Chapter VI: Front Matter (6)

Adjoining Penn's province on the south was the domain of
another great proprietor, Lord Baltimore, whose title deed,
from the same royal source as that of Penn, but prior in time
by half a century, gave rise to conflicts which troubled the
whole life of the peaceful Friend. The first Lord Baltimore
(George Calvert) received from James I. in 1632 a patent which
gave him territory on the northerly side of the Potomac River,
stretching to the Delaware Bay and River and to the 40th
parallel of north latitude. By its terms it did undoubtedly
take in Delaware and part of Pennsylvania; but the intervening
occupation by the Swedes and Dutch, the English conquest, and
the royal grant to the Duke of York, confused the title. The
controversy was not settled until 1761-7, when "Mason and
Dixon's line" was run as the accepted boundary between
Maryland and Pennsylvania. The lords proprietary of Maryland
had been in conflict long before Penn's time with their
neighbors at the south, in Virginia, and had many difficulties
to encounter and many troubles in their undertaking to found a
state. The powers they had received with their grant from the
king were the largest that royalty could concede to a subject,
and gave to their province the character of a palatine
principality. But they exercised their substantial sovereignty
with an admirable moderation. They were Catholics, and the
early settlers in Maryland were largely though not wholly of
that faith. But they introduced a policy of tolerance which
was strange at the time to every other part of the New World
except Rhode Island, and made their province free to all
religions. Numerous Puritans entered it, especially from
Virginia, where they were unwelcome; and these, it can hardly
be denied, made ill returns for the tolerant hospitality they
received. During the time of the Civil War, the Commonwealth
and the Protectorate in England, the Maryland Puritans were
hostile, not only to the proprietary government, but to its
tolerant principles, and used the ascendancy which they
frequently gained in a spirit that does not compare favorably
with that of their adversaries. Subsequently the ascendancy of
the Puritans gave way to that of the Anglican Church, without
restoring the toleration which Catholicism in power had
established—a rare instance in history—and which Protestantism
in power had suppressed.

See MARYLAND.

Beyond the Virginia plantations, in the South, the coasts to
which Raleigh had sent his first colonists, and to which the
virgin queen had intended to give her name, waited long for
settlement. The first durable colony within that territory
which took its name in time from a less worthy sovereign was
planted in 1653, at Albemarle, on the Chowan River, by a small
company of dissenters from Virginia.
{3168}
In 1665 a considerable party of emigrants from the Barbadoes,
headed by a wealthy planter of that island, Sir John Yeamans,
established themselves on Cape Fear River, near its mouth, in
the district which was afterwards called Clarendon. Two years
before this time, in 1663, King Charles II. had discharged
some part of his heavy obligations to his loyal supporters by
granting that whole section of the American continent which
lies between the 31st and 36th parallels of latitude to a
company of courtiers, including Clarendon, Monk, Shaftesbury,
and others, and the province was named Carolina. It was
divided into two great counties, Albemarle and Clarendon, and
these corresponded somewhat nearly to the North Carolina and
South Carolina of the present day. In 1670 the lords
proprietors sent out a colony under William Sayle, which
settled first at Port Royal; but Sayle died soon after
landing, and the colonists were induced to migrate northwards
to the Ashley River, where Sir John Yeamans met them with a
considerable part of his Clarendon colony, and became the head
of the united settlements. There they founded "Old
Charleston," and, after a few years, shifting the site to the
confluence of the Ashley and the Cooper, they began the
building of the present city of Charleston. This became the
nucleus of the subsequently distinct colony of South Carolina,
as Albemarle did of that of North Carolina. The division was
made in 1729, when the rights of the Proprietors were bought
by the Crown, and the Carolinas became crown colonies. Until
that time, the southern colony had made far greater progress
than its northern twin. It had received a considerable
immigration of Huguenots from France and of Scotch-Irish from
the north of Ireland, as well as of English, and Charleston
was becoming an important port, especially frequented by
buccaneers. But after the displacement of the proprietary
government, North Carolina began quickly to receive more than
its share of the Scotch-Irish immigration and no small number
of Highland Scotch. The colony was developed almost wholly in
the agricultural direction, with few and small towns. Slavery
was introduced at an early day, and rooted itself in the
industrial system, as it did in that of all the southern
settlements.

See NORTH CAROLINA and SOUTH CAROLINA.

The last of the "Thirteen Colonies" to come into existence was
the colony of Georgia, founded so late as 1733 by General
James Oglethorpe. It occupied territory too close in
neighborhood to the Spaniards of Florida to be attractive to
settlers in the 17th century. Its colonization was undertaken
by General Oglethorpe primarily as a philanthropic enterprise
for the benefit of unfortunate English debtors, who were
released from prison and permitted to emigrate under his care;
but secondarily to strengthen the defence of the English
colonies against the Spaniards. He obtained his grant from
George II. "in trust for the poor," and the colony was
governed by trustees until 1752, when it was surrendered to
the crown. The first emigrants left England in the fall of
1732, and early in the next year Savannah was laid out by
Oglethorpe in person. His scheme of colonization proved highly
attractive, not only in England but on the continent, and
numbers of Protestant Germans came over to become part of the
original population of Georgia. At the outset, slavery was
strictly prohibited; but the settlers thought themselves
grievously oppressed by the denial of slaves, and their
discontent became so great that in 1749 the trustees rescinded
the prohibition.

