Chapter LXV: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (18)

Not feeling strong enough to fight the combined Confederate
forces, Steele determined to fall back upon Little Rock. He
had scarcely commenced his retrograde movement when Smith and
Price began to press him vigorously. A retreating fight was
kept up for several days, until the Federal army reached
Jenkins's Ferry on the Saline River," where Smith and Price
made an energetic attack on the Federal army (April 30) and
were repulsed with heavy loss. "After the battle of Jenkins's
Ferry, instead of making preparations to attack the Federal
forces at Little Rock and Fort Smith, Price commenced
organizing his forces for an expedition into Missouri. …
Price's army for the invasion of Missouri numbered some 15,000
men and 20 pieces of artillery before crossing the Arkansas
River, and consisted of three divisions, commanded by Generals
Fagan, Marmaduke and Shelby. … About the 1st of September,
while strong demonstrations were being made against Fort Smith
and Little Rock, Price, with his army, crossed the Arkansas
River about half-way between those points, at Dardanelle, and
marched to the northern part of the State without opposition,
and, in fact, without his movements being definitely known to
General Rosecrans, who then commanded the Department of the
Missouri at St. Louis," to which he had been appointed in
January. At Pilot Knob, where they arrived September 26th, the
Confederates were opposed by General Thomas Ewing, Jr., with a
small force of 1051 men. The fortifications at Pilot Knob were
strong and Ewing held them against the vigorous attacks of
Price throughout the 27th, but evacuated that night, blowing
up the magazine and retreating safely. The Confederate
invaders then marched on St. Louis and attacked the outer
defences of the city, some miles to the south of it, but found
themselves opposed by the veterans of General A. J. Smith's
division, which had been opportunely stopped on its way down
the Mississippi River to join Sherman. Foiled at St. Louis,
Price then moved upon Jefferson City, the State capital, but
was closely pursued and driven off. Advancing westward, he was
met at Lexington, October 20th, by forces from Kansas, under
General Blunt, but forced the latter to retire from the town,
after severe fighting. Thence to Independence his progress was
steadily resisted by Generals Blunt and Curtis, with
volunteers and militia from Kansas. At Independence, on the
22d, Pleasonton's cavalry, of Rosecrans's army, came up and
formed a junction with the forces of Curtis, and the next day
they engaged Price in battle near Westport. "The opposing
armies fought over an area of five or six square miles, and at
some points the fighting was furious. … About the middle of
the afternoon Price's lines began to give way, and by sundown
the entire Confederate army was in full retreat southward
along the State line, closely pursued by the victorious
Federal forces." At the crossing of the Marais des Cygnes
River he lost ten pieces of his artillery and a large number
of prisoners, including Generals Marmaduke and Cabell. "At
Newtonia in south-west Missouri, on the 28th of October, Price
made another stand, and was attacked by the pursuing forces …
and finally driven from the field with heavy loss. This was
next to the severest battle of the campaign. Blunt, and some
of the Missouri troops, continued the pursuit to the Arkansas
River, but Price did not again attempt to make a stand. His
line of march from Westport to Newtonia was strewn with the
debris of a routed army. He crossed the Arkansas River above
Fort Smith with a few pieces of artillery, with his army
demoralized and reduced by captures and dispersion to perhaps
less than 5,000 men. Most of the noted guerrilla bands
followed him from the State. The 'Price raid,' as it was
called in the West, was the last military operation of much
consequence that took place in Missouri and Arkansas. It is
certain that Price lost more than he gained in war material
and that the raid did not tend to strengthen the Confederate
cause in the West."

_W. Britton,
Résumé of Military Operations in
Missouri and Arkansas, 1864-1865
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

"In General Price's report occurs the following summary of the
campaign: 'I marched 1,434 miles, fought 43 battles and
skirmishes, captured and paroled over 3,000 Federal officers
and men, captured 18 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of
small-arms, 16 stand of colors … and destroyed property to the
cost of $10,000,000. I lost ten pieces of artillery. 2 stand
of colors, 1,000 small arms, while I do not think I lost 1,000
prisoners. … I brought with me at least 5,000 recruits.'"

_Editor's note to above._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (April: Tennessee).
The Massacre at Fort Pillow.

