Chapter XIX: Part II: is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.” (6)

Page 4, My Lord—I would like, if I might, to read the middle paragraph:

“In this struggle for existence, forced upon the German people
by England and France, the Reich Government are not disposed to
await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow
them to carry the war over Belgium and the other Netherlands
into German territory.”

And, My Lord, I just emphasize this sentence and then I read no further:

“They have, therefore, now issued the command to German troops
to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military
means at the disposal of the Reich.”

My Lord, it is unnecessary, in my submission, to emphasize the falsity of that statement. The world now knows that for months preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This document is saying the orders to do so have now been issued.

My Lord, a similar document, similar in terms altogether was handed to the representatives of the Netherlands Government; My Lord, TC-60—that will be GB-113, which is the last document but one in the bundle. My Lord, that is a memorandum to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands.

My Lord, I only desire to emphasize the second paragraph of TC-60:

“In defense against the imminent attack the German troops have
now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two
countries . . . .”

My Lord, the last document, TC-59, which I formerly put in, that is GB-111.

My Lord, that is the dignified protest of the Belgian Government against the crime which was committed against her. My Lord, those are the facts supporting the charges of the violation of treaties and assurances against these three countries and supporting the allegation of the making of an aggressive war against them. My Lord, in the respectful submission of the Prosecution here the story is a very plain, a very simple one, a story of perfidy, dishonor, and shame.

COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, it is my task to present the evidence on the wars of aggression and wars in breach of treaties against Greece and Yugoslavia. The evidence which I shall put in to the Tribunal has been prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Lieutenant Colonel Krucker.

The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place in the early hours of the morning of the 6th of April 1941, constituted direct breaches of the Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Those breaches are charged, respectively, at Paragraphs I and XIII of Appendix C of the Indictment. Both have already been put in by my learned friend, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who also explained the obligation of the German Government to the Governments of Yugoslavia and Greece under those pacts.

In the case of Yugoslavia the invasion further constituted a breach of an express assurance by the Nazis, which is charged at Paragraph XXVI of Appendix C. This assurance was originally given in a German Foreign Office release made in Berlin on the 28th of April 1938 but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on the 6th of October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag, and it is in respect of this last occasion that the assurance is specifically pleaded in the Indictment.

May I ask the Tribunal to turn now to the first document in the document book, which is Book Number 5. The first document is 2719-PS, which is part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-58. This is the text of the German Foreign Office release on the 28th of April 1938, and I would read the beginning and then the last paragraph but one on the page:

“Berlin, the 28th of April 1938. The State Secretary of the
German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives.

“As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich we
have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland,
Liechtenstein and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as
final and inviolable. On this point the following special
declarations have been made . . . .”

And then to the last paragraph:

“3. Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government have been informed by
authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims
beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case
remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on the 3rd of April
of that year the Führer and Chancellor stated that in regard to
the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the
same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there
which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military
protection for them.”

Then, if I may, I will pass to the second document in the book, TC-92, and offer that as Exhibit GB-114. This is an extract from a speech made by Hitler on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on June 1, 1939. I will read the extract in full:

“The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a
spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of
the tragic confusion of the World War. The German soldier then
learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent.
I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual
respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural, and
economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’
present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and
at the same time, on that account we derive from it the hope
that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop
in the future and to grow ever closer.

“In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also
perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange
of views which—and of this I am convinced—in this sense can
only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this
all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship
of Germany and Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events
we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all
time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two
peoples and countries but can also represent an element of calm
to our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who
are disposed to perform really constructive work.”

As we now know this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already decided upon the European war. I think I am right in saying it was a week after the Reich Chancellery conference, known as the Schmundt note, to which the Tribunal has been referred more than once. The reference to “nerve-racked continent” might perhaps be attributed to the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months.

Now I pass to a document which is specifically pleaded at Paragraph XXVI as the assurance breached; it is the next document in the bundle, TC-43—German assurance to Yugoslavia of the 6th of October 1939. It is part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-80. This is an extract from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_:

“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed
Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would
also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in
peace and friendship with her.”

Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of 1899 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and under the assurances which I have read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as we now know, been sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg, on the 12th and 13th of August 1939.