See GEORGIA.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1620-1776.
Constitutional relations of the colonies to the English Crown
and Parliament.
The working of the leaven of independence
in New England Puritanism.

The history of the development of the question between England
and her colonies, as to their constitutional relations to one
another, "falls naturally into two periods: first, from the
beginning of English colonization in America to the Revolution
of 1688; second, from 1688 to the Declaration of Independence.
… Passing now to the history of the first period, it is to be
observed that the leading institution in the English
government at that time was the King in Council. … But in the
17th century, owing to a combination of very strong political
and religious forces, the struggle between the King in
Parliament and the King in Council was … opened and pushed
with vigor. It continued with alternations of success, but on
the whole with results favorable to Parliament, till 1688.
Then the King in Parliament finally gained the ascendancy, and
this result was so secured by statute as never afterwards to
be seriously called in question. The supremacy of Parliament
was established by a series of royal concessions. The
parliamentary party viewed these as compromises between
Parliament and king. This gave color to the theory of social
contract, which was now given new impulse and form by the
parliamentarian writers of the 16th and 17th centuries. … It
naturally follows from what has been said that the
administration of colonial affairs previous to 1688 was in the
hands of the King in Council. Such was the fact. The
enterprises of discovery were fitted out under the patronage
of the crown; the territories discovered or visited were taken
possession of in its name; and grants of land, of rights of
government and trade, were made to actual settlers by the
kings. Every colonial charter is a proof of this. As the king
was by the theory of English law feudal proprietor of England,
so he became proprietor of colonial territory, though that
territory was granted out in socage, one of the freest forms
of English tenure. Certain superficial distinctions were
introduced in the form of colonial governments, as royal,
proprietary, and charter; but they all emanated from the
crown. Its supremacy extended around and beneath them all. The
fact that they were established by grant is proof of this,
even though there had been no subsequent acts to enforce the
control. They were colonies of the English crown; their
inhabitants were its subjects. The true doctrine of
sovereignty and allegiance necessitates this conclusion. …
Parliament passed few statutes affecting the colonies. Yet,
not to mention others, there were five such of very great
importance which fall within this period: the Act of Supremacy
(I Eliz. cap. I), and the four Navigation acts. In all these
the colonies were expressly mentioned. But the relative
position of crown and Parliament is illustrated by the fact
that when in 1624 the Council was proceeding to annul the
third Virginia charter, the House tried to interfere but was
warned off—because the business concerned only the king and
his advisers.
{3169}
Moreover there was no lack of precedents for the extension not
only of common law but of royal ordinances and statute law
outside of the original realm of England. … Such in outline
was the status of English colonial law previous to 1688. It
was in the process of formation and adaptation to the new
empire. There were ample precedents for the exercise of the
rights of British sovereignty in America, but those rights had
not yet been called into the fullest operation. Their
legitimacy however was in general fully acknowledged by the
colonists. They had been allowed great liberty in establishing
their governments, erecting courts, levying taxes, organizing
and calling out their militia for defence against the Indians.
Colonial society had been allowed to develop freely in all
lines and the product was far different from anything which
existed in the mother country. It was democratic rather than
aristocratic; it was also extremely particularistic, and too
remote from England to feel much interest in the general
concerns of the empire. In this divergence of social
organization and interests, as between the colonies and the
mother country, lay the germ which might develop into
resistance on the part of the plantations, if at any time
England should attempt to enforce her rightful supremacy over
them. But as yet there was too little of the spirit of union
among the colonists to make possible any combined action. Also
those dynasties whose government had been most arbitrary in
England, the Tudors and Stuarts, had, till the reign of James
II, treated the colonies with great leniency. But the
statements just made do not cover the whole ground. They
describe the attitude of the colonies in general toward the
mother country, but they do not describe the special
conditions which prevailed in New England. If we wish to know
how the theory of colonial independence originated, we must
look in that direction. The American revolution cannot be
explained without reference to the political character and
tendencies of Puritanism. … Puritanism then was a political as
well as a religious movement. On the one hand its doctrines
contained a strong democratic leaven; on the other they
contained principles which might lead to the separation of
church and state. How the former tendency worked itself out in
New England is familiar; how the latter failed of
accomplishment there is equally well known. The Puritans of
Massachusetts were not opposed to the union of church and
state or to the employment of the secular power to enforce
religious conformity. … What they were opposed to was every
other form of state church except their own. … In order to
maintain her peculiar system, Massachusetts had to be on her
guard against all interference from outside. … The
Massachusetts charter was brought over to this country. A few
years later the Plymouth company was dissolved, and
representation of the colony in England, except by such agents
as she might send, ceased. The terms of the charter were very
liberal; but like all the others it was a royal grant, and
expressly stated that the inhabitants of the colony were to be
subjects of England and were to enjoy all the liberties and
immunities of such, as if they were in the realm of England.
The oaths of supremacy and allegiance were to be administered
to all who should go to the colony. The company was made a
'body corporate and politic' and was given ample powers of
government; but its laws, statutes, and ordinances were not to
be contrary to the laws of England. The admission of freemen
was left in the hands of the corporation. How did the Puritan
oligarchy make use of this charter for serving the purposes of
their government? In a word, they interpreted the expression
'body corporate and politic' to mean an independent state, and
virtually abandoned all legal connection with England except
an empty acknowledgment of allegiance. The oath of allegiance
was not administered, but instead an oath of fidelity to the
government of Massachusetts. An ecclesiastical system wholly
different from that of England was established. Only those
were admitted to political rights, made freemen, who were
members of a Congregational church. … The colony also
exercised full legislative and judicial powers, and denied the
right of appeal both practically and theoretically. The proof
of this is most direct and convincing. To illustrate: in 1646
the General Court refused to permit the appeal of Dr. Child
and others who, as Presbyterians, desired to lay before
Parliament the wrongs they suffered in Massachusetts. Not only
was the right denied, but the petitioners were prevented by
force from carrying their case to England. The same course was
