Chapter LIII: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (6)

"The British government is accustomed to preserve an attitude
of neutrality towards contending nations; but it would seem
that neutrality does not so far interfere with the sympathies
and freedom of its subjects as to compel it to issue
proclamations against Irishmen enlisting with Francis Joseph,
or Englishmen fighting for Victor Emanuel and Garibaldi. … In
the case of the United States, the laws of England and its
treaty stipulations with our Government already forbade its
subjects from engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow our
institutions. The proclamation, therefore, in forbidding
English subjects to fight in the service of the rebels against
the United States, simply declared the law as it was already
understood; while in forbidding Englishmen to fight for the
United States against the rebels, it intervened to change the
existing practice, to revive the almost obsolete act of Geo.
III. forbidding English subjects from engaging in foreign
service without the royal consent, which had slumbered in
regard to Austria and Italy, for the purpose of forbidding
Englishmen from assisting to maintain in the United States
constitutional order against conspiracy and rebellion, and the
cause of freedom against chattel slavery. The first effect of
the proclamation, therefore, was to change the position in
which England and Englishmen stood to the United States, to
the disadvantage of the latter. Before the proclamation, for
an Englishman to serve the United States Government in
maintaining its integrity was regarded honorable; after the
proclamation such service became a crime. The proclamation
makes it an offence now for an Englishman to fight for the
Government at Washington as great as it was for Englishmen
before the proclamation to fight for the rebels of Montgomery.
It thus, in a moral view, lowered the American Government to
the level of the rebel confederacy, and in the next place, it
proceeded, in an international view, to place the rebel
confederacy on a par with the American Government. … No
ingenuity can blind us to these facts:—Before the
proclamation, to support our Government was an honorable
office for the subjects of Great Britain, and the rebels were
insurgents, with no rights save under the American
Constitution. After the proclamation, for an Englishman to
serve the United States is a crime, and the rebels are
elevated into a belligerent power—and this intervention of
England, depriving us of a support which her practice
permitted, and giving the rebels a status and right they did
not possess, we are coolly told is neutrality. … What would
England have said to such a proclamation of neutrality from us
in her domestic troubles in Canada, in Ireland, or in India?
What would the English people have thought of a state paper
from Washington, declaring it the sovereign will of the people
of the United States to remain perfectly neutral in the
contest being waged in Hindostan between the British
government on the one side and the Mogul dynasty on the other,
and forbidding American citizens to enter the services of
either of the said belligerents? What would they have thought
of the American President intimating with cold etiquette that
it was a matter of profound indifference to this Government
which of the belligerents should be victorious, the King of
Oude and Nana Sahib, or Lord Canning and the immortal
Havelock?"

_John Jay,
The Great Conspiracy:
Address at Mount Kisco, July 4, 1861._

ALSO IN:
_J. H. Soley,
The Blockade and the Cruisers,
chapter 2._

_W. H. Seward,
Works,
volume 5
(Diplomatic History of the War)._

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 4, chapter 15._

_M. Bernard,
Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain
during the American Civil War,
chapters 4-10._

See, also, ALABAMA CLAIMS.

{3430}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April-May: Maryland).
The ending of rebellious trouble in Baltimore and the state.
General Butler in the field.

The Eighth Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel Monroe, arrived at
Philadelphia on the 20th of April, the day following the
passage of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment through Baltimore,
and its battle with the rebel mob of that city. The Eighth was
accompanied by General Benjamin F. Butler, who had been
appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts to command the
first brigade from that state. At Philadelphia General Butler
"first heard of the attack on the Sixth, in Baltimore. His
orders commanded him to march through that city. It was now
impossible to do so with less than 10,000 armed men. He
counselled with Major-General Robert Patterson, who had just
been appointed commander of the 'Department of Washington,'
which embraced the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
Maryland, and the District of Columbia, and whose
head-quarters were at Philadelphia. Commodore Dupont,
commandant of the Navy Yard there, was also consulted, and it
was agreed that the troops should go by water from Perryville,
at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, to Annapolis, and
thence across Maryland to Washington." This route was
accordingly taken by General Butler. Colonel Lefferts, who had
reached Philadelphia with the New York Seventh Regiment,
preferred to attempt going directly to Washington by a steamer
which he secured for the purpose; but a report of rebel
batteries on the Potomac turned him back, and his regiment,
likewise, proceeded to Annapolis, arriving there some hours
after the Eighth Massachusetts. Despite the protests and
remonstrances of the Governor of Maryland-who was striving
hard to put his state in an attitude of "neutrality," and to
persuade the national government to respect it by passing no
armed troops across Maryland soil—both regiments were landed,
and took possession of the town, where the secessionists were
making ready to capture the Naval Academy and the training
ship Constitution. The track of the railroad from Annapolis
had been torn up and the locomotives disabled. The mechanics
of the Massachusetts Eighth proceeded quickly to repair both,
and the two regiments moved forward. "The troops reached
Annapolis Junction on the morning of the 25th, when the
co-operation of the two regiments ceased, the Seventh New York
going on to Washington, and the Eighth Massachusetts remaining
to hold the road they had just opened. Before their departure
from Annapolis, the Baltic, a large steamship transport, had
arrived there with troops, and officers speedily followed.
General Scott ordered General Butler to remain there, hold the
town and the road, and superintend the forwarding of troops to
the Capital. The 'Department of Annapolis,' which embraced the
country twenty miles on each side of the railway, as far as
Bladensburg, was created, and General Butler was placed in
command of it, with ample discretionary powers to make him a
sort of military dictator. … At the close of April, General
Butler had full 10,000 men under his command at Annapolis, and
an equal number were guarding the seat of Government
[Washington]." Meantime, Baltimore had been given up to the
control of the Secessionists, though the Maryland Unionists
were numerous and strong and were gathering courage to assert
themselves. But the rebellious and riotous city was now
brought to its senses. On the 5th of May General Butler sent
two regiments to occupy the Relay House, within nine miles of
Baltimore. On the 9th, a force of 1,200 Pennsylvania troops
and regulars, ordered forward by General Patterson from
Philadelphia, were landed near Fort McHenry, under the guns of
a United States vessel, and marched through the city. On the
night of the 13th, General Butler, in person, with about 1,000
men, including the Massachusetts Sixth, entered the place and
took a commanding position on Federal Hill, which was
afterwards permanently fortified. From that day the disloyalty
in Baltimore gave no trouble to the Government.