After General Sherman's return from his raid to Meridian, and
General William Sooy Smith's return to Memphis, the
Confederate cavalry leader Forrest advanced into Tennessee,
devastating the country. "He captured Jackson in that State,
on the 23d of March, and moving northward, appeared before
Paducah, held by Colonel Hicks with 650 men.
{3523}
His demand for a surrender was accompanied with a threat: 'If
you surrender, you shall be treated as prisoners of war; but
if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter:' he
made three assaults, and then retired, having lost 1,500 men.
On the 12th of April he was at Fort Pillow, which was
garrisoned by 19 officers and 538 men, of whom 262 were
negroes. This force was not a part of the army, but a
nondescript body in process of formation, placed there to
cover a trading-post for the convenience of families supposed
to be friendly, or at least not hostile; it had been left in
violation of Sherman's peremptory orders. The attack was made
before sunrise; and after some severe fighting, Major Booth,
the commanding officer of the garrison, was killed. Major
Brodford, who succeeded him, drew the troops from the outer
line of intrenchments into the fort, and continued the contest
until afternoon. A gun-boat which had been co-operating in the
defense, withdrew to cool or clean her guns, and, the fire
slackening, Forrest sent a summons to surrender, and shortly
after a second, demanding that the surrender should be made in
twenty minutes. These terms were declined by Bradford. But
while the negotiations were in progress, the assailants were
stealthily advancing, and gaining such positions that they
could rush upon the fort. Accordingly, as soon as Bradford's
answer was received, they sprang forward. The fort was
instantly carried. Its garrison threw down their arms and
fled, seeking refuge wherever they could. And now was
perpetrated one of the most frightful acts of all recorded
history. The carnage did not cease with the struggle of the
storming, but was continued as a carnival of murder until
night, and renewed again the next morning. Without any
discrimination of color, age, or sex, the fugitives were
dragged from their hiding-places, and cruelly murdered.
Wounded men, who had made a gallant defense, were atrociously
compelled to stand up and be shot; some were burnt in their
tents, some were stabbed. For the black soldiers there was no
mercy. 'They were massacred because they were niggers,' and
the whites 'because they were fighting with niggers.' General
Stephen E. Lee, the superior of Forrest, partly denying and
partly excusing this atrocity, says, 'It is generally conceded
by all military precedent that, when the issue has been fairly
presented and the ability displayed, fearful results are
expected to follow a refusal to surrender. The case under
consideration is almost an extreme one. You had a servile race
armed against their masters, and in a country which had been
desolated by almost unprecedented outrages.' The Committee of
Congress on the Conduct of the War appointed a sub-committee
to go to such places as they might deem necessary, and take
testimony in relation to the Fort Pillow massacre. Their
report presents facts in connection with this massacre of the
deepest atrocity. Men were not only shot in cold blood and
drowned, but were even crucified, buried alive, nailed to the
floors of houses, which were then set on fire. 'No cruelty,'
says this committee, 'which the most fiendish malignity could
devise, was omitted by these murderers.' 'From 300 to 400 men
are known to have been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom at least
300 were murdered in cold blood after the post was in
possession of the rebels, and our men had thrown down their
arms and ceased to offer resistance.' … It should be mentioned
in behalf of General Forrest that one of the witnesses, who
had been rewounded, testified that 'Forrest gave orders to
stop the firing.'"

_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 74 (volume 3)._

"I arrived off the fort at 6 a. m. on the morning of the 13th
inst. [April]. … About 8 a. m. the enemy sent in a flag of
truce with a proposal from General Forrest that he would put
me in possession of the fort and the country around until 5 p.
m. for the purpose of burying our dead and removing our
wounded, whom he had no means of attending to. I agreed to the
terms proposed. … We found about 70 wounded men in the fort
and around it, and buried, I should think, 150 bodies. … All
the wounded who had strength enough to speak agreed that after
the fort was taken an indiscriminate slaughter of our troops
was carried on by the enemy with a furious and vindictive
savageness which was never equalled by the most merciless of
the Indian tribes. Around on every side horrible testimony to
the truth of this statement could be seen. … Strewn from the
fort to the river bank, in the ravines and hollows, behind
logs and under the brush where they had crept for protection
from the assassins who pursued them, we found bodies
bayoneted, beaten, and shot to death, showing how cold blooded
and persistent was the slaughter of our unfortunate troops."

_Report of Acting-Master W. Ferguson,
United States Steamer Silver Cloud
(Official Records, Series 1, volume 32, part 1, page 571)._

ALSO IN:
_Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War
(30th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. Report Number 65)._

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4., book 4, chapter 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (April-May: North Carolina).
Exploits of the ram Albemarle.
Surrender of Plymouth.

In the squadron [of the Confederates] we were gladdened by the
success of our iron-clad ram Albemarle, which vessel, under
Captain James B. Cooke, had (after overcoming innumerable
difficulties) succeeded in descending the Roanoke river, April
19th [1864], and dispersing the Federal squadron off Plymouth,
North Carolina. She sunk the steamer Southfield, and drove the
other vessels off; and her presence led to the recapture of
Plymouth by the Confederates. On the 5th of May the Albemarle
started from Plymouth with the small steamer Bombshell in
company, on what was called a secret expedition. I think it
probable the intention was to destroy the wooden men-of-war in
the sounds, and then tow troops in barges to Hatteras and
retake it. If this could have been done the Albemarle would
have had it all her own way, and Roanoke island, Newbern and
other places would again have fallen into the hands of the
Confederates. Shortly after leaving Plymouth the Albemarle
fell in with the Federal squadron, consisting of the steamers
Mattabesett, Sassacus, Wyalusing, Whitehead, Miami, Ceres,
Commodore Hull and Seymour—all under the command of Captain
Melancton Smith, and after a desperate combat was forced to
return to Plymouth."

_W. H. Parker,
Recollections of a Naval Officer,
page 339._

ALSO IN:
J. R. Soley,
The Blockade and the Cruisers
(The Navy in the Civil War, volume 1), chapter 4.