pursued in reference to appeals in ordinary judicial cases.
During the discussion of the affair just mentioned it was
boldly affirmed in the General Court that subjects were bound
by English laws only so long as they lived in England; that
neither statutes nor royal ordinances were in force beyond the
seas. A little later than this both the magistrates and the
elders were called upon to give their views on the legal
relations between the colony and England. Both agreed that by
their charter they 'had absolute power of government'; that
their government was perfect and sufficient in all its parts,
not needing the help of any superior to make it complete. They
acknowledged that they had received the charter from England,
and 'depended upon that state for protection and immunities as
freeborn Englishmen'; but the duties which were correlative to
those immunities, and which are necessary to a true conception
of allegiance, were not mentioned. This position was
consistently maintained by the Puritans of Massachusetts as
long as they remained in power. In their correspondence with
the home government and its officials between 1664 and 1684
the right of appeal was always denied. Its exercise was never
allowed. If we add to this the further statements that
Massachusetts coined money; strove to enlarge the bounds of
her patent, not only without consulting the king, but in
defiance of his absolute prohibition; taxed English imports;
and, without the consent of the home government, entered the
New England confederation, some notion can be formed of the
degree of independence claimed and exercised by that colony.
The exercise of this independence however did not make it
legal. It only illustrates the fact that the roots of the
American revolution extend back into the times of which we are
speaking. … It was to be expected that England would interfere
to bring Massachusetts within the bounds of constitutional
dependence. Complaints against the colony, on the part of
Gorges and of those who had been banished by the Puritans,
began very early.
{3170}
These led to 'quo warranto' proceedings for the recall of the
charter in 1635. But civil strife at home compelled the
government of Charles I to abandon the project. Then came the
period of the Commonwealth, when the views of the English
government were so fully in harmony with those of the New
England leaders that the practical independence of the colony
was ignored. … From the restoration dates the beginning of a
more comprehensive colonial policy." With the fall of the
Massachusetts charter, in 1684, "closes the first stage in the
development of the idea of colonial independence. The struggle
between the Puritans of Massachusetts and the crown is the
most significant fact in American history previous to 1760.
The Puritans were defeated; the authority of England was
reasserted. … But for our purpose the important result is that
the Puritans left behind them an armory full of precedents and
arguments in favor of colonial independence. They had
constructed the American theory on that subject. That was the
chief permanent result of their experiment. They had from
first to last adhered to the theory which expediency taught
them to adopt. They taught the colonists how to resist the
exercise of the ecclesiastical and judicial supremacy of the
crown. If now at any time in the future the Americans should
consider themselves aggrieved by the acts of the English
government, the Puritan spirit and theory would be likely to
appear. Such was the aspect of affairs at the close of the
first period of colonial history. After the revolution of
1688, Parliament assumes more and more the control of American
concerns. Statutes on those subjects multiply. The
administration of the colonies becomes a branch of the
ministerial government of Great Britain. The development of an
imperial as distinguished from an insular policy is begun. The
interference of England in colonial affairs became more
frequent and the control asserted more extensive than
heretofore. … The attitude of the colonists during this period
was one of passive rather than active resistance.
Parliamentary restrictions were so far evaded as not to be
burdensome. … The records show that the burden of opinion in
the colonies was jealousy of all government, so far as it
operated as a restraint. The interference of government,
whether colonial or imperial, was welcomed by the colonists,
when it could be used for the advancement of their private or
local interests; when larger objects were aimed at, it was if
possible ignored or resisted. … The political condition of the
colonies was for the first time clearly revealed during the
French and Indian war. The history of Germany can furnish no
more vivid spectacle of the evils of particularism than does
that struggle. … The condition of anarchy and helplessness
revealed by the war was such as to convince all the servants
of the crown in America that active parliamentary interference
was necessary, if the colonies were to be defended and
retained as an integral part of the British empire. The fact
that the British government, within a reasonable time after
the close of the war, proceeded to put this suggestion into
execution, implies nothing arbitrary or unreasonable. It had
the undoubted constitutional right to do so; and so far as
could be seen at the time, expediency prompted in the same
direction. But during the century since the Puritan oligarchy
of Massachusetts yielded to the supremacy of the crown, the
theory of social contract had been fully developed. It had
formulated the needs of the opposition in all the European
countries to the system of absolutism. It was the theory of
government very generally held by the Puritans in both England
and America. … This theory, as soon as it was understood,
would naturally find general acceptance in the colonies. … The
American revolution, as truly as the French, was the outgrowth
of the doctrine of natural rights and social contract. By this
I mean simply that the doctrine in question formed the
theoretical basis of both movements. So far as the American
revolution is concerned the proof of this statement is
contained in the writings of the patriot leaders at the time,
the various state papers that were issued, and the doctrine
that was held respecting the right of imperial taxation. No
man contributed so much to bringing about the revolution as
Samuel Adams; and his mind was saturated with the theory of
social contract. He made it the basis of all his reasonings. …
The reason why New England became the leader of the movement
clearly appears. The process of development through which the
colonies passed was a natural, and therefore a necessary one.
It was slow and obscure, and therefore could not be clearly
recognized at the time. But that it was nevertheless
revolutionary becomes evident when we compare the views and
aims of the colonists with the constitution of the British
empire. When the two systems came into collision the colonists
adopted a theory which was 'in the air' at the time, but one
under which no government can be successfully carried on. When
they came to erect a government of their own, they had to
abandon it. It is not claimed that the doctrine of natural
rights ever found such general acceptance in America as in
France. The character of the people and the absence of a
despotic government prevented that. But that the American
revolution cannot be explained without assigning it a
prominent place is evident. It is not intended to convey the
impression that the colonists had no grievances. There were
causes for complaint, but they were doubtless greatly
exaggerated. A mind filled with the democratic theories of the
times, and with the loose notions concerning sovereignty and
allegiance which then prevailed, could easily imagine that
Parliament, unless resisted, would establish a despotic
government in America."

