Chapter XLIV: Section 51: 135, entitled "Denial of passports to members of Communist (14)

Present were Senator John Sherman Cooper (presiding), and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; W. David Slawson, assistant counsel; and Richard A. Frank, attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.

Senator COOPER. The Commission will be in order.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this Commission is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I do.

Mr. SLAWSON. Mr. Ambassador, could you please state for the record your full name and address?

Ambassador THOMPSON. My name is Llewellyn E. Thompson. I reside at 1913 23d Street NW., Washington.

Mr. SLAWSON. And could you state your present position with the U.S. Government and the positions you have held since late 1959?

Ambassador THOMPSON. In 1959 I was Ambassador in Moscow, and then I was transferred to the State Department as Ambassador at Large, and have been that since that time. In addition, I am now Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State.

Mr SLAWSON. Thank you. Ambassador Thompson has been asked to testify today on any contacts he may have had with Lee Harvey Oswald while the Ambassador was in his post with the American Embassy in Moscow and on any knowledge he may have on pertinent Soviet practices or American practices at that time which might relate to the treatment of Mr. Oswald.

Ambassador Thompson, could you state all of the times and describe them when you heard about Lee Harvey Oswald's dealings with your Embassy at Moscow while he was in Russia, either in late 1959 or thereafter?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes; the only recollection I have is that when I returned from a trip to the United States in November 1959, or some time after that, the consul informed me about the case, and said this man had asked to renounce his citizenship. I recall asking him----

Mr. DULLES. Was that Consul Richard E. Snyder?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes; I am almost certain of that. I recall asking him why he didn't accept the renunciation, and he explained that in cases of this kind he normally waited to make sure the man was serious, and also in order to normally consult the State Department.

I believe he told me at that time that the man had not come back again. And I believe that is the only recollection I have of the case at all at the time I was in Moscow.

Mr. SLAWSON. And that includes any other time thereafter, including through 1962?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes; of course I read the press and was aware of the case when it came up in the Department. There was some discussion of it. But no knowledge that I think would bear on the case.

I recall, I think, being in Germany at the time I read in the press that he was leaving the country--leaving Moscow, that is. But I don't recall having been consulted about his application to leave.

Mr. SLAWSON. Did you have any personal dealings or any knowledge of your subordinates' dealings with Marina Oswald, Lee Oswald's wife, when she applied to accompany him back to the United States in early 1961 and frequently thereafter?

Ambassador THOMPSON. None that I recall.

Mr. SLAWSON. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you could make any comments you would like to make on the policy which Consul Snyder and others testifying for the Department of State have described in their treatment of Americans who sought to renounce their citizenship when they came to Moscow, and how these Americans were handled?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Well, I am aware that we have had cases where someone would say they wanted to renounce their citizenship and then after a few days in the Soviet Union change their minds. And while I don't recall any specific cases, I do know we have had cases of that sort.

Mr. SLAWSON. Was there any particular time in your career when this sort of thing was more frequent than other times--any groups of people where it might have occurred?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Well, I know that prior to my arrival in Moscow in 1941, when I was Secretary in the Embassy, that there had been a great influx from the United States, particularly of people of Finnish origin, who had returned to the Soviet Union. I think that some of those people at least had not renounced their citizenship; they had come over there under the impression that they would receive very good treatment, and a great many of them applied subsequently to return to the United States. But many of them were unable to get exit visas.

Mr. SLAWSON. Were those that did not give up their American citizenship usually able to return to the United States if they changed their mind?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I believe so. I know of one case of a man of Finnish origin who worked for the Embassy, and he did return to the United States. It is the one case I know of personally. I am quite sure there were some others who did get out.

Mr. SLAWSON. Shifting now to the Soviet treatment of American defectors, or would-be defectors, are there any cases in your experience where you could comment on the Soviet treatment of such persons, how quickly the Russian Government made up its mind whether it wanted them for permanent residence in Russia and so on?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that in recent times, at least, my impression is that the Soviets, because of bad experience they have had with some people who came there to reside, and renounced their citizenship, have looked these people over and let them know that they could not remain. I think there was a case since I left the Soviet Union of that sort. I don't recall the exact particulars. But I do have the impression that they now don't automatically accept people who come and say they want to renounce their citizenship and would like to reside there.

Mr. SLAWSON. Can you give the Commission any estimate on the time periods that sometimes are involved in the Soviet authorities making up their mind?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that there has been at least a case or two during the time I was there where it was pretty obvious that the person concerned was unstable and that the Soviets very quickly let the person know that he could not reside. But since I did not handle these cases, I do not--I could not cite any specific cases.