_D. Ammen,
The Atlantic Coast
(same Series, volume 2), chapter 9._

_B. Boynton,
History of the Navy,
volume 2, chapter 36._

{3524}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
Grant's movement on Richmond.
The Battle of the Wilderness.

"The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on
the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction
and orders of Major-General Mead, pursuant to instructions.
Before night the whole army was across the Rapidan—the Fifth
and Sixth Corps crossing at Germanna Ford, and the Second
Corps at United States' (Ely's) Ford, the cavalry, under
Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,—with the greater
part of its trains, numbering about 4,000 wagons, meeting with
but slight opposition. The average distance traveled by the
troops that day was about 12 miles. This I regarded as a great
success, and it removed from my mind the most serious
apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in
the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably
commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried
through a hostile country and protected. Early on the 5th, the
advance corps (the Fifth, Major General G. K. Warren
commanding), met and engaged the enemy outside his
intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all
day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as
the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the
density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done
with commendable promptness.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(April-May: Virginia).

General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was at the time the
Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at
the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria
railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions
not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the
Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such
notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the
afternoon of the 4th. By 6 o'clock of the morning of the 6th
he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness
Tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over
30 miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers.
Considering that a large proportion (probably two-thirds), of
his command was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to
marches and carrying the accouterments of a soldier, this was
a remarkable march. The battle of the Wilderness was renewed
by us at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued
with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding
substantially the same position that they had on the evening
of the 5th. After dark the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn
our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and
creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General
Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part
of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the
morning of the 7th reconnaissances showed that the enemy had
fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front,
covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident
to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of
his inability to further maintain the contest in the open
field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he
would await an attack behind his works. I therefore determined
to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond,
and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right
flank. On the night of the 7th the march was commenced toward
Spottsylvania Court House, the Fifth Corps moving on the most
direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our
movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach
there first."

_Gen. U. S. Grant,
Official Report
(Official Records, Series 1, volume 36, part 1, page 18)._

The casualties of the Army of the Potomac and Burnside's Ninth
Corps (then not incorporated with it) in the battle of the
Wilderness were "2,265 killed, 10,220 wounded, and 2,902
missing. Total, 15,387. Killed and wounded, 12,485. … The
woods took fire in many places, and it is estimated that 200
of our wounded perished in the flames and smoke. According to
the tabular statement, Part First, 'Medical and Surgical
History of the War,' the casualties in the Army of Northern
Virginia were 2,000 killed, 6,000 wounded, and 3,400 missing.
The authority for this statement is not given, and I do not
find anywhere records of the loss of that army in the
Wilderness. … Both sides lost many valuable officers in this
battle, [including, on the Union side, General Wadsworth]. …
So far as I know, no great battle ever took place before on
such ground. But little of the combatants could be seen, and
its progress was known to the senses chiefly by the rising and
falling sounds of a vast musketry that continually swept along
the lines of battle many miles in length, sounds which at
times approached to the sublime."

_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865
(Campaigns of the Civil war, volume 12), chapter 2._

"All the peculiar advantages of the Army of the Potomac were
sacrificed in the jungle-fighting into which they were thus
called to engage. Of what use here were the tactical skill and
the perfection of form, acquired through long and patient
exercise; of what use here the example and the personal
influence of a Hays or a Hancock, a Brooke or a Barlow? How
can a battle be fitly ordered in such a tangle of wood and
brush, where troops can neither be sent straight to their
destination nor seen and watched over, when, after repeatedly
losing direction and becoming broken into fragments in their
advance through thickets and jungles, they at last make their
way up to the line of battle, perhaps at the point they were
designed to reinforce, perhaps far from it? … It will never
cease to be an object of amazement to me that, with such a
tract in prospect, the character of it being known, in
general, to army headquarters through the Chancellorsville
campaign … a supreme effort was not made … to carry the Army
of the Potomac either through these jungles toward Mine Run,
or past it, toward Spottsylvania."

_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 13._

ALSO IN:
_E. M. Law, A. S. Webb, and others,
The Wilderness Campaign
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 50-51 (volume 2)._

_W. Swinton,
The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War,
chapter 9._

_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 17._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
Sheridan's raid to Richmond.