_Professor H. L. Osgood,
England and the Colonies
(Political Science Quarterly, September, 1887)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1651-1672.
The Navigation Acts and the colonies.
Spirit and objects of the English restrictive commercial system.

To the Act of Navigation, passed in 1651 (see NAVIGATION LAWS)
is due a change in the relations of the colonies to the
mother-country. "Henceforth they were regarded mainly as
feeders to its carrying-trade, as consumers of its
manufactures, as factories for the distribution of its
capital, and, in a word, as mere commercial appendages of what
was now the great commercial power. Dominion became
subordinate to trade. … Beginning … with the re-enactment of
the Navigation Act after the Restoration, we find that the new
system which is to regulate colonial trade and define the
relations of the colonies to the parent, is contained in three
Acts of Parliament.
{3171}
First, in the re-enactment itself of the Act of Navigation in
1660; secondly, in an act, passed in 1663, entitled 'an Act
for the encouragement of trade'; and, thirdly, in an act,
passed in 1672, and entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of
the Greenland and Eastland fisheries, and for the better
securing the plantation trade.' … The three acts which created
the system, were all passed in the reign of Charles II.; the
others followed rapidly, and in great numbers, for a century,
until the failure of the attempt to transform this system of
trade into one of trade and revenue, by means of what is known
as the Stamp Act. St. John's Navigation Act was reenacted in
1660, under Charles II., as the first-fruits of the
Restoration. This act forbade importation into or exportation
out of the colonies, save what came and went in English ships,
and its object was, to shut the doors of the colonies against
foreign trade. In 1663 another step was taken, and an act was
passed with the object, openly avowed in its fifth section, of
keeping the colonies in 'a firmer dependence' upon England,
and of making that kingdom the staple, or place of
distribution, not only of colonial produce, 'but also of the
commodities of other countries and places, for the supplying
of them.' To effect this, the Act of 1663 went beyond that of
1660, and exacted, that no European products or manufactures
should be imported into any colony, except what had been
actually laden and shipped in an English port, and carried
'directly thence' to the importing colony. This act forced the
colonists to get such supplies as they could not themselves
furnish in England only, and thus not only could none but
mariners of whom three fourths were English transport
merchandise to and from the colonies, but the colonists
themselves were not suffered to go anywhere but to England for
that which they could not get at home. … This position of
factor between the colonies and foreign markets was a
lucrative one. But the spirit of trade is such, that it
regards much as only a stepping-stone to more, and the next
enactment concerning colonial trade, or that of 1672, betrays
this characteristic. The existing factorage was maintained
only between the colonial and foreign trade; it had no place
in intercolonial traffic. … As this intercolonial trade
developed, it attracted the observation of the English
merchants, who at last demanded the control of it. In
compliance with this demand, an act was passed in 1672,
subjecting any enumerated commodity to a duty specified in the
statute—and thus was destroyed the freedom, and, to a great
extent, the incentive of intercolonial traffic. This act was
well entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of the Greenland
and Eastland fisheries, and for the better securing of the
plantation trade.' History is silent respecting the fisheries,
but it has been very outspoken concerning its effect on the
plantations. The effect was this: if Rhode Island wished to be
supplied by Massachusetts with one of the enumerated
commodities, and Massachusetts desired to furnish Rhode Island
with that commodity, the delivery of the goods could not be
made by the producer to the consumer, but the article would
have to be sent to England first, and landed there, and then
be sent back from England to Rhode Island before the consumer
could touch it. A line drawn from Boston, in Massachusetts, to
Bristol, in England, and thence back to Newport, in Rhode
Island, will show the course which such article must take, if
sold by Massachusetts to Rhode Island, before the demands of
English commerce were satisfied; it will in all probability
likewise show the least angle with the longest sides ever
subtended on the chart of trade. Should, however, the parties
to the transaction desire to avoid the risk and delay incident
to this phenomenal voyage, they could do so by paying the
certain rates and duties prescribed by this statute."

_E. G. Scott,
The Development of Constitutional Liberty
in the English Colonies of America,
chapter 8 (with corrections by the author)._

"Unfortunately there does not exist any history of the
commerce of the American colonies, from the Commonwealth to
1774, as affected by navigation laws, acts of trade, and
revenue measures. No one who has read the 29 acts which
comprise this legislation will recommend their perusal to
another; for, apart from their volume, the construction of
these acts is difficult,—difficult even to trained lawyers
like John Adams, whose business it was to advise clients in
respect to them. Nor have special students, like Bancroft,
stated their effect with exact precision."

