Chapter XX: Part II: is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.” (7)

These documents also show that the impetus of the famous telegram came from Berlin and not from Vienna, that Göring composed the telegram and Seyss-Inquart did not even have to send it, but merely said “agreed.”

The transcript of Göring’s telephone call to Ribbentrop is indicated as Part W of that document. In it the formula was developed and recited for English consumption that there had been no ultimatum and that the German troops crossed the border in response only to the telegram.

And now in this document from which I have just read we find the same bogus formula coming from the pen of the Defendant Von Neurath. He was at the meeting of November 5, 1937, of which we have the Hossbach minutes, Exhibit USA-25. And so he knew very well the firmly held Nazi ideas with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia. And yet in the period after March 10, 1938 when he was handling the foreign affairs for this conspiracy and particularly after the invasion of Austria, he played out his part in making false representations. He gave an assurance to Mr. Mastny regarding the continued independence of Austria. I refer to the document introduced by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Document TC-27, Exhibit GB-21.

And we see him here still handling foreign affairs, although using the letterhead of the Secret Cabinet Council as the exhibit shows, reciting this diplomatic fable with respect to the Austrian situation, a story also encountered by us in the transcript of the Göring-Ribbentrop telephone call, all in furtherance of the aims of what we call the conspiracy.

Now, if the Tribunal please, it might have been fitting and appropriate for me to present the case on collaboration with Japan and the attack on the United States on this December 7, 1945, the fourth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, our plan was to proceed chronologically so that part of the case must wait its turn for the presentation next week.

We now come to the climax of this amazing story of wars of aggression, perhaps one of the most colossal mis-estimates in history, when Hitler’s intuition led him and his associates to launch an aggressive war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In my last appearance before the Tribunal I presented an account of the aggression against Czechoslovakia. In the meantime our British colleagues have given you the evidence covering the formulation of the plan to attack Poland and the preparations and initiation of actual aggressive war. In addition they have laid before the Tribunal the story of the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression involving the planning and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece; and in doing so the British Prosecution has marshalled and presented to the Court various international treaties, agreements, and assurances, and the evidence establishing the breaching of those treaties and assurances.

I should like to present to the Tribunal now the account of the last but one of the defendants’ acts of aggression, the invasion of the U.S.S.R. The section of the Indictment in which this crime is charged is Count One, Section IV (F), Paragraph 6, German invasion on 22 June 1941 of the U.S.S.R. territory in violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. The first sentence of this paragraph is the one with which we shall be concerned today. It reads:

“On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the
Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without
any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby
beginning a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.”

The documents having a bearing on this phase of the case are contained in document book marked “P,” which we now hand to the Court.

First, if the Tribunal please, the inception of the plan. As a point of departure for the story of aggression against the Soviet Union, I should like to take the date 23 August 1939. On that date just a week before the invasion of Poland, the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. which is referred to in this section of the Indictment which I have just quoted. This treaty, Document Number TC-25, will be introduced in evidence by our British colleagues, but it contains two articles which I should like to bring to the attention of the Tribunal. Article I provides as follows:

“The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act
of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one
another, whether individually or jointly with other powers.”

Article V provides that, should disputes or conflicts arise between the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of view or, if necessary, by arbitration commissions.

It is well to keep these solemn pledges in mind during the course of the story which is to follow. This treaty was signed for the German Government by the Defendant Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise to the world since it appeared to constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation for this about-face has been provided, however, by no less eminent a witness than the Defendant Ribbentrop himself in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely personal information. This report we now have. It is Number 1834-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-129, the original German document.

On Page 2 of the English translation, Ribbentrop tells Oshima the reason for the pact with the U.S.S.R. That is Page 2 of the German:

“Then when it came to war the Führer decided on a compromise
with Russia—as a necessity for avoiding a two-front war.”

In view of the spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazis in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and non-aggression, it is not very surprising to find that they regarded it as they did all treaties and pledges, as binding on them only so long as it was expedient for them to be bound. That they did so regard it is evidenced by the fact that even while the campaign in the West was still in progress they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.

In a speech to Reichs- and Gauleiter at Munich in November 1943, which is set forth in our Document L-172 already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-34, the Defendant Jodl admitted—and I shall read from Page 7 of the English translation, which is at Page 15 of the original German text:

“Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily
growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the
Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little
perceived in Germany and of late, for diplomatic reasons, had
deliberately to be ignored. However, the Führer himself has
always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as
during the Western campaign had informed me of his fundamental
decision to take steps against this danger the moment our
military position made it at all possible.”

