Chapter 3 (7)

"Serious disputes soon arose, concerning the execution of the
treaty of peace; and each nation complained of infractions by
the other. On the part of the United States, it was alleged
that negroes had been carried away, contrary to the treaty;
and as early as May, 1783, congress instructed their ministers
for negotiating peace to remonstrate to the British court
against this conduct of their commander in America, and to
take measures to obtain reparation. The United States, also,
complained that the western posts had not been sur·rendered,
agreeably to treaty stipulations. Great Britain, on her part,
alleged that legal impediments had been interposed to prevent
the collection of British debts in America; and that the 5th
and 6th articles, relating to the property of the loyalists,
had not been complied with. In June, 1784, the legislature of
Virginia not only declared that there had been an infraction
on the part of Great Britain of the 7th article, in detaining
the slaves and other property of the citizens of the United
States, but instructed their delegates in congress to request
that a remonstrance be presented to the British court against
such infraction and to require reparation. They also directed
them to inform congress that the state of Virginia conceived a
just regard to the national honor and interest obliged her
assembly to withhold their co-operation in the complete
fulfilment of the treaty until the success of such
remonstrance was known, or they should have further directions
from congress. They at the same time declared, that as soon as
reparation for such infraction should be made, or congress
should judge it indispensably necessary, such acts as
inhibited the recovery of British debts should be repealed,
and payment made, in such time and manner as should consist
with the exhausted situation of the state. In consequence of
these difficulties and disputes, congress, early in the year
1785, determined to send a minister plenipotentiary to Great
Britain; and on the 24th of February John Adams was appointed
to represent the United States at the court of London. He was
instructed 'in a respectful but firm manner to insist that the
United States be put, without further delay, into possession
of all the posts and territories within their limits which are
now held by British garrisons.' … Mr. Jefferson was soon after
appointed to represent the United States at the court of
Versailles, in the room of Dr. Franklin, who had leave to
return home, after an absence of nine years. Mr. Livingston
having resigned the office of secretary of foreign affairs,
Mr. Jay, in March, 1784, and before his return from Europe,
was appointed in his place. Mr. Adams repaired to the British
court, and was received as the first minister from the United
States since their independence was acknowledged. … In
December, 1785, Mr. Adams presented a memorial to the British
secretary of state, in which, after stating the detention of
the western posts contrary to the stipulations in the treaty
of peace, he in the name and in behalf of the United States
required 'that all his majesty's armies and garrisons be
forthwith withdrawn from the said United States, from all and
every of the posts and fortresses before enumerated, and from
every port, place and harbor, within the territory of the said
United States, according to the true intention of the
treaties.' To this memorial the British secretary, lord
Carmarthen, returned an answer, on the 28th of February, 1786,
in which he acknowledges the detention of the posts, but
alleges a breach of the 4th article of the treaty of peace on
the part of the United States, by interposing impediments to
the recovery of British debts in America. … This answer was
accompanied with a statement of the various instances in which
the 4th article had been violated by acts of the states. The
complaints of Great Britain also extended to breaches of the
5th and 6th articles of the treaty, relating to the recovery
of certain property and to confiscations. The answer of the
British secretary was submitted to congress; and in order to
remove the difficulties complained of, that body, in March,
1787, unanimously declared that all the acts, or parts of
acts, existing in any of the states, repugnant to the treaty
of peace, ought to be repealed; and they recommended to the
states to make such repeal by a general law. … A circular
letter to the states accompanied these declarations, in which
congress say, 'we have deliberately and dispassionately
examined and considered the several facts and matters urged by
Great Britain, as infractions of the treaty of peace, on the
part of America, and we regret that, in some of the states,
too little attention has been paid to the public faith pledged
by that treaty.' In consequence of this letter, the states of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, passed acts
complying with the recommendations contained in it. The
operation of the act of Virginia, however, which repealed all
acts preventing the recovery of debts due to British subjects,
was suspended until the governor of that state should issue a
proclamation, giving notice that Great Britain had delivered
up the western posts, and was also taking measures for the
further fulfilment of the treaty of peace by delivering up the
negroes belonging to the citizens of that state, carried away
contrary to the 7th article of the treaty, or by making
compensation for the same. … The British court was not yet
disposed to enter into any commercial treaty with the United
States. The ministers were, no doubt, satisfied that the
advantages they enjoyed under their own regulations were
greater than could be obtained by any treaty they could make
with America. And this was, probably, one of the principal
reasons of their refusal to enter into any such treaty. As the
British court declined sending a minister to the United
States, Mr. Adams, in October, 1787, at his request, had leave
to return home. … The United States had also at this period to
encounter difficulties with Spain as well as Great Britain.
The two Floridas having been ceded to his catholic majesty,
serious disputes soon arose, not only on the old subject of
the navigation of the Mississippi, but with respect to the
boundaries of Louisiana and the ceded territory. The Spanish
court still persisted in its determination to exclude the
Americans from the navigation of the Mississippi. … In