"When the Army of the Potomac emerged from the Wilderness,
Sheridan was sent to cut Lee's communications. This was the
first of the remarkable raids of that remarkable leader, in
Virginia, and, though short, was a destructive one. He took
with him a greater portion of the cavalry led by Merritt,
Gregg and Wilson, and, cutting loose from the army, he swept
over the Po and the Ta, crossed the North Anna on the 9th, and
struck the Virginia Central railway at Beaver Dam Station,
which he captured.
{3525}
He destroyed ten miles of the railway; also its rolling stock,
with a million and a half of rations, and released 400 Union
prisoners, on their way to Richmond from the Wilderness. There
he was attacked in flank and rear by General J. E. B. Stuart
and his cavalry, who had pursued him from the Rapid Anna
[Rapidan], but was not much impeded thereby. He pushed on,
crossed the South Anna at Ground-squirrel Bridge, and at
daylight on the morning of the 11th, captured Ashland Station,
on the Fredericksburg road, where he destroyed the railway
property, a large quantity of stores, and the road itself for
six miles. Being charged with the duty of not only destroying
these roads, but of menacing Richmond and communicating with
the army of the James, … Sheridan pressed on in the direction
of the Confederate capital, when he was confronted by Stuart
at Yellow Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond, where that
able leader, having made a swift circuitous march, had
concentrated all of his available cavalry. Sheridan attacked
him at once, and, after a sharp engagement, drove the
Confederates toward Ashland, on the north fork of the
Chickahominy, with a loss of their gallant leader, who, with
General Gordon, was mortally wounded. Inspirited by this
success, Sheridan pushed along the now open turnpike toward
Richmond, and made a spirited dash upon the outer works.
Custer's brigade carried them at that point and made 100
prisoners. As in the case of Kilpatrick's raid, so now, the
second line of works were too strong to be carried by cavalry.
The troops in and around the city had rallied for their
defense, and in an attack the Nationals were repulsed. Then
Sheridan led his command across the Chickahominy, at Meadow
Bridge, where he beat off a considerable force of infantry
sent out from Richmond, and who attacked him in the rear,
while another force assailed his front. He also drove the foe
on his front, when he destroyed the railway bridge there, and
then pushed on southward to Haxall's Landing, on the James
River, where he rested three days and procured supplies. Then,
by way of White House and Hanover Court House, he leisurely
returned to the Army of the Potomac, which he rejoined on the
25th of May."

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 3, chapter 11._

ALSO IN:
_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 18-19._

_H. B. McClellan,
Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart,
chapter 20._

_J. B. Jones,
A Rebel War Clerk's Diary,
volume 2, pages 202-208._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
Grant's movement upon Richmond: Spottsylvania Court House.
The Bloody Angle.

"Throughout the entire day succeeding this first great
conflict [in The Wilderness], General Lee remained quiet,
watching for some movement of his adversary. His success in
the preliminary struggle had been gratifying, considering the
great disproportion of numbers, but he indulged no expectation
of a retrograde movement across the Rapidan, on the part of
General Grant. He expected him rather to advance, and
anxiously awaited some development of this intention. There
were no indications of such a design up to the night of the
7th, but at that time, to use the words of a confidential
member of Lee's staff, 'he all at once seemed to conceive the
idea that his enemy was preparing to forsake his position, and
move toward Hanover Junction via the Spottsylvania
Court-House, and, believing this, he at once detailed
Anderson's division with orders to proceed rapidly toward the
court-house. General Anderson commenced his march about nine
o'clock at night, when the Federal column was already upon its
way. A race now began for the coveted position, and General
Stuart, with his dismounted sharp-shooters behind improvised
breastworks, harassed and impeded the Federal advance, at
every step, throughout the night. This greatly delayed their
march, and their head of column did not reach the vicinity of
Spottsylvania Court-House until past sunrise. General Warren,
leading the Federal advance, then hurried forward, followed by
General Hancock, when suddenly he found himself in front of
breastworks, and was received with a fire of musketry. Lee had
succeeded in interposing himself between General Grant and
Richmond. On the same evening the bulk of the two armies were
facing each other on the line of the Po. … General Lee had
taken up his position on the south bank of one of the four
tributaries of the Mattapony. These four streams are known as
the Mat, Ta, Po, and Nye Rivers, and bear the same relation to
the main stream that the fingers of the open hand do to the
wrist. General Lee was behind the Po, which is next to the
Nye, the northern-most of these water-courses. Both were
difficult to cross, and their banks heavily wooded. It was now
to be seen whether, either by a front attack or a turning
movement, General Grant could oust his adversary, and whether
General Lee would stand on the defensive or attack. All day,
during the 9th, the two armies were constructing breastworks
along their entire fronts, and these works, from the Rapidan
to the banks of the Chickahominy, remain yet [1871] in
existence. On the evening of this day a Federal force was
thrown across the Po, on the Confederate left, but soon
withdrawn; and on the 10th a similar movement took place near
the same point, which resulted in a brief but bloody conflict,
during which the woods took fire, and many of the assaulting
troops perished miserably in the flames. The force was then
recalled, and, during that night and the succeeding day,
nothing of importance occurred, although heavy skirmishing and
an artillery-fire took place along the lines. On the morning
of the 12th, at the first dawn of day, General Grant made a
more important and dangerous assault than any yet undertaken
in the campaign. This was directed at a salient on General
Lee's right centre, occupied by Johnson's division of Ewell's
corps, and was one of the bloodiest and most terrible
incidents of the war. For this assault [made by three
divisions of Hancock's corps] General Grant is said to have
selected his best troops. These advanced in a heavy charging
column, through the half-darkness of dawn, passed silently
over the Confederate skirmishers, scarcely firing a shot, and,
just as the first streak of daylight touched the eastern
woods, burst upon the salient, which they stormed at the point
of the bayonet. The attack was a complete surprise, and
carried everything before it. The Southern troops, asleep in
the trenches, woke to have the bayonet thrust into them, to be
felled with clubbed muskets, and to find the works apparently
in secure possession of the enemy before they could fire a
shot.
{3526}
Such was the excellent success of the Federal movement, and
the Southern line seemed to be hopelessly disrupted. Nearly
the whole of Johnson's division were taken prisoners—the
number amounting to more than 3,000—and 18 pieces of artillery
fell into the hands of the assaulting column. The position of
affairs was now exceedingly critical; and, unless General Lee
could reform his line at the point, it seemed that nothing was
left him but an abandonment of his whole position. The Federal
army had broken his line; was pouring into the opening; and,
to prevent him from concentrating at the point to regain
possession of the works, heavy attacks were begun by the enemy
on his right and left wings. It is probable that at no time
during the war was the Southern army in greater danger of a
bloody and decisive disaster. At this critical moment General
Lee acted with the nerve and coolness of a soldier whom no
adverse event can shake. … Line of battle was promptly formed
a short distance in rear of the salient then in the enemy's
possession, and a fierce charge was made by the Southerners,
under the eye of Lee, to regain it. … The word ferocious best
describes the struggle which followed. It continued throughout
the entire day, Lee making not less than five distinct
assaults in heavy force to recover the works. The fight
involved the troops on both flanks, and was desperate and
unyielding. The opposing flags were at times within only a few
yards of each other, and so incessant and concentrated was the
fire of musketry that a tree of about 18 inches in diameter
was cut down by bullets, and is still preserved, it is said,
in the city of Washington, as a memorial of this bloody
struggle. The fighting only ceased several hours after dark.
Lee had not regained his advanced line of works, but he was
firmly rooted in an interior and straighter line, from which
the Federal troops had found it impossible to dislodge him."