At the time this decision was made, however, the Western campaign was still in progress, and so any action in the East necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiègne, and the campaign in the West with the exception of the war against Britain came to an end. The view that Germany’s key to political and economic domination lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor and in the acquisition of Lebensraum at her expense had long been basic in Nazi ideology. As we have seen, this idea had never been completely forgotten even while the war in the West was in progress. Now flushed with the recent success of their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazis began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union.

The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both desirable and practical. As early as August of 1940 General Thomas received a hint from the Defendant Göring that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the “Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt” of the OKW.

I should, perhaps, mention that this office is generally referred to in the German documents by the abbreviation Wi Rü.

General Thomas tells of receiving this information from Göring in his draft of a work entitled _Basic Facts for a History of German War and Armament Economy_, which he prepared during the summer of 1944. This book is our Document 2353-PS and has already been admitted into evidence as Exhibit USA-35. I am sorry, it was marked that for identification purposes. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-35.

On Pages 313 to 315 of this work Thomas discusses the Russo-German Trade Agreement of 1939 and relates how, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early in 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at Page 315 he has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940. I read from Page 9 of the English translation:

“On August 14 the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt during a
conference with Reich Marshal Göring, was informed that the
Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until
spring 1941. Later on we were to have no further interest in
completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved
the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt to give priority to
matters concerning Russian war economy.”

I shall refer to this statement again later when I discuss the preparation for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory expected to be captured. At that time, too, I shall introduce evidence which will show that in November of 1940 Göring informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the U.S.S.R.

Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet Union necessarily entailed even these many months in advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet Intelligence Service. Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for.

In an OKW directive signed by the Defendant Jodl and issued to the counter-intelligence service abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered. This directive is our Number 1229-PS and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-130, a photostat of the captured German document. This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must not be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive was being prepared, and outlined the line for the counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive indicates by implication the extent of the preparations already under way, and I should like to read it to the Tribunal:

“The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to
come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map
is supposed to be reached.

“These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that
we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand,
Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops
are stationed in the Government General, in the Eastern
Provinces and in the Protectorate; she should draw the
conclusion that we can at any time protect our
interests—especially in the Balkans—with strong forces against
Russian seizure.

“For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the
answer to questions of the Russian Intelligence Service, the
following directives apply:

“1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the
East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a
frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be
explained by movements into training camps, regroupings, _et
cetera_.

“2) The impression is to be created that the center of the
massing of troops is in the southern part of the Government, in
the Protectorate, and in Austria, and that the massing in the
north is relatively unimportant.

“3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units,
especially of the armored divisions, things are to be
exaggerated, if necessary.

“4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the
antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased
considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that
it continues to be increased with captured French material on
all important targets.

“5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, _et
cetera_, it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal
limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won eastern
territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.

“The Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent
correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of
garrisons, _et cetera_, will be made available to the defense
for purposes of counter espionage.

“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order
of”—signed—“Jodl.”

Early in November of 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline of the Army’s operational plan. This order was contained in a top-secret directive from the Führer’s headquarters, Number 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl. It is Number 444-PS in our numbered series and is already in evidence as Exhibit Number GB-116.

The directive begins by saying:

“The preparatory measures of supreme headquarters for the
prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along
the following lines . . . .”

It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.—and I read now from Page 3, Paragraph Number 5 of the English translation:

“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of
clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of
the results of these discussions all preparations for the East
which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

“Instructions on this will follow as soon as the general outline
of the Army’s operational plans have been submitted to, and
approved by me.”

On the 5th of December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Führer concerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A report of this conference with Hitler is contained in captured Document Number 1799-PS. This is a folder containing many documents all labeled annexes and all bearing on Fall Barbarossa, the plan against the U.S.S.R. This folder was discovered in the War Diary of the Wehrmachtführungsstab and was apparently an enclosure to that diary.

The report I am here referring to is Annex Number 1 and is dated December 1940.

I now offer in evidence Document Number 1799-PS as United States Exhibit Number 131. I should also like to read into the record a few sentences from the report of 5 December 1940 as they indicate the state of the planning for this act of aggression six and a half months before it occurred.

“Report to the Führer on 5 December 1940.