December, 1784, congress declared it necessary to send a
minister to Spain, for the purpose of adjusting the
interfering claims of the two nations respecting the
navigation of the Mississippi, and other matters highly
interesting to the peace and good understanding which ought to
subsist between them. This was prevented by the appointment of
Don Diego Gardoqui, a minister from Spain, who arrived in the
United States and was acknowledged by congress in the summer
of 1785.
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Soon after his arrival, Mr. Jay, then secretary of foreign
affairs, was appointed to treat with the Spanish minister on
the part of the United States. … As Mr. Jay, by his
instructions, was not to conclude a treaty until the same was
communicated to congress and approved by them, and was also
specially directed to obtain a stipulation acknowledging the
right of the United States to their territorial claims and the
free navigation of the Mississippi, as established in their
treaty with Great Britain, he, on the 3d of August, 1786,
submitted to congress the … plan of a commercial treaty, and
stated the difficulties in obtaining the stipulation required.
… 'Circumstanced as we are [said Mr. Jay] I think it would be
expedient to agree that the treaty should be limited to twenty
five or thirty years, and that one of the articles should
stipulate that the United States would forbear to use the
navigation of that river below their territories to the ocean.
Thus the duration of the treaty and of the forbearance in
question should be limited to the same period.' … Among other
reasons, Mr. Jay stated that the navigation of the Mississippi
was not at that time very important, and would not probably
become so in less than twenty five or thirty years, and that a
forbearance to use it, while it was not wanted, was no great
sacrifice—that Spain then excluded the people of the United
States from that navigation; and that it could only be
acquired by war, for which the United States were not then
prepared; and that in case of war France would no doubt join
Spain. Congress were much divided on this interesting subject.
The seven states at the north, including Pennsylvania, were
disposed, in case a treaty could not otherwise be made, to
forbear the use of the navigation of the Mississippi below the
southern boundary of the United States, for a limited time,
and a resolution was submitted to congress repealing Mr. Jay's
instructions of the 25th of August, 1785, and which was
carried, seven states against five. … This, however, was to be
on the express condition that a stipulation of forbearance
should not be construed to extinguish the right of the United
States, independent of such stipulation, to use and navigate
said river from its source to the ocean; and that such
stipulation was not to be made unless it should be agreed in
the same treaty that the navigation and use of the said river
above such intersection to its source should be common to both
nations—and Mr. Jay was to make no treaty unless the
territorial limits of the United States were acknowledged and
secured according to the terms agreed between the United
States and Great Britain. … As by the confederation the assent
of nine states was necessary in making a treaty the same
number was considered requisite in giving specific
instructions in relation to it; … and it was questioned
whether the previous instructions given to Mr. Jay could be
rescinded without the assent of nine states. These proceedings
in congress, though with closed doors, soon became partly
known, and excited great alarm in Virginia and in the western
settlements. … While these negociations were pending, the
fertile country at the west was settling with a rapidity
beyond the most sanguine calculations; and it is not
surprising that the news of an actual or intended abandonment
of the navigation of the Mississippi, the only outlet for
their productions, should have excited great alarm among its
inhabitants. They were much exasperated by the seizure and
confiscation of American property by the Spaniards, on its way
down the river, which took place about the same time. The
proposition made in congress was magnified into an actual
treaty, and called from the western people most bitter
complaints and reproaches. … To quiet the apprehensions of the
western inhabitants, the delegates from North Carolina, in
September, 1788, submitted to congress a resolution declaring
that 'whereas many citizens of the United States, who possess
lands on the western waters, have expressed much uneasiness
from a report that congress are disposed to treat with Spain
for the surrender of their claim to the navigation of the
river Mississippi; in order therefore to quiet the minds of
our fellow citizens by removing such ill founded
apprehensions, resolved, that the United States have a clear,
absolute, and unalienable claim to the free navigation of the
river Mississippi, which claim is not only supported by the
express stipulations of treaties, but by the great law of
nature.' The secretary of foreign affairs, to whom this
resolution was referred, reported, that as the rumor mentioned
in the resolution was not warranted by the negociations
between the United States and Spain, the members be permitted
to contradict it, in the most explicit terms. Mr. Jay also
stated, there could be no objection to declaring the right of
the United States to the navigation of the river clear and
absolute—that this had always been his opinion; and that the
only question had been whether a modification of that right
for equivalent advantages was advisable; and though he
formerly thought such a modification might be proper, yet that
circumstances and discontents had since interposed to render
it questionable. He also advised that further negociations
with Spain be transferred to the new general government. On
this report, congress, on the 16th of September, 1788, in
order to remove the apprehensions of the western settlers,
declared that the members be permitted to contradict the
report referred to by the delegates from North Carolina; and
at the same time resolved 'that the free navigation of the
river Mississippi is a clear and essential right of the United
States, and that the same ought to be considered and supported
as such.' All further negociations with Spain were also
referred to the new federal government."