Mr. SLAWSON. Mr. Ambassador, I have a name of an American citizen, Mr. William Edgerton Morehouse, Jr., who, according to the records of the Department of State, was hospitalized in a hospital in Moscow in the fall of 1959.

According to records furnished us by the Russian Government, and according to the personal diary kept by Lee Harvey Oswald, he, too, was hospitalized in the latter part of October, and commented--Oswald commented in his diary--that in his ward with him was what he described as an elderly American. We are trying to locate that American. We think that possibly this Mr. Morehouse was that person. I wonder if you had ever heard of Mr. Morehouse before, or know who he might be?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I have no recollection of having heard of this man before.

Mr. SLAWSON. Do you have any recollection of any other American that might fit this description?

Ambassador THOMPSON. No; I do recall that there have been American tourists who have been in the hospital in Moscow. But I don't recall at that particular date whether there were any.

Mr. SLAWSON. Mr. Ambassador, can you comment on how Americans were ordinarily given medical treatment in the Botkinskaya Hospital in Moscow, which was the hospital in which Oswald was treated, to the best of your knowledge?

Ambassador THOMPSON. The Botkinskaya Hospital has a section which is reserved for the members of the diplomatic corps, and in case of prominent Americans, particularly if the illness were serious, they were often treated there.

Mr. SLAWSON. You say the Americans normally were treated in a special ward in that hospital, or a special section of it?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes; it was a completely separate building, I believe.

Mr. SLAWSON. Was this the invariable method of treatment, or would there be a reasonable chance that an American might have gone into a normal Soviet ward which would have treated his type of illness?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I would think that the ward which was reserved for the diplomatic corps would probably only have been used for important visitors, but it is quite a large hospital, with a large number of separate buildings. It is quite possible for Americans to have been in one or the other. And obviously, if there were an infectious disease, they would be separated, and not in the regular section.

Mr. SLAWSON. If an ordinary American tourist or businessman in Moscow were to receive an injury in, say, an automobile accident or some other normal method, would he normally be put into the same ward as Embassy people were placed, or would he receive treatment right along with normal Soviet citizens?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that there is an emergency hospital type where he probably would normally be taken, rather than Botkinskaya. I cannot be sure of this. But we had an American doctor in the Embassy who would normally be called in on cases of this kind, and if he felt the case required it he would probably apply to have him taken to Botkinskaya.

Mr. SLAWSON. Do you recollect who this doctor was in the fall of 1959?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I believe at that time it was an Air Force officer. It sometimes rotated among the services. But I am almost certain it was an Air Force officer. I could get the name, but I don't recall it at the moment. I just don't recall the name.

Senator COOPER. I suggest that the Secretary can supply the name for the Commission.

Mr. SLAWSON. Mr. Ambassador, do you think it would be usual of the Soviet Government to permit someone in Oswald's circumstances, that is a would-be defector from his own government, to be treated in the same ward as other Americans, or particularly as Americans who might come under the category of this important person or Embassy official ward you were speaking of?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I would think it is probably somewhat unusual. This doctor could give you expert testimony on this, because he has been involved in almost all cases.

Mr. DULLES. Do you happen to know whether that doctor is in the United States at the present time?

Ambassador THOMPSON. He was in Texas the last I heard. I draw a blank on his name at the moment, although I know him quite well.

Mr. SLAWSON. I think with the lead you have given us, we shouldn't have any difficulty in finding his name. I have no other questions. Does anyone else present care to place a question?

Senator COOPER. It appears from the testimony that we have heard that Lee Oswald appeared at the Embassy on October 31, 1959, and stated he wished to renounce his American citizenship. As I understand, at that time you were out of the Soviet Union.

Ambassador THOMPSON. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. Was Edward L. Freers, Chargé d'Affaire?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Was there a consulate in Moscow?

Ambassador THOMPSON. There is a consular section of the Embassy, but not a separate consulate.

Senator COOPER. Who had charge of the consulate section of the Embassy?

Ambassador THOMPSON. At that time I believe it was Mr. Richard Snyder.

Senator COOPER. And was he the one who advised you on your return to Moscow that Oswald had applied to the Embassy and stated that he wished to renounce his citizenship?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I believe that is correct. I think the counselor was also present at the time. I think both of them informed me.

Senator COOPER. We have had in evidence dispatches from the Embassy at Moscow upon this question, and the matter was referred to the Department of State as to what steps should be taken towards his renunciation. Was that the normal way of the Embassy handling such applications for renunciation of citizenship?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes, sir; I believe that would be done in every case.