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 1, chapter 18._

ALSO IN:
_Official Records of the War of the Rebellion,
series 1, volume 2._

_J. Parton,
General Butler in New Orleans,
chapters 4-5._

_T. Winthrop,
New York Seventh Regiment: Our March to Washington
(Life in the Open Air)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May).
Call for additional volunteers.

On the 3d of May the President issued a call for forty
additional regiments of volunteers; directed an increase of
the regular army by ten regiments, and ordered the enlistment
of 18,000 seamen—acts subsequently legalized by Congress.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May).
Exportation of cotton from the Confederacy,
excepting through its seaports, prohibited.

On the 21st of May, 1861, the Congress of the Confederate
States passed an act declaring that "from and after the 1st
day of June next, and during the existence of the blockade of
any of the ports of the Confederate States of America by the
Government of the United States, it shall not be lawful for
any person to export any raw cotton or cotton yarn from the
Confederate States of America except through the seaports of
the said Confederate States."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May).
Secession of North Carolina.

See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-MAY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May).
General Butler at Fortress Monroe and his "Contrabands."
The first military thrust at Slavery.

General Butler was commissioned as Major-General of Volunteers
on the 16th of May, and on the 20th he was ordered to the
command at Fortress Monroe. He arrived at the Fortress on the
22d and assumed the command. "On the evening of the second day
after his arrival at the post, the event occurred which will
for ever connect the name of General Butler with the history
of the abolition of slavery in America. Colonel Phelps's visit
to Hampton [the previous day] had thrown the white inhabitants
into such alarm that most of them prepared for flight, and
many left their homes that night, never to see them again. In
the confusion three negroes escaped, and, making their way
across the bridges, gave themselves up to a Union picket,
saying that their master, Colonel Mallory, was about to remove
them to North Carolina to work upon rebel fortifications
there, far away from their wives and children, who were to be
left in Hampton. They were brought to the fortress, and the
circumstance was reported to the general in the morning. … He
needed laborers. He was aware that the rebel batteries that
were rising around him were the work chiefly of slaves,
without whose assistance they could not have been erected in
time to give him trouble. He wished to keep these men. The
garrison wished them kept. The country would have deplored or
resented the sending of them away. If they had been Colonel
Mallory's horses, or Colonel Mallory's spades, or Colonel
Mallory's percussion caps, he would have seized them and used
them without hesitation.
{3431}
Why not property more valuable for the purposes of the
rebellion than any other? He pronounced the electric words,
'These men are Contraband of War; set them at work.' 'An
epigram,' as Winthrop remarks, 'abolished slavery in the
United States.' The word took; for it gave the country an
excuse for doing what it was longing to do. … By the time the
three negroes were comfortably at work upon the new
bake-house, General Butler received the following brief
epistle, signed 'J. B. Carey, major-acting, Virginia
volunteers': 'Be pleased to designate some time and place when
it will be agreeable to you to accord to me a personal
interview.' The general complied with the request." The
interview occurred that afternoon, and was not between
strangers; for General Butler and Major Carey were old
political allies—hard-shell democrats both. The essential part
of the conversation which ensued was as follows: "Major Carey:
'I am informed that three negroes, belonging to Colonel
Mallory, have escaped within your lines. I am Colonel
Mallory's agent and have charge of his property. What do you
intend to do with regard to those negroes?' General Butler: 'I
propose to retain them.' Major Carey: 'Do you mean, then, to
set aside your constitutional obligations?' General Butler: 'I
mean to abide by the decision of Virginia, as expressed in her
ordinance of secession, passed the day before yesterday. I am
under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country,
which Virginia now claims to be.' Major Carey: 'But you say,
we can't secede, and so you cannot consistently detain the
negroes.' General Butler: 'But you say, you have seceded, and
so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall detain the
negroes as contraband of war. You are using them upon your
batteries. It is merely a question whether they shall be used
for or against the government. Nevertheless, though I greatly
need the labor which has providentially fallen into my hands,
if Colonel Mallory will come into the fort, and take the oath
of allegiance to the United States, he shall have his negroes,
and I will endeavor to hire them from him.' Major Carey:
'Colonel Mallory is absent.' The interview here terminated,
and each party, with polite farewell, went its way. This was
on Friday, May 24. On Sunday morning, eight more negroes came
in. … They continued to come in daily, in tens, twenties,
thirties, till the number of contrabands in the various camps
numbered more than 900. A commissioner of negro affairs was
appointed, who taught, fed and governed them." General Butler
reported his action to the Government, and on the 30th of May
the Secretary of War wrote to him: "Your action in respect to
the negroes who came within your lines, from the service of
the rebels, is approved. … While … you will permit no
interference, by persons under your command, with the
relations of persons held to service under the laws of any
state, you will, on the other hand, so long as any state
within which your military operations are conducted remain
under the control of … armed combinations, refrain from
surrendering to alleged masters any persons who come within
your lines." "So the matter rested for two months, at the
expiration of which events revived the question."