_M. Chamberlain,
The Revolution Impending: Critical Essay
(Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6),
page 64._

ALSO IN:
_G. L. Beer,
The Commercial Policy of England toward the American Colonies
(Columbia College Studies, volume 3, number 2)._

_W. B. Weeden,
Economic and Social History of New England,
chapter 7 (volume 1)._

_J. E. T. Rogers,
Economic Interpretation of History,
chapter 15._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1690.
The First American Congress.
King William's War.

"After the accession [in England, A. D. 1689] of William and
Mary, hostilities were declared between France and England,
which extended to America; and thus began the first
inter-colonial war [commonly known in American history as King
William's War]. The French soon planned an invasion of Boston
and New York. … On the 8th of February, 1690, a war-party, who
had come stealthily from Canada, entered the open gates of the
town of Schenectady, when it was snowing, and broke the
stillness of midnight with the terrible yell and whoop of the
savages. Men, women, and children, for two hours, were
mercilessly butchered. Their dwellings were burned. The whole
town was sacked. … The intelligence flew through the colonies.
… Schenectady was the Fort Sumter of that day. The event had a
political effect. It shamed the factions in New York at least
into a truce. It roused a spirit of patriotism. The governor
of Massachusetts urged, in letters to other colonies, the
necessity for immediate action to provide for the common
defence. … The General Court [of Massachusetts], in view of
organizing a joint effort of the colonies, proposed to hold a
congress. The call for a meeting is dated the 19th of March,
1690. It relates, that their majesties' subjects had been
invaded by the French and Indians; that many of the colonists
had been barbarously murdered, and were in danger of greater
mischiefs; and it proposed, as a measure of prevention, that
the neighboring colonies, and Virginia, Maryland, and the
parts adjacent, should be invited to meet at New York, and
conclude on suitable methods for assisting each other for the
safety of the whole land. The governor of New York was desired
to transmit this invitation to the southern colonies. Such was
the first call for a general congress in America.
{3172}
It is free from narrowness. It is liberal in its spirit,
simple in its terms, and comprehensive in its object. … The
call elicited from several colonies interesting replies.
Governor Hinckley, of Plymouth, entered with zeal into the
measure, and, though the General Court was not in session,
appointed a commissioner. The Quaker-governor of Rhode Island,
Henry Bull, replied in an excellent spirit. … Though the time
was too short to convene the assembly for the appointment of
commissioners, he promised the aid of that colony to the
utmost of its ability to resist the French and Indians. The
head of the convention of Maryland wrote, that it was the
design of the assembly to send arms and men to aid in the
general defence. … President Bacon, of Virginia, replied, that
the proposition would require the action of the assembly, and
that nothing would be done until the arrival of the daily
expected governor. The replies to the invitation were cordial.
The commissioners of four colonies [Massachusetts, Plymouth,
Connecticut, and New York] met at New York. … The
deliberations led to a unanimous result. On the 1st of May, an
agreement was signed by the delegates, in behalf of the five
colonies [including Maryland under its promise], to raise a
force of 855 men for the strengthening of Albany, and, 'by the
help of Almighty God, subduing the French and Indian enemies.'
It was agreed, that the lieutenant-governor of New York should
name the commander of this force; that it should not be
employed on any other service without the consent of the five
colonies; and that the officers should be required to preserve
among their men good order, punish vice, keep the Sabbath, and
maintain the worship of God. No proposition appears to have
been entertained for a permanent organization. … Efforts were
made to obtain additional aid from New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Rhode Island. … I need only state, as the result of this
congress, that it was resolved to attempt the reduction of
Canada by two lines of attack,—one to conquer Acadia, and then
to move on Quebec; and the other, by the route of Lake
Champlain, to assault Montreal. The New England forces under
Sir William Phips, assigned to the first route, captured
Acadia and Port Royal, and sailed for Quebec, in the
expectation of being aided by the other forces who marched by
the Champlain route. But they, under Fitz-John Winthrop, with
the title of major, were not successful. Leisler [see NEW
YORK: A. D. 1689-1691], with characteristic rashness, accused
the commander of treachery; while the officers charged the
commissary, Jacob Milborne, of New York, with inefficiency in
procuring supplies. The failure of Winthrop occasioned the
retreat of Phips."

_R. Frothingham,
The Rise of the Republic of the United States,
chapter 3._

ALSO IN:
_Doc. History of New York,
volume 2 (Leisler's administration)._

_Documents relating to Colonial History of New York,
volume 3._

See, also, CANADA: A. D. 1689-1690.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1696-1697.
The Board of Trade for the Supervision of the Colonies.
Plans of Colonial Union by Penn and others.