Senator COOPER. Did the State Department have any policy, other than reference to the State Department, as to the approval of such applications?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I believe our practice is that whenever we are convinced that the man is serious, and knows what he is doing, that this is allowed to take place--the renunciation is accepted.

Senator COOPER. Is there a policy or practice of attempting to determine whether the person is serious, or whether the person might change his or her mind after the original renunciation application?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes; that is correct. Because, as I said earlier, there have been cases where people have changed their minds in a very few days. Also, there is always the possibility that someone might be temporarily of unsound mind or some other reason, why it would need to be ascertained that they were aware of what they were doing.

Senator COOPER. There is also in evidence a letter, or a dispatch from the Embassy to the Department of State, dated May 26, 1961, signed for the Ambassador by Edward L. Freers, minister counselor. This dispatch deals with the application of Oswald to secure a renewal of his passport. Were you out of Moscow at that time?

Ambassador THOMPSON. What was the date, sir?

Senator COOPER. May 26, 1961.

Ambassador THOMPSON. I believe I was in Moscow at that time. I took a trip within the Soviet Union from May 10 to 14, 1961, but I believe I was there on May 9.

Senator COOPER. Then these dispatches, they were sent in your name, or by someone for the Ambassador?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes; but I don't recall having been shown them.

Mr. SLAWSON. For the record, Senator Cooper, could I state that the dispatch of May 26, 1961, you referred to is Commission Exhibit No. 936, and the memorandum you are also reading from is Commission Exhibit No. 935.

Mr. DULLES. How were those signed, Mr. Slawson?

Mr. SLAWSON. Commission Exhibit No. 935 is signed for the Ambassador by Boris H. Klosson, counselor for political affairs. And Commission Exhibit No. 936 is signed for the Ambassador by Edward L. Freers, minister counselor.

Senator COOPER. I might also refer to the earlier dispatch November 2, 1959, Commission Exhibit No. 908.

Now, were the procedures followed with respect to his request for renewal of his passport--that is in reference to the Department of State, for decision--was that the normal procedure followed when persons who had attempted to renounce or had renounced, claimed or desired to secure renewal of their passport--to refer it to the Department of State?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes, sir; I think in every case that would be done.

Senator COOPER. Now, between the time of Oswald's entrance into the Soviet Union and his exit, did you ever see Oswald yourself?

Ambassador THOMPSON. No, sir; I never saw him that I knew of.

Senator COOPER. Did you hear anything about him during his stay in the Soviet Union?

Ambassador THOMPSON. My only recollection is of this first briefing. I don't recall hearing anything else about him.

Senator COOPER. In evidence it has appeared that not too long after he came to Moscow, he went to Minsk and secured a job there.

From your experience as Ambassador, our Ambassador in Russia, and also in other positions in the Embassy, would you consider that unusual, that Oswald should be able to secure a job in a Russian factory while he was there?

Ambassador THOMPSON. No, sir; I think that once they had agreed to let him stay in the Soviet Union, they would have assisted him in obtaining employment, because they believe that everyone that is able to in the country should work, and since he was obviously not staying just as a tourist, I think they would normally have provided employment for him.

Senator COOPER. Also in evidence it indicates he was provided by the Soviet officials with a passport or document which described him as a stateless person.

From your experience would you be able to say whether or not that was a normal procedure for the Soviets to follow with respect to an American tourist?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that as long as they agreed to let him stay beyond the normal time of a tourist, that is a month or at the most 2 months, that they would then provide him with documentation so he could identify himself to the police. The police would not normally be able to read an American passport. In the Soviet Union, if you travel at all, you have to produce documentation--to stay in a hotel, very often to obtain transportation. So I think it would be normal that they would provide him with documentation.

Senator COOPER. Would you say that in late 1959, or 1960 or 1961 that the provision by the Soviet Union officials to a tourist of a document like this, saying he is a stateless person, and allowing him to stay beyond the usual time, for a tourist, was ordinary or usual? Would that indicate anything unusual to you, from your experience in the Embassy in Moscow?

Ambassador THOMPSON. No; I think not. I think that in cases of this kind that this would be normal.

Senator COOPER. Would it indicate in any way that they might be considering further his application to become a citizen of the Soviet Union or, in another way, that they were considering whether or not he might be used as an agent of the Soviet Union?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Well, I think there have been a good many cases of people who have come to the Soviet Union from abroad, and I believe that a number of them have not formally renounced citizenship. I recall that in 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, that there were a number of people who turned up that we had not known were in the Soviet Union, had never been near the Embassy, and had never, as far as we know renounced their citizenship. But they had been living there all this time.

