Chapter LIX: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (12)

Immediately on the assembling of Congress at its regular
session in December, 1861, "Mr. Trumbull of Illinois
introduced a bill, providing that the slaves of all who had
taken up arms against the United States should 'become forever
thereafter free, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.' …
On the 25th of February it came up for general debate, which
was very extended. … Divergences of views, even among those
who had been most prominent and pronounced in their
antislavery action, and the general drift of the discussion,
seemed to preclude any reasonable hope of agreement upon any
motion or measure then before the Senate. It was therefore
moved by Mr. Clark of New Hampshire to refer the whole matter,
the original bill, and all motions, amendments, and
substitutes, to a select committee. This, too, gave rise to a
sharp debate. … The motion was carried by a vote of 24 to 14;
and the committee, consisting of Clark, Collamer, Trumbull,
Cowan, Wilson, Harris, Sherman, Henderson, and Willey, was
appointed. Mr. Trumbull declining, Mr. Harlan was appointed in
his place. The committee reported 'a bill to suppress
insurrection, and punish treason and rebellion'; and on the
16th of May it came up for consideration. Its main provision
was that at any time after the passage of the act, the
President might issue his proclamation that the slaves of
persons found, 30 days after the issuing of the proclamation,
in arms against the government, will be free, any law or
custom to the contrary; that no slave escaping from his master
shall be given up, unless the claimant proves he has not given
aid or comfort to the Rebellion; and that the President shall
be authorized to employ persons of African descent for the
suppression of the Rebellion. … The bill was further debated,
but did not reach a vote. In the House a substantially similar
course was pursued. On the first day of the regular session
Mr. Eliot of Massachusetts introduced a resolution
confiscating the property and freeing the slaves of those
engaged in the Rebellion. It did not, however, come up for
consideration till the close of the following week. … A motion
was finally made and carried to refer the whole subject to a
select committee of seven, consisting of Olin, Eliot, Noell,
Hutchins, Mallory, Beaman, and Cobb. Mr. Olin was excused, and
Mr. Sedgwick of New York was appointed in his place. On the
14th of May Mr. Eliot from the committee reported two
bills,—the one confiscating Rebel property, and the other
freeing the slaves of Rebels,—and opened the debate on 'the
twin measures of confiscation and emancipation.' … On the 26th
of May Mr. Eliot closed the debate, and the two bills he had
reported from the special committee were brought to a vote.
The first, or that providing for the confiscation of Rebel
property, was passed by a strong majority. The second, or that
freeing the slaves of Rebels, coming up for action, the first
business was the disposal of the several amendments that had
been offered. The amendments having all been voted down, the
original bill was lost by a vote of 74 to 78. That vote was,
however, reconsidered and the bill was recommitted. On the
18th of June Mr. Eliot moved a substitute for the bill
reported by the committee, which was accepted by the House,
and the bill, as thus amended, was passed by a vote of 82 to
54. The gist of this bill consisted in the provision, that all
slaves of persons found in rebellion 60 days after the
President shall issue his proclamation should be free; and the
President should appoint commissioners to carry its provisions
into effect. The House confiscation bill was taken up in the
Senate on the 23d of June. An amendment was moved by Mr. Clark
combining confiscation and emancipation. The amendment was
sharply debated, but was adopted on the 28th. The bill as
amended was adopted by a vote of 28 to 13. The bill as thus
amended was taken up in the House on the 3d of July, and the
House non-concurred in the Senate's amendment. … A committee
of conference was appointed, which reported, on the 11th, in
substance the Senate amendment. The report was accepted by
both bodies, … and the President gave it his approval on the
17th. It provided that all slaves of Rebels coming into the
possession or under the protection of the government should be
deemed captives of war, and made free; that fugitive slaves
should not be surrendered; that no person engaged in the
military or naval service should render fugitives on pain of
being dismissed from the service; and that the President might
employ persons of the African race for the suppression of the
Rebellion in such manner as he might deem best."

_H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America,
volume 3, chapter 25._

ALSO IN:
_J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, pages 373-377._

_E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States during the Rebellion,
pages 196-203._

{3474}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-August: Virginia).
The end of the Peninsular Campaign.
The army at Harrison's Landing.
Results of the Seven Days fighting.
Withdrawal from the Peninsula.

