Chapter XV: Part II: is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.” (2)

In the last paragraph the German Government says that, nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland.

On the same day as that memorandum was issued Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag, 28 April, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of the memorandum. This is Document TC-72, Number 13, which becomes GB-43. I would only refer the Tribunal to the latter part of the second page of the translation. He has again repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in March, and he goes on to say that the Polish Government have rejected his offer and lastly:

“I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the
Polish Government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The
worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago,
believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign,
that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has
not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in
any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very
regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was
really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me.
This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a
question which intimately affects the German people by a truly
unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both
countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving
party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party,
because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never
become Polish. The intention to attack, on the part of Germany,
which was merely invented by the international press, led, as
you know, to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation
on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance
. . . .”

It is unnecessary, My Lord, to read more of that. It shows us, as I say, how completely dishonest was everything that the German Government was saying at that time. There was Hitler, probably with a copy of the orders for Fall Weiss in his pocket as he spoke, saying that the intention to attack, by Germany, was an invention of the international press.

In answer to that memorandum and that speech the Polish Government issued a memorandum on the 28th of April. It is set out in the next exhibit, TC-72, Number 16, which becomes GB-44. It is unnecessary to read more than . . .

THE PRESIDENT: It is stated as the 5th of May, not the 28th of April.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, yes, on the 5th of May.

It is unnecessary to read more than two short paragraphs from that reply. I can summarize the document in a word. It sets out the objects of the 1934 agreement: to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries, to solve difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish Government appreciate that there are difficulties about Danzig and have long been ready to carry out discussions. They set out again their part in the recent discussions, and I turn to the second page of the document, the one but last paragraph or, perhaps, I should go back a little to the top of that page, the first half of that page. The Polish Government allege that they wrote, as indeed they did, to the German Government on the 26th of March giving their point of view, that they then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German Governments of the City of Danzig based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. They said they were prepared to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities and that they received no reply to those proposals:

“It is clear that negotiations in which one state formulates
demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands
unaltered, are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration
of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and
dignity of Poland.”

Which, of course, in a word summarizes the whole position of the Polish point of view. And thereafter they reject the German accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish agreement. They state that Germany herself has entered into similar agreements with other nations and lastly, on the next page, they too say that they are still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so.

If the Tribunal would turn back to the Document C-120, to the first two letters, to which I referred only a few minutes ago, it becoming GB-41. On the bottom of the page there is a figure 614, on the first page of that exhibit, “Directives from Hitler and Keitel Preparing for War and the Invasion of Poland”. I would refer to Page 6 of that particular exhibit. The page number will be found at the bottom of the page, in the center. It is a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, signed by Hitler and dated the 10th of May. It goes to OKW, OKH, OKM, various branches of the OKW and with it apparently were enclosed “Instructions for the Economic War and the Protection of Our Own Economy.” I only mention it now to show better that throughout this time preparations for the immediate aggression were continuing. That document will still be part of the same exhibit.

Again on the next page, which is headed Number C-120(1), I am afraid this is a précis only, not a full translation and therefore, perhaps, I will not read it. But it is the annex, showing the “Directives for the War against the Enemy Economy and Measures of Protection for Our Own Economy.”

As we will see later, not only were the military preparations being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment.

I think this period of preparation, translated up to May 1939, finishes really with that famous meeting or conference in the Reich Chancellery on the 23rd of May about which the Tribunal has already heard. It was L-79 and is now Exhibit USA-27; and it was referred to, I think, and has been known as the “Schmundt minutes.” It is the last document which is in the Tribunal’s document book of this part and I do not propose to read anything of it. It has been read already and the Tribunal will remember that it was the speech in which Hitler was crying out for Lebensraum and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living space in the East, where he said that the decision had been taken to attack Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you remind me of the date of it?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The 23rd of May 1939. Your Lordship will remember that Göring, Raeder, and Keitel, among many others, were present. It has three particular lines of which I want to remind the Tribunal, where he said:

“If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia
against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to
attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The
Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with
England.”

So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France, also.

I pass to the next period, which I have described as the final preparations taken from June up to the beginning of the war, at the beginning of September—Part V of the Tribunal’s document book. If the Tribunal will glance at the index to the document book, they will find I have, for convenience, divided the evidence up under four subheadings:

Final preparations of the Armed Forces; economic preparation; the famous Obersalzberg speeches; and the political or diplomatic preparations urging on the crisis and the justification for the invasion of Poland.