We will pass to the next document in the bundle, which is TC-77. That document has already been put in as GB-48; and the passages to which I would draw Your Lordship’s attention already have been quoted, I think, by my learned friend, the Attorney General. Those passages are on Page 2 in the last paragraph from “Generally speaking . . .” until “. . . neutral of this kind,” and then again on Pages 7 and 8, the part quoted by the Attorney General and emphasized particularly by Colonel Griffith-Jones at the foot of Page 7 on the second day of the meeting, the words beginning “In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners . . .” to “. . . Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West.”

Both of those passages have been quoted before; and if I might sum up the effect of the meeting as revealed by the document as a whole, it shows Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop, only 2 months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, seeking to persuade the Italians to make war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany commences hostilities against Poland, as Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano, while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia and himself anxious to secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European war.

Despite all the persuasion which Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy maintained her position and did not enter the war when the Germans invaded Poland, while the Germans themselves were not yet ready to strike in the Balkans. It was just for this reason that on the 6th of October through Hitler’s speech they repeated the assurance they had given in April 1938. It is, of course, a matter of history that after the defeat of the Allied armies in May and June 1940 the Italian Government declared war on France and that subsequently at 3 o’clock in the morning of the 28th October 1940 the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government with a 3 hours’ ultimatum upon the expiry of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece.

If I may quote to the Tribunal the words in which His Majesty’s Minister reported that event, “The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: You have referred to a document?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not in any of my documents. It is merely carrying the story to the next document:

“The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding
place in Greek history, and whatever the future may bring, his
foresight in quietly preparing his country for war, and his
courage in resisting without demur the Italian ultimatum when
delivered in the small hours of that October morning will surely
obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft.
He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated, and this
reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.”

I turn now to the next document in the bundle. That is 2762-PS, a letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which I put in as GB-115. Although not dated, I think it is clear from the contents that it was written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece. It has been quoted in full by the Attorney General, but I think it would assist the Tribunal if I read just the last two paragraphs of the extract:

“Yugoslavia must become disinterested if possible, however, from
our point of view interested in co-operating in the liquidation
of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugoslavia, it is
useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.

“Unfortunately I must stress the fact that waging a war in the
Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore any threatening
move towards Yugoslavia would be useless since the impossibility
of a materialization of such threats before March is well known
to the Serbian General Staff. Therefore Yugoslavia must, if at
all possible, be won over by other means and other ways.”

You may think the reference in the first two lines to his thoughts—having been with Mussolini for the last 14 days—probably indicates that it was written in about the middle of November, shortly after the Italian attack.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you give us the date of the Italian attack?

COL. PHILLIMORE: 28th October 1940.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

COL. PHILLIMORE: As the Tribunal will see from the succeeding document, it was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive in the spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the north. This letter shows that it was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to co-operate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude toward the liquidation of the other Balkan states.

I pass now to the next document in the bundle, 444-PS, which becomes Exhibit GB-116. It is a top-secret directive issued from the Führer’s headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by the Defendant Jodl, and dated the 12th of November 1940. I will read the first two lines and then pass to Paragraph 4 on the third page:

“Directive Number 18. The preparatory measures of Supreme
Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future
are to be made along the following lines . . .”

Omitting the serious dealings with operations against Gibraltar and an offensive against Egypt, I will read Paragraph 4 on the third page:

“Balkans . . . The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will make
preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the
Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus
make possible the use of German Air Force units against targets
in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those
English air bases which are threatening the Romanian oil area.

“In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep
Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate
strength of 10 divisions is to be the basis for the planning and
the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count
on the railway leading through Yugoslavia for moving these
forces into position.

“So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment,
preparations will be made for an early increase in the German
Army mission in Romania, the extent of which must be submitted
to me.

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations
for the use of German Air Force units in the southeast Balkans
and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria
in accordance with the intended ground operations.”

I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next document in the bundle, 1541-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit GB-117, is the directive issued for the actual attack on Greece. Before reading it, it might be convenient if I summarized the position of the Italian invading forces at that time as this is one of the factors mentioned by Hitler in the directive. I can put it very shortly. I again use the words in which His Majesty’s Minister reported:

“The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the
highest, and our own naval and land successes at Taranto and in
the western desert have done much to maintain it.

“With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and
modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior
Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the
bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not
unworthy of the ancient traditions of their country and that
they, like their distant forefathers, are prepared to fight
against odds to maintain their freedom.”

