Chapter XXIII: Section III: of the order deals with the relations with certain other (3)

“However, I ask you to employ all available means in further
insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the
earliest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note
to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better. The
natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on
the trans-Siberian railroad before winter starts. After the
collapse of Russia, however, the position of the
Three-Power-Pact States in the world will be so gigantic that
the question of England’s collapse or the total destruction of
the British Isles will be only a matter of time. An America
totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced
with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the
British Empire which are important for the Three-Power-Pact
countries. I have the unshakeable conviction that a carrying
through of the New Order as desired by us will be a matter of
course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the
countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and
encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I
ask you to report in the near future, as often as possible and
in detail, on the political situation there.”

We have Ott’s reply to this telegram, dated 13 July 1941. This is our Document Number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-156. After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph on Page 3 of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in the English translation:

“Telegram; secret cipher system”—Sent 14 July from Tokyo;
arrived 14 July 1941—“As fast as possible.

“I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into
the war against Russia as soon as possible, especially using
arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram
cited above to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the
Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists, and friendly
businessmen. I believe that according to military preparations,
Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest
obstacle to this against which one has to fight is the disunity
within the activist group which, without unified command,
follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the
changed situation.”

On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. I shall present three documents covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943. The first is our Document 2911-PS which contains notes of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background I note that at this time German armies were sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastopol had just been announced.

I now offer our Document 2911-PS as Exhibit USA-157, and I quote the relevant extracts appearing in the English translation thereof:

“He, the German Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at
this time, when the situation was as described, because now a
question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint
conduct of the war. If Japan felt herself sufficiently strong
militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably
now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at
this time, it would lead to her (Russia) final moral collapse;
at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In
any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as
existed at present to eliminate once and for all the Russian
colossus in eastern Asia.

“He had discussed this question with the Führer, and the Führer
was of the same opinion; but he wanted to emphasize one point
right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt
sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no
circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be
allowed to bog down at the half-way mark, and we do not want to
urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable.”

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence our Document Number 2954-PS as Exhibit USA-158. This is a record of a conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943.

I note again for background that the strategic military situation in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat.

In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet armies had completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted very severe losses. Further north and west their winter offensive had removed large areas from the hands of the invader. Combined United States and British forces had already landed in North Africa.

You will remark as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop’s argument at this time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain of “So sorry, please,” likewise appears to have crept in.

I note in this record that the month of February 1943 had also seen the end of the organized Japanese resistance on the Island of Guadalcanal.

I now quote the relevant extracts from the minutes of the discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943, which appear in the English translation in the document book:

“Ambassador Oshima declared that he received a telegram from
Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The suggestion
of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a
common conference between the Japanese Government and the
Imperial headquarters during which the question was discussed in
detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following:
The Japanese Government absolutely recognize the danger which
threatens from Russia and completely understand the desire of
their German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war
against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese
Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into
the war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in
the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On
the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard
the Russian question.

“The Japanese Government have the intention to become aggressive
again in the future on other fronts.

“The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the
Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in
Tokyo. At present Germany wages the war against the common
enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly
behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that
all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their
forces not only to defeat England and America, but also Russia.
It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot
overstrain the German national strength. He was inwardly
concerned about certain forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the
opinion, and propagated the same, that doubtless, Germany could
emerge from the battle victoriously and that Japan should
proceed to consolidate her forces before she should further
exert herself to the fullest extent.”

I now skip several pages in the German text and resume the quotation:

“Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on
Russia by Japan and he declared that, after all, the fight on
the Burma front as well as in the south is actually more of a
maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China at
best very few ground forces are stationed. Therefore the attack
on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if
the necessary forces for that would be available.”

Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about 3 weeks later on 18 April 1943. The top-secret notes of this conference are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-159. I shall quote only one sentence:

“The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again
that, without any doubt, this year presented the most favorable
opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
which certainly would never again be as weak as she was at the
moment.”

I now wish to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is in a large measure responsible for the appearance of millions of Americans in uniform all over the world.

The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for an attack from across the Atlantic, and the other of fomenting war in the Pacific.

In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., I have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences relating to the United States. I shall take those documents up again in their relevant passages to show their particular application. I have also, in the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941, when the Japanese and German Governments respectively initiated and declared aggressive war against the United States.

