Chapter 3 (5)

"Leaving Philadelphia, with the Army, on the 5th of September,
Washington meets an express near Chester, announcing the
arrival, in Chesapeake Bay, of the Count de Grasse, with a
fleet of twenty-eight ships of the line, and with 3,500
additional French troops, under the command of the Marquis de
St. Simon, who had already been landed at Jamestown, with
orders to join the Marquis de La Fayette! 'The joy' says the
Count William de Deux-Ponts, in his precious journal, 'the joy
which this welcome news produces among all the troops, and
which penetrates General Washington and the Count de
Rochambeau, is more easy to feel than to express.' But, in a
foot-note to that passage, he does express and describe it, in
terms which cannot be spared and could not be surpassed, and
which add a new and charming illustration of the emotional
side of Washington's nature. 'I have been equally surprised
and touched,' says the gallant Deux-Ponts, 'at the true and
pure joy of General Washington. Of a natural coldness and of a
serious and noble approach, which in him is only true dignity,
and which adorn so well the chief of a whole nation, his
features, his physiognomy, his deportment, all were changed in
an instant. He put aside his character as arbiter of North
America, and contented himself for a moment with that of a
citizen, happy at the good fortune of his country. A child,
whose every wish had been gratified, would not have
experienced a sensation more lively, and I believe I am doing
honor to the feelings of this rare man in endeavoring to
express all their ardor.' Thanks to God, thanks to France,
from all our hearts at this hour, for 'this true and pure joy'
which lightened the heart, and at once dispelled the anxieties
of our incomparable leader. It may be true that Washington
seldom smiled after he had accepted the command of our
Revolutionary Army, but it is clear that on the 5th of
September he not only smiled but played the boy. … 'All now
went merry,' with him, 'as a marriage bell.' Under the
immediate influence of this joy, which he had returned for a
few hours to Philadelphia to communicate in person to
Congress, … and while the Allied Armies are hurrying
southward, he makes a hasty trip with Colonel Humphreys to his
beloved Mount Vernon and his more beloved wife—his first visit
home since he left it for Cambridge in 1775. Rochambeau, with
his suite, joins him there on the 10th, and Chastellux and his
aids on the 11th; and there with Mrs. Washington, he dispenses
for two days, 'a princely hospitality' to his foreign guests.
But the 13th finds them all on their way to rejoin the Army at
Williamsburg, where they arrive on the 15th, 'to the great joy
of the troops and the people,' and where they dine with the
Marquis de St. Simon. On the 18th Washington and Rochambeau,
with Knox and Chastellux and Du Portail, and with two of
Washington's aids, Colonel Cobb of Massachusetts, and Colonel
Jonathan Trumbull, jr., of Connecticut, embark on the
'Princess Charlotte' for a visit to the French fleet. … A few
days more are spent at Williamsburg on their return, where
they find General Lincoln already arrived with a part of the
troops from the North, having hurried them as Washington
besought him, 'on the wings of speed,' and where the word is
soon given, 'On, on, to York and Gloucester!'
{3279}
Washington takes his share of the exposure of this march, and
the night of the 28th of September finds him, with all his
military family, sleeping in an open field within two miles of
Yorktown, without any other covering, as the journal of one of
his aids states, 'than the canopy of the heavens, and the
small spreading branches of a tree,' which the writer predicts
'will probably be rendered venerable from this circumstance
for a length of time to come.' … Everything now hurries,
almost with the rush of a Niagara cataract, to the grand fall
of Arbitrary Power in America. Lord Cornwallis had taken post
here at Yorktown as early as the 4th of August, after being
foiled so often by 'that boy' as he called La Fayette, whose
Virginia campaign of four months was the most effective
preparation for all that was to follow, and who, with singular
foresight, perceived at once that his lordship was now fairly
entrapped, and wrote to Washington, as early as the 21st of
August, that 'the British army must be forced to surrender.'
Day by day, night by night, that prediction presses forward to
its fulfillment. The 1st of October finds our engineers
reconnoitering the position and works of the enemy. The 2d
witnesses the gallantry of the Duke de Lauzun and his legion
in driving back Tarleton, whose raids had so long been the
terror of Virginia and the Carolinas. On the 6th, the Allied
Armies broke ground for their first parallel, and proceeded to
mount their batteries on the 7th and 8th. On the 9th, two
batteries were opened—Washington himself applying the torch to
the first gun; and on the 10th three or four more were in
play—silencing the enemy's works, and making,' says the
little diary of Colonel Cobb, 'most noble music.' On the 11th,
the indefatigable Baron Steuben was breaking the ground for
our second parallel, within less than four hundred yards of
the enemy, which was finished the next morning, and more
batteries mounted on the 13th and 14th. But the great
achievement of the siege still awaits its accomplishment. Two
formidable British advanced redoubts are blocking the way to
any further approach, and they must be stormed. The allied
troops divide the danger and the glory between them, and
emulate each other in the assault. One of these redoubts is
assigned to the French grenadiers and chasseurs, under the
general command of the Baron de Viomesnil. The other is
assigned to the American light infantry, under the general
command of La Fayette. But the detail of special leaders to
conduct the two assaults remains to be arranged. Viomesnil
readily designates the brave Count William to lead the French
storming party, who, though he came off from his victory
wounded, counts it 'the happiest day of his life.' A question
arises as to the American party, which is soon solved by the
impetuous but just demand of our young Alexander Hamilton to
lead it. And lead it he did, with an intrepidity, a heroism,
and a dash unsurpassed in the whole history of the war. … Both
redoubts were soon captured; and these brilliant actions
virtually sealed the fate of Cornwallis. 'A small and
precipitate sortie,' as Washington calls it, was made by the
British on the following evening, resulting in nothing; and
the next day a vain attempt to evacuate their works, and to
escape by crossing over to Gloucester, was defeated by a
violent and, for us … most providential storm of rain and
wind. … A suspension of hostilities, to arrange terms of
capitulation, was proposed by Cornwallis on the 17th; the 18th
was occupied at Moore's House in settling those terms; and on
the 19th the articles were signed by which the garrison of
York and Gloucester, together with all the officers and seamen
of the British ships in the Chesapeake, 'surrender themselves
Prisoners of War to the Combined Forces of America and
France.'"