Senator COOPER. You would not have any reason to think, then, that these circumstances might indicate that the Soviets were--could consider using him as an agent at some future time?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I would not have much on which to base a judgment on that, other than that it seems to me, of course, possible, in this or any other case in which a foreigner has come in to reside. But as I say there have been a great many cases.

For example, there are many people of Armenian origin who have returned to the Soviet Union and have been encouraged to do so by the Soviet Government. And in view of the very large numbers, I would think that the intention to use any of them as an agent would be very rare.

As far as I can understand, they encouraged them to come back because they wanted their skills available.

Senator COOPER. When he applied for a renewal of his passport, his wife, Marina, made application for a passport. And I believe it was said that that was a prerequisite to securing an exit visa from the Soviet Union.

From your experience as Ambassador and in other posts in the American Embassy, do you consider the time in which she was able to secure an exit visa from Russia, within so short time, as unusual?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Well, if it was a short time--and I am not aware of the exact time, myself--but if it were a short time, I would say it is unusual, because we have had cases that drag out over years, and in many cases, of course, they never get an exit visa.

Senator COOPER. Well, perhaps without reference to time, from your experience, have you found that--do you know whether it was difficult for a Soviet citizen, such as Marina Oswald, even though she might be married to an American--that it is difficult for them to secure an exit visa from the Soviet Union?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes; it is very difficult.

Senator COOPER. Do you know the basis for that? Is it that they do not want to permit the exit of any Soviet citizen?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that except in the cases of rather elderly people, they have not wanted any of their people to leave permanently. They let them go on tourist trips abroad, but not for permanent residence. As you possibly know, leaving the Soviet Union without permission is one of the most severely punished crimes you can commit in the Soviet Union.

Senator COOPER. What was that?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Leaving without permission.

Senator COOPER. Would the fact that there was a child born to Lee Oswald and Marina Oswald have altered this practice of the Soviet Union, as far as any experience that you have had or any knowledge you have had about such cases?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think the existence of a child born in the Soviet Union would normally make it more difficult for a person to secure an exit visa.

Mr. SLAWSON. Mr. Ambassador, in the facts of the Oswald case they applied to leave the Soviet Union, of course, well before their first child was born, and in fact probably received Soviet permission to leave in late December 1961, and the child, I believe, was born in February 1962--although the Oswalds in fact did not leave until very early June 1962.

They nevertheless had received Soviet permission to do so before the child was born.

In light of that fact, could you comment further upon the perhaps greater difficulty of leaving when you have a child?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Well, I think probably having once processed the case and agreed to let the husband and wife leave, that they would have been more inclined then to let the child leave than if the case had been considered after the child was born.

Senator COOPER. I take it the policy of the United States would be the reverse--that is, because Marina was the wife of Lee Oswald, and because the baby had been born, the practice of the United States would be to grant a passport to Marina for the child.

Ambassador THOMPSON. I believe that is right, on compassionate grounds.

Senator COOPER. Are you familiar with the testimony about a loan that was made to the Oswalds in order to help them get back to the United States?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I have read in the press that they had received the normal loan.

Senator COOPER. Can you say anything about that as a practice of the American Government?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I only know that in general where a citizen wishes to return to the United States and doesn't have the means to do so, that we frequently do assist them. This goes back many years. But I haven't been myself concerned in this for probably 25 years, or even more.

Senator COOPER. But is it the practice that if a determination has been made that the individual is an American citizen, therefore entitled to what protections are given to American citizens, if necessary, loans will be made to assist them to return to the United States? Is that about the basis of the policy?

Ambassador THOMPSON. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. I think that is all I have.

Mr. DULLES. Did you have any conversations at any time while you were Ambassador or after you returned to the United States with any Soviet official with regard to the Oswald case?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I discussed with the Soviet Ambassador the desire of the Commission to receive any documentation that they might have available, but I did not in any way discuss the case itself, nor did the Soviet official with whom I talked.

Mr. DULLES. And do you know of any conversations of that nature that any other official of the Department had in connection with the Oswald case?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I do not myself know of any.

Mr. DULLES. You probably would, would you not, if that had taken place--of any importance?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Your testimony is you have no knowledge of any other conversations other than that of the Secretary of State, in connection with communications to and from the Soviet Government on this case?

Ambassador THOMPSON. That is correct. I know of no other cases where it was discussed with Soviet officials.

Mr. DULLES. That is all I have.

Mr. SLAWSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

(Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the President's Commission adjourned.)

_Wednesday, September 2, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF C. DOUGLAS DILLON

The President's Commission met at 12:05 p. m., on September 2, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator Richard B. Russell, Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy, members.

Also present was J. Lee Rankin, general counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, would you please rise and follow me.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Secretary DILLON. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DILLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, will you state your name and residence, please?