_J. E. Cooke,
Life of General Robert E. Lee,
part 8, chapter 4._

"For the distance of nearly a mile, amid a cold, drenching
rain, the combatants [on the 12th, at the salient] were
literally struggling across the breastworks. They fired
directly into each other's faces, bayonet thrusts were given
over the intrenchments; men even grappled their antagonists
across the piles of logs and pulled them over, to be stabbed
or carried to the rear as prisoners. … Never before, since the
discovery of gunpowder, had such a mass of lead been hurled
into a space so narrow as that which now embraced the scene of
combat. Large standing trees were literally cut off and
brought to the ground by infantry fire alone; their great
limbs whipped into basket stuff that could be woven by the
hand of a girl. … If any comparisons can be made between the
sections involved in that desperate contest, the fiercest and
deadliest fighting took place at the west angle, ever
afterwards known as 'The Bloody Angle.' … All day the bloody
work went on. … The trenches had more than once to be cleared
of the dead, to give the living a place to stand. All day
long, and even into the night, the battle lasted, for it was
not till twelve o'clock, nearly twenty hours after the command
'Forward' had been given to the column at the Brown House,
that the firing died down, and the Confederates, relinquishing
their purpose to retake the captured works, began in the
darkness to construct a new line to cut off the salient."

_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 15._

General Humphreys estimates Grant's losses in killed and
wounded on the 12th at 6,020; missing 800. Lee's losses that
day in killed, wounded and prisoners he concludes to have been
between 9,000 and 10,000. His estimate of losses on the 10th
is 4,100 (killed and wounded) on the Union side, and 2,000 on
the Confederate side. Major General John Sedgwick, commanding
the Sixth Army Corps, was killed in the skirmishing of the
9th.

_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865,
chapter 3._

ALSO IN:
_C. N. Galloway,
Hand to Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 36._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
Grant's movement upon Richmond:
from Spottsylvania to the Chickahominy.