_Robert C. Winthrop,
Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Surrender
of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Oct. 19, 1881._

ALSO IN:
_Marquis Cornwallis,
Correspondence,
volume 1, chapters 4-5._

_Marquis Cornwallis,
Answer to Sir H. Clinton._

_Count de Deux-Ponts,
My Campaigns in America, 1781._

_T. Balch,
The French in America during the War of Independence,
chapters 13-22._

_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 25-26, and 28._

_George Washington,
Writings, edited by W. C. Ford,
volume 9._

_C. Tower,
The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution,
volume 2, chapters 25-28._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A, D, 1781-1782.
Practical suspension of hostilities.
Difficulty of maintaining the army.
Financial distress of the country.

"Immediately after the surrender of Yorktown Washington
returned with his army to the vicinity of New York [see
NEWBURGH], but he felt himself far too weak to attempt its
capture, and hostilities were restricted to a few indecisive
skirmishes or predatory enterprises. It is curious to notice
how far from sanguine Washington appeared even after the event
which in the eyes of most men, outside America, had determined
the contest without appeal. It was still impossible, he
maintained, to do anything decisive unless the sea were
commanded by a naval force hostile to England, and France
alone could provide this force. The difficulties of
maintaining the army were unabated. 'All my accounts,' he
wrote in April 1782, 'respecting the recruiting service are
unfavourable; indeed, not a single recruit has arrived to my
knowledge from any State except Rhode Island, in consequence
of the requisitions of Congress in December last.' He strongly
urged the impossibility of recruiting the army by voluntary
enlistment, and recommended that, in addition to the
compulsory enrolment of Americans, German prisoners should be
taken into the army. Silas Deane, in private letters,
expressed at this time his belief that it would be utterly
impossible to maintain the American army for another year; and
even after the surrender of Cornwallis, no less a person than
Sir Henry Clinton assured the Government that, with a
reinforcement of only 10,000 men he would be responsible for
the conquest of America. … Credit was gone, and the troops had
long been unpaid. 'The long sufferance of the army,' wrote
Washington in October 1782, 'is almost exhausted. It is high
time for a peace.' Nothing, indeed, except the great
influence, the admirable moderation and good sense, and the
perfect integrity of Washington could have restrained the army
from open revolt. … Holland, immediately after the surrender
of Yorktown, had recognised the independence of America, which
had as yet only been recognised by France. John Adams was
received as representative at the Hague, and after several
abortive efforts he succeeded in raising a Dutch loan. France,
as her ablest ministers well knew, was drifting rapidly
towards bankruptcy, yet two American loans, amounting together
to £600,000, were extorted in the last year of the war.
{3280}
Up to the very eve of the formal signature of peace, and long
after the virtual termination of the war, the Americans found
it necessary to besiege the French Court for money. As late as
December 5, 1782, Franklin wrote from Paris to Livingston
complaining of the humiliating duty which was imposed on him.
… The reply of Livingston was dated January 6, 1783, and it
paints vividly the extreme distress in America. 'I see the
force,' he writes, 'of your objections to soliciting the
additional twelve millions, and I feel very sensibly the
weight of our obligations to France, but every sentiment of
this kind must give way to our necessities. It is not for the
interest of our allies to lose the benefit of all they have
done by refusing to make a small addition to it. … The army
demand with importunity their arrears of pay. The treasury is
empty, and no adequate means of filling it presents itself.
The people pant for peace; should contributions be exacted, as
they have hitherto been, at the point of the sword, the
consequences may be more dreadful than is at present
apprehended. I do not pretend to justify the negligence of the
States in not providing greater supplies. Some of them might
do more than they have done; none of them all that is
required. It is my duty to confide to you, that if the war is
continued in this country, it must be in a great measure at
the expense of France. If peace is made, a loan will be
absolutely necessary to enable us to discharge the army, that
will not easily separate without pay.' It was evident that the
time for peace had come. The predatory expeditions which still
continued in America could only exasperate still further both
nations, and there were some signs—especially in the conflicts
between loyalists and revolutionists—that they were having
this effect. England had declared herself ready to concede the
independence America demanded. Georgia and South Carolina,
where the English had found so many faithful friends, were
abandoned in the latter half of 1782, and the whole force of
the Crown was now concentrated at New York and in Canada.
France and Spain for a time wished to protract negotiations in
hopes that Rodney might be crushed, that Jamaica and
afterwards Gibraltar might be captured; but all these hopes
had successively vanished. … If the war continued much longer
America would almost certainly drop away, and France, and
perhaps Spain, become bankrupt."

