Chapter LIV: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (7)

The flight of Governor Jackson and his followers from
Booneville was westward, to Warsaw, on the Osage, first, and
thence into Vernon County, where they were joined, July 3, by
General Sterling Price.

See MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

"Their united force is stated by Pollard, at 3,600. Being
pursued by Lyon, they continued their retreat next day,
halting at 9 P. M., in Jasper County, 23 miles distant. Ten
miles hence, at 10 A. M. next morning, they were confronted by
a Union force 1,500 strong, under Colonel Franz Sigel, who had
been dispatched from St. Louis by the 'Southwestern Pacific
road, to Rolla, had marched thence to Springfield, and had
pushed on to Mount Vernon, Lawrence County, hoping to prevent
a junction between Jackson and some forces which his
Brigadiers were hurrying to his support. Each army appears to
have started that morning with intent to find and fight the
other; and such mutual intentions are seldom frustrated. Sigel
found the Rebels, halted after their morning march, well
posted, vastly superior in numbers and in cavalry, but
inferior in artillery, which he accordingly resolved should
play a principal part in the battle. In the cannonade which
ensued, he inflicted great damage on the Rebels and received
very little, until, after a desultory combat of three or four
hours, the enemy resolved to profit by their vast superiority
in cavalry by outflanking him, both right and left. This
compelled Sigel to fall back. … The retreat was made in
perfect order … to Carthage, and through that town to
Sarcoxie, some fifteen miles eastward. It was well, indeed,
that he did so; for Jackson's force was augmented, during that
night and next morning, by the arrival of Price from the
southward, bringing to his aid several thousand Arkansas and
Texas troops, under Generals Ben McCulloch and Pearce. Our
loss in the affair of Carthage was 13 killed and 31
wounded—not one of them abandoned to the enemy; while the
Rebels reported their loss at 40 to 50 killed and 125 to 150
wounded. Sigel, now outnumbered three or four to one, was
constrained to continue his retreat, by Mount Vernon, to
Springfield; where General Lyon, who had been delayed by lack
of transportation, joined and outranked him on the 10th."

_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 1, chapter 35._

"The month of August came, and found General Lyon at
Springfield, hoping to receive reenforcements; but the battle
of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it impossible to send
him aid. Major General Fremont had been appointed [July 9] to
the command of the Western Department, and had reached St.
Louis (July 25). Meantime Confederate troops were pouring over
the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, finding that they
were advancing upon him in two columns, determined to strike
before he should be overwhelmed by the combined Louisiana,
Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas troops. His force did not exceed
5,500, his antagonist had more than 12,000. A skirmish
occurred at Dug Spring (August 1st), in which he had the
advantage; but he could not prevent the junction of the two
columns. Hereupon he fell back to Springfield. His position
had now become one of great difficulty. Political as well as
military considerations rendered it almost impossible for him
to retreat farther. He therefore determined to resume the
offensive, and compensate for his weakness by audacity. Moving
out of Springfield on a very dark night (August 9-10), and
having ordered Sigel, with 1,200 men and six guns, to gain the
enemy's rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day
broke, to make an attack on their front [on Wilson's Creek].
But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was
overwhelmed. He lost five out of his six guns, and more than
half his men. The attack in front was conducted by Lyon in
person with very great energy. His horse was shot under him;
he was twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final
charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose colonel
was at that moment severely wounded, 'Come on, I will lead
you,' and in so doing was shot through the heart. After the
death of Lyon the battle was still continued, their artillery
preserving the national troops from total defeat. News then
coming of Sigel's disaster, a retreat to Springfield, distant
about nine miles, was resolved on. It was executed without
difficulty.
{3438}
In this battle of Wilson's Creek there were 223 killed, 721
wounded, 292 missing, on the national side; and, as may be
inferred from the determined character of the assault, the
loss of the Confederates was very great. They had been so
severely handled that they made no attempt at pursuit, and the
retreat was continued by the national troops, who, on the
19th, had fallen back to Rolla. After this action, the
Confederate commanders, McCulloch and Price, quarreling with
each other, and unable to agree upon a plan for their
campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter advanced
from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he found a national
force of about three thousand (2,780) under Colonel Mulligan.
Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce Mulligan,
but they did not succeed. Meantime the assailing forces were
steadily increasing in number, until they eventually reached
28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. They surrounded the
position and cut off the beleaguered troops from water. They
made repeated assaults without success until [September] 20th,
when they contrived a movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which
they rolled before them as they advanced, and compelled
Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to surrender
unconditionally. On receiving news of this disaster, Fremont
at once left St. Louis with the intention of attacking Price,
but that general instantly retreated, making his way back to
the southwest corner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch
and his Confederate troops."

_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 47 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:
_T. L. Snead,
The Fight for Missouri,
chapters 11-14._

_J. Peckham,
General Lyon and Missouri in 1861,
book 4._

_J. C. Fremont, F. Sigel and others,
Wilson's Creek, Lexington and Pea Ridge
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War', volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July-November).
McClellan's rise to the chief command.
Creation of the Army of the Potomac.
Reorganization of the western armies.

"Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, Major General
McClellan was assigned to the command of the Military
Department of Washington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieutenant
General Scott retained his command as general in chief of the
American army, until the end of October. 'I found,' says
General McClellan in his report, 'no army to command—a mere
collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac,
some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat.
Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the
southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive
works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the
avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The
number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000
infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, with nine
imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces.' … General McClellan
at once commenced the organization of the great army
authorized by Congress. His views of the military position and
appropriate military conduct were, for the most part,
accepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the
resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that the
Army of the Potomac had reached, on October 27th, a strength
of … 168,318. It was the general's opinion that the advance
upon the enemy at Manassas should not be postponed beyond the
25th of November. It was his desire that all the other armies
should be stripped of their superfluous strength, and, as far
as possible, every thing concentrated in the force under his
command. On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found
his bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a letter to the
Secretary of War requesting to be placed on the retired list.
… His desire was granted. An order was simultaneously issued
appointing General McClellan commander-in-chief under the
President. This change in his position at once produced a
change in General McClellan's views. Hitherto he had
undervalued the importance of what was to be done in the West.
He had desired the Western armies to act on the defensive. Now
he wished to institute an advance on East Tennessee, and
capture Nashville contemporaneously with Richmond. … In
preparation for this, the Department of the West was
reorganized. On the day following that of McClellan's
promotion, Fremont was removed from his command. His
department was subdivided into three: (1.) New Mexico, which
was assigned to Colonel Canby; (2.) Kansas, to General Hunter;
(3.) Missouri, to General Halleck. To General Buell was
assigned the Department of the Ohio, and to General Rosecrans
that of West Virginia. The end of November approached, and
still the Army of the Potomac had not moved. The weather was
magnificent, the roads excellent. … Winter at last came, and
nothing had been done. … Considering the military condition of
the nation when General McClellan undertook the formation and
organization of the great Army of the Potomac, the time
consumed in bringing that force into a satisfactory condition
was far from being too long. … From the resources furnished
without stint by Congress McClellan created that army. Events
showed that his mental constitution was such that he could not
use it on the battlefield. … There probably never was an army
in the world so lavishly supplied as that of the Potomac
before the Peninsular expedition. General McDowell, who knew
the state of things well, declared, in his testimony before
the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 'There
never was an army in the world supplied as well as ours. I
believe a French army of half the size could be supplied with
what we waste.'"

_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapters 44 and 49 (volume 2)._

"Some persons, who ought to have known better, have supposed
that in organizing the Army of the Potomac I set too high a
model before me and consumed unnecessary time in striving to
form an army of regulars. This was an unjustifiable error on
their part. I should, of course, have been glad to bring that
army to the condition of regulars, but no one knew better than
myself that, with the means at my command, that would have
been impossible within any reasonable or permissible time.
What I strove for and accomplished was to bring about such a
condition of discipline and instruction that the army could be
handled on the march and on the field of battle, and that
orders could be reasonably well carried out. … In spite of all
the clamor to the contrary, the time spent in the camps of
instruction in front of Washington was well bestowed, and
produced the most important and valuable results. Not a day of
it was wasted.
{3439}
The fortifications then erected, both directly and indirectly,
saved the capital more than once in the course of the war, and
enabled the army to manœuvre freely and independently. … No
other army we possessed could have met and defeated the
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. And, with all the
courage, energy, and intelligence of the Army of the Potomac,
it probably would not have been equal to that most difficult
task without the advantage it enjoyed during its sojourn in
the camps around Washington."

_G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_G. B. McClellan,
Report on the Organization and Campaigns
of the Army of the Potomac._

_Prince de Joinville,
The Army of the Potomac._

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,
37th Congress, 3d session, H. R., part. 1._

_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August).
Act of Congress freeing Slaves employed
in the service of the Rebellion.

In August, Congress passed an "Act to confiscate property used
for insurrectionary purposes." As originally framed, it only
confiscated "any property used or employed in aiding, abetting
or promoting insurrection, or resistance to the laws," which
would not include slaves. A new section was added, declaring
that "whenever hereafter during the present insurrection
against the Government of the United States, any person held
to labor or service under the law of any State shall be
required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or
service is due to take up arms against the United States, or
to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory,
intrenchment or in any military or naval service whatever
against the Government of the United States, the person to
whom such service or labor is due shall forfeit his claim
thereto." The law further provided that, "whenever any person
shall seek to enforce his claim to a slave, it shall be a
sufficient answer to such claim, that the slave had been
employed in the military or naval service against the United
States contrary to the provisions of this Act."

_J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, page 342._

ALSO IN:
_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 1, pages 568-570._

_E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States during the Rebellion,
page 195._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August: North Carolina).
The Hatteras expedition.