"The lines of Spottsylvania remained still intact, and General
Grant, who might easily have turned the position and manœuvred
his antagonist out of it, seemed bent on carrying it by direct
attack. Accordingly, during the succeeding week [after the
battle of the 12th], various movements of corps were made from
flank to flank, in the endeavor to find a spot where the lines
could be broken. These attempts were skilfully met at every
point—the Confederates extending their line to correspond
with the shiftings of the army; so that wherever attack was
essayed, the enemy bristled out in breastworks, and every
partial assault made was repulsed. Day by day Grant continued
to throw out towards the left, in the hope of overlapping and
breaking in the Confederate right flank: so that from
occupying, as the army did on its arrival, a line extending
four or five miles to the northwest of Spottsylvania
Courthouse, it had at the end of ten days assumed a position
almost due east of that place, the left resting at a distance
of four miles at Massaponax Church. After twelve days of
effort, the carrying of the position was seen to be hopeless;
and General Grant, abandoning the attempt, resolved by a
turning operation to disengage Lee from a position seen to be
unassailable. Preparations for this movement were begun on the
afternoon of the 19th; but the enemy, observing these,
retarded its execution by a bold demonstration against the
Union right. … This attack somewhat disconcerted the
contemplated movement, and delayed it till the following
night, May 20th, when the army, moving by the left, once more
took up its march towards Richmond. Before the lines of
Spottsylvania the Army of the Potomac had for twelve days and
nights engaged in a fierce wrestle, in which it had done all
that valor may do to carry a position by nature and art
impregnable. … Language is inadequate to convey an impression
of the labors, fatigues, and sufferings of the troops. … Above
40,000 men had already fallen in the bloody encounters of the
Wilderness and Spottsylvania [General Humphreys—in 'Virginia
Campaign of 1864 and 1865,' page 117—makes the total of
killed and wounded from May 5 to 21, to be 28,207, and the
entire losses of the army, including the missing and the sick
sent back to Washington, 37,335]. … The exhausted army began
to lose its spirit.
{3527}
It was with joy, therefore, that it at length turned its back
upon the lines of Spottsylvania. … The two armies once fairly
on the march … neither … seems to have sought to deal the
other a blow … and both headed, as for a common goal, towards
the North Anna. … The advances of the 21st and 22d brought the
different corps [of the Army of the Potomac], which had moved
on parallel roads at supporting distance, within a few miles
of the North Anna River. Resuming the march on the morning of
Monday, May 23d, the army in a few hours reached the northern
bank of that stream. But it was only to descry its old enemy
planted on the opposite side." Warren's corps crossed the
river at Jericho Ford without resistance, but was furiously
assailed late in the afternoon and held its ground, taking
nearly 1,000 prisoners. The left column, under Hancock, forced
a passage in the face of the enemy, carrying a bridge by
storm. But nothing was gained by these successes. "While Lee,
after the passage of Hancock on the left, threw his right wing
back from the North Anna, and on the passage of Warren on the
right threw back his left wing, he continued to cling with his
centre to the river; so that … his army took up a very
remarkable line in the form of an obtuse-angled triangle. …
The game of war seldom presents a more effectual checkmate
than was here given by Lee; for after Grant had made the
brilliantly successful passage of the North Anna, the
Confederate commander, thrusting his centre between the two
wings of the Army of the Potomac, put his antagonist at
enormous disadvantage, and compelled him, for the
reenforcement of one or the other wing, to make a double
passage of the river. The more the position of Lee was
examined, the more unpromising attack was seen to be; and
after passing the two following days in reconnoissances, and
destroying some miles of the Virginia Central Railroad,
General Grant determined to withdraw across the North Anna and
take up a new line of advance. The withdrawal from the North
Anna was begun at dark of the 26th of May, when the Second,
Fifth and Sixth Corps retired by different bridges to the
north bank. … The Second Corps held position till the morning
of the 27th, when it covered the rear. From the North Anna the
line of march of the army made a wide circuit eastward and
then southward to pass the Pamunkey. This river is formed by
the confluence of the North and South Anna; and the Pamunkey
in turn uniting with the Mattapony forms the York River,
emptying into Chesapeake Bay. Thus the successful passage of
the Pamunkey would not only dislodge Lee from the lines of the
North and South Anna, but would bring the army in
communication with a new and excellent water-base." The
crossing of the Pamunkey, at and near Hanovertown, was
accomplished without difficulty on the 27th and 28th, "and the
routes to White House, at the head of York River, being opened
up, the army was put in communication with the ample supplies
floated by the waters of Chesapeake Bay. Grant's new turning
movement was met by a corresponding retrograde movement on the
part of Lee, and as he fell back on a direct line less than
half the distance of the great detour made by the Army of the
Potomac, it was not remarkable that, on crossing the Pamunkey,
the Confederate force was again encountered, ready to accept
the gage of battle. Lee assumed a position in advance of the
Chickahominy. … The region in which the army was now operating
revived many reminiscences in the minds of those who had made
the Peninsular Campaign under McClellan. … Gaines' Mill and
Mechanicsville were within an hour's ride; Fair Oaks could be
reached in a two hours' trot; Richmond was ten miles off. …
Reconnoissances showed Lee to be in a very strong position
covering the approaches to the Chickahominy, the forcing of
which it was now clear must cost a great battle."

_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
part 11, chapters 3-5._

ALSO IN:
_A. Badeau,
Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,
chapters 18-19 (volume 2)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Virginia).
The Co-operative movement of the Army of the James.

In the plan and arrangement of General Grant's campaign,
General Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe, was instructed
"to collect all the forces of his command that could be spared
from garrison duty estimated at not less than 20,000, and
operate on the south side of James river, Richmond being his
objective. To his force 10,000 men from South Carolina, under
Gillmore, were to be added. He was ordered to take City Point
as soon as notification of movement was given, and fortify it.
By this common advance from the Rapidan and Fortress Monroe
the two armies would be brought into co-operation. … As
arranged, Butler moved from Fortress Monroe on May 4th,
Gillmore having joined him with the 10th Corps. The next day
he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda
Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 7th he
made a reconnoissance against the Richmond and Petersburg
Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On
the night of the 9th he received dispatches from Washington
informing him that Lee was retreating to Richmond and Grant in
pursuit. He had, therefore, to act with caution, fearing that
he might have Lee's whole army on his hands. On the evening of
the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the
enemy's first line of defenses at Drury's Bluff, or Fort
Darling. The time thus consumed from the 6th left no
possibility of surprising and capturing Richmond and
Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his
forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the
defense of these places. On the 16th the Confederates attacked
Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff, forced him
back into his entrenchments between the forks of James and
Appomattox Rivers [in the district called Bermuda Hundred],
and, intrenching strongly in his front, not only covered the
railroads and city, but completely neutralized his forces. …
Butler's army being confined at Bermuda Hundred, most of the
re-enforcements from the South were now brought against the
Potomac Army. In addition to this, probably not less than
15,000 men, under Breckenridge, arrived from the Western part
of Virginia. The position of Bermuda Hundred being easy to
defend, Grant, leaving only enough to secure what had heen
gained, took from it all available forces under W. F. Smith,
and joined them to the Army of the Potomac."