"The king attempted a more efficient method of administering
the colonies; and, in May 1696, a Board of Commissioners for
Trade and Plantations, consisting of the chancellor, the
president of the privy council, the keeper of the privy seal,
the two secretaries of state, and eight special commissioners,
was called into being. To William Blathwayte, who had drafted
the new charter of Massachusetts, John Locke, and the rest of
the commission, instructions were given by the crown 'to
inquire into the means of making the colonies most useful and
beneficial to England; into the staples and manufactures which
may be encouraged there, and the means of diverting them from
trades which May prove prejudicial to England; to examine into
and weigh the acts of the assemblies; to set down the
usefulness or mischief of them to the crown, the kingdom, or
the plantations themselves; to require an account of all the
moneys given for public uses by the assemblies of the
plantations, and how the same are employed.' The
administration of the several provinces had their unity in the
person of the king, whose duties with regard to them were
transacted through one of the secretaries of state; but the
Board of Trade was the organ of inquiries and the centre of
colonial information. Every law of a provincial legislature,
except in some of the charter governments, if it escaped the
veto of the royal governor, might be arrested by the
unfavorable opinion of the law officer of the crown, or by the
adverse report of the Board of Trade. Its rejection could come
only from the king in council. … The Board of Trade was hardly
constituted before it was summoned to plan unity in the
military efforts of the provinces; and Locke with his
associates despaired, on beholding them 'crumbled into little
governments, disunited in interests, in an ill posture and
much worse disposition to afford assistance to each other for
the future.' The Board, in 1697, 'after considering with their
utmost care,' could only recommend the appointment of 'a
captain-general of all the forces and all the militia of all
the provinces on the continent of North America, with power to
levy and command them for their defence, under such
limitations and instructions as to his majesty should seem
best.' … With excellent sagacity—for true humanity perfects
the judgment—William Penn matured a plan of a permanent
union, by a national representation of the American States. On
the 8th day of February 1697, he delivered his project for an
annual 'congress,' as he termed it, of two delegates from each
province. … But the ministry adopted neither the military
dictatorship of Locke and his associates, nor the peaceful
congress of William Penn."

_G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
part 3, chapter 4 (volume 2)._

The following is the Plan of Union drafted by Penn: "A Briefe
and Plaine Scheam how the English Colonists in the North parts
of America, viz.: Boston, Connecticut, Road Island, New York,
New Jerseys, Pensilvania, Maryland, Virginia, and Carolina may
be made more usefull to the Crowne, and one another's peace
and safty with an universall concurrence.
1st. That the severall Colonies before mentioned do meet once
a year, and oftener if need be, during the war, and at least
once in two years in times of peace by their stated and
appointed Deputies, to debate and resolve of such measures as
are most adviseable for their better understanding, and the
public tranquility and safety.
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2d. That in order to it two persons well qualified for sence,
sobriety and substance be appointed by each Province, as their
Representatives or Deputies, which in the whole make the
Congress to consist of twenty persons.
3d. That the King's Commissioner for that purpose specially
appointed shall have the chaire and preside in the said
Congresse.
4th. That they shall meet as near as conveniently may be to
the most centrall Colony for use of the Deputies.
5th. Since that may in all probability, be New York both
because it is near the Center of the Colonies and for that it
is a Frontier and in the King's nomination, the Governor of
that Colony may therefore also be the King's High Commissioner
during the Session after the manner of Scotland.
6th. That their business shall be to hear and adjust all
matters of Complaint or difference between Province and
Province.
As,
1st, where persons quit their own Province and goe to another,
that they may avoid their just debts, tho they be able to pay
them,
2nd, where offenders fly Justice, or Justice cannot well be
had upon such offenders in the Provinces that entertaine them,
3dly, to prevent or cure injuries in point of Commerce,
4th, to consider of ways and means to support the union and
safety of these Provinces against the public enemies. In which
Congresse the Quotas of men and charges will be much easier,
and more equally sett, then it is possible for any
establishment made here to do; for the Provinces, knowing
their own condition and one another's, can debate that matter
with more freedome and satisfaction and better adjust and
ballance their affairs in all respects for their common safty.
7ly. That in times of war the King's High Commissioner shall
be generall or chief Commander of the severall Quotas upon
service against a common enemy as he shall be advised, for the
good and benefit of the whole."

_H. W. Preston,
Documents illustrative of American History,
page 146._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1696-1749.
Growing despotism of the English mercantile policy.
Systematic suppression of colonial manufactures.