"On reaching Harrison's Landing there were scarcely 50,000 men
in the ranks, but on the 4th of July, when the corps
commanders made their reports, it was found that the net
losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted to 15,249
men, of whom 1,582 had been killed, 7,700 wounded, and 5,958
missing. This last figure comprised, besides prisoners, all
the soldiers who had been left on the field of battle, whose
fate, whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to
this number may be added, without exaggeration, 6,000 sick or
lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence of the
excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan therefore
found himself with about 84,000 men under arms, not counting
those who had just joined him. The losses of Lee's army during
the seven days amounted to 20,000 men, to which number must
also be added at least 5,000 rendered unfit for active service
by the same causes which had operated with his adversaries;
this army, therefore, had undergone a diminution of 25,000
men. This was more than one-fourth of its effective force on
the 26th of June. An interlude was to follow this great
struggle. While McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison's
Landing, Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of
subsisting his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the
environs of Richmond. … In the estimation of those who did not
allow themselves to be troubled by foolish alarms and were not
blinded by party prejudices, McClellan's situation was far
from bad. … Planted on the James, McClellan could, either by
ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, strike
much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his army lay across
the Chickahominy, far from any water communication. Such was
the position of the two armies about the 7th of July. On this
day the steamer coming from Fortress Monroe landed a passenger
at Harrison's Landing, whose dress, as simple as his manners,
did not at first attract any attention, but in whom people
soon recognized President Lincoln. He had come to consult with
the commander of the army of the Potomac about the measures to
be adopted under those grave circumstances. … On the occasion
of his interview with McClellan at Harrison's Landing, the
latter had so thoroughly demonstrated the importance of that
position that [the President] went back fully determined to
allow the chief of the army of the Potomac full freedom of
action. But General Halleck … claimed for himself, as
commander-in-chief [lately so appointed], the exclusive
direction of all the armies in the field, and Mr. Lincoln,
conscious of his own incompetency, submitted to this new
authority." Measures taken during July for placing the army of
the Potomac again upon the offensive were altered on the 3d of
August, when Halleck gave orders to McClellan to transfer his
army with all possible expedition to Aquia Creek, on the
Potomac, for the support of General Pope and the Army of
Virginia.

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 1, chapter 4
and book 3, chapter 1._

ALSO IN:
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 5, chapter 24._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-August: Virginia).
The beginning of Pope's campaign: Cedar Mountain, or Cedar Run.

"While Lee and McClellan were resting, important events were
taking place at Washington and in Northern Virginia. The
Federal administration, satisfied of the impolicy of the
separate departments and independent commands which they had
organized in that region, had determined to unite under one
leader the three armies of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, which
Jackson had beaten or baffled in succession. … Their united
armies were henceforth to be styled the Army of Virginia,
while McClellan's forces continued to be known as the Army of
the Potomac. General John Pope, whose deeds and still more his
dispatches in the West, had given him some reputation, was
called to Washington and placed at the head of the new army.
General Pope was assigned to command on the 26th of June. …
The unification of these commands under Pope was followed by
another and still more important change of the same kind. The
dissatisfaction of the Federal administration with General
McClellan had been steadily growing for many months. This
officer's caution often exposed him, and sometimes not
unjustly, to the charge of timidity. … No doubt other causes,
such as his moderation and his conservative political views,
rendered him distasteful to the progressive radicals who at
this time predominated in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet; but it must
be confessed that McClellan's military conduct was not such as
to inspire confidence or diminish antagonisms, and it, alone,
is sufficient to account for the manner in which he was
treated by his government. … After the Seven Days' Battles,
the Federal government called General Halleck from the West …
and placed him in chief command of the armies of the United
States, the position from which McClellan had been deposed in
March. The order assigning General Halleck was dated July 11,
but the latter did not arrive in Washington and enter upon his
duties until Ju]y 23. By this appointment it was designed to
give a common head to the two armies in Virginia, and insure
the cooperation of McClellan and Pope. The first great
question that presented itself to Halleck was, what to do with
McClellan's forces, and on the day after assuming command he
left Washington to visit this army. The visit seems to have
satisfied him of the propriety of withdrawing the Army of the
Potomac at once from the Peninsula, and of placing it on the
line of the Rappahannock. … During the month of Ju]y, while
McClellan was resting at Westover, General Pope, though in
Washington, was not idle. Having devoted some days to the
reorganization and equipment of his command, he directed the
concentration of the mass of his forces at the eastern base of
the Blue Ridge Mountains in Rappahannock County, from which
position he could cover the approach to Washington, or
threaten the flank of any columns going toward the Shenandoah
Valley, while he prepared for an aggressive campaign. …
General Lee on July 13 ordered Jackson with the veteran troops
of his own and Ewell's division to Gordonsville to oppose
Pope's advance. The force thus sent numbered about 11,000 men.
Robertson's brigade of cavalry, which was already in Pope's
front, added 1,000 or 1,200 more. General Lee remained with
some 65,000 men between McClellan and Richmond. General
Jackson reached the vicinity of Gordonsville on July 19. His
arrival was opportune. The Federal reconnoitring parties had
already advanced through Culpeper to the Rapidan, and on July
14 Banks had been ordered to send forward all his cavalry
under Hatch to seize Gordonsville."