"General Wool relieved General Butler August 16th, 1861, of
the command at Fortress Monroe. Butler was detailed to active
duty. The War and Navy Departments having arranged the first
of a series of expeditions against the Southern coast, the
command of the land forces was conferred upon Butler—Commodore
S. H. Stringham directing the naval arm. Materials for the
adventure were rapidly gathered at Fortress Monroe from the
date of August 16th to the 26th, on which day the fleet took
its departure. … Not until the vessels were at sea were any
but the directors of the enterprize aware of the point of
attack. Forts Hatteras and Clark commanded the entrance to the
Sounds of Pamlico and Albemarle, whose waters were a great
rendezvous for traders running the blockade. … Fort Hatteras
was an exceedingly formidable battery. It was nearly
surrounded by water, and was only approached by a circuitous
and narrow neck of land. … The secrecy and rapidity of
preparation by the Federals caught the rebels somewhat
unprepared for the attack. … The bombardment opened Wednesday
morning, at ten o'clock, preparatory to the landing of the
land forces on the beach above Fort Hatteras. … A heavy surf
rolled in upon the treacherous sands. After infinite labor,
and the beaching of three small boats, the landing was
suspended for the day. Those already on shore—315 in
number—were safe under the guns of the fleet. … The
bombardment continued during the entire first day. No land
assault was attempted. Fort Hatteras replied with great vigor,
but with little avail. … On the morning of the 29th, the
cannonade opened early. A cloudless sky and a clear sea
blessed the cause of the assailants. During the night a
transport heavily laden with troops reenforced the fort,
running down the Sound which was yet open. Fort Clark was
occupied by the Federal forces, and refused its aid to assist
its late confederate. The conflict soon raged with extreme
vigor on both sides. At eleven o'clock the Confederate flag
fluttered uneasily a moment—then ran down the halyards and a
white flag was slowly run to the peak. … Articles of
capitulation were signed on board the flag-ship Minnesota.
Butler then landed and took formal possession of the largest
fortification. The number of prisoners surrendered was 615,
who were all placed on the Minnesota. In four days time they
were in New York harbor. … The first design, it would appear,
was to destroy the forts, stop up the channel with old hulks,
and to return, temporarily at least, to Fortress Monroe with
the entire force; but the place proved to be so strong that
Butler left Weber and Hawkins' commands in possession."

_O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
volume 2, division 5, chapter 11._

ALSO IN:
_D. Ammen,
The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,
chapter 8._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August-October: Missouri).
Fremont's premature proclamation of freedom to slaves of
rebels and Lincoln's modification of it.
The change of command.

"On the 31st of August, General Fremont [commanding in the
West] issued a proclamation declaring martial law, defining
the lines of the army of occupation, and threatening with
death by the bullet all who should be found within those lines
with arms in their hands. Furthermore, the real and personal
property of all persons in the state [Missouri] who should
take up arms against the United States was declared
confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they had
any, were declared free men. This proclamation produced a
strong effect upon the public mind. The proclaiming of freedom
to the slaves of rebels struck the popular chord, particularly
among thoroughly loyal men in the free states. Of course, it
maddened all the sympathizers with the rebellion, infuriated
the rebels themselves, and perplexed those loyal men who had
upon their hands the task of so conducting affairs as to hold
to their allegiance the border slave states which had not
seceded. Mr. Lincoln did not approve some features of General
Fremont's proclamation. As soon as he read it, he wrote, under
date of September 2d, to the General, that there were two
points in it which gave him anxiety. The first was, that, if
he should shoot a man according to his proclamation, 'the
confederates would certainly shoot our best men in their hands
in retaliation, and so, man for man, indefinitely.'
{3440}
He therefore ordered him to allow no man to be shot under the
proclamation without first having his (the President's)
approbation or consent. The second cause of anxiety was that
the paragraph relating to the confiscation of property and the
liberation of slaves of traitorous owners would alarm
Unionists at the South, and perhaps ruin the fair prospect of
saving Kentucky to the Union. He, therefore, wished General
Fremont, as of his own motion, so to modify his proclamation
as to make it conformable to the confiscation act just passed
by the extra session of Congress, which only freed such slaves
as were engaged in the rebel service. … General Fremont
received the President's letter respectfully, and replied to
it September 8th, stating the difficulties under which he
labored, with communication with the government so difficult,
and the development of perplexing events so rapid in the
department under his command. As to the part of his
proclamation concerning the slaves, he wished the President
openly to order the change desired, as, if he should do it of
his own motion, it would imply that he thought himself wrong,
and that he had acted without the reflection which the gravity
of the point demanded. This the President did, in a dispatch
under date of September 11th, in the words: 'It is therefore
ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so
modified, held, and constructed, as to conform to, and not to
transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the
act of Congress entitled, An act to confiscate property used
for insurrectionary purposes, approved August 6, 1861; and
that such act be published at length with this order.' Before
this order had been received, or on the day following its
date, General Fremont, though acquainted with the President's
wishes, manumitted two slaves of Thomas L. Snead of St. Louis,
in accordance with the terms of his proclamation. Although Mr.
Lincoln desired General Fremont so to modify his proclamation
as to make it accordant with the act of Congress approved
August 6th, it is hardly to be supposed that he did it solely
out of respect to that act. … If he had believed that the time
had come for the measure of liberating the slaves of rebels by
proclamation, the act of Congress would not have stood in his
way. This act was an embodiment of his policy at that time,
and he used it for his immediate purpose. … Complications in
the personal relations of General Fremont and Colonel F. P.
Blair, under whose personal and family influence General
Fremont had received his position, occurred at an early day.
Colonel Blair doubtless thought that he had not sufficient
weight in the General's counsels, and the General, doubtless,
exercised his right in choosing his own counselors. … It was a
very unhappy quarrel, and it is quite likely that there was
blame upon both sides, though it occurred between men equally
devoted to the sacred cause of saving the country to freedom
and justice. … Mr. Lincoln always gave to each the credit due
to his motives, and so far refused to mingle in the general
quarrel that grew out of the difficulty, that he kept the
good-will of both sides, and compelled them to settle their
own differences. … General Fremont at length took the field in
person. On the 8th of October he left Jefferson City for
Sedalia. As he advanced with his forces, Price retreated,
until it was widely reported that he would give battle to the
national forces at Springfield. Just as Fremont was making
ready to engage the enemy, he was overtaken by an order
relieving him of his command. He was succeeded by General
Hunter; but Hunter's command was brief, and was transferred at
an early day to General Halleck. General Fremont was relieved
of his command by the President not because of his
proclamation, not because he hated slavery, and not because he
believed him corrupt or vindictive or disloyal. He relieved
him simply because he believed that the interests of the
country, all things considered, would be subserved by
relieving him and putting another man in his place. The matter
was the cause of great excitement in Missouri, and of much
complaint among the radical anti-slavery men of the country:
but the imputations sought to be cast upon the President were
not fastened to him; and did not, four years later, when
Fremont himself became a candidate for the presidency, prevent
the warmest anti-slavery men from giving Mr. Lincoln their
support. The federal army under General Hunter retreated
without a battle; and thus the campaign, inaugurated with
great show and immense expense, was a flat failure."