_W. E. H. Lecky,
History of England in the 18th Century,
chapter 15 (volume 4)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781-1786.
The cession of Western Territory
by the States to the Federal Union.
The Western Reserve of Connecticut.

Although the Articles of Confederation were adopted by
Congress in 1777 and ratified immediately by most of the
States, it was not until 1781 that they became operative by
the assent of all. "New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland held out
against ratifying them for from two to four years. The secret
of their resistance was in the claims to the western
territory. … The three recalcitrant States had always had
fixed western boundaries, and had no legal claim to a share in
the western territory. … New Jersey and Delaware gave up the
struggle in 1778 and 1779; but Maryland would not and did not
yield, until her claims were satisfied. Dr. H. B. Adams has
shown that the whole question of real nationality for the
United States was bound up in this western territory; that
even a 'league government' could not continue long to govern a
great and growing territory like this without developing into
a real national government, even without a change of strict
law; and that the Maryland leaders were working under a
complete consciousness of these facts."

_A. Johnston,
The United States: Its History and Constitution,
sections 89-90._

The western claims of Virginia were the most sweeping and were
founded upon the oldest historical document. "The charter
granted by James I. to South Virginia, in 1600 [see VIRGINIA:
A. D. 1609-1616] … embraced the entire north-west of North
America, and, within certain limits, all the islands along the
coast of the South Sea or Pacific Ocean. … The following is
the grant: 'All those lands, countries and territories
situate, lying and being in that part of America called
Virginia, from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort,
all along the sea-coast to the northward 200 miles; and from
the said Point or Cape Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the
southward 200 miles; and all that space and circuit of land
lying from the sea-coast of the precinct aforesaid, up into
the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west; and
also all the islands lying within 100 miles along the coast of
both seas of the precinct aforesaid.' The extraordinary
ambiguity of this grant of 1609, which was always appealed to
as a legal title by Virginia, was first shown by Thomas Paine.
… The chief ambiguity … lay in the interpretation of the words
'up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and
north-west.' From which point was the north-west line to be
drawn, from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above, or
from the point 200 miles below Cape Comfort? … The more
favorable interpretation for Virginia and, perhaps, in view of
the expression 'from sea to sea,' more natural interpretation,
was to draw the north-western line from the point on the
sea-coast 200 miles above Point Comfort, and the western line
from the southern limit below Point Comfort. This gave
Virginia the greater part, at least, of the entire north-west,
for the lines diverged continually. … At the outbreak of the
Revolution, Virginia had annexed the 'County of Kentucky' to
the Old Dominion, and, in 1778, after the capture of the
military posts in the north-west by Colonel George Rogers
Clarke, … that enterprising State proceeded to annex the lands
beyond the Ohio, under the name of the County of Illinois

See, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779,
CLARKE'S CONQUEST.

The military claims of Virginia were certainly very strong,
but it was felt by the smaller States that an equitable
consideration for the services of other colonies in defending
the back country from the French, ought to induce Virginia to
dispose of a portion of her western territory for the common
good. It is easy now to conceive how royal grants to
Massachusetts and Connecticut of lands stretching from ocean
to ocean, must have conflicted with the charter claims and
military title of Virginia to the great north-west. … The
claims of Massachusetts were based upon the charter granted by
William and Mary, in 1691, and those of Connecticut upon the
charter granted by Charles II., in 1662. …
{3281}
The former's claim embraced the lands which now lie in
southern Michigan and Wisconsin, or, in other words, the
region comprehended by the extension westward of her present
southern boundary and of her ancient northern limit, which was
'the latitude of a league north of the inflow of Lake
Winnipiseogee in New Hampshire. The western claims of
Connecticut [the zone lying between her northern and southern
boundaries—41° and 42° 2' north latitude—extended westward]
covered portions of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. …
The extension of charter boundaries over the far west by
Massachusetts and Connecticut led to no trespass on the
intervening charter claims of New York. Connecticut fell into
a serious controversy, however, with Pennsylvania, in regard
to the possession of certain lands in the northern part of the
latter State, but the dispute, when brought before a court
appointed by Congress, was finally decided in favor of
Pennsylvania. But in the western country, Massachusetts and
Connecticut were determined to assert their chartered rights
against Virginia and the treaty claims of New York; for, by
virtue of various treaties with the Six Nations and allies,
the latter State was asserting jurisdiction over the entire
region between Lake Erie and the Cumberland mountains, or, in
other words, Ohio and a portion of Kentucky. These claims were
strengthened by the following facts: First, that the chartered
rights of New York were merged in the Crown by the accession
to the throne, in 1685, of the Duke of York as James II.;
again, that the Six Nations and tributaries had put themselves
under the protection of England, and that they had always been
treated by the Crown as appendant to the government of New
York; moreover, in the third place, the citizens of that State
had borne the burden of protecting these Indians for over a
hundred years. New York was the great rival of Virginia in the
strength and magnitude of her western claims." In 1780,
Maryland still insisting upon the surrender of these western
land claims to the federal government, and refusing to ratify
the Articles of Confederation until such cession was made, the
claimant States began to yield to her firmness. On the 1st of
March, 1781, the offer of New York to cede her claims,
providing Congress would confirm her western boundary, was
made in Congress. "On that very day, Maryland ratified the
Articles and the first legal union of the United States was
complete. The coincidence in dates is too striking to admit of
any other explanation than that Maryland and New York were
acting with a mutual understanding. … The offer of Virginia,
reserving to herself jurisdiction over the County of Kentucky;
the offer of Connecticut, withholding jurisdiction over all
her back lands; and the offer of New York, untrammeled by
burdensome conditions and conferring upon Congress complete
jurisdiction over her entire western territory,—these three
offers were now prominently before the country. … On the 29th
of October, 1782, Mr. Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, moved that
Congress accept the right, title, jurisdiction, and claim of
New York, as ceded by the agents of that state on the first of
March, 1781. … On the 13th day of September, 1783, it was
voted by Congress to accept the cession offered by Virginia,
of the territory north-west of the Ohio, provided that state
would waive the obnoxious conditions concerning the guaranty
of Virginia's boundary, and the annulling of all other titles
to the north-west territory. Virginia modified her conditions
as requested, and on the 20th of October, 1783, empowered her
delegates in Congress to make the cession, which was done by
Thomas Jefferson, and others, March 1, 1784."