_T. Pitkin,
Political and Civil History of the United States,
chapter 17 (volume 2)._

"It was important for the frontiersmen to take the Lake Posts
from the British; but it was even more important to wrest from
the Spaniards the free navigation of the Mississippi. While
the Lake Posts were held by the garrisons of a foreign power,
the work of settling the northwestern territory was bound to
go forward slowly and painfully; but while the navigation of
the Mississippi was barred, even the settlements already
founded could not attain to their proper prosperity and
importance. … The Westerners were right in regarding as
indispensable the free navigation of the Mississippi. They
were right also in their determination ultimately to acquire
the control of the whole river, from the source to the mouth.
However, the Westerners wished more than the privilege of
sending down stream the products of their woods and pastures
and tilled farms.
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They had already begun to cast longing eyes on the fair
Spanish possessions. … Every bold, lawless, ambitious leader
among the frontier folk dreamed of wresting from the Spaniard
some portion of his rich and ill-guarded domain. It was not
alone the attitude of the frontiersmen towards Spain that was
novel, and based upon a situation for which there was little
precedent. Their relations with one another, with their
brethren of the seaboard, and with the Federal Government,
likewise had to be adjusted without much chance of profiting
by antecedent experience. Many phases of these relations
between the people who stayed at home and those who wandered
off to make homes, between the frontiersmen as they formed
young States, and the Central Government representing the old
States, were entirely new, and were ill-understood by both
parties. … The attitude towards the Westerners of certain
portions of the population in the older States, and especially
in the northeastern States, was one of unreasoning jealousy
and suspicion; and though this mental attitude rarely
crystallized into hostile deeds, its very existence, and the
knowledge that it did exist, embittered the men of the West. …
In the northeastern States, and in New England especially,
this feeling showed itself for two generations after the close
of the Revolutionary War. On the whole the New Englanders have
exerted a more profound and wholesome influence upon the
development of our common country than has ever been exerted
by any other equally numerous body of our people. They have
led the nation in the path of civil liberty and sound
governmental administration. But too often they have viewed
the nation's growth and greatness from a narrow and provincial
standpoint, and have grudgingly acquiesced in, rather than led
the march towards, continental supremacy. In shaping the
nation's policy for the future their sense of historic
perspective seemed imperfect. … The extreme representatives of
this northeastern sectionalism not only objected to the growth
of the West at the time now under consideration, but even
avowed a desire to work it harm, by shutting the Mississippi,
so as to benefit the commerce of the Atlantic States. … These
intolerant extremists not only opposed the admission of the
young western States into the Union, but at a later date
actually announced that the annexation by the United States of
vast territories beyond the Mississippi offered just cause for
the secession of the northeastern States. Even those who did
not take such an advanced ground felt an unreasonable dread
lest the West might grow to overtop the East in power. … A
curious feature of the way many honest men looked at the West
was their inability to see how essentially transient were some
of the characteristics to which they objected. Thus they were
alarmed at the turbulence and the lawless shortcomings of
various kinds which grew out of the conditions of frontier
settlement and sparse population. They looked with anxious
foreboding to the time when the turbulent and lawless people
would be very numerous, and would form a dense and powerful
population; failing to see that in exact proportion as the
population became dense, the conditions which caused the
qualities to which they objected would disappear. Even the men
who had too much good sense to share these fears, even men as
broadly patriotic as Jay, could not realize the extreme
rapidity of western growth. Kentucky and Tennessee grew much
faster than any of the old frontier colonies had ever grown;
and from sheer lack of experience, eastern statesmen could not
realize that this rapidity of growth made the navigation of
the Mississippi a matter of immediate and not of future
interest to the West. … While many of the people on the
eastern seaboard thus took an indefensible position in
reference to the trans-Alleghany settlements, in the period
immediately succeeding the Revolution, there were large bodies
of the population of these same settlements, including very
many of their popular leaders, whose own attitude towards the
Union was, if anything, more blameworthy. They were clamorous
about their rights, and were not unready to use veiled threats
of disunion when they deemed these rights infringed; but they
showed little appreciation of their own duties to the Union. …
They demanded that the United States wrest from the British
the Lake Posts, and from the Spaniards the navigation of the
Mississippi. Yet they seemed incapable of understanding that
if they separated from the Union they would thereby forfeit
all chance of achieving the very purposes they had in view,
because they would then certainly be at the mercy of Britain,
and probably, at least for some time, at the mercy of Spain
also. They opposed giving the United States the necessary
civil and military power, although it was only by the
possession and exercise of such power that it would be
possible to secure for the westerners what they wished. In all
human probability, the whole country round the Great Lakes
would still be British territory, and the mouth of the
Mississippi still in the hands of some European power, had the
folly of the separatists won the day and had the West been
broken up into independent states. … This final triumph of the
Union party in these first-formed frontier States was fraught
with immeasurable good."

