Chapter XV: Front Matter (15)

"At daybreak the British awoke, but it was too late. They had
fought a successful battle, they had had the American army in
their grasp, and now all was over. The victory had melted
away, and, as a grand result, they had a few hundred
prisoners, a stray boat with three camp-followers, and the
deserted works in which they stood. To make such a retreat as
this was a feat of arms as great as most victories, and in it
we see, perhaps as plainly as anywhere, the nerve and
quickness of the man who conducted it. It is true it was the
only chance of salvation, but the great man is he who is
entirely master of his opportunity, even if he have but one.
The outlook, nevertheless, was, as Washington wrote, 'truly
distressing.' The troops were dispirited, and the militia
began to disappear, us they always did after a defeat.
Congress would not permit the destruction of the city,
different interests pulled in different directions,
conflicting opinions distracted the councils of war, and, with
utter inability to predict the enemy's movements, everything
led to halfway measures and to intense anxiety, while Lord
Howe tried to negotiate with Congress, and the Americans
waited for events, Washington, looking beyond the confusion of
the moment, saw that he had gained much by delay, and had his
own plan well defined. … Everyone else, however, saw only past
defeat and present peril.

{3238}

The British ships gradually made their way up the river, until
it became apparent that they intended to surround and cut off
the American army. Washington made preparations to withdraw,
but uncertainty of information came near rendering his
precautions futile. September 15th the men-of-war opened fire,
and troops were landed near Kip's Bay. The militia in the
breastworks at that point had been at Brooklyn and gave way at
once, communicating their panic to two Connecticut regiments.
Washington, galloping down to the scene of battle, came upon
the disordered and flying troops. He dashed in among them,
conjuring them to stop, but even while he was trying to rally
them they broke again on the appearance of some sixty or
seventy of the enemy, and ran in all directions. In a tempest
of anger Washington drew his pistols, struck the fugitives
with his sword, and was only forced from the field by one of
his officers seizing the bridle of his horse and dragging him
away from the British, now within a hundred yards of the spot.
… The rout and panic over, Washington quickly turned to deal
with the pressing danger. With coolness and quickness he
issued his orders, and succeeded in getting his army off,
Putnam's division escaping most narrowly. He then took post at
King's Bridge, and began to strengthen and fortify his lines.
While thus engaged, the enemy advanced, and on the 16th a
sharp skirmish was fought, in which the British were repulsed,
and great bravery was shown by the Connecticut and Virginia
troops, the two commanding officers being killed. This affair,
which was the first gleam of success, encouraged the troops,
and was turned to the best account by the general. Still a
successful skirmish did not touch the essential difficulties
of the situation, which then as always came from within,
rather than without. To face and check 25,000 well equipped
and highly disciplined soldiers, Washington had now some
12,000 men, lacking in everything which goes to make an army,
except mere individual courage and a high average of
intelligence. Even this meagre force was an inconstant and
diminishing quantity, shifting, uncertain, and always
threatening dissolution. The task of facing and fighting the
enemy was enough for the ablest of men; but Washington was
obliged also to combat and overcome the inertness and dullness
born of ignorance, and to teach Congress how to govern a
nation at war. … Meanwhile the days slipped along, and
Washington waited on the Harlem Plains, planning descents on
Long Island, and determining to make a desperate stand where
he was, unless the situation decidedly changed. Then the
situation did change, as neither he nor anyone else apparently
had anticipated. The British warships came up the Hudson past
the forts, brushing aside our boasted obstructions, destroying
our little fleet, and getting command of the river. Then
General Howe landed at Frog's Point, where he was checked for
the moment by the good disposition of Heath, under
Washington's direction. These two events made it evident that
the situation of the American army was full of peril, and that
retreat was again necessary. Such certainly was the conclusion
of the council of war, on the 16th, acting this time in
agreement with their chief. Six days Howe lingered on Frog's
Point, bringing up stores or artillery or something, … and
gave six days to Washington. They were of little value to
Howe, but they were of inestimable worth to Washington, who
employed them in getting everything in readiness, in holding
his council of war, and then on the 17th in moving
deliberately off to very strong ground at White Plains. … On
the 28th, Howe came up to Washington's position, and found the
Americans quite equal in numbers, strongly intrenched, and
awaiting his attack with confidence. He hesitated, doubted,
and finally feeling that he must do something, sent 4,000 men
to storm Chatterton Hill, an outlying post, where some 1,400
Americans were stationed. There was a short, sharp action, and
then the Americans retreated in good order to the main army,
having lost less than half as many men as their opponents.
With caution now much enlarged, Howe sent for reinforcements,
and waited two days. The third day it rained, and on the
fourth Howe found that Washington had withdrawn to a higher
and quite impregnable line of hills, where he held all the
passes in the rear and awaited a second attack. Howe
contemplated the situation for two or three days longer, and
then broke camp and withdrew to Dobbs Ferry. Such were the
great results of the victory of Long Island, two wasted
months, and the American army still untouched. Howe was
resolved, however, that his campaign, should not be utterly
fruitless, and therefore directed his attention to the
defences of the Hudson, Fort Lee, and Fort Washington, and
here he met with better success. Congress, in its military
wisdom, had insisted that these forts must and could be held.
… An attempt was made to hold both forts, and both were lost,
as he [Washington] had foreseen. From Fort Lee the garrison
withdrew in safety. Fort Washington was carried by storm,
after a severe struggle. Twenty-six hundred men and all the
munitions of war fell into the hands of the enemy. It was a
serious and most depressing loss, and was felt throughout the
continent. Meantime Washington had crossed into the Jerseys,
and, after the loss of Fort Lee, began to retreat before the
British, who, flushed with victory, now advanced rapidly under
Lord Cornwallis."