In fact the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue. Accordingly this directive was issued on 13 December 1940; it is top-secret Directive Number 20 for the Operation Marita. The distribution included, of course, the Commander of the Navy, that would, of course, be the Defendant Raeder; one to the Commander of the Air Force, which would be the Defendant Göring; one to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; and one to the Command Staff, which I take it, would be the Defendant Jodl. I shall read the first two paragraphs and then summarize the next two, if I may:

“The result in the battles of Albania is not yet decisive.
Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly
necessary that the British endeavor to create air bases under
the protection of a Balkan front—which would be dangerous above
all to Italy as well as to the Romanian oil fields—be foiled.

“My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task
force in southern Romania within the next months (b) after the
setting in of favorable weather—probably in March—to send this
task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way
of Bulgaria and, if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek
mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be
expected.”

The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and Paragraph 4 deals with the Operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:

“The military preparations which will produce exceptional
political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all
the necessary measures by the High Command. The transport
through Hungary and the arrival in Romania will be reported step
by step by the High Command of the Armed Forces and are to be
explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission
in Romania. Consultations with the Romanians or the Bulgarians
which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the
Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of
scouting missions and advanced parties.”

I think I need not trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next document, 448-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-118, is again a top-secret directive carrying the plan a little further; it deals with decidedly different aspects, the direct support of the Italian forces in Albania. I read, if I may, the first short paragraph and then the paragraph at the foot of the page.

“The situation in the Mediterranean theater of operations
demands German assistance for strategical, political, and
psychological reasons due to employment of superior forces by
England against our allies.”

And in Paragraph 3 after dealing with the forces to be transferred to Albania the directive sets out what the duties of the German forces will be:

“a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an
emergency case should new crises arise there.

“b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later
attacking with the aim:

“To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a
far-reaching operation.

“To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order
to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s army.”

That directive was signed by Hitler and, as can be seen on the original which I have put in, it was initialed by both the Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Jodl. Here again, of course, a copy went to the Defendant Raeder, and I take it that the copy sent to foreign intelligence would probably reach the Defendant Ribbentrop.

I pass to C-134, the next document in the bundle, which becomes Exhibit GB-119. This records a conference which took place on the 19th and 20th of January between the Defendant Keitel and the Italian General Guzzoni and which was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at which the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present.

I need not trouble the Tribunal with the meeting with the Italians, but if you would pass to Page 3 of the document, there is a paragraph there in the speech, which the Führer made, which is perhaps just worth reading—the speech by the Führer on the 20th of January 1941, in the middle of Page 3. It sets out that the speech was made after the conference with the Italians and then shows who was present.

On the German side I would call your attention to the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff. That is, of course, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl; and on the Italian side, the Duce, Ciano, and then three generals. It is the last paragraph that I would wish to read:

“The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold purpose:

“a. An operation against Greece;

“b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;

“c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Romania.

“Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces;
altogether, therefore, very strong forces whose deployment far
from our base requires a long time.

“Desirable that this deployment is completed without
interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late
as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the
last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest
possible moment.”

I pass to the next document, 1746-PS, which I offer as GB-120. That document is in three parts. It consists, in the first place, of a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians on the 8th of February. The second part and the third part deal with later events, and I will, if I may, come back to them at an appropriate time. I would read the first and the last paragraphs on the first page of this document:

“Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of
the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German High
Command—General Field Marshal List—in connection with the
possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their
commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she
should involve herself in the war.”

And then the last paragraph on the page shows the plan being concerted with the Bulgarians—Paragraph 3:

“The Bulgarian and the German General Staffs will take all
measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the
operations and to assure in this way the most favorable
conditions for the execution of the German operations as
planned.

“The representatives of the two general staffs consider it
suitable to inform their governments that it will be advisable
of necessity to take secrecy and surprise into consideration
when the Three Power Treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to
assure the success of the military operations.”

I pass then to the next document, C-59. I offer that as Exhibit GB-121. It is a further top-secret directive of the 19th of February. I need not, I think, read it. All that is set out of importance is the date for the Operation Marita. It sets out that the bridge across the Danube is to be begun on the 28th of February, the river crossed on the 2d of March, and the final orders to be issued on the 26th of February at the latest.

It is perhaps worth noting that on the original which I have put in, the actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of the Defendant Keitel.

It is perhaps just worth setting out the position of Bulgaria at this moment. Bulgaria adhered to the Three Power Pact on the 1st of March . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What year?