Secretary DILLON. C. Douglas Dillon of Far Hills, N.J., presently residing in Washington, 2534 Belmont Road, NW.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an official position with the Government?

Secretary DILLON. Yes, I do. I am the Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. RANKIN. In that capacity do you have responsibility for the Secret Service of the United States?

Secretary DILLON. Yes, the Secret Service is part of the Treasury Department.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you had that position responsibility for some time?

Secretary DILLON. Since January 21, 1961.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell us briefly the nature of your supervision of the Secret Service, prior to the assassination?

Secretary DILLON. Yes. Prior to the assassination, when I first took office as Secretary of the Treasury, I naturally tried to find out, in as much detail as seemed practical, how the various offices of the Department functioned. One of the important ones was the Secret Service. So I had a number of interviews with Chief Baughman who was the Chief of the Secret Service at that time.

I got the general description from him of how the Secret Service operated, what their responsibilities were, what their problems were. After he retired, which was early, after I had only been there for a few months, I spoke with the President about this matter--President Kennedy--and it was my responsibility to find a new Chief of the Secret Service.

He had known James Rowley very well as head of the White House detail, and he felt that he would be an appropriate head of the Secret Service. I talked with Chief Baughman, and he thought there were two or three men, of whom Rowley was one, qualified to be head of the Secret Service; so I decided to appoint Rowley and thereafter talked with him considerably about the White House detail which he was more familiar with than Chief Baughman.

However, I did not in any sense conduct a day-to-day supervision, or close following, of its day-to-day operations. The Secret Service had been functioning for many years and the presumption from its record was that it had been functioning successfully. I think that the events that have developed since November have very clearly shown that some of the procedures, many of them, need to be changed and improved. I think this is probably largely due, to a considerable extent due, to a very rapid change which probably took place without our fully realizing its importance in the last 3 years, and which greatly increased the responsibility of the Secret Service. That is the greatly changed nature of Presidential travel.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you describe to us how that affects the problems of the Secret Service?

Secretary DILLON. Yes. In earlier times, the Presidents did not travel very often. When he did travel, he generally traveled by train, which was a protected train. Doing that, he could not cover very many parts of the country, and the Secret Service could move easily right along with him on the train that he was on.

What happened since has been, first, the advent of airplanes. Presidents beginning with President Eisenhower began to move more rapidly and were able to travel considerably more, and on very short time differentials they could be in cities that were thousands of miles apart.

However, this only just began with President Eisenhower because, in the first place, jets were not yet available, and in the second place, in the last 4 years of his term, he had to take greater care of his health, and he didn't travel around the country quite as much as his successors have. So when President Kennedy came into office with the availability of, the relatively recent availability, of jets and his desire to travel, this greatly increased the burden on the Secret Service. Formerly when they had a trip, they used to send out an advance agent to some big town. Now the trip would be a 3-day trip, and there might be four towns, each one 1,000 miles apart, that would have to be covered thoroughly at the same time. I think that probably there was not a full realization by anyone of this problem.

Certainly the Secret Service came to me and said they needed more personnel, and we tried to get them more personnel. Chief Rowley testified, I thought quite convincingly, in 1962 before the various Appropriations Committees of the Congress and met with very little success because I think that this was not fully understood by the public. The Appropriations Committees were a reflection of public understanding, and probably it was not even fully understood within the Secret Service.

I would like----

Senator RUSSELL. Has there been any increase, Mr. Secretary, in the number of agents assigned to guard the President. I thought there had been some increase in recent years?

Secretary DILLON. There has been some increase, and we have tried very hard to increase the Secret Service in the last 3 or 4 years. We have asked for more people every year, and while we never got the amount we asked for, we did get increases. I have the figures here. In 1961, the entire Secret Service amounted to 454 individuals, of whom 305 were classified as agents. In 1964, that is the fiscal year just finished, the figure was 571, of which 167 were clerks and 404 were agents. So we had achieved an increase of about 100 agents, a little over a third.

Mr. DULLES. That included both the counterfeiting responsibilities of the Secret Service as well as the Presidential protection?

Secretary DILLON. That is right. And I think it is important to note that the counterfeiting problem was also increasing in volume very rapidly and changing very rapidly at about the same time. Actually that may have started a few years earlier because of the development of photography, which enabled one to counterfeit by photography instead of having to do it by hand engraving.

Representative FORD. Wasn't the specific request for an increase in the White House detail--I use this in a broad sense for both the President and Vice President--primarily aimed at the increase of personnel for the Vice President?

Secretary DILLON. That was in one year.

Representative FORD. 1962?