Apart from the advantage and convenience of presentation, these documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese. Their intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere. That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United States was intimated by the Defendant Göring in a speech on 8 July 1938, when these conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were perfecting their plans against Czechoslovakia.

This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry, and the copy that we have was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret memorandum from Göring’s adjutant to General Udet, who was then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe. It is contained in our Document R-140, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-160.

I invite the Tribunal’s attention to the statement in the covering memorandum that the enclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes of the conference. I shall not go through the long speech in which Göring called for increased aircraft production and pointed to the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. I wish to quote just two sentences, which appear on Page 33 of the German text and Page 11 of the English translation. Quoting from the second full paragraph on Page 11 of the English translation, starting with the third sentence from the end of the paragraph:

“I still lack these rocket-motors which could make such flights
possible. I completely lack the bombers capable of round-trip
flights to New York with a 5-ton bomb load. I would be extremely
happy to possess such a bomber which would at last stuff the
mouth of arrogance across the sea.”

Göring’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that time, either technically or in the fact of the Nazi conspirators’ schedule of aggression that has been outlined here in the past several days.

During the period of their preparation for and the waging of aggressive war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that these conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war at that time. Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940 the prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which we have found in the files of the OKL, the German Air Force files. It is Document 376-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit Number USA-161. This document is a memorandum marked “Chefsache,” the German designation for top secret, from a Major Von Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe general.

Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that time the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which was the staff headed by the Defendant Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes as a “brief résumé on the military questions current here,” is dated the 29th of October 1940. It covers several questions. I shall quote to you numbered Paragraph 5, which appears at the bottom of the first page of the English translation and carries over to the reverse side of the one-sheet document:

“5) The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the
occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the
prosecution of a war against America at a later date.
Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.
Essential conditions are at the present:

“(a) No other operational commitment; (b) Portuguese neutrality;
(c) support of France and Spain.

“A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding
air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the
GAF.”—or the German Air Force.

The Nazis’ military interest in the United States is further indicated by Paragraph 7 which I read:

“General Bötticher has made repeated reference, especially in
his telegram 2314, dated 26th of October, to the fact that in
his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American
aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The
matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I
pointed out that the matter was specifically a GAF one but have
taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own
merits.”

Again, in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Führer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States. This top-secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is our Document C-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-162. I read from the first paragraph of that text just preceding the paragraph numbered (1):

“By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive Number 32,
for the further conduct of the war, I lay down the following
principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material
supplies:

“(1) In general:

“The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia
will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced
in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army
will allow, the armored units will be greatly increased.

“Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have
a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England
and, should the case arise, against America.

“The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force,
which must be greatly increased in strength.”

From these documents it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary plans of their own against the United States. The Nazis’ over-all plan with regard to the United States was, however, a complex one involving, in addition, collaboration with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific Far East, they again considered war against the United States.

I now refer again to Basic Order Number 24, regarding collaboration with Japan. This is our Document C-75, which I have put in as Exhibit USA-151. I have read it in its entirety into the record. The Tribunal will recall that in that basic order, which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in Subparagraph (3) (a) as “forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war.”

Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated, within the framework of that policy, the possibility of the United States’ entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were then instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on possessions of the United States practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire, as actually happened. Other possibilities of involvement of the United States were also discussed. This Basic Order Number 24 stated—and I am referring to Subparagraph (3) (c), on the top of Page 2 of the Document C-75:

“(c) The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that
Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it
needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United
States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even
after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital
importance to Germany.”

The order continues in an unnumbered paragraph, immediately below Subparagraph (3) (d):

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
entry of the United States into the war cannot be
prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
(Australia).”

In these passages there is a clear envisagement of United States involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States interests, if Japan were to capture Singapore, was also envisaged by the Defendant Raeder in his meeting of 18 March 1941 with Hitler and the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. These minutes are contained in our Document C-152, which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-122. I wish now to repeat the four sentences of Item 11 of the minutes of that conference, contained on Page 1 of the English translation. I am quoting the Defendant Raeder:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (tie-up
of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of the U.S.A. for war
against Japan, inferiority of the United States Fleet in
comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
preparations for this action, but according to all declarations
made by Japanese officers, she will carry it out only if Germany
proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore,
concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act
immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic
questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved
(Guam, the Philippines, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
possible.”