_William Allan,
The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862,
chapter 20._

{3475}

"After ascertaining that the enemy were in large force under
General Pope … Jackson applied to General Lee for
reinforcements. The division of A. P. Hill was immediately
sent to him, and, with this accession to his small army,
Jackson had no intention of remaining idle or of awaiting an
attack from so powerful a foe, but determined to strike a blow
himself before the enemy had time to concentrate all their
forces. He therefore advanced towards them on the 7th of
August. Before taking this step, it was observed that he was
much in prayer, but this was his custom previous to every
battle. … Pope's army was gathering in all its strength at
Culpepper Court-House, and on the 9th of August Jackson's
little army came in contact with his advance-guard about six
miles from the Court-House, on the borders of a little stream
called Cedar Run. Here hostilities began by a furious
cannonade on both sides, lasting two hours, when, about five
o'clock in the afternoon, the infantry of both armies became
hotly engaged. The conflict was fierce and stubborn, but the
overwhelming numbers of the enemy swept down with such
impetuosity that the weaker party were forced to yield, and it
looked as if it were doomed to destruction. Ewell, Early, A.
P. Hill, Winder, and other commanders all fought their bravest
and best—the gallant Winder receiving a mortal wound—and
still they were pressed back. 'It was at this fearful moment,'
says his late chief-of-staff, Dr. Dabney, 'that the genius of
the storm reared his head, and in an instant the tide was
turned, Jackson appeared in the mid-torrent of the highway, …
he drew his own sword (the first time in the war), and shouted
to the broken troops with a voice which pealed higher than the
roar of battle: "Rally, brave men, and press forward! Your
general will lead you! Jackson will lead you† Follow me!" This
appeal was not in vain, and the Federals, startled by this
unexpected rally, were driven from the field. They afterwards
made an attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the day, which
they had so nearly won, by an assault from a magnificent body
of cavalry, but even this was repelled, and the troopers
driven in full retreat.' … This battle of Cedar Run [called
Cedar Mountain by the Unionists] Jackson himself pronounced
the most successful of his exploits. … In this battle the
Confederates had between eighteen and twenty thousand men
engaged, while the Federals, according to their own returns,
had thirty-two thousand. Jackson, however, had one
incalculable advantage over the enemy, which he gained by his
promptitude in seizing and holding Slaughter's Mountain—an
elevation which commanded all the surrounding plains, and
enabled him to overlook the whole scene of action. … It was to
the advantage of this position as well as the bravery of his
troops that he was indebted for his complete success. By this
victory Pope received such a blow that he was deterred from
making another advance until he could gather reinforcements.
Burnside's corps was withdrawn from North Carolina and sent on
to Culpepper Court-House, and it was believed that McClellan's
remaining forces would be recalled from James River and sent
also to swell the ranks of the grand 'Army of Virginia,' as
the command of Pope was called. At all events, General Lee was
convinced that McClellan was incapable of further aggression,
and that the most effective way to dislodge him from the
Peninsula was to threaten Washington! He therefore determined
to move his army from Richmond to Gordonsville. He began his
march on the 13th, and four days after, on the 17th, McClellan
evacuated the Peninsula and removed his troops to the
Potomac." Pope's army was withdrawn behind the Rappahannock.
"General Lee now ordered Jackson to cross the Rappahannock
high up, and by a forced march go to Manassas and get in
Pope's rear. Other divisions were sent to Pope's front, and
the two hostile armies marched along on either side of the
stream, opening fire upon each other whenever the opportunity
offered. Jackson continued his march up stream until he
reached Warrenton Springs, on the 22d, where he found the
bridge destroyed, but he passed Early's brigade over on a
mill-dam, and took possession of the Springs. Before other
troops could be crossed to his support, a sudden and heavy
rainfall swelled the river so as to render it impassable, and
Early was thus cut off from his friends and surrounded by the
enemy. His situation was one of extreme peril, but he managed
to conceal his troops in the woods, and hold his foes at bay
with artillery, until Jackson had constructed a temporary
bridge, and by the dawn of the morning of the 24th the gallant
Early, with his command, had recrossed the river without the
loss of a man. While a fierce artillery duel was going on
across the river between A. P. Hill and the enemy, Jackson
left the river-bank a few miles, and marched to the village of
Jeffersonton. He was thus lost sight of by the Federals, and
to Longstreet was given the task of amusing Pope by the
appearance of a crossing at Warrenton Springs. Jackson was now
preparing to obey Lee's order to separate himself from the
rest of the army, pass around Pope to the westward, and place
his corps between him and Washington at Manassas Junction.