I refer the Tribunal to the first document in that book, dealing with the final preparations of the Armed Forces. It again is an exhibit containing various documents, and I refer particularly to the second document, dated the 22d of June 1939. This is Document C-126, which will become GB-45.

It will be remembered that a precise timetable had been called for. Now, here it is:

“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the
Führer and Supreme Commander, a ‘preliminary timetable’ for Case
White based on the particulars so far available from the Navy,
Army, and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the
attack and the start of the attack were not included in this
timetable.

“The Führer and Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement
with the intentions of the Navy, Army, and Air Force and made
the following comments on individual points:

“1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up
reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers
scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments,
employers or other private persons who make inquiries should be
told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and
for the exercise units it is intended to form for these
maneuvers.

“It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to
subordinate establishments.”

All this became relevant, particularly relevant, later when we find the German Government making allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles. Here we have it in May, or rather June—they are mobilizing, only doing so secretly:

“2. For reasons of security, the clearing of hospitals in the
area of the frontier must not be carried out.”

If the Tribunal will turn to the top of the following page, it will be seen that that order is signed by the Defendant Keitel. I think it is unnecessary to read any further from that document. There is—which perhaps will save turning back, if I might take it rather out of date now—the first document on that front page of that exhibit, a short letter dated the 2d of August. It is only an extract, I am afraid, as it appears in the translation:

“Attached are operational directions for the employment of
U-boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of
precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out Case
White remaining unchanged. Commander, U-boats is handing in his
operation orders by the 12th of August to the operations staff
of the Navy.”

One must assume that the Defendant Dönitz knew that his U-boats were to go out into the Atlantic “by way of precaution in the event of the intention to carry out Case White remaining unchanged.”

I turn to the next document in the Tribunal’s book, C-30, which becomes GB-46. That is a letter dated the 27th of July. It contains orders for the air and sea forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig:

“The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the
Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy Danzig Free
State immediately in order to protect the German population.
There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long
as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.”

It then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again becomes more relevant when we discuss the diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was purporting to make specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means. I would like to offer this as evidence that the decision had been taken and nothing was going to move him from that decision. That document, as set out, says that, “There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.” Nevertheless, that was not the only condition upon which the occupation was to take place and we find that during July, right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation.

I refer the Tribunal to the next Document, TC-71, which becomes GB-47, where there are set out a few only of the reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, the Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister. The sum total of those reports can be found in the _British Blue Book_. I now would refer to only two of them as examples of the kind of thing that was happening.

I refer to the first that appears on that exhibit, dated the 1st of July 1939.

“Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived
here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig Heimwehr.
All approaches to hills and dismantled forts, which constitute a
popular public promenade on the western fringe of the city, have
been closed with barbed wire and ‘verboten’ notices. The walls
surrounding the shipyards bear placards: ‘Comrades keep your
mouths shut lest you regret consequence.’

“Master of British steamer _High Commissioner Wood_, while he
was roving Königsberg from the 28th of June to 30th of June,
observed considerable military activity, including extensive
shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material, by
small coasting vessels. On the 28th of June four medium-sized
steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, and so
forth, left Königsberg ostensibly returning to Hamburg after
maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of steamers
. . . .”

And again, as another example, the report Number 11, on the next page of the exhibit, dated the 10th of July, states:

“The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me
that on the 8th of July, he personally saw about 30 military
lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg,
where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges.
There were also eight large antiaircraft guns in position, which
he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three
six-barreled light antiaircraft machine guns. There were about
500 men, drilling with rifles, and the whole place is
extensively fortified with barbed wire.”

I do not think it is necessary to occupy the Tribunal’s time in reading more. Those, as I say, are two reports only, of a number of others that can be found in the _British Blue Book_, which sets out the arming and preparation of the Free City of Danzig.

On the 12th of August and the 13th of August, when preparations were practically complete—and it will be remembered that they had to be complete for an invasion of Poland on the 1st of September—we find Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing their intentions to their allies, the Italians.

One of the passages in Hitler’s speech of the 23rd of May, it will be remembered—I will not quote it now because the document has been read before. However, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in regard to his proposed attack on Poland, had said, “Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese.”

Now, when his preparations are complete, he discloses his intentions to his Italian comrades, and does so in hope that they will join him.

The minutes of that meeting are long, and it is not proposed to read more than a few passages. The meeting can be summarized generally by saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the Italians to come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano, rather, is most surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency of the matter; and they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying to dissuade Hitler from starting off so soon until the Duce can have had a little more time to prepare himself.