_H. C. Lodge,
George Washington,
volume 1, chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapters 33-36._

_G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathanael Greene,
chapters 8-11 (volume 1)._

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the American Revolution,
volume 2, chapter 23._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (October).
Connecticut assumes independence and sovereignty.

See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1777.
Washington's retreat through New Jersey and his
masterly return movement.
The victories at Trenton and Princeton
retrieving the situation.

"On the 17th [of November] Washington ordered Lee [who had
lately returned from the south, and who had command of 7,000
men at Northcastle] to come over and join him; but Lee
disobeyed, and in spite of repeated orders from Washington he
stayed at Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward
had some time since resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to
Washington. A good many people were finding fault with the
latter for losing the 3,000 men at Fort Washington, although,
as we have seen, that was not his fault but the fault of
Congress.
{3239}
Lee now felt that if Washington were ruined, he would surely
become his successor in the command of the army, and so,
instead of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing
letters calculated to injure him. Lee's disobedience thus
broke the army in two, and did more for the British than they
had been able to do for themselves since they started from
Staten Island. It was the cause of Washington's flight through
New Jersey, ending on the 8th of December, when he put himself
behind the Delaware river, with scarcely 3,000 men. Here was
another difficulty. The American soldiers were enlisted for
short terms, and when they were discouraged, as at present,
they were apt to insist upon going home as soon as their time
had expired. It was generally believed that Washington's army
would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did not
think it worth while to be at the trouble of collecting boats
wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to
Baltimore. People in New Jersey began taking the oath of
allegiance to the crown. Howe received the news that he had
been knighted for his victory on Long Island, and he returned
to New York to celebrate the occasion. While the case looked
so desperate for Washington, events at the north had taken a
less unfavourable turn. Carleton [who began preparations to
invade the province of New York as soon as Arnold retreated
from Canada] had embarked on Lake Champlain early in the
autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had fitted up a
small fleet to oppose his advance, and on the 11th of October
there had been a fierce naval battle between the two near
Valcour Island, in which Arnold was defeated, while Carleton
suffered serious damage. The British general then advanced
upon Ticonderoga, but suddenly made up his mind that the
season was too late for operations in that latitude. The
resistance he had encountered seems to have made him despair
of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d
of November he started back for Canada. This retreat relieved
General Schuyler at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and
presently he detached seven regiments to go southward to
Washington's assistance. On the 2d of December Lee crossed the
Hudson with 4,000 men, and proceeded slowly to Morristown.
Just what he designed to do was never known, but clearly he
had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to assist
Washington, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought
Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it certainly was.
Whatever his plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud.
For some unknown reason he passed the night of the 12th at an
unguarded tavern, about four miles from his army; and there he
was captured next morning by a party of British dragoons, who
carried him off to their camp at Princeton. The dragoons were
very gleeful over this unexpected exploit, but really they
could not have done the Americans a greater service than to
rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came
in the nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid
of Washington. Even after this force and that sent by Schuyler
had reached the commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6,000
men fit for duty. With this little force Washington instantly
took the offensive. It was the turning-point in his career and
in the history of the Revolutionary War. On Christmas, 1776,
and the following nine days, an Washington's most brilliant
powers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 strong, lay
at Princeton. The principal generals, thinking the serious
business of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced
party of Hessians, 1,000 strong, was posted on the bank of the
Delaware at Trenton, and another one lower down, at
Burlington. Washington decided to attack both these outposts,
and arranged his troops accordingly, but when Christmas night
arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating
ice, and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the
one that Washington led in person. It was less than 2,500 in
number, but the moment had come when the boldest course was
the safest. By daybreak Washington had surprised the Hessians
at Trenton and captured them all. The outpost at Burlington,
on hearing the news, retreated to Princeton. By the 31st
Washington had got all his available force across to Trenton.
Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others
who had just gone home. At this critical moment the army was
nearly helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning
Robert Morris was knocking at door after door in Philadelphia,
waking up his friends to borrow the $50,000, which he sent off
to Trenton before noon. The next day Cornwallis arrived at
Princeton, and taking with him all the army, except a
rear-guard of 2,000 men left to protect his communications,
came on toward Trenton. When he reached that town, late in the
afternoon, he found Washington entrenched behind a small creek
just south of the town, with his back toward the Delaware
river. 'Oho!' said Cornwallis, 'at last we have run down the
old fox, and we will bag him in the morning.' He sent back to
Princeton, and ordered the rearguard to come up. He expected
next morning to cross the creek above Washington's right, and
then press him back against the broad and deep river, and
compel him to surrender. Cornwallis was by no means a careless
general, but he seems to have gone to bed on that memorable
night and slept the sleep of the just. Washington meanwhile
was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging
and entrenching, and made a fine show with his camp-fires.
Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek,
and got around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and
so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered
the British rear-guard, fought a sharp battle with it and sent
it flying, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The
booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late. To preserve his
communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with
all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious
army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown.
There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a
position. But to leave Washington in possession of Morristown
was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For
that position guarded the Highlands of the Hudson on the one
hand, and the roads to Philadelphia on the other. Except that
the British had taken the city of New York-which from the
start was almost a foregone conclusion—they were no better off
than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island. In
nine days the tables had been completely turned.
{3240}
The attack upon, an outpost had developed into a campaign
which quite retrieved the situation. The ill-timed
interference of Congress, which had begun the series of
disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated;
and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve
had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier
successes had been local; this was continental. Seldom has so
much been done with such slender means."