_Mrs. M. A. Jackson,
Life and letters of General Thomas J. Jackson,
chapter 17._

ALSO IN:
_G. H. Gordon.
History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia,
chapters 1-3._

_W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 4, chapter 19._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-September: Missouri-Arkansas). Warfare with the Rebel Guerrillas.

"Since the autumn of 1861, General J. M. Schofield, Lyon's
second at the battle of Wilson's Creek, had been in command of
the militia of Missouri, and in June, 1862, that State was
erected into a separate military district, with Schofield at
its head. He was vigilant and active; but when Curtis withdrew
to the Mississippi, and left Arkansas and Southern Missouri
open to the operations of guerrilla bands, then numerous in
the western part of the former State, he found his forces
inadequate to keep down the secessionists in his district.
When Price crossed the Mississippi, early in May, he sent back
large numbers of Missourians to recruit guerrilla bands for
active service during, the summer, and these, at the middle of
July, were very numerous in the interior, and were preparing
to seize important points in the State. To meet the danger,
Schofield obtained authority from the Governor to organize all
the militia of the State.
{3476}
This drew a sharp dividing line between the loyal and disloyal
inhabitants. He soon had 50,000 names on his rolls, of whom
nearly 20,000 were ready for effective service at the close of
July, when the failure of the campaign against Richmond so
encouraged the secessionists in Missouri that it was very
difficult to keep them in check. Schofield's army of
volunteers and militia was scattered over Missouri in six
divisions, and for two months a desperate and sanguinary
guerrilla warfare was carried on in the bosom of that
Commonwealth, the chief theater being northward of the
Missouri River, in McNeill's division, where insurgent bands
under leaders like Poindexter, Porter, Cobb, and others, about
5,000 strong, were very active." They were also aided by
incursions from Arkansas, under Hughes, Coffey and other
leaders. The encounters were many and fierce. At Kirksville,
August 6, and Chariton River, four days later, the loyal
forces achieved considerable victories; at Independence (which
was captured) August 11, and at Lone Jack, about the same
time, they suffered defeat. These were the principal
engagements of the month. With the cooperation of General
Blunt, commanding in Kansas, the Arkansas invasion was driven
back. Missouri was now somewhat relieved, but the Confederates
were gathering in force in Arkansas, where they were joined by
conscripts from Southern Missouri and a large number of troops
from Texas. Their entire number was estimated to be 50,000 at
the middle of September, with General T. C. Hindman in chief
command. … So threatening was this gathering that Schofield
took the field in person, and General Curtis succeeded him in
command of the District of Missouri." Schofield's vanguard,
under General Salomon, encountered the enemy at Newtonia,
September 30, and was defeated; but the Confederates retreated
before the united forces of Schofield and Blunt and "were
chased about 30 miles into Arkansas."

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 2, chapter 20._

ALSO IN:
_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 4, chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August).
Draft of Militia for nine months.

By proclamation, August 4, the President ordered a draft of
300,000 militia, for nine months service unless sooner
discharged.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August).
President Lincoln's "policy" explained to Horace Greeley.

"Executive Mansion, Washington, August 22, 1862.
Hon. Horace Greeley.
Dear Sir:
I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself
through the New York 'Tribune.' If there be in it any
statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be
erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there
be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely
drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be
perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive
it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always
supposed to be right. As to the policy I 'seem to be
pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave anyone in
doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest
way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority
can be restored, the nearer the Union will be the Union as it
was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless
they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with
them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless
they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree
with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the
Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I
could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it;
and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do
it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others
alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the
colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the
Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe
it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I
shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do
more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause.
I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I
shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true
views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of
official duty; and I intend no modification of my
oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be
free.
Yours, A. Lincoln."

_Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, page 227-228._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August: Virginia.)
General Pope's campaign: Stonewall Jackson's movement
into the rear of the Federal Army.