_T. Roosevelt,
The Winning of the West,
volume 3, chapter 3._

See FLORIDA: A. D. 1783-1787;
and LOUISIANA: A. D. 1785-1800.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1787.
First troubles and dealings with the Barbary pirates.

See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1785-1801.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1786-1787.
Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts.

See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1786-1787.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787.
The, Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory.
Exclusion of Slavery forever.

See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1787;
also, EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1880.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787.
The framing of the Federal Constitution.
The Union constructed of compromises.

The convention of delegates appointed to revise the Articles
of Confederation, but which took upon itself the task of
framing anew a Federal Constitution for the States, assembled
at Philadelphia on the 25th of May, 1787, eleven days later
than the day appointed for its meeting. "The powers conferred
by the several states were not uniform. Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey appointed their delegates 'for
the purpose of revising the Federal Constitution;' North
Carolina, New Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia 'to decide upon
the most effectual means to remove the defects of the Federal
Union;' New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut 'for the sole
and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation;'
South Carolina and Maryland 'to render the Federal
Constitution entirely adequate to the actual situation.'
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Rhode Island held aloof. She was governed by a class of men
who wanted to pay their debts in paper money, and she did not
wish to surrender her power to collect duties upon the goods
that came into her port. The trade of Newport at that day
surpassed that of New York. Connecticut came in reluctantly,
and New Hampshire late in July, 1787. … Washington was made
president of the convention. … Many names great in the
revolutionary struggle were absent from the roll of delegates.
John and Samuel Adams, and John Hancock, were not there.
Patrick Henry of Virginia refused to attend. Thomas Jefferson
and John Jay were absent from the country. George Washington
and Benjamin Franklin, however, were there. … Among the
younger men was James Madison of Virginia. … Alexander
Hamilton came from New York. … Charles C. Pinckney was a
delegate from South Carolina. … James Wilson of Pennsylvania
was a Scotchman. He surpassed all others in his exact
knowledge of the civil and common law, and the law of nations.
… Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman came from Connecticut. …
Many of the 55 delegates shared Hamilton's contempt for a
democracy, but the strength they would repose in a government
they preferred to retain in the states. … The first business
of the convention was the adoption of rules. Each state was to
have one vote. Such was the rule in the Confederate Congress.
Seven states made a quorum. The convention was to sit with
closed doors, and everything was to be kept secret: nothing
was to be given to the public except the completed work. This
injunction of secrecy was never removed. Fortunately James
Madison kept a pretty full account of the debates and
proceedings, all in his own hand."

_J. S. Landon,
Constitutional History and Government of the United States,
lecture 3._

"Madison tells us in his report of these debates that previous
to the opening of the Convention it had been a subject of
discussion among the members present, as to how the States
should vote in the Convention. Several of the members from
Pennsylvania had urged that the large States unite in refusing
to the small States an equal vote, but Virginia, believing
this to be injudicious if not unjust, ' discountenanced and
stilled the project.' On the 29th the real business of the
Convention was opened by Edmund Randolph, who as Governor of
Virginia was put forward as spokesman by his colleagues. He
began by saying that as the Convention had originated from
Virginia, and the delegation from this State supposed that
some proposition was expected from them, the task had been
imposed on him. After enumerating the defects of the
Confederation, he detailed the remedy proposed. This latter
was set forth in fifteen resolutions and was called afterwards
the Virginia plan of government. Charles Pinckney from South
Carolina had also a draft of a federal government, which was
read and like the former referred to a committee of the whole
House. … The Committee of the Whole … debated from day to day
the resolutions contained in the Virginia plan, and on the
13th of June they reported nineteen resolutions based upon
those of Virginia, forming a system of government in outline.
On the following day Mr. Paterson, of New Jersey, asked for
time to prepare another plan founded on the Articles of
Confederation. This was submitted to the Convention on the
15th. The Virginia and the New Jersey plan were contrasted
briefly by one of the members: Virginia plan proposes two
branches in the legislature, Jersey, a single legislative
body; Virginia, the legislative powers derived from the
people, Jersey, from the States; Virginia, a single executive,
Jersey, more than one; Virginia, a majority of the legislature
can act, Jersey, a small majority can control; Virginia, the
legislature can legislate on all national concerns, Jersey,
only on limited objects; Virginia, legislature to negative all
State laws, Jersey, giving power to the executive to compel
obedience by force; Virginia, to remove the executive by
impeachment, Jersey, on application of a majority of the
States; Virginia, for the establishment of inferior judiciary
tribunals, Jersey, no provision. Neither of these plans
commended themselves to men like Hamilton, who wanted a strong
government, and were afraid of democracy or giving power to
the people. He thought the Virginia plan 'but pork still with
a little change of the sauce.' The Articles of Confederation
amended, as in the New Jersey plan, set forth a government
approved of by the opposite wing of the Convention, consisting
of men like Lansing, who professed an ultra devotion to the
rights and autonomy of the States. … The Convention did not go
again into committee of the whole, but continued to debate the
nineteen resolutions from the 19th of June until the 23d of
July. Some of these were referred to grand committees,
consisting of one member from each State, or they were
referred to select committees consisting of five members."