Secretary DILLON. I think that was in--I think that was in 1963. In 1962 the law was passed, and we did have a deficiency appropriation which was given to us. The following year when we came up for our regular appropriation, we not only did not get the full amount that we thought was necessary to cover the Vice President, but they cut the protection we had been affording the Vice President in half, and whereas there had been 20 persons assigned, they reduced it to 10.

Representative FORD. But there had been no reduction in the funds for the protection of the President?

Secretary DILLON. For the White House detail; no.

Representative FORD. It was a reduction for the protection of the Vice President.

Secretary DILLON. That is correct. But the thing that I think we are coming to is, it is perfectly obvious that we have to do a great deal more in this advance work, field work, in interviewing people who are dangers to the President or could be classified as such. We need more people in the field on account of this. That is what I say was not probably fully realized, although Rowley specifically, when he first went up in 1962 asking for an increase, pitched it on that basis, but he did not have a very good reception from the Appropriations Committee at that time because they felt that the White House detail was the White House detail, right around the President. I don't think anyone fully understood the connection with people in the field. I am not sure that Secret Service made as good a case as they should, to be really understood on this. It has become clear now.

Representative FORD. Mr. Rowley in that presentation asked for additional funds for and personnel for the Protective Research Service?

Secretary DILLON. I don't think it was specifically for that. It was for protection of the President, and he was the first person that made this type of request. Baughman had always said that people in the field were counterfeiting and just worked a little bit for the President, and Rowley when he came in was the first one that made this claim that they were needed to actually protect the President. He wanted more people in the field to do these things, and that was the thing that did not go over right away. I think it would be interesting here. We have----

Mr. RANKIN. May I interrupt a moment? We have a problem with some of the members of the Commission that have to go to the Congress right away for the vote. They would like to question you if they may.

Senator COOPER. I have a question which I think you can address yourself fully to later but considering these new factors which make the protection of the President more difficult, I would like to ask if it is your judgment that the Secret Service, if it is provided adequate personnel and if it is--if a broader criteria for the ascertainment of the persons who might be dangerous to the President is adopted, if it is your judgment that the Secret Service could meet these new factors and provide an effective protection for the President, taking into consideration the factors which you mentioned?

Secretary DILLON. Yes; I think they could. I think the answer is clearcut. I don't think that means that under every and all circumstances you could be absolutely a thousand percent certain that nothing can happen. You never can be in a situation like this. But I think they could be a great deal better, and you could feel everything has been done. We have just completed--the thing I wanted to say--this study we have been working on many months as to what is needed to provide this in the Secret Service. Chief Rowley was not able to give you this when he was here before. I have given a copy of this to Mr. Rankin. I think it ought to go into the record at this point.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, I will hand to you the document you just referred to, called Planning Document, U.S. Secret Service, and ask if that is the document that you were describing.

Secretary DILLON. Yes. That is the document; yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to ask leave at this time to mark this document our next exhibit number which I will furnish later to the reporter, and offer it in evidence as part of this examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, that is not a security matter that couldn't go into the record, is it?

Secretary DILLON. No. I have one thing I would like to say about that, and I think it should go into the record. What this is is our report as to how many personnel are needed and what has to be done and what they should do. We have transmitted that with a covering letter to the Bureau of the Budget. The final decision on what will be done on many of these things is taken in the light of recommendations of the Bureau of the Budget to the President and what he finally decides for budgetary reasons. So ordinarily budgetary matters are not published prior to the time the President has approved them. He hasn't approved this. He hasn't seen it, but I think under the circumstances I see no reason under this special circumstance, why this report should not go into the record, and I think it is perfectly all right.

The CHAIRMAN. The report may be admitted and take the next number.

(Commission Exhibit No. 1053-A was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Representative FORD. This would be the recommendation of the Treasury Department to the Bureau of the Budget for the personnel and the funds for the Secret Service in fiscal year 1966?

Secretary DILLON. No. This is a recommendation to the Bureau of the Budget for the personnel and equipment that would be needed to put the Secret Service in what they consider adequate position to fully handle this problem. They feel that it would take about 20 months to get all the necessary people on board and trained. If this were started right away, as we think it could be if a reapportionment on a deficiency basis were approved, this could start in fiscal year 1965 and depending on whether such is approved, the fiscal year 1966 final recommendation would be affected. But this is the total picture, and it is assuming our recommendation that they start in the next couple of months.

Representative FORD. In other words, this is the plan that you would like instituted immediately regardless of budget considerations.

Secretary DILLON. That is right.