_H. B. Adams,
Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States
(Johns Hopkins University Studies, 3d series, Number 1),
pages 9-11, 19-22, 36-39._

The Massachusetts deed of cession was executed April 19, 1785.
It conveyed the right and title of the state to all lands
"west of a meridian line drawn through the western bent or
inclination of Lake Ontario, provided such line should fall 20
miles or more west of the western limit of the Niagara River"
—that being the western boundary of New York, fixed four years
before. In May, 1786, Connecticut authorized a cession which
was not complete. Instead of beginning at the western boundary
line of Pennsylvania, her conveyance was of lands beyond a
line 120 miles west of the Pennsylvania line—thus retaining
her claim to the large tract in Ohio known subsequently as the
Western Reserve, or Connecticut Reserve. "The acceptance of
this cession was strongly opposed in Congress. … After a
severe struggle it was accepted, May 26, 1786, Maryland alone
voting in the negative."

_B. A. Hinsdale,
The Old Northwest,
chapter 13._

South Carolina executed the cession of her western claims in
1787; North Carolina in 1790, and Georgia in 1802.

_A. Johnston,
Connecticut,
chapter 15._

ALSO IN:
_T. Donaldson,
The Public Domain: its History,
chapter 3._

See, also, OHIO: A. D. 1786-1796.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (February-May).
Peace Resolutions in the British House of Commons.
Retirement of Lord North.
Pacific overtures through General Carleton.

"Fortunately for the United States, the temper of the British
nation on the question of continuing the American war was not
in unison with that of its sovereign. That war into which the
nation had entered with at least as much eagerness as the
minister had now become almost universally unpopular. Motions
against the measures of administration respecting America were
repeated by the opposition, and on every new experiment the
strength of the minority increased. At length, on the 27th of
February [1782], general Conway moved in the house of commons,
'that it is the opinion of this house that a further
prosecution of offensive war against America, would, under
present circumstances, be the means of weakening the efforts
of this country against her European enemies, and tend to
increase the mutual enmity so fatal to the interests both of
Great Britain and America.' The whole force of administration
was exerted to get rid of this question, but was exerted in
vain; and the resolution was carried. An address to the king
in the words of the motion was immediately voted, and was
presented by the whole house. The answer of the crown being
deemed inexplicit, it was on the 4th of March resolved by the
commons, 'that the house will consider as enemies to his
majesty and the country, all those who should advise or
attempt a further prosecution of offensive war on the
continent of North America.' These votes were soon followed by
a change of administration [Lord North resigning and being
succeeded by Lord Rockingham, with Fox, Shelburne, Burke and
Sheridan for colleagues], and by instructions to the
commanding officers of his Brittanic majesty's forces in
America which conformed to them. …
{3282}
Early in May, Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Sir Henry
Clinton in the command of all the British forces in the United
States, arrived at New York. Having been also appointed in
conjunction with admiral Digby a commissioner to negotiate a
peace, he lost no time in conveying to general Washington
copies of the votes of the British parliament, and of a bill
which had been introduced on the part of administration,
authorizing his majesty to conclude a peace or truce with
those who were still denominated the revolted colonies of
North America. These papers he said would manifest the
dispositions prevailing with the government and people of
England towards those of America, and if the like pacific
temper should prevail in this country, both inclination and
duty would lead him to meet it with the most zealous
concurrence. He had addressed to congress, he said, a letter
containing the same communications, and he solicited from the
American general a passport for the person who should convey
it. At this time, the bill enabling the British monarch to
conclude a peace or truce with America had not passed into a
law; nor was any assurance given that the present
commissioners possessed the power to offer other terms, than
those which had formerly been rejected. General Carleton
therefore could not hope that negotiations would commence on
such a basis; nor be disappointed that the passports he
requested were refused by congress, to whom the application
was, of course, referred. … The several states passed
resolutions expressing their objections to separate
negotiations, and declaring those to be enemies to America who
should attempt to treat without the authority of congress. But
the public votes which have been stated, and probably the
private instructions given to the British general, restrained
him from offensive war, and the state of the American army
disabled general Washington from making any attempt on the
posts held by the enemy. The campaign of 1782 consequently
passed away without furnishing any military operations of
moment between the armies under the immediate direction of the
respective commanders in chief."