The Defendant Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of United States involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was urging on the Japanese. I refer again to his meeting of 23 February 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained in our Document 1834-PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-129.

The Tribunal will recall that in a passage I have already read, Subparagraph (2) near the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation, Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise by Japan was bound to keep the United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as the result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later Ribbentrop practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be involved. I quote here from the last paragraph at the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation:

“The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that if America
should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this
would mean that America had the intention to enter the war
sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to
avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be
by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of
the countries of the Three Power Pact. The Foreign Minister
further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the
British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be
canceled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to
all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to
send their navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far
East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries
of the Three Power Pact to bring the war to an end with the
greatest rapidity. He—the Foreign Minister—is convinced that
the Japanese Fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador
Oshima replied to this that unfortunately he does not think the
Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his
fleet in Japanese waters.”

In the paragraphs that follow, some of which have already been read into the record, Ribbentrop again stressed the mutual inter-dependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and suggested co-ordinated action.

I want to quote now only the last paragraph on Page 5, a difficult bit of Nazi cynicism which by now is quite familiar.

“The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question,
explicitly designated as theoretical, that the contracting
powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the
U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy
were fundamentally determined on this. After signing of the
Three Power Pact, we should proceed, if the occasion arises,
also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes
of the people in the United States, and under certain conditions
swing public opinion towards isolation. Naturally a situation
had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the
wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be
exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however,
was in no way acute at the time.”

Again, on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop, this time in a conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, discussed the possible involvement of the United States. Notes of this conference are contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I have already introduced as Exhibit USA-152; and I have read it into the record. The relevant statements appear in the bottom two paragraphs of Page 1 and the first full paragraph on Page 2 of the English translation. I shall not take the Tribunal’s time to read them again.

I should like to refer to one more document to show that the Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United States and could lead to the United States’ involvement in the contemplated Far Eastern conflict. This document is our 1881-PS, report of the conference between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4 April 1941. I have already offered, in my opening statement to the Tribunal 2 weeks ago, Document 1881-PS as Exhibit USA-33; and I read at that time a considerable portion of it into the record. Unless the Court prefers that I do not do so, it seems to me desirable at this point to re-read a few brief passages.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we might treat it as being in evidence.

MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to emphasize, however, that the passages which I read 2 weeks ago and which I had expected to re-read at this point show not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the United States. Furthermore, we have a document that shows the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war plans were.

I now refer again to Document Number 1538-PS, which has been offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-154, the secret telegram from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941. He talks about the conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in the event Germany should become involved in war with the United States.

In the paragraph numbered 1 this sentence also appears—I quote the last sentence in numbered Paragraph Number 1, “Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.”

May I at this point review the Nazi position with regard to the United States at this time, the spring of 1941. In view of their pressing commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R. set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in the war at that time. Nevertheless, they had been considering their own preliminary plan against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic island document which I offered.

They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth just as they would urge them to attack the U.S.S.R. soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. They were aware that the course along which they were pushing the Japanese in the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the United States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler this in so many words, and their own military men had fully realized the implications of the move against Singapore. They also knew that the Japanese Army and Navy were preparing operation plans against the U.S. They knew at least part of those plans.

The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things; they accepted the risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and pushed their eastern allies still further along that course.

In April 1941 Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the event Japan would have become involved in the war with the United States, Germany would immediately take the consequences and strike without delay.

I refer to our Document 1881-PS, the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941, which has already been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-33. I refer particularly to the first four paragraphs on Page 2 of the English translation. I think that has been read to you at least twice, and I perhaps need not repeat it.

Then, skipping two paragraphs, we see Hitler then encouraging Matsuoka in his decision to strike against the United States; and I invite your attention to the fourth paragraph on Page 2, which you have heard several times and which I shall not re-read.

Here in those passages were assurance, encouragement, and abetment by the head of the German State, the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of support did not end there.

I now offer our Document 2898-PS as Exhibit Number USA-163. This is another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo regarding his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister. It is dated the 30th of November 1941, exactly 1 week before Pearl Harbor. I will read from the first four paragraphs on Page 2 of the German text, which is the first paragraph of the English translation; and this passage, I am sure, has not been read to the Tribunal. No part of this document has been read.