Mr. McCLOY. Mr. Secretary, there is nothing in this exhibit that in any way, according to your judgment, would compromise the protection of the security of the President if it became----

Secretary DILLON. Oh, no; and there is also with it--it is just a covering letter but I think it is equally important--it is a letter which I wrote to the Director of the Budget on Monday when I forwarded this plan to him, and I think that probably should also go in because it has a recommendation at the end covering the matter Mr. Ford raised.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, I will ask you if this document, dated Angust 31, 1964, is a copy of the letter that you have just referred to now?

Secretary DILLON. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask that this letter, dated August 31, 1964, directed "Dear Kermit," from the Secretary, be marked the next number in order and offered in evidence as part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit No. 1053-B was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Secretary DILLON. It is marked "limited official use," and I think that should be declassified for this purpose.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, Mr. Secretary, will you very briefly describe the general plan of your planning document. We have that so we can use it in considerable detail, but if you can just summarize briefly.

Secretary DILLON. Well, in brief, this asks for a total of 205 additional agents, which is about--not quite but nearly--a 50 percent increase from the 415 agents they now have. It asks also for 50 clerks to add to the 171 that are presently there. Those are stenographers, typists and other clerical workers. And for five technicians. Of this the idea is to put 17 agents and the 5 technicians in the PRS. Five would be used to maintain 24-hour coverage in the PRS which is not presently in force because of lack of personnel. One would add to the Research and Countermeasures Unit to fill out three full units that could be operating all the time. Six of them would do advance work for PRS with local agencies and institutions. One of the new things we have instituted is that each time they do an advance, someone from the PRS goes out and works with the local law enforcement agencies. I think that is obviously a very important thing. They need more people in view of the volume of traveling. Then they also need five more employees to expand our liaison with the other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. We now have one man assigned really full time to that. We found even in the period that we have been doing this that while that is a great help, much the best way would be to have individuals assigned to each agency that work full time with the agency, know the people in the agency, and that is the only way we can be sure we have adequate liaison.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask, would that include the FBI?

Secretary DILLON. Oh, yes.

Mr. DULLES. And the CIA and military intelligence services?

Secretary DILLON. Oh, yes.

Mr. DULLES. And the State Department possibly?

Secretary DILLON. Yes.

Representative FORD. Could you specify those agencies. I was interested in what agencies you were referring to.

Secretary DILLON. Well, I would think certainly it would be the military, the FBI, the security services of the State Department, and the CIA.

Now, there may be additional ones. There are additional ones within the Treasury Department. I think we probably have one, for instance, with the intelligence section of the Internal Revenue Service, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit, and so forth, which a good deal can come out of.

In addition we recommend here five technical specialists, two of which would be highly trained computer technicians, programers, and three less well trained to work with these others. The purpose of this is to automate the whole PRS operation. We have been thinking of that for some time. It was something that obviously needed to be done.

Mr. RANKIN. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. Will you describe a little more what you mean by automate.

Secretary DILLON. I mean using electronic processing, punchcard systems, so that they would be able to pull out of their files for any locality, various different types of people that might be a danger or might have made threats to the President or to other high officials, so that they would be able to function rapidly and well in planning protection as the President travels to these various cities.

Mr. RANKIN. Does that include computer systems?

Secretary DILLON. Yes. And what I was going to say was about 2 or 3 months before the events in Dallas, the Secret Service had asked the IBM Co. to make a study of this problem for it. That study was not completed until after the events in Dallas, and it did not prove satisfactory because from our point of view it did not go into enough detail in being able to handle criteria so you could tell when you retrieved a name from the file whether it was truly dangerous or not.

We needed a more complex system and after working with Rand Corp., the Research Analysis Corp., and also talking with IBM, we all felt the best way would be to hire some good programers, knowing our problems, and then work out a pilot program and get consultants in.

One of the things we recommend here is appropriation of $100,000 to get consultants from IBM Co., Honeywell or other companies, and get pilot machines to try to work out the details of this system.

Mr. McCLOY. For the record, Mr. Secretary, you had no electronic system of this character operating before the assassination?

Secretary DILLON. No. Now, the total of that is 17 agents and 5 specialists for the PRS.

In addition, for a long time, Mr. Rowley has believed that it would be preferable to improve the capacity of the White House detail if we could establish a headquarters pool of 18 men where new individuals who are going into the White House detail would be fully trained first--before, they had to be trained sort of partially on the job--and also through which you could rotate people from the field from time to time, bringing them up to date on Presidential protection.

So we would ask for 18 people, 18 spaces for that.

We have asked for 25 spaces to provide adequate protection for the Vice President in addition to the 10 that are already on board.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, excuse me. I think spaces may not be clear to all our readers. Will you explain what that means?