_K. M. Rowland,
Life of George Mason,
volume 2, chapter 4._

"The plan presented by Mr. Patterson, called the New Jersey
plan, was concerted and arranged between the deputations of
that State, of Delaware, of New York, and of Connecticut, with
the individual cooperation of Mr. Luther Martin, one of the
delegates of Maryland. The extreme jealousy … manifested by
the representatives of the two first-named States with regard
to the equal suffrage of the States in the common councils of
the Confederacy, was the principal source of their aversion to
the plan reported by the committee of the whole. The delegates
of Connecticut, and Messrs. Lansing and Yates,—forming a
majority of the delegation of New York,—united with the
deputations of New Jersey and Delaware, not so much from an
exclusive attachment to the principle of the sovereignty and
equality of the States, as from the policy of preserving the
existing framework of the confederation, and of simply vesting
in Congress, as then organized, a few additional powers. It
was under the influence of these mixed political views that
the New Jersey plan was conceived and prepared. It proposed to
vest in the existing Congress,—a single body in which all the
States had an equal suffrage,—in addition to the powers
already given to it by the articles of confederation, that of
raising revenue by imposts and stamp and postage duties, and
also that of passing acts for the regulation of commerce with
foreign nations and between the States; leaving the
enforcement of all such acts, in the first instance, to the
State courts, with an ultimate appeal to the tribunals of the
United States.
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Whenever requisitions on the States for contributions should
be made, and any State should fail to comply with such
requisitions within a specified time, Congress was to be
authorized to direct their collection in the non-complying
States, and to pass the requisite acts for that purpose. None
of the foregoing powers, however, were to be exercised by
Congress without the concurrence of a certain number of the
States, exceeding a bare majority of the whole. The plan also
proposed the organization of a Federal executive and a Federal
judiciary. … It was, finally, provided that if any State, or
any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the
carrying into execution any act of Congress passed in virtue
of the powers granted to that body, or any treaty made and
ratified under the authority of the United States, the Federal
executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the
confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary,
to enforce and compel an obedience to the acts, or an
observance of the treaties, whose execution shall have been so
opposed or prevented. Such were the salient features of the
plan now brought forward as a substitute for the Virginia
propositions, as reported by the committee of the whole. … In
the progress of the discussion upon the two plans, Colonel
Hamilton, of New York, made an elaborate speech, declaring
himself to be opposed to both, and suggesting a third and more
absolute plan, which he thought was alone adequate to the
exigencies of the country. He frankly avowed his distrust of
both republican and federal government, under any
modification. He entered into a minute analysis of the various
sources and elements of political power, in order to show that
all these would be on the side of the State governments, so
long as a separate political organization of the States was
maintained, and would render them an over-match for any
general government that could be established, unless a
'complete sovereignty' was vested in the latter. He thought it
essential, therefore, to the ends of a good and efficient
government of the whole country, that the State governments,
with their vast and extensive apparatus, should be
extinguished; though 'he did not mean,' he said, 'to shock
public opinion by proposing such a measure.' He also expressed
his despair of the practicability of establishing a republican
government over so extensive a country as the United States.
He was sensible, at the same time, that it would be unwise to
propose one of any other form. Yet 'he had no scruple,' he
said, 'in declaring that, in his private opinion, the British
government was the best in the world, and that he doubted much
whether any thing short of it would do in America.' He
descanted upon the securities against injustice, violence, and
innovation, afforded, in the English system, by the permanent
constitution of the House of Lords, and by the elevated and
independent position of the monarch. He thence deduced the
necessity of as permanent a tenure as public opinion in this
country would bear, of the leading branches of the new
government. 'Let one branch of the legislature,' he said,
'hold their places for life, or at least during good behavior.
Let the executive also be for life.' In concluding, he
expressed his conviction that 'a great progress was going on
in the public mind; that the people will, in time, be
unshackled from their prejudices; and, whenever that happens,
they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the
plan brought forward by Mr. Randolph [the Virginia plan] would
place them, but would be ready to go as far, at least, as he
proposed.' He then read a plan of government he had prepared,
which, he said, he did not submit as a proposition to the
convention, but as giving a correct sketch of his ideas, and
to suggest the amendment which he should probably offer to the
Virginia plan in the future stages of its consideration. … The
convention now had presented for their consideration three
distinct schemes of government: one purely Federal, founded
upon the idea of preserving undiminished the sovereignty and
equality of the States, and of constituting a special
political agency in Congress for certain purposes, but still
under the dependence and control of the States; another of a
consolidated character, bottomed on the principle of a virtual
annihilation of the State sovereignties and the creation of a
central government, with a supreme and indefinite control over
both individuals and communities; the third a mixed and
balanced system, resting upon an agreed partition of the
powers of sovereignty between the States and the Union,—one
portion to be vested in the Union for certain objects of
common and national concern, the residue retained by the
States for the regulation of the general mass of their
interior and domestic interests. … On the 19th of June … Mr.
King, of Massachusetts, moved that 'the committee do now rise,
and report that they do not agree to the propositions offered
by the Honorable Mr. Patterson; and that they report to the
House the resolutions offered by the Honorable Mr. Randolph,
heretofore reported from a committee of the whole.' The motion
was carried by the votes of Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia, in the affirmative,—New York, New Jersey, and
Delaware voting in the negative; and Maryland, divided."