_J. Fiske,
The War of Independence,
chapter 6._

"The effect of these two unexpected strokes at Trenton and
Princeton was to baffle Howe, and utterly disconcert his
plans. Expecting to march upon Philadelphia at his leisure, he
suddenly finds Washington turning about and literally cutting
his way through the British posts, back to a point where he
threatened Howe's flank and rear. The enemy were at once
compelled to retire from all their positions below Brunswick,
give up the thought of wintering in Philadelphia, and fall
back to the vicinity of New York. When Horace Walpole heard of
these movements, he wrote to Sir Horace Mann: 'Washington has
shown himself both a Fabius and a Camillus. His march through
our lines is allowed to have been a prodigy of generalship. In
one word, I look upon a great part of America as lost to this
country.' Here the campaign closed. Washington could not be
dislodged from his strong mountain position, and Howe was
satisfied to rest his troops and postpone further operations
until the next season. Meantime the country took heart,
Congress voted troops and supplies, and the army was recruited
and organized on a better basis. 'The business of war is the
result of Experience,' wrote Wolcott from Congress, with faith
unshaken during the darkest hours of the campaign; and
experience was now put to good profit. The crisis was passed.
Events proved decisive. Hardship and anxiety were yet to come
during succeeding years of the war; but it was the result of
this year's struggle that cleared away misgivings and
confirmed the popular faith in final success. England could do
no more than she had done to conquer America; while America
was now more ready than ever to meet the issue. Independence
was established in the present campaign—in the year of its
declaration; and more than to any others we owe this political
privilege to the men who fought from Long Island to
Princeton."

_H. P. Johnston,
Campaign of 1776,
Memoirs of the Long Island Historical Society,
volume 3, part 1, chapter 8._

ALSO IN:
_J. F. Hageman,
History of Princeton,
chapter 4, sections 4-5 (volume 1)._

_J. O. Raum,
History of New Jersey,
chapter 20 (volume 2)._

_W. B. Reed,
Life of Joseph Reed,
volume 1, chapter 4._

_W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 3, chapter 21._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1777.
Prisoners and exchanges.
British treatment of captives.
The Jersey Prison-ship and the Sugar-house prison.

In New York, during the British occupation of the city,
"wretched indeed was the condition of the poor refugee, of the
sick soldier, and, above all, the patriot prisoner. The
newspapers are filled with calls for charitable contributions
for women and children perishing with cold and hunger, for
disabled soldiers and families without a shelter. … But if the
favored Tories suffered, what must have been the condition of
the patriot prisoners, confined by thousands in bleak
barracks, churches, and prison-ships? Let us pass up Broadway,
amidst the uncleared ruins, and, turning down Liberty Street,
pause before a huge brick building near the Middle Dutch
Church. It is five stories high, with broken windows, through
which the fierce winds of winter rush unrestrained. Through
its imperfect roof and various openings, snow, ice, and water
penetrate to every part of the building. Sentries pace round
its walls prepared to fire upon any of its maddened inmates
who attempt in desperation to escape. Wounded men crawl to the
windows begging aid; but the impassive sentinel turns back the
gifts of the charitable. No communication with the prisoners
can be allowed. The walls within are bare and cheerless, nor
do any of the common conveniences of life soften the horrors
of those dreary chambers. Yet the old Sugar-House is the most
crowded building in New York, and hundreds of prisoners, some
chained, others at large, fill its comfortless interior. In
the old Sugar-House were confined the prisoners of Long
Island, the captives of sudden forays, the patriot citizen,
and the heroes of the rebel army. Clothed in rags and scarcely
covered from the winter air, crowded in narrow apartments and
broken by hunger and disease, the prisoners died by thousands.
The sick lay down on beds of snow to perish; the feeble
wounded quivered in the February blast. Food of the coarsest
kind was served out to them in scanty measure, and devoured
with the eagerness of famine. Every night ten or twenty died;
every day their corpses were thrown into pits without a single
rite of burial. When led out to be exchanged, the glad hope of
freedom gave them no joy—they died on the way to their
friends, or lingered out a few weeks of miserable decline in
the hospitals of the Jerseys. So wretched was their condition
that Washington refused to consider them fit subjects for
exchange. 'You give us only the dead or dying,' he wrote to
Howe, 'for our well-fed and healthy prisoners.' Howe, as if in
mockery, replied that they had been kept in 'airy, roomy
buildings,' on the same fare as his own soldiers. Washington
pointed to the condition in which they reached him—diseased,
famished, emaciated, and dying, as they were conducted to his
quarters. Across the river, in Wallabout Bay, lay the
prison-ship 'Jersey.' She was the hulk of a 64 gun ship, long
unseaworthy, her masts and rigging gone, her figurehead broken
off, and her whole appearance singularly repulsive. Yet on
board of the Jersey were confined 1,200 captured seamen. She
was never cleansed, and lay in that condition seven years. No
fires warmed her occupants in winter, no screen sheltered them
from the August sun; no physician visited the sick, no
clergyman consoled the dying there. Poor and scanty food, the
want of clothing, cleanliness, and exercise, and raging
diseases that never ceased their ravages, made the Jersey a
scene of human suffering to which the Black Hole of Calcutta
might favorably compare. Benevolent Tories would sometimes
convey by stealth food or clothing to her unhappy inmates; but
this was little. Toward the close of the war the British, from
shame or pity, made some improvement in her condition; but she
remained throughout the contest a centre of sickness and
death, always decimated by disease and always replenished with
new victims. The bones of her dead, estimated at 11,000, lie
buried on the Brooklyn shore. The crowded city itself was
never free from contagion. In winter the smallpox made fearful
ravages."