“The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint
that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is
very great. The Japanese Government, since they sent Ambassador
Kurusu, have taken a firm stand as he told me. He is convinced
that this position is in our favor, and makes the United States
think that her entry into the European war would be risky
business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great
divergencies in the viewpoints of the two nations. These
differences of opinion concern, for example, the further
treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest”—and then the
German text has the legend “one group missing,” indicating that
one group of the secret code was garbled on transmission. It
would appear from the text that the missing words are
“difference of opinion”—“The biggest (one group missing),
however, resulted from the United States attempt to make the
three-power agreement ineffective. The United States suggested
to Japan that she conclude treaties of non-aggression with the
United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and other
countries in order to prevent Japan’s entry into the war on the
side of the Axis Powers. Japan, however, insisted upon
maintaining her treaty obligations, and for this reason American
demands are the greatest obstacles for adjusting
Japanese-American relations. He avoided discussing concessions
promised by the United States and merely mentioned that grave
decisions were at stake.

“The United States is seriously preparing for war and is about
to operate a considerable part of its navy from southern Pacific
bases. The Japanese Government are busy working out an answer in
order to clarify their viewpoint. But he has no particulars at
that moment. He thinks the American proposals as a whole
unacceptable.

“Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations, and she
hopes that if occasion arises Germany and Italy, according to
the Three Power Pact, would stand at her side. I answered that
there could be no doubt about Germany’s future position. The
Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood
from my words that Germany, in such a case, would consider her
relationship to Japan as that of a union by fate. I answered,
according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready to have
mutual agreement between the two countries over this situation.

“The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible
that he would come back to this point soon. The conversation
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression
that the United States note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory
even for the compromise-seeking politicians here. For these
circles America’s position, especially in the China question, is
very disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three Power Pact as
being the main obstacle between successful Japanese-United
States negotiations seems to point to the fact that the Japanese
Government are becoming aware of the necessity of close
co-operation with the Axis Powers.”

The time is now fast approaching for that day of infamy. I offer our Document 2987-PS as Exhibit USA-166. This document consists of extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano during the period 3 December to 8 December 1941. It consists of notes he jotted down in the course of his daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy. The Italian has been translated into both English and German, and copies of both the English and the German are in the document books.

I now quote from the beginning of the entry of 3 December, Wednesday:

“Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience
with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of
the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion
that they have reached a dead end. Then invoking the appropriate
clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on
America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and
proposes the signing of an agreement not to conclude a separate
peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling
like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the
right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was
pleased with the communication and said, ‘We are now on the
brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as
September 1939.’ What does this new event mean? In any case it
means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he
could not enter the war immediately and directly, he entered it
indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore,
this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming
further and further removed and that it is now easy—much too
easy—to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out
longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be
considered. Berlin’s answer will be somewhat delayed because
Hitler has gone to the southern Front to see General Kleist,
whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an
unexpected Soviet offensive.”

And then December 4, Thursday—that is 3 days before Pearl Harbor:

“Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious.
Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but
the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans
less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about
it.”

And December 5, Friday:

“A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After
delaying 2 days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the
Japanese; and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my
house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to
Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate
peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and
the latter was very glad I had not.”

It appears from the last entry I have read, that of December 5, that some sort of an agreement was reached.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan, without previous warning or declaration of war, commenced an attack against the United States at Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, 4 days after the Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on the United States, committing the last act of aggression which was to seal their doom. This declaration of war is contained in Volume IX of the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, of which I now ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice as Exhibit USA-164. An English translation is contained in our document book, and for the convenience of the Tribunal is Number 2507-PS.

The same day, 11 December, the fourth anniversary of which is tomorrow, the Congress of the United States resolved:

“That the state of war between the United States and the
Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United
States, is hereby formally declared.”

This declaration is contained as Document 272 in the official publication _Peace and War_, of which the Tribunal has already taken judicial notice as Exhibit USA-122. The declaration itself has been reproduced for the document books as our Document 2945-PS.

It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility, even probability, of such involvement as a result of the action they were encouraging. They were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans for attack against the United States, and they accepted the consequences by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United States should a United States-Japanese conflict result.

In dealing with captured documents of the enemy the completeness of the plan is necessarily obscured, but those documents which have been discovered and offered in evidence before this Tribunal show that the Japanese attack was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their collaboration policy and that their exhortations and encouragement of the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned.