_W. C. Rives,
Life and Times of James Madison,
chapter 29._

"It appeared," wrote Madison, in a letter to Jefferson,
October 24th "to be the sincere and unanimous wish of the
Convention to cherish and preserve the Union of the States. No
proposition was made, no suggestion was thrown out, in favor
of a partition of the Empire into two or more Confederacies.
It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could
not be secured by any system founded on the principle of a
confederation of Sovereign States. A voluntary observance of
the federal law by all the members could never be hoped for. A
compulsive one could evidently never be reduced to practice,
and if it could, involved equal calamities to the innocent and
the guilty, the necessity of a military force, both obnoxious
and dangerous, and, in general, a scene resembling much more a
civil war than the administration of a regular Government.
Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which,
instead of operating on the States, should operate without
their intervention on the individuals composing them; and
hence the change in the principle and proportion of
representation.
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This ground-work being laid, the great objects
which presented themselves were:
1. To unite a proper energy in the Executive, and a proper
stability in the Legislative departments, with the essential
characters of Republican Government:
2. To draw a line of demarkation which would give to the
General Government every power requisite for general purposes,
and leave to the States every power which might be most
beneficially administered by them.
3. To provide for the different interests of different parts
of the Union.
4. To adjust the clashing pretensions of the large and small
States.

Each of these objects was pregnant with difficulties. The
whole of them together formed a task more difficult than can
well be conceived by those who were not concerned in the
execution of it. Adding to these considerations the natural
diversity of human opinions on all new and complicated
subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of concord
which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle. The first
of these objects, as respects the Executive, was peculiarly
embarrassing. On the question whether it should consist of a
single person or a plurality of co-ordinate members, on the
mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree
of power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated
discussions took place. The plurality of co-ordinate members
had finally but few advocates. Governor Randolph was at the
head of them. The modes of appointment proposed were various;
as by the people at large, by electors chosen by the people,
by the Executives of the States, by the Congress; some
preferring a joint ballot of the two Houses; some, a separate
concurrent ballot, allowing to each a negative on the other
house; some, a nomination of several candidates by one House,
out of whom a choice should be made by the other. Several
other modifications were started. The expedient at length
adopted seemed to give pretty general satisfaction to the
members. As to the duration in office, a few would have
preferred a tenure during good behaviour; a considerable
number would have done so in case an easy and effectual
removal by impeachment could be settled. It was much agitated
whether a long term, seven years for example, with a
subsequent and perpetual ineligibility, or a short term, with
a capacity to be re-elected, should be fixed. In favor of the
first opinion were urged the danger of a gradual degeneracy of
re-elections from time to time, into first a life and then a
hereditary tenure, and the favorable effect of an incapacity
to be reappointed on the independent exercise of the Executive
authority. On the other side it was contended that the
prospect of necessary degradation would discourage the most
dignified characters from aspiring to the office; would take
away the principal motive to the faithful discharge of its
duties—the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment; would
stimulate ambition to violent efforts for holding over the
constitutional term; and instead of producing an independent
administration and a firmer defence of the constitutional
rights of the department, would render the officer more
indifferent to the importance of a place which he would soon
be obliged to quit forever, and more ready to yield to the
encroachments of the Legislature, of which he might again be a
member. The questions concerning the degree of power turned
chiefly on the appointment to offices, and the controul on the
Legislature. An absolute appointment to all offices, to some
offices, to no offices, formed the scale of opinions on the
first point. On the second, some contended for an absolute
negative, as the only possible means of reducing to practice
the theory of a free Government, which forbids a mixture of
the Legislative and Executive powers. Others would be content
with a revisionary power, to be overruled by three-fourths of
both Houses. It was warmly urged that the judiciary department
should be associated in the revision. The idea of some was,
that a separate revision should be given to the two
departments; that if either objected, two-thirds, if both,
three-fourths, should be necessary to overrule. In forming the
Senate, the great anchor of the government, the questions, as
they come within the first object, turned mostly on the mode
of appointment, and the duration of it. The different modes
proposed were:

1. By the House of Representatives.
2. By the Executive.
3. By electors chosen by the people for the purpose.
4. By the State Legislatures.