_E. Lawrence,
New York in the Revolution
(Harper's Magazine, July, 1868)._

ALSO IN:
_Force's American Archives,
4th Series, volume 6,
5th Series, volumes 1-3._

_History Magazine, 1866, sup._

_W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 3, chapter 21._

{3241}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1778.
Attitude and feeling of France.
Her disposition to aid the colonies and the reasons for it.
The American embassy to the French court.
Silas Deane and Beaumarchais.
Franklin at Passy.

"On March 17, 1776, Vergennes presented to his associates in
the cabinet—Maurepas, Turgot (controller-general), Sartine
(secretary of the navy), and St. Germain (secretary of war)—a
paper entitled 'Considerations,' which, after for many years
evading the search of historians, … was brought to light by De
Witt and republished by Doniol. In this important paper
Vergennes, after some general reflections on the advantages
which the two crowns of France and Spain derived from the
continuance of the civil war in America, and, on the other
hand, on the inconveniences which might arise from the
independence of the Colonies, and the probability that, in
case of failure in North America, England would, to recover
its credit, turn its arms against the French and Spanish
possessions in America, proceeds to consider the course at
once to be pursued. He bitterly attacks the English for their
habitual breach of good faith, violation of treaties, and
disregard of that observance of the sacred laws of morality
which distinguish the French, and infers that they will take
the first opportunity to declare war against France or invade
Mexico. No doubt, if the kings of France and Spain had martial
tendencies; if they obeyed the dictates of their own
interests, and perhaps the justice of their cause, which was
that of humanity, so often outraged by England; if their
military resources were in a sufficiently good condition, they
would feel that Providence had evidently chosen that very hour
for humiliating England and revenging on her the wrongs she
had inflicted on those who had the misfortune to be her
neighbors and rivals, by rendering the resistance of the
Americans as desperate as possible. The exhaustion produced by
this internecine war would prostrate both England and her
Colonies, and would afford an opportunity to reduce England to
the condition of a second-rate power; to tear from her the
empire she aimed at establishing in the four quarters of the
world with so much pride and injustice, and relieve the
universe of a tyranny which desires to swallow up both all the
power and all the wealth of the world. But the two crowns not
being able to act in this way, they must have recourse to a
circumspect policy." Vergennes "draws the following
inferences:
(1) That they should continue dexterously to keep the English
ministry in a state of false security with respect to the
intentions of France and Spain.
(2) That it would be politic to give the insurgents secret
assistance in military stores and money; that the admitted
utility would justify this little sacrifice, and no loss of
dignity or breach of equity would be involved in it.
(3) That it would not be consistent with the king's dignity or
interest to make an open contract with the insurgents until
their independence was achieved.
(4) That in case France and Spain should furnish assistance,
they should look for no other return than the success of the
political object they had at that moment in view, leaving
themselves at liberty to be guided by circumstances as to any
future arrangements.
(5) That perhaps a too-marked inactivity at the present crisis
might be attributed by the English to fear, and might expose
France to insults to which it might not be disposed to submit.
The English, he adds, respect only those who can make
themselves feared.
(6) That the result to which all these considerations led was
that the two crowns should actively prepare means to resist or
punish England, more especially as, of all possible issues,
the maintenance of peace with that power was the least
probable.
… It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the French
support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the
humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and
exercised a decisive influence. There was a conviction, and a
right one, in France that for Britain to hold under control
the whole of North America as well as of India would give her
a maritime supremacy, as well as a superiority in wealth,
which would constitute a standing menace to the rest of the
civilized world. There was, again, an enthusiasm among the
young nobility and among officers in the army for America,
which, even aside from the bitterness towards Britain with
which it was mingled, had great effect on people as well as on
court; and to this was added the sympathy of doctrinaire
political philosophers who then and for some time afterwards
had great power in forming French public opinion. By the
enthusiasm of the young nobility the queen—brilliant, bold,
weary of the traditions of the old court, inconsiderate as to
ultimate political results—was affected, and through her her
husband was reached. But above this was the sense of right
which was uppermost in the breast of the unfortunate sovereign
who then, with little political experience but high notions of
duty as well as of prerogative, occupied the throne."

