“I shall never forget this proof of friendship, and Your
Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.
Your devoted friend, Horthy.”

From this cynical and callous letter from the distinguished Admiral . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin?

MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the President please.

THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look like a Hungarian name.

MR. ALDERMAN: That is the letter heading. As I understand it, the letter was addressed to Adolf Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was—it ended with the . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which indicates that?

MR. ALDERMAN: Only the fact that it was found in the Berlin Foreign Office, and the wording of the letter and the address “Your Excellency.” We may be drawing a conclusion as to whom it was addressed; but it was found in the Berlin Foreign Office.

From that cynical and callous letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian Government of their plans for further military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out the timetable was advanced somewhat. I would draw the inference that His Excellency, Adolf Hitler, informed his devoted friend Horthy of this change in good time.

On the diplomatic level the Defendant Ribbentrop was quite active. On 13 March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram to the German Minister in Prague outlining the course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure. I offer in evidence Document 2815-PS as Exhibit USA-116. This is the telegram sent by Ribbentrop to the German Legation in Prague on 13 March.

“Berlin, 13 March 1939.

“Prague. Telegram in secret code.

“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.
In case you should get any written communication from President
Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take
any other action on them, but pass them on here by cipher
telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the
legation to make a point of not being available if the Czech
Government wants to communicate with you during the next few
days.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.”

On the afternoon of 13 March Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky and Herr Meissner and the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler to which I have heretofore referred. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the Reich Chancellery and presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: Either declare the independence of Slovakia, or be left without German assistance to what were referred to as the emergence of Poland and Hungary. This decision Hitler said was not a question of days, but of hours. I now offer in evidence Document 2802-PS as Exhibit USA-117—again a document captured in the German Foreign Office—German Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March. I read the bottom paragraph on Page 2 and the top paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation. The first paragraph I shall read is a summary of Hitler’s remark. You will note that in the inducements he held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for the truth. I quote:

“Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to
make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no
interest east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to
him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia
wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for
anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people, or even
a single soldier, to something which was not in any way desired
by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation
as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that
reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving
something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a
liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this
connection unrest was only an outward indication of interior
instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason
permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not
a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time
that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would
support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by
his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished
for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve
the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of
Slovakia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer
responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German
interests, and those did not lie east of the Carpathians.
Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged
to Germany.

“The Führer asked the Reich Foreign Minister”—the Defendant
Ribbentrop—“if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign
Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in
this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He
showed the Führer a message he had just received which reported
Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Führer
read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope
that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.”

A most extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in Slovakia; Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was invited there. And this is what happened: Those present at that meeting included the Defendant Ribbentrop, the Defendant Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, the German Minister of State Meissner. I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the presence of the Defendant Keitel on this occasion, as on so many other occasions, where purely political measures in furtherance of Nazi aggression were under discussion, and where apparently there was no need for technical military advice.

While in Berlin the Slovaks also conferred separately with the Defendant Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials, Ribbentrop very solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak language, of the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the night of the 13th a German plane was conveniently placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. With Slovak extremeness acting at the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the Czechoslovak Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the suggestion of the German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, and M. Chvalkowsky, his Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they found themselves might be described as somewhat hostile. Since the preceding weekend, the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks, and especially against the members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger. Such a situation was intolerable. It was necessary to smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in the heart of Europe.—These peacemakers!

After midnight on the 15th, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancellery. They found there Adolf Hitler, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Göring, and Keitel and other high Nazi officials. I now offer in evidence Document 2798-PS as Exhibit USA-118. This document is the captured German Foreign Office account of this infamous meeting. It is a long document. Parts of it are so revealing and give so clear a picture of Nazi behavior and tactics that I should like to read them in full.

It must be remembered that this account of the fateful conference on the night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and of course it must be read as an account biased by its source, or as counsel for the defendants said last week “a tendentious account”. Nevertheless, even without too much discounting of the report on account of its source, it constitutes a complete condemnation of the Nazis, who by pure and simple international banditry forced the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I interpolate to suggest that international banditry has been a crime against international law for centuries.

I will first read the headings to the minutes. In the English mimeographed version in the document books the time given is an incorrect translation of the original. It should read 0115 to 0215:

“Conversation between the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the
President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich
Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian
Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15
March 1939, 0115 to 0215 hours.”

Others present were General Field Marshal Göring, General Keitel, Secretary of the State Von Weizsäcker, Minister of the State Meissner, Secretary of the State Dietrich, Counselor of the Legation Hewel. Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory—even humble, though the President of a sovereign state. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and he said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Führer’s hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the President. Hacha was then, I believe, in his seventies. But this journey, Hitler told the President, could be of great advantage to his country because, and I quote, “It was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene.” I quote now from the top of Page 3 of the English translation. You will bear in mind that what I am reading are rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said:

“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had
kept closer to Germany it would have been an obligation to
Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation
now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the
Little Carpathian Mountains. He did not want to draw the final
consequences in the autumn. . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, don’t you think you ought to read the last sentence on Page 2?

MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from the preceding page was:

“For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means
to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really
stand up for Czechoslovakia.

“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him.”

Then I had read down to:

“But even at that time and also later in his conversations with
Chvalkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this
State if Beneš’ tendencies were not completely revised.
Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Führer to have
patience.”—He often bragged of his patience.—“The Führer saw
this point of view, but the months went by without any change.
The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one
psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth-to-mouth
propaganda, dismissals of Germans, and many other things which,
to him, were a symbol of the total perspective.

“At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to
him he drew his consequences because, had the development
continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would
in a few years have become the same as 6 months ago. Why did
Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its Army to a reasonable
size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state,
because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political
mission of the state. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a
foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He
enumerated several examples which proved to him that the spirit
in the Army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the
Army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the
future. Added to this were the inevitable development of
economic necessities, and, further, the protests of national
groups which could no longer endure life as it was.”

I now interpolate, if the Tribunal please, to note the significance of that language of Adolf Hitler to the President of a supposed sovereign state and its Prime Minister, having in his presence General Field Marshal Göring, the Commander of the Air Force, and General Keitel. And continuing to quote:

“Thus it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday.”—This is
still the language of Hitler.—“I sent for the Hungarian
minister and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this
country. We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the
order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to
incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to
give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a
larger extent than she had ever enjoyed during Austrian rule.
Germany’s attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined
tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and depends on the
attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian
military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the
Government. He believes in the honesty and straightforwardness
of Hacha and Chvalkowsky, but doubts that the Government will be
able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had
already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance
was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had
given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.

“At 6 o’clock in the morning the German Army would invade
Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German Air Force would
occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The
first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would
lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by
all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the
invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that
case, it would be easy for the Führer to give Czechoslovakia in
the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own,
autonomy, and a certain national liberty.

“We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He
would not like to torture and denationalize the Czechs. He also
did not do all that because of hatred, but in order to protect
Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not
have yielded”—I suppose that is a bad translation for “had not
yielded”—“the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody
could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that
the Czech people should live a full national life and he
believed firmly that a way could be found which would make
far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting
should break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in
counter-pressure. One would annihilate another and it would then
not be possible any more for him to give the promised
alleviations. Within 2 days the Czech Army would not exist any
more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would
result in a hatred which would force him”—that is,
Hitler—“because of his instinct of self-preservation, not to
grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He
felt pity for the Czech people when he was reading the foreign
press. It would leave the impression on him which could be
summarized in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the
Moor may go.’

“That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in
Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and
wished, in memory to the past, that Czechoslovakia would be
conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which
corresponded with his just-mentioned suggestions.

“That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This
invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the
Czech people. If it should come to a fight, the bloodshed would
also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps
prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a
form of construction which would be so far-reaching for
Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old
Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for
the German people.

“The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He
was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to
each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but
planned with all generosity. He would advise him”—that is,
Adolf Hitler advised poor old Hacha—“now to retire with
Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should be done.”

In his reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army, in the 4 hours left to him, before the German Army crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech Army. If so, he indicated that might possibly be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final; that it was well known what a decision of the Führer meant. He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, for their support, and you will remember that the Defendants Göring, Ribbentrop, and Keitel were all present. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the intervention of the German Army.

I read now one paragraph from Page 4 of the English version of the German minutes of this infamous meeting. It is the next to the last paragraph on Page 4.

“The Führer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was
well known what a decision of the Führer meant. He did not see
any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other
gentlemen”—that is, including Göring, Ribbentrop, and
Keitel—“whether they shared his opinion, which was answered in
the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech Army
was by the German Army.”

At this sad point, Hacha and Chvalkowsky retired from the room.

I now offer in evidence Document 2861-PS, an excerpt from the official _British War Blue Book_, at Page 24, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-119. This is an official document of the British Government, of which the Tribunal will take judicial notice under the provisions of Article 21 of the Charter. The part from which I read is a dispatch from the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, describing a conversation with the Defendant Göring, in which the events of this early morning meeting are set forth.

“Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax, Berlin, May 28, 1939.

“My Lord: I paid a short visit to Field Marshal Göring at
Karinhall yesterday.”