On the point of duration, the propositions descended from good
behaviour to four years, through the intermediate terms of
nine, seven, six, and five years. The election of the other
branch was first determined to be triennial, and afterwards
reduced to biennial. The second object, the due partition of
power between the General and local Governments, was perhaps,
of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended for an
entire abolition of the States; some, for indefinite power of
Legislation in the Congress, with a negative on the laws of
the States; some, for such a power without a negative; some,
for a limited power of legislation, with such a negative; the
majority, finally, for a limited power without the negative.
The question with regard to the negative underwent repeated
discussions, and was finally rejected by a bare majority. … I
return to the third object above mentioned, the adjustments of
the different interests of different parts of the continent.
Some contended for an unlimited power over trade, including
exports as well as imports, and over slaves as well as other
imports; some, for such a power, provided the concurrence of
two-thirds of both Houses were required; some, for such a
qualification of the power, with an exemption of exports and
slaves; others, for an exemption of exports only. The result
is seen in the Constitution. South Carolina and Georgia were
inflexible on the point of the slaves. The remaining object
created more embarrassment, and a greater alarm for the issue
of the Convention, than all the rest put together. The little
States insisted on retaining their equality in both branches,
unless a compleat abolition of the State Governments should
take place; and made an equality in the Senate a sine qua non.
The large States, on the other hand, urged that as the new
Government was to be drawn principally from the people
immediately, and was to operate directly on them, not on the
States; and, consequently, as the States would lose that
importance which is now proportioned to the importance of
their voluntary compliance with the requisitions of Congress,
it was necessary that the representation in both Houses should
be in proportion to their size. It ended in the compromise
which you will see, but very much to the dissatisfaction of
several members from the large States."

_J. Madison,
Letters and other Writings,
volume 1, pages 344-354._

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"Those who proposed only to amend the old Articles of
Confederation and opposed a new Constitution, objected that a
government formed under such a Constitution would be not a
federal, but a national, government. Luther Martin said, when
he returned to Maryland, that the delegates 'appeared totally
to have forgot the business for which we were sent. … We had
not been sent to form a government over the inhabitants of
America considered as individuals. … That the system of
government we were intrusted to prepare was a government over
these thirteen States; but that in our proceedings we adapted
principles which would be right and proper only on the
supposition that there were no state governments at all, but
that all the inhabitants of this extensive continent were in
their individual capacity, without government, and in a state
of nature.' He added that, 'in the whale system there was but
one federal feature, the appointment of the senators by the
States in their sovereign capacity, that is by their
legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but
it was said that this feature was only federal in appearance.'
The Senate, the second house as it was called in the
convention, was in part created, it is needless to say, to
meet, or rather in obedience to, reasoning like this. … The
Luther Martin protestants were too radical to remain in the
convention to the end, when they saw that such a confederacy
as they wanted was impossible. But there were not many who
went the length they did in believing that a strong central
government was necessarily the destruction of the state
governments. Still fewer were those who would have brought
this about if they could. … The real difficulty, as Madison
said in the debate on that question, and as he repeated again
and again after that question was settled, was not between the
larger and smaller States, but between the North and South;
between those States that held slaves and those that had none.
Slavery in the Constitution, which has given so much trouble
to the Abolitionists of this century, and, indeed, to
everybody else, gave quite as much in the last century to
those who put it there. Many of the wisest and best men of the
time, Southerners as well as Northerners, and among them
Madison, were opposed to slavery. … Everywhere north of South
Carolina, slavery was looked upon as a misfortune which it was
exceedingly desirable to be free from at the earliest possible
moment; everywhere north of Mason and Dixon's Line, measures
had already been taken, or were certain soon to be taken, to
put an end to it; and by the Ordinance for the government of
all the territory north of the Ohio River, it was absolutely
prohibited by Congress, in the same year in which the
Constitutional Congress met. But it was, nevertheless, a thing
to the continued existence of which the anti-slavery people of
that time could consent without any violation of conscience.
Bad as it was, unwise, wasteful, cruel, a mockery of every
pretense of respect for the rights of man, they did not
believe it to be absolutely wicked. … The question with the
North was, how far could it yield; with the South, how far
could it encroach. It turned mainly an representation. … There
were some who maintained at first that the slave population
should not be represented at all. Hamilton proposed in the
first days of the convention 'that the rights of suffrage in
the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the
number of free inhabitants.'"