"By the erection, in 1696, of a new Standing Council, or Board
of Trade, under the denomination of 'The Lords Commissioners
for Trade and Plantations,' the interests of British commerce
and the affairs of Colonial trade and government were confided
to that body, which thenceforward became the repository of all
official intelligence upon those subjects, and the medium of
communication with the several governors and assemblies of the
Colonies. Yearly reports of the state of the Provinces were
required from the governors, in answer to queries addressed to
them by the Board. An Act of Parliament of the same year still
further restricted commercial intercourse, by limiting trade
between England and her Colonies to English, Irish and
Colonial built vessels, and by prohibiting Colonial produce
from going to the ports of Ireland or Scotland. … The feeble
attempts of the Colonists to make a portion of their own
clothing from their abundant materials had not been unnoticed
in England. Three years after—the Board of Trade having
received complaints from English merchants and manufacturers,
that the wool and woolen manufactures of Ireland and the North
American plantations began to be exported to foreign markets
formerly supplied by England—an Act passed the British
Parliament, … dictated by that sleepless vigilance which
guarded the staple manufacture of England. It prohibited the
exportation of any wool or woolen manufacture from Ireland,
except to certain ports in England; but, by way of
compensation, virtually surrendered to Ireland the linen
manufacture, then little regarded in comparison with the
woolen interests. In reference to the Colonies, it was enacted
that 'After the first day of December, 1699, no wool,
woolfels, yarn, cloth, or woolen manufactures of the English
plantations in America shall be shipped in any of the said
English plantations, or otherwise loaden, in order to be
transported thence to any place whatsoever, under the penalty
of forfeiting ship and cargo, and £500 for each offence.' … A
letter from New England to the Board of Trade [in 1715] …
reiterates the necessity of employing the New England people
in producing naval stores, to turn them from manufactures. …
The discouragement of American manufactures, from this time,
became the settled and avowed policy of the government, and,
three years later, the Bill prohibiting the erection of forges
and iron mills was introduced, and declared that the erecting
of Manufactories in the Colonies 'tends to lessen their
dependence upon Great Britain.' … The company of Feltmakers,
in London, petitioned Parliament, in February, 1731, to
prohibit the exportation of hats from the American Colonies,
representing that foreign markets were almost altogether
supplied from thence, and not a few sent to Great Britain. The
petition was referred to a special committee, who reported
that, in New York and New England, beaver hats were
manufactured to the number, it was estimated, of 10,000
yearly. … The exports were to the Southern plantations, the
West Indies, and Ireland. In consequence of this evidence, and
that furnished by the Board of Trade in the same session, an
act was passed (5 George II. c. 22) that 'no hats or felts,
dyed or undyed, finished or unfinished, shall be put on board
any vessel in any place within any of the British plantations;
nor be laden upon any horse or other carriage to the intent to
be exported from thence to any other plantation, or to any
other place whatever, upon forfeiture thereof, and the
offender shall likewise pay £500 for every such offence.' …
This severe and stringent law continued in force in the
Colonies until the Revolution. It aimed at the prostration of
one of the oldest and, on account of the abundance and
cheapness of beavers and other furs, one of the most
profitable branches of industry."

_J. L. Bishop,
History of American Manufactures,
volume 1, chapter 14._

In 1749 an act of Parliament was passed "to encourage the
importation of pig and bar iron from his majesty's colonies in
America, and to prevent the erection of any mill or other
engine for slitting or rolling of iron, or any plateing forge
to work with a tilt hammer, or any furnace for making steel in
any of the said colonies." "Pig iron was allowed to be
imported free to all parts of the kingdom, so as to secure
cheap bar iron. But bar iron could not be imported at any port
but London, and carried no further than ten miles from that
city. This clause was intended to aid the owners of woods. In
order to protect the nail trade, all slitting-mills in the
colonies were ordered to be destroyed."

_J. B. Pearse,
Concise History of the Iron Manufacture
of the American Colonies,
page 121._

ALSO IN:
_W. B. Weeden,
Economic and Social History of New England,
volume 2._

G. L. Beer,
Commercial Policy of England toward the Colonies
(Col. Col. Studies, volume 3).

See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1763 and 1764.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:A. D. 1704-1729.
The first colonial newspapers.

See PRINTING AND PRESS: A. D. 1704-1729.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1748-1754.
First collisions with the French in the Ohio Valley.

"As the year 1750 approached, there came upon the colonies two
changes, destined to lead to a new political life. In the
first place, the colonies at last began to overrun the
mountain barrier which had hemmed them in on the west, and
thus to invite another and more desperate struggle with the
French. The first settlement made west of the mountains was on
a branch of the Kanawha (1748); in the same season several
adventurous Virginians hunted and made land-claims in Kentucky
and Tennessee. Before the close of the following year (1749)
there had been formed the Ohio Company, composed of wealthy
Virginians, among whom were two brothers of Washington. King
George granted them 500,000 acres, on which they were to plant
100 families and build and maintain a fort. The first attempt
to explore the region of the Ohio brought the English and the
French traders into conflict; and troops were not long in
following, on both sides.

See OHIO VALLEY: A. D. 1748-1754.

At the same time the home government was awaking to the fact
that the colonies were not under strict control. In 1750 the
Administration began to consider means of stopping unlawful
trade."

_R. G. Thwaites,
The Colonies, 1492-1750
(Epochs of American History),
chapter 14, section 130._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1749-1755.
Unsettled boundary disputes of England and France.
Preludes of the last French War.

See NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749-1755;
CANADA: A. D. 1750-1753; 1755;
and OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1754.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1750-1753.
The eve of the great French war.
Attitude of the colonies.

"The quarrel in which the French and English now engaged was
exclusively a colonial one. The possession and defence of the
Americans had already cost, over and over again, a larger sum
than the whole produce of their trade would have produced. The
English had the mortification of observing that the colonists
claimed an the security of Englishmen against attack, and
repudiated their obligation to take a share of the burdens
which their defence occasioned. Were they attacked by the
French,—they were Englishmen, and had a right to the ægis
which that name throws over all subjects of the crown; were
they called upon for a subscription in aid of the war,—they
were men who would not submit to be taxed without their own
consent; were they taken at their word, and requested through
their own assemblies to tax themselves,—they sometimes
refused, and sometimes doled out a minute supply, taking care
to mix up with their money bill some infringement on the royal
prerogative, which rendered it impossible, except under severe
exigency of the public service, for the governor to accept the
terms offered. … The action of the colonies at this crisis was
in accordance with their invariable policy. As soon as they
perceived that the French meditated a war of aggression in
America, a chorus of complaint and apprehension came at once
from the colonists. Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, and
Clinton, Governor of New York, had convened an assembly at
Albany during the last year of the last war, to concert
measures for uniting an the colonies for common defence;
Massachusetts and the other New England States were, of
course, anxious that the union should be carried out. They
were the barrier between the Canadas and the southern
colonies, and if any attack was made they must bear the brunt
of it. … The Congress of Albany, and especially the
Legislature of Massachusetts, advocated the erection of a line
of detached forts which might be so arranged as to overawe the
French frontier, and defend the New England colonies from
attack. … It was all in vain; every colony, with the exception
of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and South Carolina, refused to
contribute one farthing towards the expense. … Even in 1753,
when the French were actually on the Ohio, and Washington had
brought back certain intelligence of their intentions and
views, the Virginians refused supplies to Dinwiddie because
they declared themselves 'easy on account of the French.' When
at last the French had actually established themselves in
fortified posts at Niagara, at Le Bœuf, and at Venango, when
Contrecœur had driven a colonial officer out of a post which
he held on the forks of the Monongahela, when Fort du Quesne
had arisen on the ruins of an English stockade, they could no
longer close their eyes to the danger which was actually
within the boundaries of their State. They granted £10,000 of
their currency; but Dinwiddie wrote home that the bill was so
clogged with encroachments on the prerogative, that he would
not have given his assent had not the public service rendered
the supply imperatively necessary."