_J. G. Holland,
Life of Abraham Lincoln,
chapter 20._

ALSO IN:
_J. C. Fremont,
In Command in Missouri
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1),
pages 278-288._

_W. Dorsheimer,
Fremont's Hundred Days in Missouri
(Atlantic Monthly, volume 9, 1862)._

_Official Record,
series 1, volume 3, pages 466-564._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861
(August-December: West Virginia).
Rosecrans against Lee.
Battles of Carnifex Ferry and Cheat Summit.

"When General McClellan was called [July 22] to take General
McDowell's place at the head of the Army of the Potomac,
Brigadier-General William S. Rosecrans was left in command of
the troops in West Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, the
Confederate commander, who had gathered together the forces
which had been defeated under Garnett and Pegram, and some
others, found himself in August at the head of about 16,000
men. Lee made his headquarters at Huntersville, while General
John B. Floyd … took up a position on the Gauley River for the
purpose of cutting off General Cox of Ohio, who, with a
brigade of Rosecrans's army, had just driven a Confederate
force under ex-Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia out of the
Kanawha Valley. Floyd surprised and routed the Seventh Ohio
under Colonel Tyler, and then moved to a place on the Gauley
River called Carnifex Ferry, hoping to cut off Cox from
Rosecrans. But early in September Rosecrans, leaving part of
his army under General Joseph J. Reynolds to watch Lee,
marched southward with about 10,000 men and [September 10]
attacked Floyd, who had strongly fortified himself with about
2,000 men on the banks of the river. After a severe fight of
three or four hours, in which the Union troops lost heavily,
Rosecrans, finding the position much stronger than he
expected, gave orders at twilight to stop the assault until
morning; but when morning came no enemy was to be seen; Floyd,
finding his enemy much superior in numbers, had crossed the
river in the night over a bridge hastily built of logs, and
retreated to the mountains 30 miles away. Rosecrans followed,
but finally fell back again to the Gauley. When Rosecrans
marched against Floyd, Reynolds took up a strong position on
Cheat Mountain."