The value—perhaps the greatest value—of the minutes of that meeting is that they show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same time as Poland.

I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is trying to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning the war; and, therefore, he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in:

“At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements
in prospect.”—I quote from the top of the second page.—“Some
time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction
could be taken into service. As far as the land army was
concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had
been called to the colors.”

I quote this passage particularly to show the intention to attack England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here his thoughts are turned entirely towards England:

“If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she
could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and
one armored division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber
squadrons, but hardly any fighters, since, at the outbreak of
war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the
English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of
their own country.

“With regard to the position of France, the Führer said that in
the event of a general war, after the destruction of
Poland—which would not take long—Germany would be in a
position to assemble a hundred divisions along the West Wall and
France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available
forces from the colonies, from the Italian frontier and
elsewhere, on her own Maginot Line for the life and death
struggle which would then ensue. The Führer also thought that
the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian
fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano
showed signs of extreme doubt.”—Doubts which, perhaps, in view
of the subsequent performances, were well justified.

“The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few
parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less
value. Poland was very weak in antitank and antiaircraft defense
and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in
this respect.”

What this Tribunal will appreciate, of course, is that Poland formed such a threat to Germany on Germany’s eastern frontier.

“If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers
over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German
superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the
fanatics of Warsaw and Kraków, the population of their areas is
indifferent. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the
position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one
and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews,
and approximately nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles
were much less in number than the total population and, as
already said, their striking power was to be valued variably. In
these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by
Germany in the shortest time.

“Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it
clear that in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would
stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick
liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for
the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a
hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only
would the 11 East Prussian divisions be tied down; but also
further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This
would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.”

The argument goes on on those lines.

I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page:

“Coming back to the Danzig question, the Führer said to Count
Ciano that it was impossible for him to go back now. He had made
an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from
South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care
to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal
could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he
had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly
and northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and
northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been
Germany’s undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial,
as the Mediterranean had been the appropriate sphere for Italy.
For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and
timber from these eastern regions.”

Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but the economic reasons, the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland:

“In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material,
although the city had the greatest harbor in the Baltic—the
transshipment by tonnage was 40 percent of that of Hamburg—but
Danzig was a Nuremberg of the north, an ancient German city
awaking sentimental feelings for every German, and the Führer
was bound to take account of this psychological element in
public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano
should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a
large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav
soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long
remain quiet over anything of this kind.

“Count Ciano, in replying to the Führer’s statement, first
expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the
completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in
the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during
his Berlin visit had there been any sign, from the German side,
that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the
contrary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said that in his
opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of
time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that
a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed
that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made
plans for a period of 2 or 3 years. If immediate conflict was
unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly
stand on the German side; but for various reasons he would
welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later
time.”

No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict; the only concern of anybody is as to time.

“Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy
in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict
with Poland would not be limited to that country but would
develop into a general European war.”

Thereafter, during the meeting, Ciano goes on to try to dissuade Hitler from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argument at the top of Page 5 of the exhibit:

“For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should
make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful
intentions of Italy and Germany.”

Then we get the Führer’s answer to those arguments, half-way down Page 5:

“The Führer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem
no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn,
the more difficult would military operations in eastern Europe
become. From the middle of September weather conditions made air
operations hardly possible in these areas, while the conditions
of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the
autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for
motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great
marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations.
Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in October . . . and
Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they
obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.”

They couldn’t possibly bombard or destroy any place where there happened to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England, London—I wonder whether any sentiments of that kind were held in consideration in regard to those places.

“Ciano asked how soon, according to the Führer’s view, the
Danzig question must be settled. The Führer answered that this
settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August.
To the question of Ciano as to what solution the Führer
proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political
control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would
obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must
contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted
whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to
the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Führer
had made this proposal personally to Beck, at his visit to
Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return
for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete
guarantee of Polish interests, and the establishment of a
connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would
have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship,
and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck
had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to
examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of
English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen
clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia,
and even proposed to advance to Berlin . . . .”—That was
something quite different.

The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following day.

On Page 7, in the middle of the page, it will be seen:

“The Führer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1)
in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately
attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her
political intention, she must be forced to do so.”

I go to the last line on that page:

“As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist
further in the world through the lack of space; not only was
there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded
by its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps
of gold and deluded themselves about their riches . . . . The
Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the
world and would not regard Germany and Italy as in their class.
This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst
thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a
life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet
more easily because their interests did not clash on any point.