“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reported about
the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the
geographical fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are
in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”

Then skipping:

“The Führer declares that he has agreed with the discussed
operational plans and adds the following:

“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from
withdrawing on a closed front. The eastward advance should be
combined until the Russian Air Force will be unable to attack
the territory of the German Reich and on the other hand the
German Air Force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy
Russian war industrial territory. In this way we should be able
to achieve the annihilation of the Russian Army and to prevent
its regeneration. The first commitment of the forces should take
place in such a way as to make the annihilation of strong enemy
units possible.”

Then, skipping again:

“It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions
in the rear again. The number of 130 to 140 divisions as planned
for the entire operation is sufficient.”

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?

MR. ALDERMAN: Very convenient, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Then we shall not sit in open session tomorrow. We will sit again on Monday at 10 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]

SIXTEENTH DAY
Monday, 10 December 1945

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received a letter from Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. In answer to that the Tribunal wishes the defendants’ counsel to know that they will be permitted to make one speech only in accordance with Article 24 (h) of the Charter, and this speech will be at the conclusion of all the evidence.

At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the defendants’ counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they propose to call; but they will be strictly confined to the names of the witnesses and the matters to which their evidence will be relevant, and this submission must not be in the nature of a speech. Is that clear? In case there should be any misunderstanding, what I have just said will be posted up on the board in the defendants’ Counsel Room so that you can study it there.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose Friday, I had just reached the point in my discussion of aggression against the U.S.S.R. where, with the campaign in the West at an end, the Nazi conspirators had begun the development of their plans to attack the Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planning and action was in progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November that more detailed and definite instructions would be issued. These would be issued as soon as the general outline of the Army’s operational plans had been submitted to him and approved by him. We had thus reached the point in the story indicated on the outline submitted last Friday as Part 3 of the Plan Barbarossa.

By the 18th of December 1940, the general outline of the Army’s operational plan having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the High Command of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force for Barbarossa—Directive Number 21—was issued. This directive, which for the first time marks the plan to invade the Soviet Union, was specifically referred to in an order although the order was classified top secret. It also marked the first use of the code word Barbarossa to denote this operation.

The directive is Number 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in the course of my opening statement as Exhibit USA-31. Since it was fully discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now merely to recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence with which the order begins:

“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
in a quick campaign even before the end of the war with
England.”

On the same page it is stated:

“Preparations requiring more time to start are, if this has not
yet been done, to begin presently and are to be completed by 15
May 1941. Great caution has to be exercised that the intention
of the attack will not be recognized.”

The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts that the various services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) were to play therein, and calls for oral reports to Hitler by the commanders-in-chief, closing as follows:

“V.”—that is on Page 2—“I am expecting the reports of the
commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter
of instructions.

“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces
are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in
regard to their time.”

Signed by Hitler, and initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible name.

It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no mere planning exercise by the staff. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression, which was intended to occur and which actually did occur.

The various services which received the order certainly understood it as an order to prepare for action, and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive.

So we come to the military planning and preparation for the implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-132.

This document contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play the part. I feel, however, that it will be sufficient for the establishment of our point that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a small portion of the entry into the record, beginning on Page 1 of the English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry reads:

“30 January 1941.

“7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the
Barbarossa Case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed
Forces.”

I should note that “Ia” is in this case the abbreviation for a deputy chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy’s objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter many tasks for the Navy are listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to give the Tribunal an idea of all. I quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation:

“II. Objectives of War Against Russia . . . .

“d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: 1)
Lightning-like actions at the outbreak of the war by air force
units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic,
Black Sea, and Polar Sea.”

The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa almost six months before the operation actually got under way. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was one of the most cold-bloodedly premeditated attacks on a neighboring power in the history of the world. Similarly the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such references are contained in Document C-33, which I am now offering in evidence as Exhibit USA-133.

I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical the entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English translation and at Page 248 of the Diary itself.

“In regard to the impending operation Barbarossa for which all
S-boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer can only be
considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.”

On the 3rd of February 1941 the Führer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference also discussed the plans for “Sonnenblume,” which was the code name for the North African operation—“Sunflower.” Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Defendant Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well as several others, including Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant.

A report of this conference is contained in our Document Number 872-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-134.

During the course of this conference the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with their own strength and the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Führer.