_F. Wharton, editor,
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence
of the United States,
Introduction, chapter 4 (volume 1)._

"From the earliest moment France had been hopefully regarded
by the colonists as probably their friend and possibly their
ally. To France, therefore, the first American envoy was
dispatched with promptitude [receiving his instructions in
March and reaching Paris in the following June, 1776] even
before there was a declaration of independence or an
assumption of nationality. Silas Deane was the man selected.
He was the true Yankee jack-at-all-trades; he had been
graduated at Yale College, then taught school, then practiced
law, then engaged in trade, had been all the while advancing
in prosperity and reputation, had been a member of the first
and second congresses, had failed of reëlection to the third,
and was now without employment. Mr'. Parton describes him as
'of somewhat striking manners and good appearance, accustomed
to live and entertain in liberal style, and fond of showy
equipage and appointment.' Perhaps his simple-minded
fellow-countrymen of the provinces fancied that such a man
would make an imposing figure at an European court.
{3242}
He developed no other peculiar fitness for his position; he
could not even speak French; and it proved an ill hour for
himself in which he received this trying and difficult honor.
… Deane arrived in France in June, 1776. He had with him a
little ready money for his immediate personal expenses, and
some letters of introduction from Franklin. It was intended to
keep him supplied with money by sending cargoes of tobacco,
rice, and indigo consigned to him, the proceeds of which would
be at his disposal for the public service. He was instructed
to seek an interview with de Vergennes, the French minister
for foreign affairs, and to endeavor with all possible
prudence and delicacy to find out what signs of promise the
disposition of the French government really held for the
insurgents. He was also to ask for equipment for 25,000
troops, ammunition, and 200 pieces of field artillery, all to
be paid for—when Congress should be able! In France he was to
keep his mission cloaked in secure secrecy, appearing simply
as a merchant conducting his own affairs. … Before the arrival
of Deane the interests of the colonies had been already taken
in hand and substantially advanced in France by one of the
most extraordinary characters in history. Caron de
Beaumarchais was a man whom no race save the French could
produce, and whose traits, career, and success lie hopelessly
beyond the comprehension of the Anglo-Saxon. Bred a
watchmaker, he had the skill, when a mere youth, to invent a
clever escapement balance for regulating watches; had he been
able to insert it into his own brain he might have held more
securely his elusive good fortunes. From being an ingenious
inventor he became an adventurer general, watchmaker to the
king, the king's mistresses, and the king's daughters, the
lover, or rather the beloved, of the wife of the controller of
the king's kitchen, then himself the controller, thence a
courtier, and a favorite of the royal princesses. Through a
clever use of his opportunities he was able to do a great
favor to a rich banker, who in return gave him chances to
amass a fortune, and lent him money to buy a patent of
nobility. This connection ended in litigation, which was near
ruining him; but he discovered corruption on the part of the
judge, and thereupon wrote his Memorials, of which the wit,
keenness, and vivacity made him famous. He then rendered a
private, personal, and important service to Louis XV., and
soon afterwards another to the young Louis XVI. … He became
frenzied in the American cause. In long and ardent letters he
opened upon King Louis and his ministers a rattling fire of
arguments sound and unsound, statements true and untrue,
inducements reasonable and unreasonable, forecastings probable
and improbable, politics wise and unwise, all designed to show
that it was the bounden duty of France to adopt the colonial
cause."

_J. T. Morse, Jr.,
Benjamin Franklin,
chapter 9._

Soon after the arrival of Deane in Paris, the American
Congress, having determined to declare the independence of the
states represented in it, appointed a committee "to prepare
the plan of a treaty to be proposed to foreign powers, which,
after a long discussion, was at length agreed to, and
ministers were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed.
Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were elected; but,
the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the
appointment offered him, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was
chosen in his place. These transactions were placed on the
secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any
specific information concerning them; or to state more than,
'that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary
for obtaining foreign alliances.' The secret committee were
directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of £10,000
sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners. They
assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate
interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that
the success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been
so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than
it had been at any time during the war with both France and
Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities
and energies of the nation. They were assured that the ports
of France would remain open to their ships, and that the
American merchants might freely vend in them every article of
commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their
country. But it was apparent that the minister wished to avoid
a rupture with England, and was, therefore, unwilling to
receive them openly as the ministers of the United States, or
to enter into any formal negotiation with them."