_Viscount Bury,
Exodus of the Western Nations,
volume 2, chapter 7._

"The attitude of these various colonies towards each other is
hardly conceivable to an American of the present time. They
had no political tie except a common allegiance to the British
Crown. Communication between them was difficult and slow, by
rough roads traced often through primeval forests. Between
some of them there was less of sympathy than of jealousy
kindled by conflicting interests or perpetual disputes
concerning boundaries. The patriotism of the colonist was
bounded by the lines of his government, except in the compact
and kindred colonies of New England, which were socially
united, though politically distinct. The country of the New
Yorker was New York, and the country of the Virginian was
Virginia. The New England colonies had once confederated; but,
kindred as they were, they had long ago dropped apart. … Nor
was it this segregation only that unfitted them for war. They
were all subject to popular legislatures, through whom alone
money and men could be raised; and these elective bodies were
sometimes factious and selfish, and not always either
far-sighted or reasonable. Moreover, they were in a state of
ceaseless friction with their governors, who represented the
king, or, what was worse, the feudal proprietary. These
disputes, though varying in intensity, were found everywhere
except in the two small colonies which chose their own
governors; and they were premonitions of the movement towards
independence which ended in the war of Revolution. The
occasion of difference mattered little. Active or latent, the
quarrel was always present. … Divided in government; divided
in origin, feelings, and principles; jealous of each other,
jealous of the Crown; the people at war with the executive,
and, by the fermentation of internal politics, blinded to an
outward danger that seemed remote and vague,—such were the
conditions under which the British colonies drifted into a war
that was to decide the fate of the continent."

_F. Parkman,
Montcalm and Wolfe,
chapter 1 (volume 1)._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1754.
The Congress at Albany and its Plans of Union.
Franklin's account.

"In 1754, war with France being again apprehended, a congress
of commissioners from the different colonies was, by an order
of the Lords of Trade, to be assembled at Albany, there to
confer with the chiefs of the Six Nations concerning the means
of defending both their country and ours. Governor Hamilton
[of Pennsylvania], having received this order, acquainted the
House with it, requesting they would furnish proper presents
for the Indians, to be given on this occasion; and naming the
speaker (Mr. Norris) and myself to join Mr. Thomas Penn and
Mr. Secretary Peters as commissioners to act for Pennsylvania.
(The House approved the nomination, and provided the goods for
the present, and tho' they did not much like treating out of
the provinces;) and we met the other commissioners at Albany
about the middle of June. In our way thither, I projected and
drew a plan for the union of all the colonies under one
government, so far as might be necessary for defense, and
other important general purposes. As we passed thro' New York,
I had there shown my project to Mr. James Alexander and Mr.
Kennedy, two gentlemen of great knowledge in public affairs,
and, being fortified by their approbation, I ventured to lay
it before the Congress. It then appeared that several of the
commissioners had formed plans of the same kind. A previous
question was first taken, whether a union should be
established, which passed in the affirmative unanimously. A
committee was then appointed, one member from each colony, to
consider the several plans and report. Mine happened to be
preferred, and, with a few amendments, was accordingly
reported. … The debates upon it in Congress went on daily,
hand in hand with the Indian business. Many objections and
difficulties were started, but at length they were all
overcome, and the plan was unanimously agreed to, and copies
ordered to be transmitted to the Board of Trade and to the
assemblies of the several provinces. Its fate was singular:
the assemblies did not adopt it, as they all thought there was
too much 'prerogative' in it, and in England it was judged to
have too much of the 'democratic.' The Board of Trade
therefore did not approve of it, nor recommend it for the
approbation of his majesty; but another scheme was formed,
supposed to answer the same purpose better, whereby the
governors of the provinces, with some members of their
respective councils, were to meet and order the raising of
troops, building of forts, etc., and to draw on the treasury
of Great Britain for the expense, which was afterwards to be
refunded by an act of Parliament laying a tax on America. …
The different and contrary reasons of dislike to my plan makes
me suspect that it was really the true medium; and I am still
of opinion it would have been happy for both sides the water
if it had been adopted. The colonies, so united, would have
been sufficiently strong to have defended themselves; there
would then have been no need of troops from England; of
course, the subsequent pretence for taxing America, and the
bloody contest it occasioned, would have been avoided."

_B. Franklin,
Autobiography
(edited by John Bigelow)
volume 1, pages 308-310._