_J. D. Champlin,
Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,
chapter 10._

{3441}

"General Lee proposed first to win a victory, if possible,
over Reynolds. He was combative, anxious to strike, but many
difficulties confronted him. He fully realized he had been
sent to West Virginia to retrieve Confederate disasters, and
that he had a most difficult task to perform. The Federal
commander [his main force at Elk Water] held the center summit
of Cheat Mountain pass, the mountain having three well-defined
summits. … It was necessary first to carry this well-selected
position of the Federal troops. A citizen surveyor, in
sympathy with the South and familiar with the mountain paths,
had made a trip to an elevated point where he could clearly
see the Federal position, and reported his observations to
General Lee. Afterward he made a second reconnoissance,
accompanied by Colonel Albert Rust, of the Third Arkansas
Regiment, who was anxious to see the nature of the ground and
the strength of the position for himself. They reported to
General Lee that in their opinion the enemy's position could
be assailed with success with troops which could be guided to
the point they had reached. General Lee decided to make the
attack, and gave to Rust a column of 1,200 infantry. … The
movement was to begin at night, which happened to be a very
rainy one. All the troops, however, got in the positions
assigned to them without the knowledge of the enemy, where
they waited, every moment expecting to hear the rattle of
Rust's muskets, who had been charged with the capture of the
pass on Cheat Mountain; but hour after hour passed, and no
sounds were heard. After a delay of many hours, and the enemy
had divined the nature of the attack, the troops were ordered
back to their former position. There had been only a small
conflict between cavalry, in which Colonel John A. Washington,
General Lee's aid-de-camp, who had been sent with Major W. H.
F. Lee to reconnoiter the enemy, was killed from an ambuscade.
… Rust claims in his reports that spies had communicated the
movements of the Confederate troops to the enemy. This officer
evidently did not attack, because he found, on getting close
to the Federal position, that it was much stronger than he had
thought it was from the preliminary reconnoissances he had
made. As the attack of the whole depended on the assault of
this force, the failure to attack caused a corresponding
failure of the whole movement. … This movement having failed,
and knowing that the enemy would be prepared for any second
attempt which, from the nature of the country, would have to
be similar to the one already tried, General Lee decided to
turn his attention to the commands of Wise and Floyd in front
of Rosecrans, leaving General H. R. Jackson in Reynolds's
front. He proceeded at once to Floyd's command, which he
reached on September 20th, and then to Wise's camp, closely
inspecting both. He at once perceived that Wise's position was
the strongest and offered the best means for successful
defense, and promptly concentrated his forces at that point. …
Rosecrans had advanced to the top of Big Sewell Mountain and
had placed his army in a strong position. General Lee, with te
troops of Wise, Floyd, and Loring—about 8,000 men—occupied a
position on a parallel range. The two armies were now in close
proximity to each other, both occupying strong defensive
positions. Lee and Rosecrans, having been officers of the
engineers, were fully aware of the great disadvantage an
attacking army would have, and each waited, hoping the other
would attack. After occupying these positions for twelve days,
Rosecrans, on the night of October 6th, retreated. The
condition of the roads, the mud, the swollen streams, the
large numbers of men with typhoid fever and measles, the
condition of the horses, of the artillery, and transportation,
were such that Lee decided not to pursue. … The rapid approach
of winter and the rainy season terminated the campaign in this
section. … At the termination of this campaign of General
Lee's the Confederate Government did not bestow much attention
upon this section. The majority of the people seemed inclined
to support the Federal side. … It must be admitted that
General Lee retired from West Virginia with diminished
military reputation. Great results had been expected from his
presence there. Garnett's defeat and death were to be avenged,
and the whole of that portion of Virginia speedily wrested
from the Federal arms. The public did not understand the
difficulties of the situation, or comprehend why he did not
defeat Reynolds, or the failure to attack Rosecrans."

_F. Lee,
General Lee,
chapter 6._

After Lee left General H. R. Jackson in front of Reynolds'
position, the former established himself in a fortified camp
on Buffalo Hill, and was unsuccessfully attacked there by
Reynolds, October 3. Two months later, on the 13th of
December, the attack was repeated by Reynolds' successor in
command, General Milroy, and again without success. Meantime,
Floyd had been driven into the mountains, with little
fighting, by Rosecrans, and military operations, for the time,
were at an end.

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 1, book 4, chapter 2._

ALSO IN:
_V. A. Lewis,
History of West Virginia,
chapter 28._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (September-November: On the Mississippi). General Grant's first battle, at Belmont.

In August, General Ulysses S. Grant, who had been serving for
a few weeks in Missouri, first as Colonel of the 21st Illinois
Regiment, and later as a brigadier-general, was assigned by
General Fremont to "the command of the district of south-east
Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in
Missouri, as well as all southern Illinois." On the 4th of
September he established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois,
and the next day, having learned from a scout that the rebels
were preparing to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee
River, he placed a couple of regiments of troops and a light
battery on board of steamers: and occupied the place on the
6th,—telegraphing meanwhile for orders, but not waiting for
them. His movement anticipated the enemy by a few hours, only,
and secured a command of the Tennessee, the importance of
which was afterward demonstrated by Grant, himself, when he
moved on Forts Henry and Donelson. In his "Memoirs" General
Grant says: "From the occupation of Paducah up to the early
part of November, nothing important occurred with the troops
under my command.
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I was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled
and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to
come. By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men.
… About the 1st of November I was directed from department
headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the
Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels within
their lines. Before my troops could be got off, I was notified
from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy
on the St. Francis River about 50 miles west, or south-west,
from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against
them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops
sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy.
On the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were
about to detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by
boats down the Mississippi and up the White River, in
Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to
prevent this movement if possible." To carry out these orders,
General Grant directed a demonstration to be made from Paducah
towards Columbus, while, at the same time, he conveyed some
3,000 troops down the river, in steamers, and attacked a camp
of rebels at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus. The
battle was a severe one. "The officers and men engaged at
Belmont were then under fire for the first time. Veterans,"
says General Grant, "could not have behaved better than they
did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point
they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap
its full reward. … The moment the camp was reached our men
laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick
up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better
than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men
to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the
Union cause and the achievements of the command." The result
was a rallying of the defeated rebels and a reinforcement from
Columbus which forced the Unionists to retire with haste. "Our
loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About
125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We
returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four
other pieces. The loss of the enemy, as officially reported,
was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about
2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports.
The enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops
brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first
defence of Belmont. The two objects for which the battle of
Belmont was fought were fully accomplished. The enemy gave up
all idea of detaching troops from Columbus. … If it had not
been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably have been captured
or destroyed with his 3,000 men. Then I should have been
culpable indeed."