_J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 7._

"It is … a settled rule of diplomacy that a minister should
not be pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood
that he will not be received. To this may be added the rule
that applications for loans should, unless as part of a treaty
alliance, be made through business channels. In disregard of
these rules the majority of Congress, under the influence of
Richard H. Lee and Samuel Adams, instituted a series of
missions to European courts for the bare purpose of borrowing
money, when the courts so addressed not only gave no
intimation that they would receive these envoys, but when,
from the nature of things, as well as from unofficial
intimation, it should have been known that such reception
would be refused. With France there was no difficulty, as
France had intimated unofficially that such envoys would be
received, at least in a private capacity, France being then
ready to take the consequence of war with Britain. And this
reception was accorded … first to Silas Deane, then to
Franklin, and then to Arthur Lee. Here Franklin thought
Congress should stop, saying that ministers should not be sent
to sovereigns without first having some sort of assurance of
recognition of the United States as an independent
sovereignty, and that a 'virgin' republic, as he called it,
should wait till there was some such recognition before
thrusting embassies on foreign courts with demands for money.
Congress thought differently. Arthur Lee was instructed to go
to Madrid with an alternate commission to Berlin; William Lee
was sent to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The
Hague, Izard to Florence, and the instructions in each case
were to demand not only recognition, but subsidy. … The policy
of sending ministers to European courts where such ministers
were not received worked injuriously to the United States from
the mere fact of their non-reception. Another difficulty arose
from the circumstance that several of these ministers took up
their residence in Paris, and, without specific authority,
considered it their duty to take part in the counsels of the
American legation.
{3243}
Thus Ralph Izard, commissioned to Tuscany, never went there,
but remained in Paris, claiming a right to be informed of all
the details of the negotiations with France, and occupying no
small share of the time and care of Franklin with discussions
of this claim, which Franklin could not accede to, but on
which Izard continued to insist. When the triple legation of
Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee (and afterwards Franklin,
Arthur Lee, and Adams), was commissioned, it was understood
that its members were to divide, so that one (Franklin) should
remain in Paris, while the others should take charge of the
missions to other capitals. But Arthur Lee, when he found that
he could not be received in Madrid, or in Vienna, or in
Berlin, made but brief excursions to Spain, to Austria, and to
Berlin, reporting himself after each short trip promptly at
Paris, there to differ from Franklin not only as to important
business details, but as to the whole policy of the mission.
When Adams was in Paris, during their joint mission, he
concurred with Arthur Lee in what turned out to be the
disastrous measure of removing Williams as commercial agent
and putting in his place William Lee, with a nephew of William
and Arthur Lee as clerk; while on the whole question of
sending legations to foreign courts which had not consented to
receive them, and in the still more important question of the
attitude to be assumed by the commissioners to the French
court, Adams agreed with Lee. … It is due to Adams to say that
he saw the inherent difficulties of permanent missions
conducted by three joint commissioners; that he recommended
that there should be but one permanent minister to France; and
that he recognized Franklin's great influence with the French
ministry as a strong reason for his retention though without
colleagues. But there can be no doubt that down to the period
when Franklin became sole minister, the American cause in
Europe was much embarrassed by the fact that he had colleagues
associated with him."

_F. Wharton,
Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of The United States,
chapter 1, sections 16-17,
and chapter 9, section 106 (volume 1)._