At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan, which is at Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting extract, which, although written in a semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently clear to inform us that elaborate timetables had already been set out for the deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I quote:

“The proposed time schedule is charted on the map. First
Deployment Echelon”—Aufmarschstaffel—“now being transferred,
Front-Interior-East. Second Deployment Echelon from the middle
of March gives 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West, but
Army groups and Army High Commands are withdrawn from the West.
In the East there are already considerable reinforcements though
still in the rear area. From now on, ‘Attila’”—I might state
here parenthetically that this was the code word for the
operation for the occupation of unoccupied France—“Attila can
be carried out only with difficulty. Economic traffic is
hampered by transport movements. From the beginning of April,
Hungary will be approached about the march-through. Third
Deployment Echelon, from the middle of April. ‘Felix’ is now no
longer possible, as the main part of the artillery has been
shipped.”—Felix was the name for the proposed operation against
Gibraltar.—“In industry the full capacity timetable is in
force. No more camouflage. Fourth Deployment Echelon, from 25.
IV to 15. V, withdraws considerable forces from the West
(‘Seelöwe’ can no longer be carried out).”—“Seelöwe” (or Sea
Lion) was a code word for the planned operation against England,
and “Marita,” which we shall see a little later in the
quotation, was the code word for the action against
Greece.—“The concentration of troops in the East is clearly
apparent. The full capacity timetable is maintained. The
complete picture of the disposition of forces on the map shows 8
Marita divisions.

“Commander-in-Chief, Army, requests that he no longer have to
assign 5 control divisions for this; but might hold them ready
as reserves for commander in the West.

“Führer: ‘When Barbarossa commences the world will hold its
breath and make no comment.’”

This much, I believe, when read with the conference conclusions, which I shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February 1941—almost 5 months prior to 22 June, the date the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa, as follows; I am now reading from Page 6 of the English translation, which is on Page 7 of the German:

“Conclusions:

“1. Barbarossa.

“a. The Führer on the whole is in agreement with the operational
plan. When it is being carried out it must be remembered that
the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and
Leningrad.

“b. The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan of
the deployment of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.

“c. Agreements with neighboring states who are taking part may
not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for
camouflage. The exception is Romania with regard to reinforcing
the Moldau.

“d. It must, in any case, be possible to carry out Attila. (With
the means available.)

“e. The concentration for Barbarossa will be carried out as a
feint for Sea Lion and the subsidiary measure Marita.”

On 13th March 1941 the Defendant Keitel signed an operational directive to Führer Order Number 21, which was issued in the form of “Directives for Special Areas.” This detailed operational order is Number 447-PS in our numbered series, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-135.

This order which was issued more than 3 months in advance of the attack indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed, “Area of Operations and Executive Power,” and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is in progress in territory through which the Army is advancing, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power. During this period, however, the Reichsführer SS is entrusted with “special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in Paragraph 2b, which appears on Page 1 of the English translation and reads as follows:

“b) In the area of operations of the Army the Reichsführer SS
is, on behalf of the Führer, entrusted with special tasks for
the preparation of the political administration—tasks which
result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two
opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks the
Reichsführer SS shall act independently and under his own
responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme
Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him
shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the
Reichsführer SS that through the execution of his tasks military
operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged
directly through the OKH with the Reichsführer SS.”

The order then states that in time political administration will be set up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the relationship of these officials to the Army. This is contained in Paragraph 2c and Paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read:

“c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient
depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied
territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given
its own political administration. For the present it is to be
divided on the basis of nationality and according to the
positions of the Army groups into North (Baltic countries),
Center (White Russia), and South (Ukraine). In these territories
the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners
of the Reich who receive their orders from the Führer.

“3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas
under the political administration in the rear of the area of
operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

“The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the
Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the
military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a territorial
commander and the rights of a supreme Army commander or a
commanding general. In this capacity he is responsible primarily
for the following tasks:

“a) Close co-operation with the Commissioner of the Reich in
order to support him in his political tasks; b) exploitation of
the country and securing its economic values for use by German
industry.”

The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop more fully later in my presentation. This provision is also in Section I, Paragraph 4, which I shall read:

“4) The Führer has entrusted the uniform direction of the
administration of economy in the area of operations and in the
territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal,
who has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rü Amt’ with the
execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the
OKW/Wi Rü Amt.”

The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at some time who these people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?

MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Göring.

THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsführer of the SS at that time?

MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler.

THE PRESIDENT: Himmler?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and communication traffic, and I shall not read it here.