_J. Parton,
General Butler in New Orleans,
chapter 6._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May: Virginia).
First Advance of Union Troops across the Potomac.
Death of Ellsworth at Alexandria.

"Already 'Confederate' pickets were occupying Arlington
Heights and the Virginia shore of the Long Bridge, which spans
the Potomac at Washington City; and engineers had been seen on
those heights selecting eligible positions for batteries. A
crisis was evidently at hand, and the General-in-chief was now
persuaded to allow an immediate invasion of Virginia. Orders
were at once issued [May 23] for the occupation of the shores
of the Potomac opposite, and also the city of Alexandria, nine
miles below, by National troops. General Mansfield was in
command of about 13,000 men at the Capital. Toward midnight,
these forces in and around Washington were put in motion for
the passage of the river, at three different points. One
column was to cross at the Aqueduct Bridge, at Georgetown;
another at the Long Bridge, at Washington; and a third was to
proceed in vessels, and seize the city of Alexandria. The
three invading columns moved almost simultaneously. … The
troops moving by land and water reached Alexandria at about
the same time. The National frigate Pawnee was lying off the
town, and her commander had already been in negotiation for
the evacuation of Alexandria by the insurgents. A detachment
of her crew, bearing a flag of truce, now hastened to the
shore in boats, and leaped eagerly upon the wharf just before
the zouaves [the New York Fire Zouave Regiment, under Colonel
Ellsworth] reached it. They were fired upon by some Virginia
sentries, who instantly fled from the town. Ellsworth,
ignorant of any negotiations, advanced to the center of the
city, and took possession of it in the name of his Government,
while the column under Wilcox marched through different
streets to the Station of the Orange and Alexandria Railway,
and seized it, with much rolling stock. They there captured a
small company (thirty-five men) of Virginia cavalry, under
Captain Ball. Other Virginians, who had heard the firing of
the insurgent pickets, escaped by way of the railroad.
Alexandria was now in quiet possession of the National troops,
but there were many violent secessionists there who would not
submit. Among them was a man named Jackson, the proprietor of
an inn called the Marshall House. The Confederate flag had
been flying over his premises for many days, and had been
plainly seen from the President's house in Washington. It was
still there, and Ellsworth went in person to take it down.
When descending an upper staircase with it, he was shot by
Jackson, who was waiting for him in a dark passage, with a
double-barreled gun, loaded with buckshot. Ellsworth fell
dead, and his murderer met the same fate an instant afterward,
at the hands of Francis E. Brownell, of Troy, who, with six
others, had accompanied his commander to the roof of the
house. He shot Jackson through the head with a bullet, and
pierced his body several times with his saber-bayonet. …
Ellsworth was a very young and extremely handsome man, and was
greatly beloved for his generosity, and admired for his
bravery and patriotism. His death produced great excitement
throughout the country. It was the first of note that had
occurred in consequence of the National troubles, and the very
first since the campaign had actually begun, a few hours
before.
{3432}
It intensified the hatred of rebellion and its abettors; and a
regiment was raised in his native State (New York) called the
Ellsworth Avengers. Intrenching tools were sent over the
Potomac early on the morning of the 24th, and the troops
immediately commenced casting up intrenchments and redoubts,
extending from Roach's Spring, on the Washington and
Alexandria Road, across Arlington Heights, almost to the Chain
Bridge."

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 1, chapter 20._

ALSO IN:
_F. Moore,
Anecdotes, Poetry and Incidents of the War,
page 391._

_J. T. Headley,
The Great Rebellion,
chapter 5._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May-June).
Tennessee dragged into the rebel Confederacy.
Loyal resistance of East Tennessee.

See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-MAY) and (JUNE).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May-July: Missouri).
The baffling of the 'Secessionists in Missouri.
Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson.
The Battle of Boonville.

See MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May-September: Kentucky).
The struggle for the state.
Secession and Neutrality overcome.

See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-SEPTEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (June: Virginia).
The fight at Big Bethel.