Before Franklin or Lee reached France, Silas Deane had already
entered into negotiations with Beaumarchais and opened a train
of dealings which proved unfortunate for both. Leaving aside
"all the long controversy about the rights and wrongs of
Beaumarchais, which have never been completely and
satisfactorily solved, … it appears that a large part of the
misunderstanding between him and Deane and Arthur Lee is
attributable to a change of plan between April and July, 1776.
Beaumarchais's scheme of operation, when he saw Lee in London,
was to expend money which should, at least in pretence and
form, be obtained from the voluntary contributions of wealthy
Frenchmen in aid of the American cause; but in July, when he
saw Deane, that scheme had been dropped, and the project was
that he should appear as a merchant. … In May, there was a
plan on the part of the French government to employ a real
merchant; now the plan was to employ a comedy merchant. This
was exactly the role which Beaumarchais was qualified to fill,
and he proceeded to establish and open a large house, with all
the accessories of a house of business, as the same are
understood and represented on the stage, At that time it was
believed that the colonists had plenty of exportable products
which they could and would contribute for the purpose
[purchase?] of arms and ammunition. It was thought that their
main difficulty would be to find any market in which they
could purchase contraband of war. The chief assistance,
therefore, which they would need from France would be secret
permission to make this exchange in France. Beaumarchais's
commercial operations would be real commercial operations, and
at worst could only issue in some expenses and losses, on the
balance of account, which the French government might have to
make good. Beaumarchais approached Deane with all the forms
and reality of a commercial proposition, and Deane assured him
that he should have some returns in six months, and full pay
for everything which he supplied in a year. Two days later
they made a contract by which Congress was to pay the current
price of the goods in America when they should arrive, or take
them at the cost price, with insurance, charges, and
commission 'proportioned to the trouble and care, which cannot
now be fixed.' … August 18, Beaumarchais writes to the
Committee of Secret Correspondence that, led by esteem for a
people struggling for liberty, he has established an extensive
commercial house, solely for the purpose of supplying them
with all things useful, even gold for the payment of troops;
and that without waiting for their consent he has already
procured 200 cannons, 200,000 pounds of powder, 20,000 guns,
with balls, lead, clothing, etc. He wants the cargoes
consigned to him in return, and promises that he has great
power to use any consignments whatsoever; but he wants
especially tobacco. He signs this letter Roderique Hortales &
Co. … A million livres were advanced by Spain to Beaumarchais,
August 11, 1776, and the Farmers-general of France advanced a
million livres, but took advantage of the distress of the
Americans to stipulate that it should be paid for in tobacco
at half its then current price. Beaumarchais also advanced
money to Deane for his personal expenses; and it has never
been doubted that he exerted himself with the utmost energy,
if not always with the greatest prudence, to expedite the
shipment of the goods. Of the three ships which he despatched
at the end of the year, two were captured by the English; but
the one which arrived was of the greatest possible value to
the cause. … When Arthur Lee received his appointment as
Commissioner to France and entered upon the discharge of his
duties, he found that the promises made to him by Beaumarchais
… had not been kept. He reported to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence that a change in the mode of sending had been
settled between Deane and Hortales. … Arthur Lee always held
the attitude of suspicion that Deane and Beaumarchais were in
a conspiracy to levy contributions for themselves on the free
gifts of France to the United States. Franklin always affected
to ignore the dealings with Beaumarchais, and to treat them as
exclusively in the hands of Deane; while Congress always
showed themselves very careful not to pay for anything which
possibly was intended as a gift. Therefore Deane and
Beaumarchais were left for years to claim and protest that
there had been genuine mercantile contracts which had not been
fulfilled, and they could scarcely obtain attention. … September
8, 1777, Congress voted that Deane had no authority to make
contracts with persons to come to America.
{3244}
November 21, they voted to recall him. Undoubtedly the
vexation which Deane had caused them by sending over a great
number of persons to serve in the army, under contracts which
enabled them to demand large pay and high rank, was the chief
cause of irritation against him; but Arthur Lee had also been
poisoning the mind of his brother, and through him, of the
whole Lee-Adams faction in Congress, with suspicions of
Deane's honesty. Deane had found himself transferred, within a
period of two or three years, from an utterly obscure
existence at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to the position of a
quasi-ambassador at the court of France. He adopted a large
and expensive style of living, and kept open house for the
Americans at Paris. It is very reasonable to suppose that this
large expenditure on his part was one of the chief grounds of
belief that he was making great gain out of his position. …
The affair of Silas Deane has importance far beyond the merits
or the fate of that individual. The quarrel over him and his
rights and wrongs, as will presently be seen, entered into the
hottest party contests in Congress during the next two or
three years, and it comes up again often subsequently. It has
even been asserted that the intimacy into which John Adams was
thrown with the Lees, in this connection, was what made him
President of the United States, by winning him votes from
Virginia in 1796. January 1, 1778, Beaumarchais, having heard
that money had been given to the Americans through Grand, the
banker, writes to Vergennes: 'So I have lost the fruit of the
most noble and incredible labour by those very exertions which
conduct others to glory.' … He is in terror of bankruptcy.
Inasmuch as a treaty of alliance between France and the United
States was now made, matters had entered upon a new stage.
Beaumarchais, with his fictitious firm of Hortales, was no
longer necessary or useful. The French government dealt
directly with the American envoys in granting supplies and
subsidies. April 7, Congress made a contract with Hortales
that they should pay, for all the cargoes already shipped and
those to be shipped, the first cost, charges, and freight, in
France. The contract between Beaumarchais and Deane is
recognized. Hortales is to pay bills drawn every two months at
double usance for twenty-four million livres annually. This
article, however, is subject to ratification by the house in
Paris and the American Commissioners at Paris. American
produce is to be exported and consigned to this house.
Interest is to be paid on all sums due, with a commission of
two and a half per cent. From this time Beaumarchais falls out
of sight as an agent of aid and supplies to the American
cause, and becomes a claimant, who considers that he has been
treated with injustice and ingratitude by the United States."

_W. G. Sumner,
The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution,
chapter 8 (volume 1)._

"The episode of Beaumarchais … was a survival of the secret
diplomacy of Louis XV, for a short time exercising an
extraordinary influence in the first period of the reign of
Louis XVI. Louis XVI, on reaching the throne, found the
machinery of secret diplomacy so ingeniously constructed by
his predecessor in full operation; and, … for one or two
delicate inquiries at the outset of the new reign,
Beaumarchais, who of all the diplomatists of this peculiar
breed was the most adroit and fertile in expedients, was well
fitted. Hence came his employment, and from his employment
came his suggestions, full of brilliant wit and effective
reasoning, as to America. But the antagonism between him and
Vergennes was too marked to permit sustained political
relationship; and when Franklin entered into diplomatic life
in Paris Beaumarchais ceased to take a prominent political
position. And even during the period of Beaumarchais' greatest
activity it must be remembered that he was not technically
Vergennes' subordinate. It was one of the peculiarities of the
secret diplomacy of Louis XIV and Louis XV, as depicted by
Broglie in his admirable treatise on that topic, that even the
existence of the secret agent was not to be supposed to be
known to the king's ostensible ministers. This was not the
case with Beaumarchais; but at the same time Beaumarchais'
political influence ceased … when, on the arrival of Franklin,
Vergennes, with Franklin's aid, took control of Anglo-American
diplomacy."