"By the capture of Pope's papers [effected in a raid of
Stuart's cavalry to the Federal rear] Lee gained an accurate
knowledge of the situation of the Federal army. Acting on it,
he ordered Jackson to advance his corps to Jeffersonton and
secure the bridge over the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs.
… Jackson, on arriving at Jeffersonton in the afternoon of the
22d, found that the bridge on the Warrenton turnpike had been
destroyed by the Federals. … On the 23d Lee ordered
Longstreet's corps to follow Jackson and mass in the vicinity
of Jeffersonton. The headquarters of the army was also moved
to that place. … General Longstreet made a feint on the
position of Warrenton on the morning of the 24th, under cover
of which Jackson's corps was withdrawn from the front to the
vicinity of the road from Jeffersonton to the upper fords of
the Rappahannock. Jackson was then directed to make
preparations to turn the Federal position and seize their
communications about Manassas Junction. Longstreet continued
his cannonade at intervals throughout the day, to which the
Federals replied with increasing vigor, showing that Pope was
massing his army in Lee's front. It was the object of Lee to
hold Pope in his present position by deluding him with the
belief that it was his intention to force a passage of the
river at that point, until Jackson by a flank movement could
gain his rear. Longstreet, on the morning of the 25th, resumed
his cannonade with increased energy, and at the same time made
a display of infantry above and below the bridge. Jackson
then, moved up the river to a ford eight miles above; crossing
at that point and turning eastward, by a rapid march he
reached the vicinity of Salem. Having made a march of 25
miles, he bivouacked for the night. Stuart's cavalry covered
his right flank, the movement being masked by the natural
features of the country. The next morning at dawn the march
was resumed by the route through Thoroughfare Gap. The
cavalry, moving well to the right, passed around the west end
of Bull Run Mountain and joined the infantry at the village of
Gainesville, a few miles from the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
{3477}
Pressing forward, still keeping the cavalry well to the right,
Jackson struck the railroad at Bristoe Station late in the
afternoon, where he captured two empty trains going east.
After dark he sent a detachment under Stuart to secure
Manassas Junction, the main depot of supplies of the Federal
army. The cavalry moved upon the flanks of this position,
while the infantry, commanded by Trimble, assaulted the works
in front and carried them with insignificant loss, capturing
two batteries of light artillery with their horses and a
detachment of 300 men, besides an immense amount of army
supplies. The next morning, after effectually destroying the
railroad at Bristoe, Jackson … moved his main body to
Manassas, where he allowed his troops a few hours to refresh
themselves upon the abundant stores that had been captured.
About 12 o'clock the sound of artillery in the direction of
Bristoe announced the Federal advance. Not having
transportation to remove the captured supplies, Jackson
directed his men to take what they could carry off, and
ordered the rest to be destroyed. General Ewell, having
repulsed the advance of two Federal columns [at Bristoe
Station], rejoined Jackson at Manassas. The destruction of the
captured stores having been completed, Jackson retired with
his whole force to Bull Run, and took a position for the
night, a part of his troops resting on the battle-field of the
previous year. Pope, … upon learning that Jackson was in his
rear, … immediately abandoned his position on the Rappahannock
and proceeded with al despatch to intercept him before he
could be reinforced by Lee. His advance having been arrested
on the 27th by Ewell, he did not proceed beyond Bristoe that
day. Lee on the 26th withdrew Longstreet's corps from its
position in front of Warrenton Springs, covering the
withdrawal by a small rear-guard and artillery, and directed
it to follow Jackson by the route he had taken the day before.
… The corps bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of Salem.
On the morning of the succeeding day, the 27th, a messenger
appeared bringing the important and cheering news of the
success of Jackson at Bristoe and Manassas. … Thoroughfare Gap
was reached about noon of the 28th. It was quickly found to be
occupied by a Federal force. Some slight attempt was made to
dislodge the enemy, but without success, as their position
proved too strong, and it seemed as if the movement of the
Confederate army in that direction was destined to be
seriously interfered with. Meanwhile, nothing further had been
heard from Jackson, and there was a natural anxiety in regard
to his position and possible peril. … Under these critical
circumstances General Lee made every effort to find some
available route over the mountains," and had already succeeded
in doing so when his adversary saved him further trouble.
"Pope … had ordered McDowell to retire from the Gap and join
him to aid in the anticipated crushing of Jackson. McDowell
did so, leaving Rickett's division to hold the Gap. In evident
ignorance of the vicinity of Longstreet's corps, this force
was also withdrawn during the night, and on the morning of the
29th Lee found the Gap unoccupied, and at once marched through
at the head of Longstreet's column. … Pope had unknowingly
favored the advance of the Confederate commander. His removal
of McDowell from his position had been a tactical error of
such magnitude that it could not well be retrieved. … The
cannonade at the Gap on the 28th had informed Jackson of Lee's
proximity. He at once took a position north of the Warrenton
turnpike, his left resting on Bull Run. … About three o'clock
the Federals bore down in heavy force upon Ewell and
Taliaferro, who maintained their positions with admirable
firmness, repelling attack after attack until night. The loss
on both sides was considerable. … Jackson, with barely 20,000
men, now found himself confronted by the greater part of the
Federal army. Any commander with less firmness would have
sought safety in retreat. But having heard the Confederate
guns at Thoroughfare Gap, he knew that Lee would join him the
next day. Therefore he determined to hold his position at all
hazards. By the morning of the 29th … Hood's division had
reached the south side of the mountain, and early in the day
was joined by the remainder of Longstreet's corps, by way of
the open Gap. While these important movements were in
progress, Pope had resumed his attack upon Jackson. … On the
arrival of Lee, Pope discontinued his attack, and retired to
the position which the year before had been the scene of the
famous battle of Bull Run, or Manassas."