_S. H. Gay,
James Madison,
chapters 7-8._

"When the great document was at last drafted by Gouverneur
Morris, and was all ready far the signatures [September 17,
1787], the aged Franklin produced a paper, which was read for
him, as his voice was weak. Same parts of this Constitution,
he said, he did not approve, but he was astonished to find it
so nearly perfect. Whatever opinion he had of its errors he
would sacrifice to the public good, and he hoped that every
member of the convention who still had objections would on
this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and for
the sake of unanimity put his name to this instrument.
Hamilton added his plea. A few members, he said, by refusing
to sign, might do infinite mischief. … From these appeals, as
well as from Washington's solemn warning at the outset, we see
how distinctly it was realized that the country was on the
verge of civil war. Most of the members felt so, but to some
the new government seemed far too strong, and there were three
who dreaded despotism even more than anarchy. Mason, Randolph,
and Gerry refused to sign. … In the signatures the twelve
states which had taken part in the work were all represented,
Hamilton signing alone for New York."

_J. Fiske,
The Critical Period of American History,
page 303._

A "popular delusion with regard to the Constitution is that it
was created out of nothing; or, as Mr. Gladstone puts it, that
·It is the greatest work ever struck off at any one time by
the mind and purpose of man.' The radical view on the other
side is expressed by Sir Henry Maine, who informs us that the
'Constitution of the United States is a modified version of
the British Constitution … which was in existence between 1760
and 1787.' The real source of the Constitution is the
experience of Americans. They had established and developed
admirable little commonwealths in the colonies; since the
beginning of the Revolution they had had experience of State
governments organized on a different basis from the colonial;
and, finally, they had carried on two successive national
governments, with which they had been profoundly discontented.
The general outline of the new Constitution seems to be
English; it was really colonial. The President's powers of
military command, of appointment, and of veto were similar to
those of the colonial governor. National courts were created
on the model of colonial courts. A legislature of two houses
was accepted because such legislatures had been common in
colonial times. In the English Parliamentary system as it
existed before 1760 the Americans had had no share; the later
English system of Parliamentary responsibility was not yet
developed, and had never been established in colonial
governments; and they expressly excluded it from their new
Constitution. They were little more affected by the experience
of other European nations. … The chief source of the details
of the Constitution was the State constitutions and laws then
in force. Thus the clause conferring a suspensive veto on the
President is an almost literal transcript from the
Massachusetts constitution. In fact, the principal experiment
in the Constitution was the establishment of an electoral
college; and of all parts of the system this has worked least
as the framers expected. The Constitution represents,
therefore, the accumulated experience of the time. … The real
boldness of the Constitution is the novelty of the federal
system which it set up."

_A. B. Hart,
Formation of the Union
(Epochs of American History),
section 62._

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"That a constitution should be framed in detail by a body of
uninstructed delegates, expressly chosen for that purpose, was
familiar in the States of the Union; but was perhaps
unexampled elsewhere in the world, and was certainly
unexampled in the history of federations. That the instrument
of federal government should provide for proportional
representation in one house, and for a federal court, was a
step in federal organization which marks a new federal
principle. For many purposes the Union then created was
stronger than the Prussian monarchy at that moment. In many
respects the States were left stronger than the little
nominally independent German principalities. The great merit
of the members of the convention is their understanding of the
temper of their own countrymen. They selected out Of English,
or colonial, or State usages such practices and forms as
experience had shown to be acceptable to the people. … The
Convention had further the wisdom to express their work in
general though carefully stated principles. All previous
federal governments had been fettered either by an imperfect
and inadequate statement, as in the constitution of the United
Netherlands, or by an unwritten constitution with an
accumulation of special precedents, as in the Holy Roman
Empire. The phrases of the Constitution of 1787 were broad
enough to cover cases unforeseen. A third distinction of the
federal Convention is the skill with which it framed
acceptable compromises upon the three most difficult questions
before it. The two Houses of Congress satisfied both large and
small States; the three-fifths representation of slaves
postponed an inevitable conflict; the allowance of the slave
trade for a term of years made it possible for Congress to
perfect commercial legislation. The Convention had profited by
the experience of the Confederation: on every page of the
Constitution may be found clauses which would not have stood
there had it been framed in 1781. An adequate revenue was
provided; foreign and interstate commerce was put under the
control of Congress; the charge of foreign affairs was given
entirely to the central authority; the powers of government
were distributed among three departments."

_A. B. Hart,
Introduction to the Study of Federal Government,
chapter 4._

ALSO IN:
_I. Eliot,
Debates in the Convention at Philadelphia, 1787._

_J. Madison,
Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution._

_W. C. Rives,
Life and Times of James Madison,
chapters 27-33 (volume 2)._

_G. Bancroft,
History of the Formation of the Constitution of
the United States._

_G. T. Curtis,
History of the Constitution of the United States._

_C. E. Stevens,
Sources of the Constitution of the United States._

_J. H. Robinson,
The Original and Derived Features of the Constitution.
(Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, volume l)._

For the text of the Constitution.

See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787-1789.
The struggle for the Federal Constitution in the States.
Its ratification.
The end of the Confederation.