I should like to read the Ciano diary entry for 8 December, the day after Pearl Harbor:

“A night telephone call from Ribbentrop. He is overjoyed about
the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I
am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final
advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain, that
America will enter the conflict and that the conflict will be so
long that she will be able to realize all her potential forces.
This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about
the event. He ended by admitting that, in the long run, I may be
right. Mussolini was happy, too. For a long time he has favored
a definite clarification of relations between America and the
Axis.”

The final document consists of the top-secret notes of a conference between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. It is our Document 2932-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-165. The immediate subject matter is the Pearl Harbor attack, but the expressions therein typify Nazi technique. I quote from the second paragraph of the English translation which has not been previously read:

“First the Führer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand
Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With
cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of
German-Japanese co-operation, which has now obtained its
culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

“General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and
emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now
come about between Germany and Japan.

“The Führer continues: ‘You gave the right declaration of war.’
This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly
and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as
long as possible. But if one sees the other is interested only
in putting one off, in shamming and humiliating one, and is not
willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike as hard
as possible, indeed, and not waste time declaring war. It was
heart-warming to him to hear of the first operations of the
Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times,
for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then
realized that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he
struck suddenly and without formality. He would continue to go
on this way in the future.”

If the Tribunal please, that ends my presentation of the various phases of aggressive warfare charged as Crimes against Peace in Count One of the Indictment. As I conclude this phase I hope the Tribunal will allow me to express my deep sense of obligation to Commander Sidney J. Kaplan, section chief, and to the members of his staff, who did the yeoman work necessary to assemble and prepare these materials that I have presented. These members of that staff, in the order in which the materials were presented, are: Major Joseph Dainow, Lieutenant Commander Harold Leventhal, Lieutenant John M. Woolsey, Lieutenant James A. Gorrell, Lieutenant Roy H. Steyer.

Commander Kaplan and his staff have fully measured up to the famous motto of his branch of the armed services, the United States Coast Guard, “Semper Paratus” (Always Prepared).

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]

SEVENTEENTH DAY
Tuesday, 11 December 1945

_Morning Session_

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the United States next offers in evidence some captured moving pictures through Commander Donovan, who had charge of taking them.

COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, the United States now offers in evidence Document Number 3054-PS, United States Exhibit Number 167, the motion picture entitled _The Nazi Plan_. This document contains several affidavits with exhibits, copies of which have been furnished to Defense Counsel. I ask the Tribunal whether it believes it to be necessary that I formally read the affidavits at this time. Since the motion pictures themselves will be presented to the Tribunal and thereafter be in its permanent record, I respectfully submit that the reading be waived.

In the past 3 weeks the Prosecution has presented to this Tribunal a vast amount of evidence concerning the nature of the Nazi conspiracy and what we contend to be its deliberate planning, launching, and waging of wars of aggression. That evidence has consisted of documentary and some oral proof, but the Nazi conspirators did more than leave behind such normal types of evidence. German proficiency in photography has been traditional. Its use as a propaganda instrument was especially well known to these defendants, and as a result the United States in 1945 captured an almost complete chronicle of the rise and fall of National Socialism as documented in films made by the Nazis themselves. It is from excerpts of this chronicle that we have compiled the motion picture now presented, entitled _The Nazi Plan_, which in broad outline sums up the case thus far presented under Counts One and Two of the Indictment.

The motion picture has been divided into four parts. This morning we first offer to the Tribunal Parts 1 and 2, respectively entitled “The Rise of the NSDAP, 1921 to 1933,” and “Acquiring Totalitarian Control of Germany, 1933 to 1935.” These will be concluded by 11:20, at which time we assume the Tribunal will order its customary morning adjournment. At 11:30 we shall present Part 3, entitled “Preparation for Wars of Aggression, 1935 to 1939.” This will be concluded shortly before 1 o’clock. At 2 p.m. we will offer Part 4, “Wars of Aggression, 1939 to 1944,” and this will be concluded by 3 p.m.

Parts 1 and 2 now to be presented, enable us to re-live those years in which the Nazis fought for and obtained the power to rule all life in Germany. We see the early days of terrorism and propaganda bearing final fruit in Hitler’s accession to the Chancellery in 1933, then the consolidation of power within Germany, climaxed by the Parteitag of 1934, in which the Nazis proclaimed to the nation their plans for totalitarian control. It is in simple and dramatic form the story of how a nation forsook its liberty.