_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 19-20 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_A. Badeau,
Military History of U. S. Grant,
chapter 1._

_W. P. Johnston,
Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,
chapter 24._

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia).
Confederate project for the invasion of the North
vetoed by Jefferson Davis.

"Between the 4th of August and the 15th of October more than
110 regiments and thirty batteries, comprising at least
100,000 men, were added to the forces in Washington and its
neighborhood, and there appeared to be no limit to the
resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Northern
troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the
immense resources at the disposal of the United States
Government, that there was every reason to expect in the
spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and
vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities, on
the part of the soldiers. The army at Manassas, on the other
hand, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate
Government, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of
clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward
with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter. … It was
easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if
the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active
operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have
learned 'the trade of the soldier,'—should have acquired
familiarity with the use of arms, habits of obedience, trust
in their officers and superiors, discipline,—the Federal
general would enter on the next campaign with all those
chances of success which attend largely superior numbers,
better arms and equipment, and a sound and thorough
organization of his army. Such in fact was the view of the
situation taken by the sagacious officer who commanded the
lately victorious army at Manassas Junction, Joseph E.
Johnston. In his opinion his two corps commanders, Beauregard
… and G. W. Smith, … entirely concurred. They saw that
something must be done to break up this constantly increasing
Federal army while it was yet in the process of formation. The
Confederate generals determined to urge their views upon the
President of the Southern Confederacy. Mr. Davis responded at
once to their expressed wish for a conference upon the
military situation, and he reached Manassas on September 30,
1861. The conference was held the next day. The generals
strongly advised Mr. Davis to reinforce the army at Manassas
so that they might cross the Potomac, cut the communications
of Washington with the North, and carry the war into the
enemy's country. Johnston and Beauregard fixed the strength of
an army adequate to these tasks at 60,000 men. Smith was
content with a force of 50,000. Additional transportation and
supplies of ammunition were also demanded. The army then at
Manassas numbered about 40,000 men. With the quality of the
soldiers the generals seemed to be perfectly content. They
only asked that the additional troops sent should be of an
equal degree of efficiency,—'seasoned soldiers' as
distinguished from 'fresh volunteers.' But President Davis
decided that he could not furnish the required reinforcement
without 'a total disregard of the safety of other threatened
positions.' The project was therefore dropped, and no further
attempt was made during the ensuing autumn and winter to
interfere with the uninterrupted development of the Federal
army at and near Washington in organization and efficiency. …
It is altogether probable that the Confederate army was at
that time decidedly the superior of its antagonist in many
important respects. It had the prestige of victory. … We may
fairly say therefore, that an invasion of the North,
undertaken in October, 1861, held out a very fair promise of a
successful result for the Confederate arms."

_J. C. Ropes,
The Story of the Civil War,
chapter 10._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia).
The affair at Ball's Bluff, or Leesburg.