_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 11._

ALSO IN:
_R. L. Dabney,
Life and Campaigns of General Thomas J. Jackson._

_G. H. Gordon,
History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia,
chapters 4-10._

_W. B. Taliaferro,
Jackson's Raid around Pope
(Battles and Leader, volume 2, pages 501-511)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August-September: Virginia).
The end of General Pope's campaign: Groveton.
Second Bull Run.
Chantilly.

"By contradictory orders and the useless marches and
counter-marches they involved, Pope's opportunity was thrown
away, and instead of fighting Jackson's corps alone, it was
the entire army of Lee with which he had to deal,—this, too,
with his forces very much out of position, and he himself
ignorant both of his own situation and that of the enemy.
When, towards noon [August 29], Pope, coming from Centreville,
reached the field near Groveton, he found the situation as
follows: Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and
Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley Springs
road; Reno and Sigel holding the centre,—Sigel's line being
extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike;
Reynolds with his division on the left. But the commander was
ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter and McDowell, and
he knew not that Longstreet had joined Jackson! The troops had
been considerably cut up by the brisk skirmishing that had
been going on all morning. An artillery contest had also been
waged all forenoon between the opposing lines; but it was at
long range and of no effect. The position of the troops in
front of Jackson's intrenched line was one that promised very
little success for a direct attack, and especially for a
partial attack. Nevertheless, at three o'clock, Pope ordered
Hooker to assault. The attempt was so unpromising that that
officer remonstrated against it; but the order being
imperative, he made a very determined attack with his
division," and was driven back.
{3478}
"Too late for united action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's
assistance, and he also suffered repulse. Meanwhile, Pope had
learnt the position of Porter's command, and, at half-past
four in the afternoon, sent orders to that officer to assail
the enemy's right flank and rear,—Pope erroneously believing
the right flank of Jackson, near Groveton, to be the right of
the Confederate line. Towards six, when he thought Porter
should be coming into action, he directed Heintzelman and Reno
to assault the enemy's left. The attack was made with vigor,
especially by Kearney," but the enemy brought up heavy
reserves and repelled the assault. "Turning now to the left,
where Porter was to have assailed the Confederate left
[right], it appears that the order which Pope sent at
half-past four did not reach Porter till about dusk. He then
made dispositions for attack, but it was too late. It is,
however, more than doubtful that, even had the order been
received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted
from its execution. … Contrary to Pope's opinion, he [Porter]
had then, and had had since noon, Longstreet's entire corps
before him. So, as firing now died away in the darkling woods
on the right, a pause was put for the day to the chaos and
confusion of this mismanaged battle [known as the battle of
Groveton], in which many thousand men had fallen on the Union
side. It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the
then condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn
across Bull Run and taken position at Centreville, or even
within the fortifications of Washington. By doing so he would
have united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then
between Washington and Centreville. … With untimely obstinacy,
Pope determined to remain and again try the issue of battle.
To utilize Porter's corps, he drew it over from the isolated
position it had held the previous day to the Warrenton road. …
Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes
occur in battle, it so was that the opposing commanders had
that day formed each the same resolution: Pope had determined
to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to attack
Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when
Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the
refusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to
his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack on
Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were
retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. …
Pope … telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was
'retreating to the mountains,'—a dispatch which, flashed
throughout the land, gave the people a few hours, at least, of
unmixed pleasure. To take advantage of the supposed 'retreat'
of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell with three corps—Porter's in the
advance—to follow up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike, and
'press the enemy vigorously during the whole day.' But no
sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pursuit of a
supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hitherto concealed
in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered themselves." The
result of this misdirected movement was a fatal check,
Porter's troops being fearfully cut up and driven back.
"Jackson immediately took up the pursuit, and was joined by a
general advance of the whole Confederate line—Longstreet
extending his right so as, if possible, to cut off the retreat
of the Union forces." In this attempt, however, he was foiled,
and "under cover of the darkness the wearied troops retired
across Bull Run, by the stone bridge, and took position on the
heights of Centreville. Owing to the obscurity of the night,
and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, Lee attempted no
pursuit." The engagement of this day is called the Second
Battle of Bull Run, or the Second Battle of Manassas, as it
was named by the Confederate victors. "At Centreville, Pope
united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and he remained
there during the whole of the 31st. But Lee had now yet given
up the pursuit. Leaving Longstreet on the battle-field, he
sent Jackson by a detour on Pope's right, to strike the Little
River turnpike, and by that route to Fairfax Courthouse; to
intercept, if possible, Pope's retreat to Washington.
Jackson's march was much retarded by a heavy storm that
commenced the day before and still continued. Pope, meantime,
fell back to positions covering Fairfax Courthouse and
Germantown; and on the evening of the 1st of September,
Jackson struck his right, posted at Ox Hill." The short but
severe action which then occurred (called the battle of
Chantilly) was indecisive. Jackson's attack was repelled, but
the repulse cost the lives of two excellent officers of high
rank and reputation, Generals Kearney and Stevens, besides
many men. "On the following day, September 2d, the army was,
by order of General Halleck, drawn back within the lines of
Washington."