“The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for
which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself . . .
had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy,
because of its geographic location, was already the dominant
power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Führer said
that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that
this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that
Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in
the Mediterranean. Bismarck . . . had recognized it and had said
as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The interests of
Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there
never could be a conflict between them.

“The Minister of Foreign Affairs added that if the two problems
mentioned in yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and
Germany would have their backs free for work against the West.
The Führer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 10
years”—there appears to have been a query raised in the
translation—“for so many years long she would have been
incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could
be settled.

“Ciano thanked the Führer for his extremely clear explanation of
the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would
give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite
information on one point, in order that the Duce might have all
the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no
decision because the Führer believed that the conflict with
Poland could be localized. On the basis of long experience
he”—Ciano—“quite saw that so far the Führer had always been
right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini
had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of
precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following
question:

“The Führer had mentioned two conditions under which he would
take Poland: (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation,
and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The
first of these conditions did not depend on the decision of the
Führer, and German reaction would follow in a moment. The second
condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore
asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied
Germany about her political condition. He realized that this
date depended upon climatic conditions.

“The Führer answered that the decision of Poland must be made
clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the
decisive part of military operations against Poland could be
carried out within a period of 14 days, and the final
liquidation would need another . . . 4 weeks, it could be
finished at the end of September or the beginning of October.
These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore,
that the last date on which he could begin to take action was
the end of August.

“Finally, the Führer reassured Ciano that since his youth he had
favored German-Italian co-operation, and that no other view was
expressed in his publications. He had always thought that
Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since
there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was
personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from
himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great
and unique in history; that he could be this man’s friend was
for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour
of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of
the Duce for better or for worse.”

THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If the Tribunal please, I never actually put that last document that I was referring to in as an exhibit. It is Document TC-77, which becomes GB-48.

Having referred the Tribunal to those documents showing that the military preparations were throughout the whole period in hand and nearing their completion, I would refer to one letter from the Defendant Funk, showing that at the same time the economists had not been idle. It is a letter dated the 26th of August 1939, in which Funk is writing to his Führer. He says:

“My Führer! I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most
friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How
happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being granted
the favor of experiencing these overwhelmingly great and
world-changing times and taking part in the mighty events of
these days.

“The information given to me by Field Marshal Göring, that you,
my Führer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures
prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the
relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through
emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to
you, with all respect, that I have succeeded by means of
precautions taken during the last few months in making the Reich
Bank internally so strong and externally so unassailable that
even the most serious shocks in the international money and
credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime, I
have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of
the Reich Bank and of the whole of the German economy abroad on
which it was possible to lay hands. Under the proposals I have
prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is
not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public
works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be
in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy
without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the
general plenipotentiary for economy, appointed by you, to make
this report and solemn promise to you, my Führer. Heil my
Führer”—signed—“Walter Funk.”

That document is PS-699, and it goes in as GB-49.

It is difficult in view of that letter to see how the Defendant Funk can say that he did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of the German Government to wage war.

I come now to the speech which Hitler made on the 22d of August at Obersalzberg to his commanders-in-chief. By the end of the third week of August, preparations were complete. That speech has already been read to the Tribunal. I would, perhaps, ask the Tribunal’s patience if I quoted literally half a dozen lines so as to carry the story on in sequence.

On the first page of PS-1014, which is already USA-30, the fourth line:

“Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were
determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.”

The second paragraph:

“Destruction of Poland is in the foreground. The aim is the
elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of
Poland shall be the primary objective.”

Again, the famous sentence in the third paragraph:

“I shall give a propagandists cause for starting the war, never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and
making a war, not the right is what matters but victory.”

We are going to see only too clearly how that propagandistic cause, which already had been put in hand, was brought to its climax.

I turn to the next page (798-PS, USA-29), the third paragraph:

“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring,
but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few
years, and only afterwards against the East.”

I refer to these passages again particularly to emphasize the intention of the Nazi Government, not only to conquer Poland, but ultimately, in any event, to wage aggressive war against the Western Democracies.

I refer lastly to the last page, a passage which becomes more and more significant as we continue the story of the last few days: I quote from the fourth paragraph:

“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which
demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation.

“The political aim is set farther. A beginning has been made for
the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the
soldier, after I have made the political preparations.”

And, again, the very last line becomes significant later:

“Göring answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that
the Armed Forces will do their duty.”