_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
volume 3, pages 368 and 382-385._

ALSO IN:
_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865,
chapter 5._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 36, part 2._

{3528}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May: Georgia).
Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: Johnston's Retreat.

Sherman now held command of the three armies of the Tennessee,
the Cumberland, and the Ohio, having McPherson, Thomas and
Schofield for their subordinate commanders, respectively. The
main army of the rebellion in the West, Joe Johnston
commanding, was at Dalton, northern Georgia, confronting
Thomas at Chattanooga. "Grant and Sherman had agreed to act in
concert. While the former should thrust Lee back upon
Richmond, his late lieutenant was to push Johnston towards
Atlanta. And Banks was to transfer his forces from New Orleans
to Mobile and thence move towards and join hands with the
Western armies. Sherman devoted his earliest energies to the
question of transportation and railroads. Baggage was reduced
to the lowest limits, the higher officers setting the example.
Actual supplies and fighting-material were alone to be
carried. Luxuries were to be things of the past; comforts to
be forgotten. War's stern reality was to be each one's lot.
Probably no officer in such high command ever lived so
entirely from hand to mouth as did Sherman and his military
family during the succeeding campaigns. The entire equipment
of his army head-quarters would have shamed the shabbiest
regimental outfit of 1861. Spring was to open with a general
advance. It was agreed to put and keep the Confederates on the
defensive by a policy of constant hammering. Bragg had been
removed to satisfy public opinion in the South, but was
nominally called to Richmond to act as Mr. Davis'
chief-of-staff. Johnston, as commander of the Department, had
personally undertaken to hold head against Sherman. But the
fact that he possessed neither the President's good will nor
that of his new adviser, militated much against a happy
conduct of the campaign. Sherman's forces occupied a front
sixteen miles in advance of Ringgold, just south of
Chattanooga. McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee was on
his right with 25,000 men and 100 guns. Thomas and the Army of
the Cumberland held the centre with 60,000 men and 130 guns.
Schofield and the Army of the Ohio formed the left wing. His
command was 15,000 men and 30 guns. This grand total of
100,000 men and 260 guns formed an army of as good stuff as
ever bore arms, and the confidence of the leader in his men
and of the men in their leader was unbounded. Johnston himself
foresaw the necessity of a strictly defensive campaign, to
which his far from sanguine character, as well as his judgment
as to what the existing conditions demanded, made him
peculiarly suited. Counted after the same fashion as Sherman's
army, Johnston had some 75,000 men. … He intrenched every step
he took; he fought only when attacked; he invited battle only
when the conditions were largely in his favor. Subsequent
events showed how wise beyond his critics he could be. Sherman
took the measure of the intrenchments at Dalton with care,
and, though he outnumbered his antagonist, preferred not to
hazard an engagement at such odds when he might force one on
better ground. This conduct shows in strong contrast with
Grant's, when the latter first met his opponent at this same
moment in Virginia. Sherman despatched McPherson towards
Resaca, on the railroad in Johnston's rear, with instructions
to capture the town if possible. Combined with this flanking
movement, a general advance was made upon the Confederate
lines, and after tactical manœuvring of several days in front
of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston concluded to retire from his
stronghold. McPherson had strangely failed to seize Resaca,
though an excellent chance had offered, and at this place the
Confederate army took up its new stand. … Sherman faced his
antagonist on the line of Camp Creek in front of Resaca, with
his right flank resting on the Oostanaula. From this position
he operated by unintermitted tapping upon Johnston's defences
at constantly varying points, without, however, bringing on a
general engagement [though the losses were 2,747 Union and
2,800 Confederate]. … Sherman's uniform tactics during this
campaign, varied indefinitely in details, consisted, as will
be seen, in forcing the centre of the army upon Johnston's
lines, while with the right and left he operated upon either
flank as chance or ground best offered. Johnston did not
propose to hazard an engagement unless all conditions were in
his favor. He attempted a stand at Adairsville, twenty miles
south of Resaca, but shortly withdrew to Kingston and
Cassville. Each captain manœuvred for a chance to fight the
other at a disadvantage. … From Cassville, Johnston retired
across the Etowah. So far this campaign had been one of
manœuvres. Neither combatant had suffered material loss. Like
two wrestlers, as yet ignorant of each other's strength or
quickness, they were sparring for a hold. … The Union army was
growing skillful. Local difficulties multiplied many fold by
bad maps and hostile population were overcome in considerable
measure by an able corps of topographical engineers. … Bridges
were uniformly burned and railroads wrecked by the retreating
Confederates. To save delays in rebuilding, so far as
possible, trestles were fitted in the rear to a scale with
interchangeable timbers, so that bridges could be constructed
with a speed never before dreamed of. No sooner had the
Confederates put torch to a bridge, than a new one arose as by
magic, and the whistle of the locomotive always followed hard
upon the heels of the army."