"Major-General Butler and staff arrived at Fortress Monroe
Wednesday afternoon, May 22d. … Colonel Magruder—late Colonel
in the United States service, and an officer of much
distinction as an obstinate combatant—was placed in command
(rebel) of the Peninsula. … Troops rapidly poured into
Butler's department, and he soon found himself in a condition
to act on the offensive. Magruder's scouts and cavalry greatly
annoyed the two camps mentioned. They had, also, seized
several Union men. These raids became so frequent and annoying
that a night attack was concerted upon their positions at
Little Bethel and Big Bethel—the latter, near the north branch
of Back River, where it was understood Magruder's outposts
were throwing up strong works. Brigadier-General Pierce, of
the Massachusetts troops, was detailed to command the
expedition. … Approaching the enemy's position at Big Bethel,
it was found that their guns commanded all points of approach.
The road leading up to the bridge over the creek was swept by
their artillery. A thick woods to the left of the road
afforded some protection to the Federal left. An open field on
the right of the approach only offered a house and
out-buildings as a cover. The enemy occupied a hill, beyond
the creek, which almost completely secured their front. At
their rear was a dense wood. This gave them the advantage of
ground, greatly. A reconnaissance would have demonstrated the
futility of a front attack except by artillery. The only hope
for the Federals was in a flank movement, higher up the creek,
by which, the stream being passed, the enemy could be
assaulted in their works, at the point of the bayonet, if
necessary. This movement was only attempted partially at a
late hour in the day. The rebels were well prepared, and only
awaited the appearance of the head of the Federal advance to
open a sharp fire. … The fight was, from the first, extremely
unequal. A front attack was sheer folly. But, the flank
movement was not ordered. … The fortunes of the day needed but
a master-hand to direct them, to have turned in favor of the
Union troops. … Lieutenant-Colonel Washburne had … arranged
for a flank movement which, with a combined attack from the
front, must have ended the struggle; but the order for retreat
was given before the movement could be executed. … The Federal
loss was 14 killed, 49 wounded and five missing. Among the
killed were two of the most gallant and noble men in the
service—Major Theodore Winthrop, Secretary and Aid to General
Butler, and first-Lieutenant John T. Greble, of the United
States regular artillery, Second regiment. The rebels
pronounced their loss to have been but one killed and four
wounded. The retreat was accomplished in good order—the enemy
not pursuing."

_O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
volume 2, division 4, chapter 18._

ALSO IN:
_W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 4, chapter 17._

_Life and Poems of Theodore Winthrop,
chapter 9._

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (June-July: West Virginia).
General McClellan's campaign in the mountains.
Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford.

"Although some thousands of West Virginians had volunteered to
fight for the Union, none of them were encamped on the soil of
their State until after the election held [May 23] to ratify
or reject the Ordinance of Secession. …

See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-JUNE)]

The Virginians who volunteered were mustered in and organized
at Camp Carlile, in Ohio, opposite Wheeling, under the command
of Colonel Kelly, himself a Virginian. George B. McClellan,
who had been appointed a Major-General and assigned to the
command of the Department of the Ohio, remained at Cincinnati,
his home. Three days after the election aforesaid, he issued
from that city a spirited address 'To the Union men of Western
Virginia.' … A brief and stirring address to his soldiers was
issued simultaneously with the above; and, both being read to
those in Camp Carlile that evening, the 1st Virginia, 1,100
strong, Colonel Kelly, crossed to Wheeling early next morning,
closely followed by the 16th Ohio, Colonel Irvine. The 14th
Ohio, Colonel Steedman, crossed simultaneously, and quietly
occupied Parkersburg, the terminus of the Northwestern branch
of the Baltimore and Ohio road. A Rebel force, then holding
Grafton, which connected the branch aforesaid with the main or
Wheeling division of the railroad, had meditated a descent on
Wheeling; but, finding themselves anticipated and outnumbered,
they obstructed and destroyed the railroad west of them," and
fell back to Philippi, some fifteen miles southward. "General
McClellan having ordered that Philippi be captured by
surprise, the attempt was made on the night of June 2d. Two
brigades of two regiments each approached the Rebel camp by
different roads" and dispersed it completely, with some loss
on both sides, capturing the tents, provisions and munitions.
The Rebel commander, Colonel Porterfield, "gathering up such
portion of his forces as he could find, retreated hastily to
Beverly, and thence to Huttonsville; where the Rebel array was
rapidly increased by conscription, and Governor Wise placed in
command. General McClellan arrived at Grafton on the 23d. …
His forces were rapidly augmented, till they amounted, by the
4th of July, to over 30,000 men; while the Rebels in his front
could hardly muster 10,000 in all.
{3433}
He therefore resolved to advance. The Rebel main force,
several thousand strong, under General Robert S. Garnett, was
strongly intrenched on Laurel Hill, a few miles north of
Beverly, … while a smaller detachment, under Colonel John
Pegram was intrenched upon the summit and at either base of
Rich Mountain … three or four miles distant from the Rebel
main body." General Rosecrans, sent by a detour of eight miles
through the mountains to Pegram's rear, drove the rebels (July
11) from their position, at the point of the bayonet; and the
following day their commander, with about 600 men, was forced
to surrender. "General McClellan pushed on to Beverly, which
he entered early next morning, flanking General Garnett's
position at Laurel Hill and compelling him to a precipitate
flight northward. Six cannon, 200 tents, 60 wagons and over
100 prisoners, were the trophies of this success. The Rebel
loss in killed and wounded was about 150; the Union about 50.
General Garnett, completely flanked, thoroughly worsted, and
fearfully outnumbered, abandoned his camp at Laurel Hill
without a struggle, crossing the Laurel Mountains eastward, by
a by-road, into the narrow valley of Cheat river. … At length,
having crossed the Cheat at a point known as Carrick's Ford,
which proffered an admirable position for defense. Garnett
turned [July 14] to fight." But the Union force which pursued
him was overpowering; Garnett himself was killed in the battle
at the Ford and his command fled in confusion. General
McClellan telegraphed to Washington, next day, from
Huttonsville: "We have completely annihilated the enemy in
Western Virginia. Our loss is about 13 killed and not more
than 40 wounded; while the enemy's loss is not far from 200
killed; and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount
to at least 1,000. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns
in all. A portion of Garnett's forces retreated; but I look
for their capture by General Hill, who is in hot pursuit."
"This expectation was not realized. The pursuit was only
continued two miles beyond the ford; when our weary soldiers
halted, and the residue of the Rebels, under Colonel Ramsey,
turning sharply to the right, made their way across the
mountains, and joined General Jackson at Monterey." Meantime,
simultaneously with General McClellan's advance on Beverly,
another strong Union force, under General Cox, had moved from
Guyandotte to the Kanawha, and up that river to Charleston,
which it reached on the 25th of July. Governor Wise, who
commanded the rebels in the Kanawha Valley, retreated, General
Cox pursuing, until the pursuit was checked on the 29th by
Wise's destruction of Gauley bridge. The rebels then made good
their flight to Lewisburg, in Greenbrier county, where Wise
was reinforced and superseded by General John B. Floyd.