_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
pages 184-193._

"The Second Battle of Bull Hun … was a severe defeat for
General Pope; but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor
anything like a rout. … Lee claims to have captured in these
engagements 30 pieces of artillery and 7,000 unwounded
prisoners."

_J. C. Ropes,
The Army under Pope
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 4),
chapters 8-11._

ALSO IN:
_G. H. Gordon,
History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia,
chapters 11-13._

_The Virginia Campaign of General Pope
(Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 2)._

_J. Pope,
The Second Battle of Bull Run
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 449-494)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 12, part 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland).
Lee's first invasion: His cold reception and disappointment.

"The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not
contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from
Richmond. … He accordingly determined to advance into
Maryland—the fortifications in front of Washington, and the
interposition of the Potomac, a broad stream easily defended,
rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. On the 3d
of September, therefore, and without waiting to rest his army,
which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous marching
and fighting since it had left the Rapidan, General Lee moved
toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to
the music of the bands playing the popular air, 'Maryland, my
Maryland,' advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on
the 7th of September. Lee's object in invading Maryland has
been the subject of much discussion. … It can only be said
that General Lee, doubtless, left the future to decide his
ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and
clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words.
{3479}
His object was to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia. …
The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says,
'encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however
inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington
Government to retain all its available force to provide for
contingencies which its course toward the people of that State
gave it reason to apprehend,' and to cross the Potomac 'might
afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in
any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their
liberty.' It may be said, in summing up on this point, that
Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his
standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the
yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared
this expectation. The identity of sentiment generally between
the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia, and their
strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation
reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result
afterward was extremely bitter. Such were the first designs of
Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear. By advancing into
Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew
that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops
from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the
Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was
accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross
the Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge, called there the
South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the
Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow
him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies,
while his own communications would remain open by way of the
Shenandoah Valley. … The Southern army was concentrated in the
neighborhood of Frederick City by the 7th of September, and on
the next day General Lee Issued an address to the people of
Maryland. … This address, couched in terms of such dignity,
had little effect upon the people. Either their sentiment in
favor of the Union was too strong, or they found nothing in
the condition Of affairs to encourage their Southern feelings.
A large Federal force was known to be advancing; Lee's army,
in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very
uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his
standard, the population in general remaining hostile or
neutral. … Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his
own men for success in his future movements. He faced that
conviction courageously; and, without uttering a word of
comment, or indulging in any species of crimination against
the people of Maryland, resolutely commenced his movements
looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the invasion of
Pennsylvania."

_J. E. Cooke,
Life of Robert E. Lee,
part 5, chapters 1-2._

ALSO IN:
_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 12._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland).
Lee's first invasion: Harper's Ferry.
South Mountain.
Antietam.