COL. PHILLIMORE: In 1941, and on the same day the entry of German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and the directives to which I have referred the Tribunal.

The landing of British troops in Greece on the 3rd of March in accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by His Majesty’s Government may have accelerated the movement of the German forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen, the invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time.

I pass now to the next document in the bundle, C-167, which I put in as GB-122. I am afraid it is not a very satisfactory copy, but the original which I have put in shows that both the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were present at the interview with Hitler which this extract records. It is a short extract from a report by the Defendant Raeder on an interview with Hitler in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps interesting as showing the ruthless nature of the German intention.

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy asks for confirmation that
the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event
of a peaceful settlement.

“Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any
settlement.”

The above document . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th of March at 1600 hours.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, on the original document.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows, it is submitted, that the Nazi conspirators in accordance with their principle of liquidating any neutral who did not remain disinterested had made every preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with and getting the better of their Italian allies.

They were not, however, yet ready to deal with Yugoslavia towards which their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting victim. On the 25th of March 1941 in accordance with this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact was secured. This adherence followed a visit on the 15th of February 1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetković and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markovic to the Defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on the 25th of March. On this occasion the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance, which are set out in the next document in the bundle, 2450-PS, which I put in as GB-123. If I might read from half-way down the page:

“Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.

“At the same time when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia
to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the Governments of the Axis
Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following
identical notes:

“‘Mr. Prime Minister:

“‘In the name of the German Government and at their behest I
have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

“‘On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the
Tri-Partite Pact the German Government confirm their
determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.’”

That letter was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, who you will remember, was present at the meeting in August of 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia. In fact it was 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade Yugoslavia and 2 days after the letter was written that they issued the necessary order.

If I might read the second letter:

“Mr. Prime Minister:

“With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection
with the entry of Yugoslavia into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have
the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of
the Reich Cabinet”—Reichsregierung—“that in the agreement
between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government the
Governments of the Axis Powers during this war will not direct a
demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of
troops through Yugoslavian national territory.”

The position at this stage, the 25th of March 1941, was therefore, that German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler’s own term in his letter to Mussolini, “become disinterested” in the cleaning-up of the Greek question.

The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact appears very clearly from the next document in the bundle, 2765-PS, which I put in as GB-124. It is an extract from the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano, and if I might just read the first paragraph:

“The Führer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s
joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her
position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed
military action against Greece, for if one considers that for
350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication
through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav
border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia
an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an
extremely foolhardy venture.”

Again it is a matter of history that on the night of the 26th of March, when the two Yugoslav Ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic and his colleagues effected their removal by a _coup d’état_; and Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of the 27th of March ready to defend, if need be, her independence. The Yugoslav people had found themselves.

The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapidity, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on.

I ask the Tribunal to turn back to 1746-PS, which I put in as GB-120, to the second part on Page 3 of the document consisting of a record of a conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia dated 27th of March 1941.

It shows that those present included the Führer; the Reich Marshal, that is of course, the Defendant Göring; Chief, OKW, that is the Defendant Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab, that is the Defendant Jodl. Then over the page—“later on the following persons were added.” I call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that those who came in later included the Defendant Ribbentrop.

If I might read the part of Hitler’s statement set out on Page 4:

“The Führer describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the _coup
d’état_. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in
regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to
the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were
never pro-Germans.”

I think I can pass on to the second paragraph:

“The present moment is for political and military reasons
favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the
country and the country’s attitude towards us. For if the
overthrow of the government would have happened during the
Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have
been considerably more serious.”

And then the next paragraph to which I would particularly draw the Tribunal’s attention:

“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in
order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit.
No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented.
Assurances of the Yugoslav Government which cannot be trusted
anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will
start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

“It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible.
An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate
in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia
is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of
Bulgaria too. Romania’s main task is the protection against
Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian Ministers have already
been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed
to the Duce.

“Politically it is especially important that the blow against
Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the
military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In
this way Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the
campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a
favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to
our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment
(autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against
Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and
Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to
these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for
Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

“This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all
preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav
collapse will take place within the shortest time.”

Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that third paragraph—2 days after the pact had been signed and the assurances given—because there has been a _coup d’état_ and it is just possible that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia is decided upon without any question of taking the trouble to ascertain the views of the new government.

Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of the document, which I would like to read:

“5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as
possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force
ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in
attacks by waves . . . .”