_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 1, chapter 32._

"The war in Western Virginia seemed to have ended with the
dispersion of Garnett's forces, and there was much rejoicing
over the result. It was premature. The 'Confederates' were not
disposed to surrender to their enemy the granaries that would
be needed to supply the troops in Eastern Virginia, without a
severer struggle. General Robert E. Lee succeeded Garnett, and
more important men than Wise and Floyd took the places of
these incompetents. Rosecrans succeeded McClellan, who was
called to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and the war
in the mountain region of Virginia was soon renewed."

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 1, chapter 22._

ALSO IN:
_Official Records of the War of the Rebellion,
series 1, volume 2, page 193-293._

_V. A. Lewis,
History of West Virginia,
chapter 28._

_J. D. Cox,
McClellan in West Virginia
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July).
First depredations of the Confederate cruiser Sumter.

See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1861-1862.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July: Virginia).
The seat of the rebel government transferred to Richmond.

See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JULY).

[Image: The Principal Theatre of War in Virginia.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July: Virginia).
On to Richmond.
The First Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.

"The Southern Government having inclined to the defensive
policy as that upon which they should act, their first object
was to prevent an advance of any Federal force into Virginia.
Early in the month of May troops were assembled in Richmond,
and pushed forward toward the northeastern boundary of the
State, to a position known as Manassas Junction. … It is here
that a railroad from Alexandria, another from Staunton up the
valley and through Manassas Gap, and another from Gordonsville
unite. At Gordonsville the railroad from Richmond and the line
from East Tennessee unite. As a point for concentration none
more eligible exists in northeastern Virginia. The advantages
for fortification are naturally such that the place can be
rendered impregnable. Here the centre of the northern force of
the Southern army was posted, with the left wing pushed
forward to Winchester [under the command of General Joseph E.
Johnston, with the Union General Patterson opposed to him] and
the right extended to the Potomac, and sustained by heavy
batteries which served to blockade the river. The Federal
force, the advance of which was assembled at Washington for
the defence of that city against any attack by the Southern
troops, was posted on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on
Arlington Heights, which were strongly fortified. Their right
was pushed some distance up the Potomac, and chiefly on the
Maryland side, while their left occupied Alexandria. The
armies of both sides consisted of raw militia hastily brought
together, and of volunteers who for the first time had put on
the uniform, and taken up the weapons of the soldier. On both
sides the forces were constantly accumulating. On the morning
of June 27th, the consolidated report of General Mansfield,
commanding the Department of Washington, gives the number of
troops in that city and vicinity. The privates, including
regulars and volunteers present for duty, numbered 22,846 men.
The grand aggregate of the force, including officers, etc.,
present and absent, was 34,160 men. The force of General
Patterson, commanding in Maryland above Washington, and also
on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on the 28th of June, was
returned, embracing officers and men enlisted and present for
duty, 15,923. Of these about 550 were reported as sick."