I wish again to emphasize that all film now presented to the Tribunal, including, for example, pictures of early Nazi newspapers, is the original German film, to which we have added only the title in English. And now, if it please the Tribunal, we shall present Parts 1 and 2 of _The Nazi Plan_.

THE PRESIDENT: It may be convenient for the United States Prosecutor to know that the Tribunal propose to rise this afternoon at 4 o’clock instead of 5.

[_The film, The Nazi Plan, was then shown in the court room until 1125
hours, at which time a recess was taken._]

COMMANDER DONOVAN: May it please the Tribunal, in the films which have just been shown to the Tribunal we have watched the Nazi rise to power. In Part 3 of our documentary motion picture now to be presented, we see the use they made of that power and how the German nation was led by militaristic regimentation to preparation for aggressive war as an instrument of national policy. Part 3, “Preparation for Wars of Aggression, 1935-1939; 1935—Von Schirach urges Hitler Youth to follow principles of _Mein Kampf_.”

[_The showing of the film then continued and at the end a recess was
taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

COMMANDER DONOVAN: This morning we presented photographic evidence of the history of National Socialism from 1921 to September 1939. We saw the dignity of the individual in Germany destroyed by men dedicated to perverted nationalism, men who set forth certain objectives and then preached to a regimented people the accomplishment of those objectives by any necessary means, including aggressive war.

In September 1939 the Nazis launched the first of a series of catastrophic wars, terminated only by the military collapse of Germany. It is this final chapter in the history of National Socialism that the Prosecution now presents.

May I again remind the Tribunal that all film presented and all German narration heard is in the original form as filmed by the Nazis.

[_The showing of the film, part 4, then continued._]

COMMANDER DONOVAN: The Prosecution has concluded its presentation of the photographic summation entitled _The Nazi Plan_. We shall deliver for the permanent records of the Tribunal, as soon as possible, the original films projected today.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, just a brief announcement about the presentation that shall follow. The rest of the week will be consumed in the presentation of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, starting with exploitation of forced labor, concentration camps, persecution of the Jews, and Germanization and spoliation in occupied countries. We should like to call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that many of these crimes will be crimes attributed to the criminal organizations which will follow. The program following will be the criminal organizations, beginning with the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Reich Cabinet, the SA, the SS, and finally, the SD and Gestapo.

Mr. Dodd will now present “Exploitation of Forced Labor.”

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, we propose to submit during the next several days, as Colonel Storey has said a moment ago, evidence concerning the conspirators’ criminal deportation and enslavement of foreign labor, their illegal use of prisoners of war, their infamous concentration camps, and their relentless persecution of the Jews. We shall present evidence regarding the general aspects of these programs, and our French and Soviet colleagues will present evidence of the specific application of these programs in the West and the East respectively.

These crimes were committed both before and after Nazi Germany had launched her series of aggressions. They were committed within Germany and in foreign countries as well. Although separated in time and space, these crimes had, of course, an inter-relationship which resulted from their having a common source in Nazi ideology; for we shall show that within Germany the conspirators had made hatred and destruction of the Jews an official philosophy and a public duty, that they had preached the concept of the master race with its corollary of slavery for others, that they had denied and destroyed the dignity and the rights of the individual human being. They had organized force, brutality, and terror into instruments of political power and had made them commonplaces of daily existence. We propose to prove that they had placed the concentration camp and a vast apparatus of force behind their racial and political myths, their laws, and their policies. As every German Cabinet minister or high official knew, behind the laws and decrees in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ was not the agreement of the people or their representatives but the terror of the concentration camps and the police state. The conspirators had preached that war was a noble activity and that force was the appropriate means of resolving international differences; and having mobilized all aspects of German life for war, they plunged Germany and the world into war.

We say this system of hatred, savagery, and denial of individual rights, which the conspirators erected into a philosophy of government within Germany or into what we may call the Nazi constitution, followed the Nazi armies as they swept over Europe. For the Jews of the occupied countries suffered the same fate as the Jews of Germany, and foreign laborers became the serfs of the “master race,” and they were deported and enslaved by the million. Many of the deported and enslaved laborers joined the victims of the concentration camps, where they were literally worked to death in the course of the Nazi program of extermination through work. We propose to show that this Nazi combination of the assembly line, the torture chamber, and the executioner’s rack in a single institution has a horrible repugnance to the twentieth century mind.