We pass from the military-economic preparations and his exhortations to his generals to see how he was developing the position in the diplomatic and political field.

On the 23rd of August 1939 the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the Free City of Danzig, a position which did not exist under the statute setting up the constitution of the Free City. I put in the next document, which is taken from the _British Blue Book_, only as evidence of that event, an event that was, of course, aimed at stirring up the feeling in the Free City at that time. That is TC-72, Number 62, which becomes GB-50.

At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi Government with the aid of the SS. The Tribunal has already heard the evidence of General Lahousen the other day in which he referred to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS forces for these purposes, so that dead Poles could be found lying about the German side of the frontier. I refer the Tribunal now to three short reports which corroborate the evidence that that gentleman came and gave before you, and they are found in the _British Blue Book_. They are reports from the British Ambassador in Warsaw.

The first of them, TC-72, Number 53, which becomes GB-51, is dated 26th of August.

“A series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German
frontier.

“Polish patrol met a party of Germans one kilometer from the
East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish
patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned.

“German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo,
twice near Rybnik, and twice elsewhere, firing shots and
attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and
hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.

“_Gazeta Polska_, in an inspired lead article today, says these
are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of
aggression of para-military disciplined detachments, supplied
with regular army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army
detachment. Attacks more or less continuous.

“These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong
attitude of defense. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of
aggression came from German side. This was the best answer to
the ravings of German press.

“Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment
has since shot a Pole across frontier and wounded another.”

I pass to the next report, TC-72, Number 54, which becomes GB-52. It is dated the same date, the 26th of August.

“Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted
by Hitler to the French Ambassador that 24 Germans were recently
killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. The story is without any
foundation whatever.”

And lastly, TC-72, Number 55, which becomes GB-53, the report of the next day, the 27th of August.

“So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment
of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration,
if not complete falsification.

“2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by
Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain,
the rest of Poland is still completely calm.

“3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods
regarding Czechoslovakia last year.

“4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German
provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since
March”—since the date when the rest of Czechoslovakia was
seized and they were ready to go against Poland—“that has since
March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities. I
suppose this has been done with the object:

“(a) Creating war spirit in Germany, (b) impressing public
opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent
aggression in Poland.

“5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter
objects.

“6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr
Hitler.

“7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is
apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of
Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more
than 10 per cent of the population in any commune.

“8. In the face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if
Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of
destroying Polish independence.

“9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for
Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove
that Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are false.”

And yet, again, we have further corroboration of General Lahousen’s evidence in a memorandum, which has been captured, of a conversation between the writer and Keitel. It is 795-PS, and it becomes GB-54. That conversation with Keitel took place on the 17th of August, and from the memorandum I quote the first paragraph:

“I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he
would not pay any attention to this action, as the Führer had
not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to
furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct
the General Staff. He says he does not think much of actions of
this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they
have been ordered by the Führer; that he could not ask the
Führer how he had planned the execution of this special action.
In regard to Dirschau, he has decided that this action would be
executed only by the Army.”

That then, My Lord, was the position at the end of the first week in August—I mean at the end of the third week in August. On the 22d of August the Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, and we have heard in Hitler’s speech of that date to his commanders-in-chief how it had gone down as a shock to the rest of the world. In fact, the orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of the 25th of August. Orders were given to invade Poland in the early hours of the 25th of August, and that I shall prove in a moment.

Oh the same day—the 23rd of August—that the German-Russian agreement was signed in Moscow, news reached England that it was being signed. And of course the significance of it from a military point of view as to Germany, particularly in the present circumstances, was obvious; and the British Government immediately made their position clear in one last hope—and that one last hope was that if they did so the German Government might possibly think better of it. And I refer to Document TC-72, Number 56; it is the first document in the next to the last part of the Tribunal document book, in which the Prime Minister wrote to Hitler. That document becomes GB-55:

“Your Excellency:

“Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures
taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press
and on the wireless this evening.

“These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government,
been rendered necessary by the military movements which have
been reported from Germany and by the fact that apparently the
announcement of a German-Soviet agreement is taken in some
quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great
Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need
be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may
prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot
alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland, which His Majesty’s
Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and
which they are determined to fulfill.

“It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made
their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would
have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that
allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this
occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

“If the case should arise, they are resolved and prepared to
employ without delay all the forces at their command; and it is
impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It
would be a dangerous delusion to think that, if war once starts,
it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the
several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been
secured.”