Secretary DILLON. Twenty-five job positions. I think the thing that is very important here is to keep in mind that to keep one man on the job around the clock covering a post, which is the way the Secret Service works--one man that would be always with the President or the Vice President, that would be always watching his house--to get one man requires five job positions. In the first place, the coverage required is for 24 hours a day.

In the second place, there are holidays, there are weekends off. On a full-time basis, the Secret Service works a 40-hour week, 5-day week, as the rest of the Government does, and there are provisions for sickness and leave, and so forth. When the number of hours that a man can work a year full time is figured out, it requires 5 men to fill one spot.

So that is one reason why these protective numbers may seem rather high to the uninitiated.

When you are talking about the Vice President, and 10 people are required to produce two posts, coverage of two posts, it is obviously not adequate because you have to cover his house, whether he is there or not, so that someone can't come in and put a destructive device in it.

This simply can't be done with the present numbers that are assigned.

Then, going beyond this to complete this list, there is a request for 145 agents in the field offices who would handle the substantially increased volume of security investigations. We are now getting about twice as many referrals already as we did before. Instead of something like 25,000, we are up to something over 50,000, and they expect it will go over 60,000 next year.

To really run these down out in the districts, they need, obviously, more men than they have had.

Now, one thing that they also need these fellows for, which I think is important, is keeping track of more dangerous individuals. They have tried to keep track of a few of them. But I think that probably a good many more should be put on that list. It requires more people, so they can periodically check up, and particularly before a visit, that all of these people are looked at to see where they are and what they have been doing recently before the President visits a particular place.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, while you are on that subject, could you explain to the Commission how you make use of your agents in the White House duty and those in the field so they will understand that?

Secretary DILLON. Well, yes; the White House detail is composed of about 60 people now. About half of these are what you might call, more or less, permanent employees. They have been there for a long time, 10 years, 12 years, 15 years, on the White House detail.

The other half are shorter time employees who generally serve up to 3 years on the White House detail and then either leave because they prefer other duty in the Secret Service or sometimes leave because the Secret Service feels they can do other duty better.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, for the protection of the President. Mr. Secretary, is there any need to have the White House detail have any connection or reciprocal arrangement with those in the field?

Secretary DILLON. Well, I think it is a great help. Because of this turnover that I mentioned, very many of the agents in the field have had service in the White House detail of up to 2 or 3 years. So they know what the problems are and they are able to fit in very easily and very readily and very quickly with the White House detail which is with the President when he comes out on a trip.

Mr. DULLES. By fieldwork you mean attached to your field stations, of which I believe there are 65 in the United States?

Secretary DILLON. Yes; that is right. And if they had not had this training, obviously they would be enforcement officers and they could work with White House detail when they come out, but they wouldn't be able to be as cognizant of its procedures, how the matter is handled, and they wouldn't be able to be fitted right into the routine as well as they can presently. I think it is highly valuable that we have this pool of experienced people around the country and, of course, this is again one reason that if we get a few more people out there, we will be able to do better.

One of the additional things that we are now undertaking, is, for instance, these building surveys that are partially a result of a study by the Research Analysis Corp. This seems to be something that we can probably do something about. We will probably use more people when the President travels through a city than we have in the past because you can have some success in designating certain buildings as high risk or higher risk than other buildings, and as I say, they are now trying to map the whole United States, at least the major cities where the President might travel, the routes he might follow, coming in from an airport, going to a major stadium or something like that so they will know ahead of time what the danger spots are. And one of the obvious ones which has come out is a warehouse where there are not so many people in it and where someone could more likely be alone and therefore more dangerous. A building that is full of people is not as dangerous because the other people would be watching. It is that sort of criteria. The same thing about roof access. If there is easy access to a roof and people are not usually on it, that would be more dangerous than if there wasn't.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, have you made quite a change in the Secret Service in regard to the inspection of buildings along a motorcade route since the assassination?

Secretary DILLON. Oh yes. We have been doing this, and we have used a great many more people as a result of this in our procedures, both local police officers and also our own people. The figures we have here are interesting. They are in this report. From February 11--I don't know why that was the beginning date for these figures--but from there through June 30, we used 9,500 hours of work by other enforcement agencies. About 2,000 of that came from the Justice Department and the rest of it from other Treasury agencies, the biggest one being the Intelligence Section of the Internal Revenue, but also the Bureau of Narcotics, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit and so on.

Mr. RANKIN. And that is in connection with this motorcade route?

Secretary DILLON. That is largely in connection with that, both planning it out ahead and also stationing them in buildings that they thought might be difficult.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, Mr. Secretary, returning to your Planning document, is there anything else that you have not covered in that?