I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruthlessly this bombing was done when the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o’clock on the following Sunday morning, the morning of the 6th.

THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April?

COL. PHILLIMORE: The 6th of April.

Then again still in the same document, the last part of it, Part V at Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by the Defendant Jodl and I would read one small paragraph at the top of the following page, Page 6:

“In the event that the political development requires an armed
intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to
attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to
destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national
territory.”

I read that because the plan is issued from the office of the Defendant Jodl.

Now passing to the next document in the bundle, C-127, I put that in as Exhibit GB-125. It is an extract from the order issued after the meeting from the minutes of which I have just read, that is the meeting of the 27th of March recorded in 1746-PS, Part II. It is worth reading the first paragraph:

“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political
situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her
protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an
enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.”

I pass to the next document, 1835-PS, which I put in evidence as GB-126. It is an original telegram containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini forwarded through the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini of the course decided on and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce is given his orders. If I might read the first five paragraphs:

“Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest
means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which
may result from it.

“(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the most
dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from
the purely military point of view, German intervention in the
war in Thrace would not be at all justified as long as the
attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous, and she could threaten
the left flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front.

“(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have
endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together
by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet
with success, or they were begun too late to produce any
definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the
imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.

“(3) I do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but
nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any
mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole
position.

“(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary
measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary
military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has
been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request
you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in
the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that
you should cover and screen the most important passes from
Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces.

“These measures should not be considered as designed for a long
period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent
for at least 14 days to 3 weeks a crisis arising.

“I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce
your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available
means and with utmost speed.

“(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which
we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only
personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything
about them. These measures will completely lose their value
should they become known . . . .”

Then he goes on to emphasize further the importance of secrecy.

I pass to R-95; the next document in the bundle, which I put in as Exhibit GB-127. It was referred to by my learned friend, the Attorney General. It is an operational order signed by General Von Brauchitsch which is merely passing to the armies the orders contained in Directive Number 25, which was the Document C-127, an extract of which I put in as Exhibit GB-125. I won’t trouble the Tribunal with reading it.

I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as GB-114. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this morning, the 6th of April, on which Hitler issued the proclamation from which this passage is an extract:

“From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s
steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theater of war. British
diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War,
succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her
and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes.

“The documents published today afford”—that refers to the
_German White Book_ which they published of all the documents
leading up to the invasion—“The documents published today
afford a glimpse of a practice which in accordance with very old
British recipes is a constant attempt to induce others to fight
and bleed for British interests.

“In the face of this I have always emphasized that: (1) The
German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that
(2) we shall never as in the World War tolerate a power
establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a
given time, of being able to advance thence from the southeast
into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free
of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in
the south.”

Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal’s particular attention:

“In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has
been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above
all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have
consciously put out of mind everything that once took place
between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian
people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made
efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all
difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and
various nations allied to Germany.”

One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August of 1939 and the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop and the others on 27th March a few days earlier.

I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which has already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as Exhibit USA-34. It is a record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on 7th November 1943. At Page 4 there is a short passage which sets out his views two and a half years later on the action taken in April 1941. I refer to Paragraph 11 on Page 4:

“What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of
affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in
consequence of the ‘extra-turn’ of the Italians against Greece.
The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from
Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all
agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part
which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become
necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on
Greece from the north was not executed merely as an operation in
aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from
gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Romanian oil
area from that country.”

If I might summarize the story:

The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as December or November 1940 and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of international law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that the German forces might have an unsuspecting victim.

In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to secure her co-operation for the offensive against Greece or at least to ensure that she would abstain from any interference.

The _coup d’état_ of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then decided that irrespective of whether or not his government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated.

It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia’s intentions when it would be so little trouble now that the German troops were deployed to destroy her militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly in the early hours of Sunday morning, the 6th of April, German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece simultaneously with the formality of handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin informing him that the German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same reply as in the preceding October.

That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and Yugoslavia. But as I have the honor to conclude the British case I would like, if the Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed, to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I can do it, I think, in 5 minutes.

It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression which was used with singular consistency not only by the Nazis themselves but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus there was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland.

The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the night of April 8-9 and was well under way as a military operation before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th and to the Norwegian Minister between half past 4 and 5 on that morning.

The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than 5 o’clock, in most cases earlier in the small hours of the 10th of May, while the formal ultimatum delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations was not presented until afterwards.