_J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 11._

ALSO IN:
_Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope)
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 65 (volume 7)._

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (April).
Recognition by the Dutch Republic.

"Henry Laurens, the American plenipotentiary to the
Netherlands, having been taken captive and carried to England,
John Adams was appointed in his place. The new envoy had
waited more than eight months for an audience of reception.
Encouraged by the success at Yorktown, on the 9th of January
1782 Adams presented himself to the president of the
states-general, renewed his formal request for an opportunity
of presenting his credentials, and 'demanded a categorical
answer which he might transmit to his sovereign.' He next went
in person to the deputies of the several cities of Holland,
and, following the order of their rank in the confederation,
repeated his demand to each one of them. The attention of
Europe was drawn to the sturdy diplomatist, who dared, alone
and unsupported, to initiate so novel and bold a procedure.
Not one of the representatives of foreign powers at the Hague
believed that it could succeed;" but, beginning with
Friesland, in February, the seven states, one by one, declared
in favor of receiving the American envoy. "On the day which
chanced to be the seventh anniversary of 'the battle of
Lexington' their high mightinesses, the states-general,
reporting the unanimous decision of the seven provinces,
resolved that John Adams should be received as the minister of
the United States of America. The Dutch republic was the
second power in the world to recognise their independence."

_G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, page 527._

ALSO IN:
_J. Q. and C. F. Adams,
Life of John Adams,
chapter 6 (volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September).
The opening of negotiations for Peace.

The Rockingham ministry, which succeeded Lord North's in the
British government, in March, 1782 (see ENGLAND: A. D.
1782-1783), "though soon dissolved by the death of the Marquis
of Rockingham, were early distracted by a want of unanimity,
and early lost the confidence of the people. The negotiation
with America during May and June made no progress. Mr. Oswald
was the agent of Lord Shelburne, known to be opposed to the
acknowledgment, and Mr. Grenville, of Mr. Fox. This ministry
had been forced upon the king by a vote of the House of
Commons. The hopes of regaining America were again excited by
the decisive victory of Lord Rodney in the West Indies [see
ENGLAND: A. D. 1780-1782], and the unexpected successes of Sir
Eyre Coote against Hyder Ali in the East; and, if credit may
be given to the reports of the day, the government looked
forward with some confidence to the making a separate peace
with Congress by means of Sir Guy Carleton, who had been
appointed to the command of the forces in North America. … Mr.
Adams, writing from the Hague, June 13, 1782, observes, 'I
cannot see a probability that the English will ever make
peace, until their finances are ruined, and such distress
brought upon them, as will work up their parties into a civil
war.' It was not till September of the same year, under Lord
Shelburne's administration, formed upon the dissolution of the
Rockingham, that the British government took a decisive and
sincere step to make peace, and authorized their commissioner,
Mr. Oswald, at Paris, to acknowledge the independence of the
colonies. … This is the first instruction given by the British
Ministry in which it was proposed to recognize the celebrated
act of July 4th, 1776. A great and immediate progress was now
made in the preliminaries. … The commission, under which the
preliminaries of the treaty were actually concluded, was
issued by Congress in June 1781. It empowered 'John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas
Jefferson, or the majority of them, or such of them as may
assemble, or in case of the death, absence, indisposition, or
other impediment of the others, to any one of them, full power
and authority, general and special commission, … to sign, and
thereupon make a treaty or treaties, and to transact every
thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and
strengthening the great work of pacification, in as ample
form, and with the same effect, as if we were personally
present and acted therein.'
{3283}
All the commissioners, except Mr. Jefferson, were present
during the discussions, being in Europe at the time the
meeting was appointed. Mr. Jefferson was in America, and did
not leave it, as a report reached the government that the
preliminaries were already signed. Mr. Oswald's commission in
proper form was not issued till the 21st of September."