_W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
page 67._

{3434}

"The return of Johnston's [Confederate] army for June 30th
showed his total force present for duty to have been 10,654;
but this includes some troops which, though assigned to his
army, did not join him till after July 3d. … A prime object of
Johnston in taking post at Winchester was, that he might be
enabled to join the army at Manassas in case of need. On June
2d, only a week after Johnston's arrival at Harper's Ferry,
Beauregard had reached Manassas and assumed command. He and
Johnston at once communicated with each other, and agreed in
their views of the importance of mutual support. … As soon as
Johnston ascertained … that McClellan [from West Virginia] was
not moving on Romney and Winchester, the feasibility of this
movement to Manassas at the right time became greater. The
only problem then remaining was to so time it as to arrive
just long enough before the impending battle to take part in
it, and not so long as to cause, by the news of his arrival, a
corresponding transfer of Patterson. … It was for the purpose
of gaining as much start as possible on Patterson that
Johnston had retired to Winchester, instead of remaining
opposite the Northern force at Martinsburg. He kept his
cavalry well out, in order to be informed as promptly as
possible of the slightest change in Patterson's position.
Meanwhile the grand Federal advance upon Manassas had
commenced."

_R. M. Hughes,
General Johnston,
pages 47-51._

The advance from Washington, which began on the 16th of July,
and which resulted in the grievous defeat of the Union forces
at Bull Run, or Manassas, on Sunday, the 21st, was undertaken
to appease the impatient, ignorant clamor of Northern
newspapers, and in opposition to the judgment and the plans of
General Scott, who was then at the head of the National army.
The cry "On to Richmond" was taken up by Congressmen and
Senators, and the pressure on the government became too strong
to be resisted. Instead of keeping the raw troops, hurriedly
gathered at Washington, in camps of instruction, until they
were properly drilled and until their officers had acquired
some experience in handling them, they were hurriedly pushed
into a serious campaign movement, against an enemy likewise
untrained, to be sure, but who was far better prepared to
receive an attack than the assailants were to make one.
General Irwin McDowell had been recently placed in command of
the army intended for the field, with General Mansfield
commanding the troops in Washington. The former had "entered
on his new and responsible duties with great alacrity, working
night and day to prepare his command for the approaching
conflict. … McDowell was laboring at a great
disadvantage—drilling and preparing his troops as best he
could—under the heavy pressure from the North to deliver
battle to the enemy in his front. Secretary Chase was the
champion, in the Cabinet, of the intense feeling in the North
that the war should be pushed at once, with a vigor that would
end it soon. … There is no doubt that General Scott was
weakened with the administration, for the reason that he did
not believe in the prevailing opinion that a few days would
crush the rebellion; and the more the old hero insisted, or
faithfully stood by his views, the more it antagonized the
opinion of those who hoped and said it would end speedily. At
the Cabinet meeting a week before, General Hamilton says:
'General Montgomery Blair said he would march to Richmond with
10,000 men, armed with lathes.' 'Yes,' said General Scott, 'as
prisoners of war.' Continuing General Hamilton's statement of
the events which occurred prior to the battle and during its
progress, he says: 'On the Sunday preceding the battle of Bull
Run, Scott directed me, his military secretary, to say to
McDowell that he wished him to dine with him without fail. At
the dinner, at which General McDowell appeared, General Scott
used every possible argument to dissuade General McDowell from
fighting the first battle of Bull Run under the then existing
condition of public affairs. … He then begged General McDowell
to go to Secretary Chase, his kinsman, and aid him (General
Scott) in preventing a forward movement at that moment; one of
the arguments used by General Scott being that the Union
sentiment of the South had been surprised by the suddenness
and promptitude of the movement in favor of secession; that he
(General Scott) was well advised that the Union sentiment was
recovering itself, and gaining head in the South; that from
the moment blood was shed the South would be made a unit.
General McDowell regretted that he could not agree with
General Scott in his views, and arose and retired. … In the
course of the succeeding week General McDowell reported to
General Scott his proposed plan of battle. It was hung upon
the wall, and I followed with a pointer the positions
indicated by General McDowell as those he intended the forces
under his command should occupy. After General McDowell had
gone through a detailed statement of his plan, and had
finished, General Scott remarked, "General McDowell, that is
as good a plan of battle as I ever saw upon paper." General
McDowell said in rep]y: "General Scott, the success of this
whole plan depends upon General Patterson holding General
Johnston in check at Winchester." General Scott remarked that
General Johnston was a very able soldier, that he had a
railroad at his command with which to move his troops, and if
General McDowell's plan of battle, which had just been
presented to him, depended upon General Patterson holding
General Johnston in check, his plan was not worth the paper it
was drawn upon.' That ended that interview."

_J. H. Stine,
History of the Army of the Potomac,
pages 7-10._

Says General McDowell, in his subsequent report of the
movement and the disastrous battle:
"When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with
his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate
of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into
effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday). Every facility
possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the
administrative departments in making the necessary
preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of
transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come
across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and
went forward without my ever seeing them and without having
been together before in a brigade. The sending re-enforcements
to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further
and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean
efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in
every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence,
&c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did
not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed
to move.
{3435}
I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the
desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should
not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 10th ultimo.
When I did set out on the 10th I was still deficient in wagons
for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being
procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly
gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and
wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with
difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in
getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on
Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could
not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier
than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second
day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled
us, so far as they were concerned, to go in to action on the
19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax
Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told
it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only
come from Vienna, about 6 miles, and it was not more than 6½
miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of 12½ miles; but
the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the
distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused
by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to
move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed
to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of
work, and not used to carrying even the load of 'light
marching order.'"