_F. Wharton,
Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States,
chapter 4, section 55 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_E. E. Hale,
Franklin in France._

_J. Bigelow, editor,
Life of Franklin, by himself,
volume 2, chapters 13-15._

_J. Parton,
Life of Franklin,
part 6 (volume 2)._

_L. de Lomenie,
Beaumarchais and his Times,
chapters 20-23 (volume 3)._

_Papers in relation to the Case of Silas Deane
(Seventy-Six Society, 1855)._

_C. Tower, Jr.,
The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 5._

See, also,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (FEBRUARY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1779.
The Thirteen Colonies become States.
The framing and adoption of State Constitutions.

"The recommendations to form governments proceeded from the
general congress; the work was done by the several states, in
the full enjoyment of self-direction. Each of them claimed to
be of right a free, sovereign, and independent state; each
bound its officers to bear to it true allegiance, and to
maintain its freedom and independence. Massachusetts, which
was the first state to frame a government independent of the
king, deviated as little as possible from the letter of its
charter; and, assuming that the place of governor was vacant
from the 19th of July 1775, it recognised the council as the
legal successor to executive power. On the 1st day of May
1776, in all commissions and legal processes, it substituted
the name of its 'government and people' for that of the king.
In June 1777, its legislature assumed power to prepare a
constitution; but, on a reference to the people, the act was
disavowed. In September 1779, a convention, which the people
themselves had specially authorized, framed a constitution. It
was in a good measure the compilation of John Adams, who was
guided by the English constitution, by the bill of rights of
Virginia, and by the experience of Massachusetts herself; and
this constitution, having been approved by the people, went
into effect in 1780. On the 5th of January 1776, New Hampshire
shaped its government with the fewest possible changes from
its colonial forms, like Massachusetts merging the executive
power in the council. Not till June 1783 did its convention
agree upon a more perfect instrument, which was approved by
the people, and established on the 31st of the following
October.
{3245}
The provisional constitution of South Carolina dates from the
26th of March 1776. In March 1778, a permanent constitution
was introduced by an act of the legislature. Rhode Island
enjoyed under its charter a form of government so thoroughly
republican that the rejection of monarchy, in May 1776,
required no change beyond a renunciation of the king's name in
the style of its public acts. A disfranchisement of Catholics
had stolen into its book of laws; but, so soon as it was
noticed, the clause was expunged. In like manner, Connecticut
had only to substitute the people of the colony for the name
of the king; this was done provisionally on the 14th of June
1776, and made perpetual on the 10th of the following October.
Before the end of June of the same year Virginia, sixth in the
series, first in the completeness of her work, by a
legislative convention without any further consultation of the
people, framed and adopted a bill of rights, a declaration of
independence, and a constitution. On the second of July 1776,
New Jersey perfected its new, self-created charter. Delaware
next proclaimed its bill of rights, and, on the 20th of
September 1776, the representatives in convention having been
chosen by the freemen of the state for that very purpose,
finished its constitution. The Pennsylvania convention adopted
its constitution on the 28th of September 1776; but the
opposition of the Quakers whom it indirectly disfranchised,
and of a large body of patriots, delayed its thorough
organization for more than five months. The delegates of
Maryland, meeting on the 14th of August 1776, framed its
constitution with great deliberation; it was established on
the 9th of the following November. On the 18th of December
1776, the constitution of North Carolina was ratified in the
congress which framed it. On the 5th of February 1777, Georgia
perfected its organic law by the unanimous agreement of its
convention. Last of the thirteen came New York, whose
empowered convention, on the 20th of April 1777, established a
constitution that, in humane liberality, excelled them all.
The privilege of the suffrage had been far more widely
extended in the colonies than in England; by general consent,
the extension of the elective franchise was postponed. The age
of twenty-one was a qualification universally required. So,
too, was residence, except that in Virginia and South Carolina
it was enough to own in the district or town a certain
freehold or 'lot.' South Carolina required the electors to
'acknowledge the being of a God, and to believe in a future
state of rewards and punishments.' 'White men alone could
claim the franchise in Virginia, in South Carolina, and in
Georgia; but in South Carolina a benign interpretation of the
law classed the free octaroon as a white, even though
descended through an unbroken line of mothers from an imported
African slave; the other ten states raised no question of
color. In Pennsylvania, in New Hampshire, and partially in
North Carolina, the right to vote belonged to every resident
taxpayer; Georgia extended it to any white inhabitant 'of any
mechanic trade'; with this exception, Georgia and all the
other colonies required the possession of a freehold, or of
property variously valued, in Massachusetts at about $200, in
Georgia at £10. Similar conditions had always existed, with
the concurrence or by the act of the colonists themselves.
Maryland prescribed as its rule that votes should be given by
word of mouth; Virginia and New Jersey made no change in their
usage; in Rhode Island each freeman was in theory summoned to
be present in the general court; he therefore gave his proxy
to his representative by writing his own name on the back of
his vote; all others adopted the ballot, New York at the end
of the war, the other eight without delay."

_G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, chapter 9._

ALSO IN:
_American Archives,
series 5, volumes 2-3 (as indexed)._

See, also,
VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776;
SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY-APRIL);
NEW YORK: A. D. 1777;
CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776;
NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1774-1776;
PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776;
MARYLAND: A. D. 1776;
GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777;
NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (January-December).
The campaign on the Delaware.
Lord Howe in possession of Philadelphia.
Battles on the Brandywine and at Germantown.
The winter of Washington's army at Valley Forge.