_The Diplomacy of the United States,
chapter 8._

"At the moment … that negotiations were set on foot, there
seemed but little hope of finding the Court of France
peaceably inclined. Fox alone among the Ministers, though
strongly opposed to a French alliance, inclined to a contrary
opinion, and imagined that the independence of America once
recognized, no further demands would be made upon England. It
was therefore his wish to recognize that independence
immediately, and by a rapid negotiation to insure the
conclusion of what he believed would prove a favourable peace.
Shelburne on the contrary believed that further concessions
would be asked by France, and that the best chance England
possessed of obtaining honourable terms, was to reserve the
recognition of independence as part of the valuable
consideration to be offered to the Colonies for favourable
terms, and to use the points where the interests of France,
Spain, and the Colonies were inconsistent, to foment
difficulties between them, and be the means of negotiating, if
necessary, a separate peace with each of the belligerents, as
opportunity might offer. The circumstances of the time
favoured the design. Vergennes had not gone to war for the
sake of American independence, but in order to humiliate
England. He not only did not intend to continue the war a day
longer than was necessary to establish a rival power on the
other side of the Atlantic, but was desirous of framing the
peace on conditions such as would leave England, Spain, and
the United States to balance one another, and so make France
paramount. He therefore intended to resist the claim which the
Colonies had invariably advanced of pushing their frontiers as
far west as the Mississippi, and proposed following the
example of the Proclamation of 1763, to leave the country
between Florida and the Cumberland to the Indians, who were to
be placed under the protection of Spain and the United States,
and the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by
the Quebec Act of 1774. Nor was he prepared to support the
claim of the New Englandmen to fish on the banks off
Newfoundland, over a considerable portion of which he desired
to establish an exclusive right for his own countrymen, in
keeping with the French interpretation of the Treaties of
Utrecht and Paris. Of a still more pronounced character were
the views of Spain. Her troops had recently conquered West
Florida and threatened East Florida as well. She had
determined to obtain formal possession of these territories,
and to claim that they ran into the interior till they reached
the great lakes. The United States, according to both the
French and Spanish idea, were therefore to be restricted to a
strip of land on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, bounded by
almost the same line which France had contended for against
England after the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1779, when the
alliance of France was not a year old, and the great triumph
over Burgoyne was fresh, Congress notwithstanding the pressure
of M. Gerard, the French envoy, had adopted the following
conditions as the ultimatum of peace:

(l.) The acknowledgment of the independence of the United
States by Great Britain, previous to any treaty or negotiation
for peace.

(2.) The Mississippi as their western boundary.

(3.) The navigation of that river to the southern boundary of
the States with a port below it.

They also passed a resolution to the effect that any
interference after the conclusion of peace by any power with
the fishery off Newfoundland hitherto exercised by the
inhabitants of the Colonies, should be regarded as a casus
belli. 'The advice of the allies, their knowledge of American
interests, and their own discretion,' were in other matters to
guide the American Commissioners sent to the European Courts.
As however the war progressed, and French assistance,
especially in money, became of greater and greater importance
to the Congress, the tone of their instructions became
sensibly modified, under the pressure, first of M. Gérard and
then of Count Luzerne, his successor. On the 25th January
1780, M. Gérard having obtained the appointment of a Committee
of Congress, informed them that the territories of the United
States extended no further west than the limits to which
settlements were permitted by the English proclamation of
1763; that the United States had no right to the navigation of
the Mississippi, having no territories adjoining any part of
the river; that Spain would probably conquer both Floridas,
and intended holding them; and that the territory on the east
side of the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain, and would
probably be conquered by Spain. He at the same time urged upon
Congress the immediate conclusion of an alliance with that
power, to which Jay had been sent as Commissioner in 1779. On
the 15th February, Congress having considered this
communication, resolved to instruct Jay to abandon the claim
to the navigation of the Mississippi. This practically implied
the abandonment of the claim to that river as the western
boundary. Shortly after, and again on the demand of Luzerne,
the instructions to Adams, who had been appointed Commissioner
for negotiating a peace, and was then in Europe, were altered.
Independence was to be the sole ultimatum, and Adams was to
undertake to submit to the guidance of the French Minister in
every respect. 'You are to make the most candid and
confidential communications,' so his amended instructions ran,
'upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the
King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for
peace or truce without their knowledge or concurrence, and to
make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majesty's
influence for effectual support in every thing that may be
necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the
United States of America.' As a climax Count Luzerne suggested
and Congress agreed to make Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and
Laurens, joint Commissioners with Mr. Adams. Of the body thus
appointed Jefferson refused to serve, while Laurens, as
already seen, was captured on his way to England. Of the
remaining Commissioners, John Adams was doubly odious to the
diplomatists of France and Spain, because of his fearless
independence of character, and because of the tenacity with
which as a New Englander he clung to the American rights in
the Newfoundland fisheries; Jay had been an enthusiastic
advocate for the Spanish alliance, but the cavalier treatment
he had received at Madrid, and the abandonment of the
Mississippi boundary by Congress, had forced upon him the
conviction that his own country was being used as a tool by
the European powers, for their own ulterior objects. The
French he hated.
{3284}
He said 'they were not a moral people, and did not know what
it was.' Not so Franklin, influenced partly by his long
residence in the French capital, and by the idea that the
Colonies were more likely to obtain their objects, by a firm
reliance upon France than by confidence in the generosity of
England. He also pointed to the terms of the treaty he had
negotiated with the former power, which forbade either party
to conclude a separate peace without the leave previously
obtained of the other, as imposing a moral and legal
obligation on his countrymen to follow the policy which he
believed their interests as a power required them to adopt.
Meanwhile the King of France congratulated Congress on having
entrusted to his care the interests of the United States, and
warned them that if France was to be asked to continue
hostilities for purely American objects it was impossible to
say what the result might be, for the system of France
depended not merely on America, but on the other powers at
war."