"On the 2d of September the President went to General
McClellan's house in Washington, asked him to take command
again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now
been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The
first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of
Miles's force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said,
it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force.
All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and
unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck
intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Halleck's
principal reason appeared to be a reluctance to abandon a
place where so much expense had been laid out. Miles, a worthy
subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders
with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead
of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command
it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland,
McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover
Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a
decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on
the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to
that accorded to the army that had left the town two days
before. … But this flattering reception was not the best
fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his
arrival in the town General McClellan came into possession of
a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in
which the whole campaign was laid out. … General Lee had taken
it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry would be
evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when
he found they were not, he had so far changed or suspended the
plan with which he set out as to send back a large part of his
army to capture those places and not leave a hostile force in
his rear." This was easily accomplished by Jackson and McLaws,
the latter of whom took possession of the heights commanding
the town, where Miles waited to be trapped. "A bombardment the
next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to
attack. General Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last
shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation,
with 73 guns. … Jackson, leaving the arrangements for the
sur·render to A. P. Hill, hurried with the greater part of his
force to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of
the 16th. The range known as the South Mountain, which is a
continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about
1,000 feet high. The two principal gaps are Turner's and
Crampton's, each about 400 feet high, with the hills towering
600 feet above it. When McClellan learned the plans of the
Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart
them. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's
Gap and press on to relieve Harper's Ferry; the corps of Reno
and Hooker, under command of Burnside, he moved to Turner's
Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick
enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the
Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then
have had his whole army between Lee's divided forces, and
could hardly have failed to defeat them disastrously and
perhaps conclusively. But he did not arrive at the passes till
the morning of the 14th; and by that time Lee had learned of
his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, from Boonsboro
and beyond, to defend Turner's Gap, while he ordered McLaws to
look out for Crampton's. … There was stubborn and bloody
fighting all day, with the Union forces slowly but constantly
gaining ground, and at dark the field was won," at both the
passes. The two engagements were called the battle of South
Mountain by the Federals, the Battle of Boonsboro by the
Confederates.
{3480}
At Turner's Gap there was a loss of about 1,500 on each side,
and 1,500 Confederates were made prisoners; at Crampton's Gap,
the loss in killed and wounded was some 500 on each side, with
400 Confederate prisoners taken. The Union army had forced the
passage of the mountains, but Lee had gained time to unite his
scattered forces. "He withdrew across the Antietam, and took
up a position on high ground between that stream and the
village of Sharpsburg. … Lee now had his army together and
strongly posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in
battle and straggling that it numbered but little over 40,000
combatants. … McClellan had somewhat over 70,000 men. … The
ground occupied by the Confederate army, with both flanks
resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam flowing in front, was
advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and
a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly
guarded. The land was occupied by meadows, cornfields, and
patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges.
McClellan only reconnoitered the position on the 15th. On the
16th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to
throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and
unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this
had sufficiently engaged the enemy's attention and drawn his
strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with
his left and centre. … All day long an artillery duel was kept
up. … It was late in the afternoon when Hooker's corps crossed
by the upper bridge, advanced through the woods, and struck
the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood's men.
Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on,
and the lines rested for the night where they were." At
sunrise, next morning, Hooker assaulted Jackson and was
seriously wounded in the fighting which followed. Sumner's
corps finally joined in the attack, and all the forenoon the
battle was desperate in that part of the field. "But while
this great struggle was in progress on McClellan's right, his
centre and left, under Porter und Burnside, did not make any
movement to assist. At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton's
Gap, and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just
in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over
from the Confederate right. At eight o'clock in the morning
Burnside had been ordered to carry the bridge in his front,
cross the stream, and attack the Confederate right. But,
though commanded and urged repeatedly, it was one o'clock
before he succeeded in doing this, and two more precious hours
passed away before he had carried the ridge commanding
Sharpsburg and captured the Confederate battery there. Then
came up the last division of Lee's forces (A. P. Hill's) from
Harper's Ferry, 2,000 strong, united with the other forces on
his left, and drove Burnside from the crest and re-took the
battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was
closed, or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because
both sides had been so severely punished that neither was
inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee's force had
been actively engaged, but not more than two thirds of
McClellan's. The reason why the Confederate army was not
annihilated or captured must be plain to any intelligent
reader. … General McClellan reported his entire loss at
12,469, of whom 2,010 were killed. General Lee reported his
total loss in the Maryland battles as 1,567 killed and 8,724
wounded, saying nothing of the missing; but the figures given
by his division commanders foot up 1,842 killed, 9,399
wounded, and 2,292 missing—total 13,533. … Nothing was done on
the 18th, and when McClellan determined to renew the attack on
the 19th, he found that his enemy had withdrawn from the field
and crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The
National commander reported the capture of more than 6,000
prisoners, 13 guns, and 39 battle-flags, and that he had not
lost a gun or a color. As he was also in possession of the
field … and had rendered Lee's invasion fruitless of anything
but the prisoners carried off from Harper's Ferry, the victory
was his."

_R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Secession,
chapter 12._

ALSO IN:
_F. W. Palfrey,
The Antietam and Fredericksburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5)._

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 3, chapter 4._

_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 4._

_A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th. Army Corps,
part 2, chapters 2-3._

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 19._

_G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
chapters 33-38._

_D. H. Hill, J. D. Cox, J. Longstreet, and others,
Lee's Invasion of Maryland
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2)._

_W. Allan,
The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862,
chapters 37-48._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September).
President Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation,
and the attitude of Northern parties on the Slavery question.