_Brig. General I. McDowell,
Report
(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, pages 323-324)._

The advance of the Union Army was made "in five divisions,
commanded by Generals Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, Runyon, and
Miles. Among the brigade commanders that afterward rose to
eminence were William T. Sherman, Ambrose E. Burnside, Erastus
D. Keyes, and Oliver O. Howard. The total force was somewhat
over 34,000 men; but Runyon's division was left to guard the
line of communication with Washington, and the number that
actually moved against the enemy was about 28,000 with 49 guns
and a battalion of cavalry. So little did strict military
discipline as yet enter into the policy of the Government that
a large number of civilians, including several members of
Congress, obtained passes enabling them to ride out in
carriages, close in the rear of the army, to witness the
expected battle. … The troops marched by the Warrenton
turnpike, and found themselves in the presence of the enemy on
the banks of Bull Run on the 18th. … The enemy's outposts had
fallen back as the army advanced, and the first serious
opposition was met at Blackburn's Ford," where some sharp
fighting occurred between Tyler's division and the Confederate
troops under Longstreet. "McDowell, finding that Beauregard
was very strongly intrenched on his right, and that the roads
in that direction were not good, changed his plan and
determined to attack on the north or left wing. Another reason
for doing this lay in the fact that McDowell had distrusted
Patterson from the first, having no faith that he would hold
Johnston. … The action at Blackburn's Ford had been fought on
Thursday. Friday and Saturday were consumed in reconnoissances
and searching for a suitable ford on the upper part of the
stream, where a column could cross and, marching down on the
right bank, uncover the fords held by the enemy and enable the
remainder of the army to cross. Such a ford was found at
length, and on Sunday morning, the 21st, the army was put in
motion. McDowell did not know that Johnston had easily eluded
Patterson and with two fifths of his forces joined Beauregard
on Saturday. … The Confederate commanders had actually ordered
a forward movement of their own right wing; but as they saw
the development of McDowell's plan they recalled that, and
gradually strengthened their left to meet the onset. … The
battleground was a plateau, wooded and broken."

_R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Rebellion,
chapter 4._

In the Report of the Confederate General Beauregard, the
plateau which now became the principal battle ground of the
conflict is described as follows: "It is inclosed on three
sides by small water-courses, which empty into Bull Run within
a few yards of each other a half a mile to the south of the
stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100 feet above
the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three
sides to the level of the enclosing streams in gentle slopes,
but which are furrowed by ravines of irregular direction and
length, and studded with clumps and patches of young pines and
oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is
oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the
Brentsville and turnpike roads, which intersect each other at
right angles. Immediately surrounding the two houses …
[mentioned below] are small open fields of irregular outline,
not exceeding 150 acres in extent. The houses, occupied at the
time, the one by the Widow Henry and the other by the free
negro Robinson, are small wooden buildings, the latter densely
embowered in trees and environed by a double row of fences on
two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of the plateau
an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave
excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of
it with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining
the fields, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across the
crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which during the
battle regiments of both armies met and contended for the
mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view
embraces a wide expanse of woods and gently undulating open
country of broad grass and grain fields in all directions."

_General G. T. Beauregard,
Report
(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, pages 493-494)._

At an early hour in the afternoon, the Union forces had driven
the enemy from this plateau and seemed to be in a position
which promised victory to them. Says General McDowell in his
official report: "The enemy was evidently disheartened and
broken. But we had then been fighting since 10.30 o'clock in
the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The
men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made
what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before
coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was
not more that 9½ miles; and though they had three days'
provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt,
either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or
during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had
done much severe fighting.
{3436}
Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in
the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it
had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the
ranks. It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements
came to his aid from the railroad train (understood to have
just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's
army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and
opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to
break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into
disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made
to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but
in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the
hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained
itself until our men could get down to and across the
Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied
in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating
groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in
contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon
degenerated still further into a panic. Finding this state of
affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted
so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining
almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on
that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I
gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging
the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of
organization and force. They returned by the fords to the
Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's
force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps
coming together in small parties, many without officers, they
became intermingled, and all organization was lost."

_Brigadier General I. McDowell,
Report
(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, page 320)._

"The battle of Bull Run was a misfortune, and not a disgrace,
to the Federal arms; but the reports of losses on both sides
prove that it was bravely disputed. … The rout—or, in other
words, the panic— … was one of those accidents to which even
victorious armies are sometimes liable, and against which old
troops are not always able to guard. The importance of the
battle of Bull Run cannot be measured by the amount of losses
sustained by the two contending parties. … Its immediate
effect upon military operations was to produce a sudden change
in the attitude of the belligerents. The possession of
Virginia, with the exception of that portion which had been
recaptured by McClellan, was secured to the Confederates.
Richmond was beyond danger of any attack, and Washington was
threatened anew. … But it was chiefly through its moral effect
that this first encounter was to exercise a powerful influence
upon the war of which it was only the prelude. The South saw
in this victory a kind of ratification of her claims. It was
not only the Federal soldiers who were vanquished on that day,
but with them all who had remained more or less openly loyal
to the Union in the Southern States. … This disaster, which
might have discouraged the North, proved, on the contrary, a
salutary lesson."