_Lord E. Fitzmaurice,
Life of William, Earl of Shelburne,
volume 3, chapter 4._

"Benjamin Franklin, now venerable with years, had been doing
at the court of Versailles a work hardly less important than
that of Washington on the battle-fields of America. By the
simple grace and dignity of his manners, by his large good
sense and freedom of thought, by his fame as a scientific
discoverer, above all by his consummate tact in the management
of men, the whilom printer, king's postmaster-general for
America, discoverer, London colonial agent, delegate in the
Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of
Independence, had completely captivated elegant, free-thinking
France. Learned and common folk, the sober and the frivolous
alike swore by Franklin. Snuff-boxes, furniture, dishes, even
stoves were gotten up 'à la Franklin.' The old man's portrait
was in every house. That the French Government, in spite of a
monarch who was half afraid of the rising nation beyond sea,
had given America her hearty support, was in no small measure
due to the influence of Franklin. And his skill in diplomacy
was of the greatest value in the negotiations now pending."

_E. B. Andrews,
History of the United States,
volume 1, pages 208-209._

ALSO IN:
_E. E. Hale,
Franklin in France,
volume 2, chapters 3-4._

_Lord J. Russell,
Life of Fox,
chapters 16-17 (volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September-November).
The Peace parleyings at Paris.
Distrust of French aims by Jay and Adams.
A secret and separate negotiation with England.

"The task of making a treaty of peace was simplified both by
[the change of ministry which placed Lord Shelburne at the
head of affairs in England] … and by the total defeat of the
Spaniards and French at Gibraltar in September [see ENGLAND;
A. D. 1780-1782]. Six months before, England had seemed
worsted in every quarter. Now England, though defeated in
America was victorious as regarded France and Spain. The
avowed object for which France had entered into alliance with
the Americans, was to secure the independence of the United
States, and this point was now substantially gained. The chief
object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France
was to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was
now decidedly lost. France had bound herself not to desist
from the war until Spain should recover Gibraltar; but now
there was little hope of accomplishing this, except by some
fortunate bargain in the treaty, and Vergennes tried to
persuade England to cede the great stronghold, in exchange for
West Florida, which Spain had lately conquered, or for Oran or
Guadaloupe. Failing in this, he adopted a plan for satisfying
Spain at the expense of the United States; and he did this the
more willingly as he had no love for the Americans, and did
not wish to see them become too powerful. France had strictly
kept her pledges; she had given us valuable and timely aid in
gaining our independence; and the sympathies of the French
people were entirely with the American cause. But the object
of the French government had been simply to humiliate England,
and this end was sufficiently accomplished by depriving her of
her thirteen colonies. The immense territory extending from
the Alleghany Mountains to the Mississippi River, and from the
border of West Florida to the Great Lakes, had passed from the
hands of France into those of England at the peace of 1763;
and by the Quebec Act of 1774 England had declared the
southern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River. … Vergennes
maintained that the Americans ought to recognize the Quebec
Act, and give up to England all the territory north of the
Ohio River. The region south of this limit should, he thought,
be made an Indian territory, and placed under the protection
of Spain and the United States. … Upon another important point
the views of the French government were directly opposed to
American interests. The right to catch fish on the banks of
Newfoundland had been shared by treaty between France and
England; and the New England fishermen, as subjects of the
king of Great Britain, had participated in this privilege. The
matter was of very great importance, not only to New England,
but to the United States in general. … The British government
was not inclined to grant the privilege, and on this point
Vergennes took sides with England, in order to establish a
claim upon her for concessions advantageous to France in some
other quarter. … Jay [who had lately arrived in Paris to take
part in the negotiations] soon began to suspect the designs of
the French minister. He found that he was sending M. de
Rayneval as a secret emissary to Lord Shelburne under an
assumed name; he ascertained that the right of the United
States to the Mississippi valley was to be denied; and he got
hold of a dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of
legation at Philadelphia, to Vergennes, opposing the American
claim to the Newfoundland fisheries. As soon as Jay learned
these facts, he sent his friend Dr. Benjamin Vaughan to Lord
Shelburne to put him on his guard, and while reminding him
that it was greatly for the interest of England to dissolve
the alliance between America and France, he declared himself
ready to begin the negotiations without waiting for the
recognition of independence, provided that Oswald's commission
should speak of the thirteen United States of America, instead
of calling them colonies and naming them separately.
{3285}
This decisive step was taken by Jay on his own responsibility,
and without the knowledge of Franklin, who had been averse to
anything like a separate negotiation with England. It served
to set the ball rolling at once. … Lord Shelburne at once
perceived the antagonism that had arisen between the allies,
and promptly took advantage of it. A new commission was made
out for Oswald, in which the British government first
described our country as the United States; and early in
October negotiations were begun and proceeded rapidly. On the
part of England the affair was conducted by Oswald, assisted
by Strachey and Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville. In
the course of the month John Adams arrived in Paris, and a few
weeks later Henry Laurens. … The arrival of Adams fully
decided the matter as to a separate negotiation with England.
He agreed with Jay that Vergennes should be kept as far as
possible in the dark until everything was cut and dried, and
Franklin was reluctantly obliged to yield. The treaty of
alliance between France and the United States had expressly
stipulated that neither power should ever make peace without
the consent of the other. … In justice to Vergennes, it should
be borne in mind that he had kept strict faith with us in
regard to every point that had been expressly stipulated. … At
the same time, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated,
Vergennes was clearly playing a sharp game against us; and it
is undeniable that, without departing technically from the
obligations of the alliance, Jay and Adams—two men as
honourable as ever lived—played a very sharp defensive game
against him. … The treaty with England was not concluded until
the consent of France had been obtained, and thus the express
stipulation was respected; but a thorough and detailed
agreement was reached as to what the purport of the treaty
should be, while our not too friendly ally was kept in the
dark."