Thereafter the Prime Minister urged the German Government to try and resolve the difficulty without recourse to the use of force; and he suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions between the two Governments, the Polish and German Governments, might take place. I quote in Prime Minister Chamberlain’s language:

“At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a
catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the
grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action
of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with
the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put
before you.”

On the following day, the 23rd of August, Hitler replied to Prime Minister Chamberlain, and that document is TC-72, Number 60, and it becomes GB-56. He starts off by saying that Germany has always wanted England’s friendship, and has always done everything to get it; on the other hand, she has some essential interests which it is impossible for Germany to renounce. I quote the third paragraph:

“Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and of
the corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a
proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegation which
is disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization
against Poland”—we see here the complete dishonesty of the
whole business—“the assertion of aggressive designs towards
Romania, Hungary, and so forth as well as the so-called
guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given, had,
however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of
this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.

“The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland, that
she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances
regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring,
could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement
thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave
of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German
inhabitants living in Poland.”

Again I cannot help remembering the report by the British Ambassador, to which I just referred:

“The atrocities which since then have been taking place in that
country are terrible for the victims but intolerable for a great
power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a
passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty
of numerous breaches of her obligations towards the Free City of
Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has
initiated a process of economic strangulation.”

It goes on to say that “Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution” and the fact that there is a British guarantee to Poland makes no difference to her determination to end this state of affairs. I quote from Paragraph 7:

“The German Reich Government has received information to the
effect that the British Government has the intention to carry
out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements
contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against
Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since
Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures
other than those of a defensive character against England or
France and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended,
and does not in the future intend, to attack England or France,
it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime
Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated
act of menace directed against the Reich. I, therefore, inform
your Excellency that in the event of these military
announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate
mobilization of the German forces.”

If the intention of the German Government had been peaceful, if they really wanted peace and not war, what was the purpose of these lies; these lies saying that they had never intended to attack England or France, carried out no mobilization, statements which, in view of what we now have, we know to be lies? What can have been their object if their intention had always been for a peaceful settlement of the Danzig question only? Then I quote again from the last paragraph:

“The question of the treatment of European problems on a
peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but
primarily on those who since the crime committed by the
Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any
peaceful revision. Only after a change of the spirit on the part
of the responsible powers can there be any real change in the
relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life
fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by
British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however,
convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be
any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be
happier than I.”

On the 25th of August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of mutual assistance was signed in London. It is unnecessary to read the document. The Tribunal will be well aware of its contents where both Governments undertake to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression against either by any third power. I point to Document TC-73; it is Number 91 and it becomes GB-57. I shall refer to the fact of its signing again in a moment but perhaps it is convenient while we are dealing with a letter between the British Prime Minister and Hitler to refer also to a similar correspondence which took place a few days later between the French Prime Minister M. Daladier and Hitler. I emphasize these because it is desired to show how deliberately the German Government was set about their pattern of aggression. “The French Ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your personal communication,” written on the 26th of August:

“In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility
which two heads of the Governments can possibly take upon
themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great
nations who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to
you, personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of
peace still rests in your hands alone.

“You cannot doubt but what are my own feelings towards Germany,
nor France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman
has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations
not only peace but also sincere co-operation in their own
interests as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world.
Unless you credit the French people with a lower sense of honor
than I credit to the German nation, you cannot doubt that France
loyally fulfills her obligations toward other powers, such as
Poland, which, as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace
with Germany. These two convictions are fully compatible.

“Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution
of the international crisis with all honor and dignity for all
nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.

“Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all
her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s
readiness, which she has always shown, to submit to the mutual
application of a method of open settlement as it can be imagined
between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the
clearest conscience I can assure you that, among the differences
which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question
of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such
a method with a purpose of reaching a peaceful and just
solution.

“Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in
France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies,
which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my
country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not
prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state
of mind.

“In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no high-minded
human being could understand it if a war of destruction were
started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful
settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace
could, in all certainty, work for this aim without any prejudice
to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French
and the German people, and who am, on the other hand, bound to
Poland by bonds of friendship and by a promise, am prepared, as
head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man
can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.

“You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I
do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war
have left in the conscience of the people without any regard to
its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your
outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road
of peace, toward the fulfillment of its task in the common work
of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.

“If French and German blood should be shed again as it was shed
25 years ago in a still longer and more murderous war, then each
of the two nations will fight believing in its own victory. But
the most certain victors will be destruction and barbarity.”

THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_