We say that it is plain that the program of the concentration camp, the anti-Jewish program, and the forced labor program are all parts of a larger pattern, and this will become even more plain as we examine the evidence regarding these programs, and then test their legality by applying the relevant principles of international law.

The evidence relating to the Nazi slave labor program has been assembled in a document book bearing the letter “R”; and in addition, there is an appendix to the document book consisting of certain photographs contained in a manila folder. Your Honors will observe that on some of the books we have placed some tabs, so that it would be easier for the Tribunal to locate the documents. Unfortunately, we did not have a sufficient number of tabs to do the work completely, and that would account for tabs which are missing on some of the document books.

It may illuminate the specific items of evidence which will be offered later if we first describe in rather general terms the elements of the Nazi foreign labor policy. It was a policy of mass deportation and mass enslavement, as I said a minute ago, and it was also carried out by force, by fraud, by terror, by arson, by means unrestrained by the laws of war and laws of humanity, or the considerations of mercy. This labor policy was a policy as well of underfeeding and overworking foreign laborers, of subjecting them to every form of degradation, brutality, and inhumanity. It was a policy which compelled foreign workers and prisoners of war to manufacture armaments and to engage in other operations of war directed against their own countries. It was a policy, as we propose to establish, which constituted a flagrant violation of the laws of war and of the laws of humanity.

We shall show that the Defendants Sauckel and Speer are principally responsible for the formulation of the policy and for its execution: that the Defendant Sauckel, the Nazis’ Plenipotentiary General for Manpower, directed the recruitment, deportation, and the allocation of foreign civilian labor, that he sanctioned and directed the use of force as the instrument of recruitment, and that he was responsible for the care and the treatment of the enslaved millions; that the Defendant Speer, as Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions, Director of the Organization Todt, and member of the Central Planning Board, bears responsibility for the determination of the numbers of foreign slaves required by the German war machine, was responsible for the decision to recruit by force and for the use under brutal, inhumane, and degrading conditions of foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the manufacture of armaments and munitions, the construction of fortifications, and in active military operations.

We shall also show in this presentation that the Defendant Göring, as Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, is responsible for all of the crimes involved in the Nazi slave labor program. Finally, we propose to show that the Defendant Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and the Defendant Frank, as Governor of the Government General of Poland, and the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, as Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands, and the Defendant Keitel, as Chief of the OKW, share responsibility for the recruitment by force and terror and for the deportation to Germany of the citizens of the areas overrun or subjugated by the Wehrmacht.

The use of vast numbers of foreign workers was planned before Germany went to war and was an integral part of the conspiracy for waging aggressive war. On May 23, 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler’s study at the Reich Chancellery. Present were the Defendants Göring, Raeder, and Keitel.

I now refer to Document L-79, which has already been entered in evidence as Exhibit USA-27. The document presents the minutes of this meeting at which Hitler stated, as Your Honors will recall, that he intended to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity; but I wish to quote from Page 2 of the English text starting with the 13th paragraph as follows. In the German text, by the way, the passage appears at Page 4, Paragraphs 6 and 7. Quoting directly from the English text:

“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be
able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war than
in peace.

“The population of non-German areas will perform no military
service and will be available as a source of labor.”

We say the slave labor program of the Nazi conspirators was designed to achieve two purposes, both of which were criminal. The primary purpose, of course, was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine by compelling these foreign workers, in effect, to make war against their own countries and their allies. The secondary purpose was to destroy or weaken peoples deemed inferior by the Nazi racialists or deemed potentially hostile by the Nazi planners of world supremacy.

These purposes were expressed by the conspirators themselves.

I wish to refer at this point and to offer in evidence Document 016-PS, which is Exhibit USA-168. This document was sent by the Defendant Sauckel to the Defendant Rosenberg on the 20th of April 1942, and it describes Sauckel’s labor mobilization program. I wish to quote now from Page 2 of the English text, starting with the sixth paragraph; and in the German text, again, it appears at Page 2 of the second paragraph. Quoting from the text directly:

“The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all
the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by
our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler,
for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition
of the homeland. The raw materials as well as the fertility of
the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be
used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and
her allies.”

The theory of the master race underlay the conspirators’ labor policy in the East as well.