_J. Fiske,
The Critical Period of American History,
chapter 1._

"If his [Vergennes'] policy had been carried out, it seems
clear that he would have established a claim for concessions
from England by supporting her against America on the
questions of Canada and the Canadian border and the
Newfoundland fishery. … The success of such a policy would
have been extremely displeasing to the Congress, and Jay and
Adams defeated it. … The act was done, and if it can be
justified by success, that justification, at least, is not
wanting."

_W. E. H. Lecky,
History of England in the 18th Century,
chapter 15 (volume 4)._

"The instructions of congress, given to the American
commissioners under the instigation of the French court, were
absolute and imperative, 'to undertake nothing without the
knowledge and concurrence of that court, and ultimately to
govern themselves by their advice and opinion.' These orders,
transmitted at the time of the enlargement of the commission,
had just been reinforced by assurances given to quiet the
uneasiness created in France by the British overtures through
Governor Carleton. Thus far, although the commissioners had
felt them to be derogatory to the honor of their country, as
well as to their own character as its representatives, there
had been no necessity for action either under or against them.
But now that matters were coming to the point of a serious
negotiation, and the secondary questions of interest to
America were to be determined, especially those to which
France had shown herself indifferent, not to say adverse, it
seemed as if no chance remained of escaping a decision. Mr.
Jay, jealous of the mission of De Rayneval, of which not a
hint had been dropped by the French court, suspicious of its
good faith from the disclosures of the remarkable dispatch of
Marbois, and fearful of any advice like that of which he had
received a foretaste through M. de Rayneval, at the same time
provoked that the confidence expected should be all on one
side, the Count communicating nothing of the separate French
negotiation, came to the conclusion that the interests of
America were safest when retained in American hands. He
therefore declared himself in favor of going on to treat with
Great Britain, without consulting the French court. Dr.
Franklin, on the other hand, expressing his confidence in that
court, secured by his sense of the steady reception of
benefits by his country, signified his willingness to abide by
the instructions he had received. Yet it is a singular fact,
but lately disclosed, that, notwithstanding this general
feeling, which was doubtless sincerely entertained, Dr.
Franklin had been the first person to violate those
instructions, at the very inception of the negotiations, by
proposing to Lord Shelburne the cession of Canada, and
covering his proposal with an earnest injunction to keep it
secret from France, because of his belief that she was adverse
to the measure. … It may fairly be inferred that, whatever
Franklin might have been disposed to believe of the French
court, his instincts were too strong to enable him to trust
them implicitly with the care of interests purely American.
And, in this, there can be no reasonable cause for doubt that
he was right. The more full the disclosures have been of the
French policy from their confidential papers, the more do they
show Count de Vergennes assailing England in America, with
quite as fixed a purpose as ever Chatham had to conquer
America in Germany. Mr. Adams had no doubt of it. He had never
seen any signs of a disposition to aid the United States from
affection or sympathy. On the contrary, he had perceived their
cause everywhere made subordinate to the general
considerations of continental politics. Perhaps his
impressions at some moments carried him even further, and led
him to suspect in the Count a positive desire to check and
depress America. In this he fell into the natural mistake of
exaggerating the importance of his own country. In the great
game of nations which was now playing at Paris under the
practised eye of France's chief (for Count de Maurepas was no
longer living), the United States probably held a relative
position, in his mind, not higher than that of a pawn, or
possibly a knight, on a chess-table. Whilst his attention was
absorbed in arranging the combinations of several powers, it
necessarily followed that he had not the time to devote that
attention to any one, which its special representative might
imagine to be its due. But even this hypothesis was to Mr.
Adams justification quite sufficient for declining to submit
the interests of his country implicitly to the Count's
control. If not so material in the Count's eyes, the greater
the necessity of keeping them in his own care. He therefore
seized the first opportunity to announce to his colleagues his
preference for the views of Mr. Jay.
{3286}
After some little reflection, Dr. Franklin signified his
acquiescence in this decision. His objections to it had
doubtless been increased by the peculiar relations he had
previously sustained to the French court, and by a very proper
desire to be released from the responsibility of what might
from him be regarded as a discourteous act. No such delicacy
was called for on the part of the other commissioners. Neither
does it appear that Count de Vergennes manifested a sign of
discontent with them at the time. He saw that little
confidence was placed in him, but he does not seem to have
made the slightest effort to change the decision or even to
get an explanation of it. The truth is, that the course thus
taken had its conveniences for him, provided only that the
good faith of the American negotiators, not to make a separate
peace, could be depended upon. Neither did he ever affect to
complain of it, excepting at one particular moment when he
thought he had cause to fear that the support he relied on
might fail."

_J. Q. and C. F. Adams,
The Life of John Adams,
volume 2, chapter 7._