In the case of Holland the invasion began between 3 and 4 in the morning. It was not until about 6 when The Hague had already been bombed that the German Minister asked to see M. Van Kleffens. In the case of Belgium where the bombing began at 5, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until 8.

The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 and it was at 7 when the German Minister asked to see M. Beck.

Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of the 28th of October in 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a 3-hour ultimatum to General Metaxas.

The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both began in the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler—a proclamation from which I read an extract—at 5 o’clock that Sunday morning some 2 hours before Belgrade was bombed.

In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 20 minutes past 5 that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory.

The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is in itself further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning at night to secure an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian, of the state which has no respect for its own pledged word nor for the rights of any people but its own.

One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on after a short adjournment? That’s what you were intending to do?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We’ll adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding with the presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall take about 15 minutes to offer two further documents relating to the aggression against Austria.

These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book, supplement to Document Book N. Both documents are correspondence of the British Foreign Office. They have been made available to us through the courtesy of our British colleagues.

First I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA-127. This is in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from Ambassador Nevile Henderson at the British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It reads:

“My Lord:

“With reference to your telegram Number 79 of March 11th, I have
the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a
letter which I addressed to Baron Von Neurath in accordance with
the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on
the same evening.

“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron Von
Neurath at the same time.”

The enclosure is the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows:

“Dear Reich Minister:

“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was
delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, _inter alia_, the
resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the
Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of
the members were to be National Socialists and the readmission
of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping
order in Vienna.

“I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to
the German Government that if this report is correct His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to
register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of
coercion backed by force against an independent state in order
to create a situation incompatible with its national
independence.

“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been
informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest
reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.”

I now offer Document 3287-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-128. This consists of a transmittal from the British Embassy, Berlin, to the British Foreign Office of Defendant Von Neurath’s letter of response dated 12 March 1938. The letter is identified in the document with the letter “L”.

First the Defendant Von Neurath objected to the fact that the British Government were undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s independence. I quote from the second paragraph of his letter:

“In the name of the German Government I must point out here that
the Royal British Government have no right to assume the role of
a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of
diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German
Government never left any doubt with the Royal British
Government that the formation of relations between Germany and
Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern
of the German people and that it did not affect a third power.”

Then in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events. I quote the last two long paragraphs of the letter; in the English translation I start at the bottom of Page 1 of the letter:

“Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced on the
evening of the 9th of March the surprising and arbitrary
resolution decided on by himself to hold an election within a
few days which, under the prevailing circumstances and
especially according to the details provided for the execution
of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of
oppressing politically the predominant majority of the
population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this
procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of
Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s
internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the
then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for
an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore a
crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of
March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and
in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich
used forceful pressure to bring about this development.
Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former
Chancellor that the German Government had presented the Federal
President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention;
according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed
candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the
proposals of the German Government otherwise the invasion of
Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the
matter is that the question of sending military or police forces
from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed
Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the
press, to the German Government urgently asking for the dispatch
of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace
and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately
threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German
Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to
it.

“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the
attitude of the German Government as asserted in your letter
could lead to some unforseeable reactions. A complete picture of
the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at
noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the
German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take
place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise
its influence contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate
aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in
Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of
self-government of the German people.”

That ends the quotation.

Now in the light of the evidence which has already been presented to the Tribunal, this version of the events given by the Defendant Von Neurath is a hollow mockery of the truth.

We have learned, from the portions quoted from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit Number USA-72, Jodl’s diary, the entry for March 10, 1938, the fact that Von Neurath was taking over the duties of the Foreign Office while Ribbentrop was detained in London, that the Führer wished to send an ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet, that he had dispatched a letter to Mussolini of his reasons for taking action, and that army mobilization orders were given.

We have seen the true facts about the ultimatum from two different documents. I refer to 812-PS, Exhibit Number USA-61, report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Bürckel, dated 6 July 1939, which was transmitted to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart on 22 August 1939. The portions reporting on the events of March 11 have already been read to the Tribunal.

I also refer to Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, the transcripts of Göring’s telephone conversations, relevant portions of which I have already read to the Tribunal.

These documents emphatically show and with unmistakable clarity, that the German Nazis did present an ultimatum to the Austrian Government that they would send troops across the border if Schuschnigg did not resign and if Defendant Seyss-Inquart were not appointed Chancellor.