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 1, book 3, chapter 2._

"Those only can realize the condition of our Army, at that
time, who can recall the incidents of this memorable campaign
and the battle with which it closed. The crowds of curious and
impertinent spectators who accompanied and often rode through
our ranks; the long and fatal delay of Hunter's column, on the
morning of the battle—a delay occasioned by a few
baggage-waggons, which should have been miles in rear—the many
ludicrous, yet sad, scenes on the field; the heroic, but
fruitless, gallantry of separate regiments, each attempting,
in detail, the accomplishment of a work which required the
combined effort of all; the dread, on the part of our men, of
those terrible 'masked batteries' and 'the fierce Black-horse
Cavalry,' neither of which ever had an existence except in the
imaginative brains of our newspaper reporters, all help to
fill up the picture. … I believe the plan of this battle to
have been well-conceived, notwithstanding its disastrous
result. We were compelled to take the offensive against troops
in position, and upon a field, the topography of which was
unknown to nearly all our officers. Notwithstanding these
facts, successes would have been achieved but for the
impatient spirit which hurried us on, without the slightest
preparation. Of the march, the battle, the rout, and the
disorderly retreat to Washington, the description given by
William H. Russell was not greatly exaggerated. It was far
more truthful than many of the descriptions given by the
reporters of our own papers. Who has forgotten the newspaper
accounts of the conduct of the celebrated Fire Zouaves—of the
prodigies of valor performed by them—of their bayonet
charges—of their heroic assaults—of the fearful destruction
inflicted by them upon the enemy—and, finally, when the order
to retreat came, of the great difficulty experienced by the
officers in forcing 'these gallant, but bloodthirsty lambs,'
as they were called, to cease fighting and commence
retreating? We all remember these accounts, and many others of
a similar character; and yet, every intelligent officer who
was on the field knows that this regiment dispersed at the
first fire, and so thoroughly was it dispersed that it was
from that day never again known as a military organization.
This campaign, and every subsequent one, of the War, taught us
that the rough element of our cities—the prize-fighter, the
veteran of a score of street-fights—does not necessarily make
the most valuable soldier. On the contrary, many a pale-faced
boy, who, from a sense of duty, has left school or
counting-room to join our Army, has exhibited a degree of
endurance on the march and of bravery on the field, seldom
equalled by the rough element of our cities."

_General H. W. Slocum,
Military Lessons taught by the War
(Historical Magazine, February 1871)_.

"The failure of the Confederate army to pursue after the
battle of Manassas has been much criticised, and has caused
much acrimonious discussion. General Johnston, however, never
hesitated to assume his share of the responsibility for the
action taken, though insisting that the course pursued was
proper, and the only practicable one under the circumstances.
… The troops who had been actually engaged all day, in the hot
summer season, were in no condition to follow up the enemy.
But the great obstacle to any effective pursuit was the
weakness of the cavalry arm in the Southern army. Its entire
strength was considerably under 2,000 men, and a large
proportion of these were not in call.
{3437}
Many of those within reach had been fighting for hours, and
were in little better condition than the infantry. All who
were available were sent off in immediate pursuit, with the
result of greatly swelling the number of prisoners and
captured guns. But by the time the captors turned their prizes
over to proper guards, the Northern army had covered a
sufficient distance to be out of danger, being protected in
their retreat by large bodies of troops that had not been
engaged. This was all that could be accomplished. … The fact
that the condition of the Confederate troops put any active
pursuit out of the question is established by the official
reports. General Johnston's report says: 'Our victory was as
complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be.' …
The same reasons apply with equal force to any attempted
advance during the few days succeeding the battle. The army
was not in a condition to make the movement, being itself much
demoralized by the engagement. Many thought the war over and
went home; many accompanied wounded comrades to their homes;
for the ties of discipline were not as strong then as in a
veteran army. But a yet stronger obstacle to an advance was
the lack of necessary transportation. … Even if the
Confederates had advanced and captured the intrenchments
opposite Washington, they could have accomplished nothing.
They could not have crossed the river on the bridge under the
fire of the Federal vessels of war. They had no artillery of
sufficient range to bombard Washington from the southern side,
even if they had been disposed to wage war in that manner.
They had no sufficient supply of ammunition."

_R. M. Hughes,
General Johnston,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 8._

_J. G. Nicolay,
Outbreak of the Rebellion,
chapters 13-16._

_J. B. Fry and others,
Campaign of the First Bull Run
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1)._

_J. E. Cook,
Stonewall Jackson,
part 1, chapter 12._

_A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
volume 1, chapter 9._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (JULY).
Enlistment of volunteers authorized by Congress.

The enlistment of 500,000 volunteers was authorized by Acts of
Congress passed July 22 and 25.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July-September: Missouri).
Sigel's well-conducted retreat from Carthage.
Death of Lyon at Wilson's Creek.
Siege of Lexington.
Fremont in command.