"The true story of the affair of Ball's Bluff, is, in brief,
as follows: One of General Stone's officers, Captain
Philbrick, of the 15th Massachusetts, thought that he had
discovered a camp of the enemy about one mile beyond
Harrison's island in the direction of Leesburg. Having
completed the feint of crossing made in the course of the
20th, General Stone at 10.30 P. M. of the same day issued his
orders for the surprise of the supposed camp at daybreak of
the 21st. Colonel Devens, of the 15th Massachusetts, was
entrusted with the duty, with four companies of his regiment.
Colonel Lee, of the 20th Massachusetts, was directed to
replace Colonel Devens in Harrison's island with four
companies of his own regiment, one of which was to pass over
to the Virginia shore and hold the heights there to cover
Colonel Devens's return. Colonel Devens was directed to
'attack the camp at daybreak, and, having routed, to pursue
them as far as he deems prudent, and to destroy the camp, if
practicable, before returning.' … Having accomplished this
duty, Colonel Devens will return to his present position,
unless he shall see one on the Virginia side near the river
which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced, and one which
can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In
which case he will hold on and report.' In obedience to these
orders Colonel Devens crossed about midnight with five
companies (instead of four), numbering about 300 men, and
halted until daybreak in an open field near the bluffs
bordering the shore. While there he was joined by Colonel Lee
with 100 men of the 20th Massachusetts, who halted here to
cover his return. At daybreak he advanced about a mile towards
Leesburg, and then discovered that the supposed camp did not
exist. After examining the vicinity and discovering no traces
of the enemy, he determined not to return at once, but at
about half-past six A. M. sent a non-commissioned officer to
report to General Stone that he thought he could remain where
he was until reinforced. At about seven o'clock a company of
hostile riflemen were observed on the right, and a slight
skirmish ensued. A company of cavalry being soon observed on
the left, the skirmishers were drawn back to the woods, and,
after waiting half an hour for attack, the command was
withdrawn to the position held by Colonel Lee; but, after
again scouting the woods, Colonel Devens returned to his
advanced position. About eight o'clock the messenger returned
from General Stone with orders for Colonel Devens to remain
where he was, and that he would be reinforced. The messenger
was again sent back to report the skirmish that had taken
place. Colonel Devens then threw out skirmishers and awaited
reinforcements. At about ten o'clock the messenger again
returned with the information that Colonel Baker [Senator
Edward D. Baker, of California] would soon arrive with his
brigade and take command. Between nine and eleven Colonel
Devens was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Learned with the
remainder of the 15th. bringing up his command to 28 officers
and 625 men. About midday Colonel Devens learned that the
enemy were gathering on his left, and about half-past twelve
or one he was strongly attacked; and as he was in great danger
of being outflanked, and no reinforcements had arrived, at
about a quarter-past two he fell back to the bluff, where he
found Colonel Baker, who directed him to take the right of the
position he proposed to occupy. … At about three o'clock the
enemy attacked in force, the weight of his attack being on our
centre and left. At about four our artillery was silenced, and
Colonel Devens was ordered to send two of his companies to
support the left of our line; shortly after he learned that
Colonel Baker had been killed. Colonel Coggswell then assumed
command, and, after a vain attempt to cut his way through to
Edward's Ferry, was obliged to give the order to retreat to
the river-bank and direct the men to save themselves as best
they could. I have gone thus much into detail because at the
time I was much criticised and blamed for this unfortunate
affair, while I was in no sense responsible for it."

_G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
chapter 11._

In connection with the disaster at Ball's Bluff (called the
battle of Leesburg by the Confederates) a great wrong seems to
have been done to General Stone. Accused of disloyalty, he was
arrested, but on no specific charge, imprisoned for six
months, denied a trial, and set free without explanation. He
went abroad and for many years was Chief of the General Staff
to the Khedive of Egypt.

_J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, chapter 17._

ALSO IN:
_R. B. Irwin,
Ball's Bluff and the arrest of General Stone
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
volume 2, pages 123-134)._

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,
37th Congress, 3d session, H. R., part 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861
(October-December: South Carolina-Georgia).
The Port Royal Expedition.
Capture of Hilton Head.
Extensive occupation of the coast.
Savannah threatened.

"On the 29th of October, another and far stronger naval and
military expedition [than that against the Hatteras forts] set
forth from Hampton Roads, and, clearing the capes of Virginia,
moved majestically southward. Genera] T. W. Sherman [not to be
confused with General William T. Shennan of the Western
armies] commanded the land forces, consisting of 13 volunteer
regiments, forming three brigades, and numbering not less than
10,000 men; while the fleet—commanded by Commodore Samuel F.
Du Pont—embraced the steam-frigate Wabash, 14 gun-boats, 22
first-class and 12 smaller steamers, with 26 sailing vessels.
After a stormy passage, in which several transports were
disabled and four absolutely lost, Commodore Du Pont, in his
flag-ship, came to off Port Royal, South Carolina, during the
night of November 3d and 4th; and, after proper soundings and
reconnoissances, which developed the existence of a new fort
on either side of the entrance, the commodore brought his most
effective vessels into action at 9 A. M., on Thursday,
November 7th, taking the lead in his flagship, the Wabash—the
gunboats to follow at intervals in due order. Thus the
fighting portion of the fleet steamed slowly up the bay by the
forts, receiving and returning the fire of the batteries on
Bay Point as they passed up, and exchanging like compliments
with the stronger fort on Hilton Head as they came down. Thus
no vessel remained stationary under fire; so that the enemy
were at no time enabled to gain, by experiment and
observation, a perfect aim. The day was lovely; the spectacle
magnificent; the fight spirited, but most unequal.
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Despite the general presumption that batteries, well manned
and served, are superior to ships when not ironclad, the
terrible rain of shot and shell upon the gunners in the Rebel
forts soon proved beyond human endurance. … The battle … raged
nearly five hours, with fearful carnage and devastation on the
part of the Rebels, and very little on ours, when the
overmatched Confederates, finding themselves slaughtered to no
purpose, suddenly and unanimously took to flight. … The Rebel
forts were fully manned by 1,700 South Carolinians, with a
field battery of 500 more stationed not far distant. The
negroes, save those who had been driven off by their masters,
or shot while attempting to evade them, had stubbornly
remained on the isles."