Then I skip two paragraphs and begin reading with Paragraph 4. I am sorry, I think I better read all of those paragraphs:

“Field Marshal Göring, who had obviously just been talking to
someone else on the subject, began by inveighing against the
attitude which was being adopted in England towards everything
German and, particularly, in respect of the gold held there on
behalf of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. Before, however,
I had time to reply, he was called to the telephone and on his
return did not revert to this specific question. He complained,
instead, of British hostility in general, of our political and
economic encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he
described as the war party in England. . . .

“I told the Field Marshal that before speaking of British
hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of
feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As he knew
quite well, the basis of all the discussions between Mr.
Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the effect
that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich, Germany
would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing to interfere
with their independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite
assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of
the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of his ‘wild men’
and deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had
not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had infringed
the whole principle of self-determination on which the Munich
Agreement rested.

“At this point, the Field Marshal interrupted me with a
description of President Hacha’s visit to Berlin. I told Field
Marshal Göring that it was not possible to talk of free will
when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard
Prague with his airplanes, if Doctor Hacha refused to sign. The
Field Marshal did not deny the fact but explained how the point
had arisen. According to him, Doctor Hacha had from the first
been prepared to sign everything but had said that
constitutionally he could not do so without reference first to
Prague. After considerable difficulty, telephonic communication
with Prague was obtained and the Czech Government had agreed,
while adding that they could not guarantee that one Czech
battalion at least would not fire on German troops. It was, he
said, only at that stage that he had warned Doctor Hacha that,
if German lives were lost, he would bombard Prague. The Field
Marshal also repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the
story that the advance occupation of Vitkovice had been effected
solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known
to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first
opportunity.”

I also invite the attention of the Tribunal and the judicial notice of the Tribunal, to Dispatch Number 77, in the _French Official Yellow Book_, at Page 96 of the book, identified as our Document 2943-PS, appearing in the Document Book under that number, and I ask that it be given an identifying number, Exhibit USA-114. This is a dispatch from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, and it gives another well-informed version of this same midnight meeting. The account, which I shall present to the Court, of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from these two sources, the _British Blue Book_ and the _French Yellow Book_. I think the Court may be interested to read somewhat further at large, in those two books, which furnish a great deal of the background of all of these matters.

When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reich Chancellery, he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention from a physician who was conveniently on hand for that purpose, a German physician. When the two Czechs returned to the room, the Nazi conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the Wehrmacht. They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You are not reading? I beg your pardon!

MR. ALDERMAN: I am not reading, I am summarizing.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

MR. ALDERMAN: They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning, the German Army would cross the border. The Defendant Göring boasted of what the Wehrmacht would do if the Czech forces dared to resist the invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Defendant Göring said, his Luftwaffe would blaze half of Prague into ruins in 2 hours and that, Göring said, would be only the beginning.

Under this threat of imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the aged President of Czechoslovakia at 4:30 o’clock in the morning, signed the document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him and which they had already had prepared. This Document is TC-49, the declaration of 15 March 1939, one of the series of documents which will be presented by the British prosecutor, and from it I quote this, on the assumption that it will subsequently be introduced.

“The President of the Czechoslovakian State . . . entrusts with
entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech
country to the hands of the Führer of the German Reich”—really
a rendezvous with destiny.

While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the representatives of the Czech Government, the Wehrmacht had in some areas already crossed the Czech border.

I offer in evidence Document 2860-PS, another excerpt from the _British Blue Book_, of which I ask the Court to take judicial notice. This is a speech by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from which I quote one passage:

“It is to be observed”—and the fact is surely not without
significance—“that the towns of Mährisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice
were actually occupied by German SS detachments on the evening
of the 14th March, while the President and the Foreign Minister
of Czechoslovakia were still on their way to Berlin and before
any discussion had taken place.”

At dawn on March 15, German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a proclamation to the German people, which stated distinctly, “Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.”

On the following day, in contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the German Reich under the name of “The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” The decree is Document TC-51, another of the documents which the British Delegation will present to the Tribunal later in this week. It was signed in Prague on 16 March 1939, by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendants Frick and Von Ribbentrop.

I should like to quote the first sentence of this decree, “The Bohemian and Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the Lebensraum”—living space—“of the German people.” The remainder of the decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which Czechoslovakia henceforth was subjected to Germany. A German Protector was to be appointed by the German Führer for the so-called “Protectorate”—the Defendant Von Neurath. God deliver us from such protectors! The German Government assumed charge of their foreign affairs and of their customs and of their excises. It was specified that German garrisons and military establishments would be maintained in the Protectorate. At the same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia who, at German Nazi insistence, had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that the independence of their week-old state was itself, in effect, qualified.

I offer in evidence Document 1439-PS as Exhibit USA—I need not offer that. I think it is a decree in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and it is identified as our Document 1439-PS. It appears at Page 606, 1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_,