_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
chapter 36._

"The effect of the battle of Port Royal was as largely felt in
the North, where it revived the hopes of her people, as in the
South, to whose people it revealed the presence of a new and
pressing danger. The Federals had conquered a strong base of
operations on the enemy's coast; they had carried the war into
South Carolina. … Sherman might, perhaps, at the first moment
of his adversary's disorder, have been able to push his
success farther, and to lead his army upon Charleston, or
Savannah. But he was afraid of risking such a venture. … The
occupation of most of the islands in the vicinity of the St.
Helena group was the natural consequence of the victory of
Hilton Head. It was effected gradually before the end of the
year. Among all the points of the coast which the Federals had
thus seized without striking a blow, thanks to the prestige of
their success, the most important was Tybee Island, at the
entrance of the Savannah River. Situated on the right bank of
the mouth of that river, and being the spot where the
lighthouse stands, Tybee Island enabled the Federals, as soon
as they became masters of it, to obstruct the passage of the
blockade-runners on their way to the great mart of Savannah.
At a distance of about 600 feet from its borders, on an islet
in the middle of the river, stood Fort Pulaski. … A few days
after, the navy extended its conquests still farther south,"
occupying the channel between the Tybee Island group and the
Warsaw Islands, "and thus opening a passage for future
operations, which would enable them to reach Savannah by
turning Fort Pulaski. … At the end of the year, Dupont's
fleet, supported by detachments from Sherman's army, was in
possession of the five large bays of North Edisto, St. Helena,
Port Royal, Tybee, Warsaw, and the whole chain of islands
which forms the coast of Carolina and Georgia between those
bays."

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
book 4, chapter 3 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
volume 1, chapter 26._

_D. Ammen,
The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,
chapter 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (November).
The Trent affair.
Arrest of Mason and Slidell.

"On the 8th of November, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, of the
United States Steamer San Jacinto, intercepted on the ocean H.
B. M. [His Britannic Majesty] mail packet boat Trent, having
on board four rebel emissaries bound for England. Having
boarded the Trent, an officer of the San Jacinto, with an
armed guard, arrested the rebels Mason, Slidell, McFarland and
Eustis, and transferred them to the San Jacinto. The Trent
then proceeded on her voyage. Captain Wilkes conveyed his
captives to Boston, where they were consigned to Fort Warren,
then a receptacle for political prisoners. When this
transaction became known to the British government, immediate
preparations were made for war. In the United States, the act
was hailed as a victory. The Secretary of the Navy publicly
applauded Captain Wilkes, and the House of Representatives did
the same. The Secretary of State, upon whom the chief
responsibility in the matter rested, saw, more clearly than
others, that a breach of international law had been committed
by the commander of the San Jacinto. The President coincided
with Mr. Seward, and it was at once resolved to restore the
rebel captives to the protection of the British flag."

_G. E. Baker,
Biographical Memoir of William H. Seward
(volume 5 of Seward's Works, pages 10-11)._

In his diplomatic correspondence as quoted in the volume cited
above, under the caption "Diary or Notes on the War,"
Secretary Seward wrote:

"November 30, 1861.—Captain Wilkes, in the Steamer San
Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken
from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on
an errand of treason against their own country. Lord Lyons has
prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I
presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing
on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not
furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course
now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by
the British government should be first made to us here, and
that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here.
In the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British
vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions
from the government, the subject is therefore free from the
embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been
specially directed by us. …

January 20, 1862.—We have reason to be satisfied with our
course in the Trent affair. The American people could not have
been united in a war which, being waged to maintain Captain
Wilkes's act of force, would have practically been a voluntary
war against Great Britain. At the same time it would have been
a war in 1861 against Great Britain for a cause directly the
opposite of the cause for which we waged war against the same
power in 1812." In a despatch to Lord Lyons, British Minister,
Mr. Seward had written: "If I decide this case in favor of my
own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles,
and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The
country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those
principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the
case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this government
could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in
this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the
British nation just what we have always insisted all nations
ought to do to us. … By the adjustment of the present case
upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as I trust,
mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a
question is finally and rightly settled between them, which,
heretofore exhausting not only all forms of peaceful
discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more
than half a century alienated the two countries from each
other."

_W. H. Seward,
To Lord Lyons, December 26, 1861
(Works, volume 5, Diplomatic History of the War,
pages 308-309)._

ALSO IN:
_M. Bernard,
Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain,
chapter 9._

_D. M. Fairfax,
Captain Wilkes's Seizure of Mason and Slidell
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 135-142)._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862
(December-March: Virginia).
Protracted inaction of McClellan.
His Plan of Campaign and its frustration by
the rebel evacuation of Centreville.