_T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War,
chapters 42-43._

ALSO IN:
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapter 15 (volume 2)._

_T. B. Van Horn,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapters 25-28 (volume 2)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 38, part 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-June: Virginia).
Grant's Movement upon Richmond: The Battle of Cold Harbor.

"The passage of [the Pamunkey] had been completed on May 28,
and then, after three days of marching, interspersed with the
usual amount of fighting, the army found itself again
confronted by Lee's main line on the Totopotomoy. The
operations which followed were known as the battle of Cold
Harbor. On the afternoon of May 31st, Sheridan, who was on the
left flank of the army, carried, with his cavalry, a position
near the old well and cross roads known as Old Cold Harbor,
and, with his men dismounted behind rough breast-works, held
it against Fitzhugh Lee until night. To this point, during the
night, marched the van·guard of the Army of the Potomac. …
About 9 the next day (June 1st) the head of the column reached
Sheridan's position, and the cavalry was withdrawn.
{3529}
The enemy, who had been seriously threatening Sheridan,
withdrew from our immediate front within their lines and
awaited us, occupying a strong outer line of intrenchments in
front of our center, somewhat in advance of their main
position, which included that on which the battle of Gaines'
Mill had been fought two years before. It covered the
approaches to the Chickahominy, which was the last formidable
obstacle we had to meet before standing in front of the
permanent works of Richmond. A large detachment, composed of
the Eighteenth Corps and other troops from the Army of the
James, under General W. F. Smith, had disembarked at White
House on the Pamunkey, and was expected to connect that
morning with the Sixth Corps at Cold Harbor. A mistake in
orders caused an unnecessary march and long delay. In the
afternoon, however, Smith was in position on the right of the
Sixth Corps. Late in the afternoon both corps assaulted. The
attack was made vigorously and with no reserves. The outer
line in front of the right of the Sixth and the left of the
Eighteenth was carried brilliantly, and the enemy was forced
back, leaving several hundred prisoners in our hands. … This
left the well and the old tavern at Cold Harbor in our rear,
and brought us in front of the most formidable position yet
held by the enemy. In front of him was a wooded country,
interspersed with clearings here and there, sparsely
populated, and full of swamps. Before daylight the Army of the
Potomac stood together once more almost within sight of the
spires of Richmond, and on the very ground where, under
McClellan, they had defended the passage of the river they
were now endeavoring to force. On the 2d of June our
confronting line, on which the burden of the day must
necessarily fall, consisted of Hancock on the left, Wright in
the center, and Smith on the right. Warren and Burnside were
still farther to the right, their lines refused, or drawn
back, in the neighborhood of Bethesda Church, but not
confronting the enemy. … No reconnoissance had been made other
than the bloody one of the evening before. Everyone felt that
this was to be the final struggle. No further flanking marches
were possible. Richmond was dead in front. No further wheeling
of corps from right to left by the rear; no further dusty
marches possible on that line, even 'if it took all summer.'
The general attack was fixed for the afternoon of the 2d, and
all preparations had been made, when the order was
countermanded and the attack postponed until half-past four
the following morning. Promptly at the hour named on the 3d of
June the men moved from the slight cover of the rifle-pits,
thrown up during the night, with steady, determined advance,
and there rang out suddenly on the summer air such a crash of
artillery and musketry as is seldom heard in war. No great
portion of the advance could be seen from any particular
point, but those of the three corps that passed through the
clearings were feeling the fire terribly. Not much return was
made at first from our infantry, although the fire of our
batteries was incessant. The time of actual advance was not
over eight minutes. In that little period more men fell
bleeding as they advanced than in any other like period of
time throughout the war. A strange and terrible feature of
this battle was that as the three gallant corps moved on
[necessarily diverging, the enemy's line forming an arc of a
circle, with its concave side toward them] each was enfiladed
while receiving the full force of the enemy's direct fire in
front. … At some points the slashings and obstructions in the
enemy's front were reached. Barlow, of Hancock's corps, drove
the enemy from an advanced position, but was himself driven
out by the fire of their second line. R. O. Tyler's brigade
(the Corcoran Legion) of the same corps swept over an advance
work, capturing several hundred prisoners. One officer alone;
the colonel of the 164th New York [James P. McMahon], seizing
the colors of his regiment from the dying color-bearer as he
fell, succeeded in reaching the parapet of the enemy's main
works, where he planted his colors and fell dead near the
ditch, bleeding from many wounds. Seven other colonels of
Hancock's command died within those few minutes. No troops
could stand against such a fire, and the order to lie down was
given all along the line. At points where no shelter was
afforded, the men were withdrawn to such cover as could be
found, and the battle of Cold Harbor, as to its result at
least, was over. … Shortly after midday came the order to
suspend for the present all further operations, and directing
corps commanders to intrench, 'including their advanced
positions,' and directing also that reconnoissances be made,
'with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular
approaches'. … When night came on the groans and moaning of
the wounded, all our own, who were lying between the lines,
were heart-rending. Some were brought in by volunteers from
our intrenchments, but remained for three days uncared for
beneath the hot summer suns and the unrefreshing dews of the
sultry summer nights. … An impression prevails in the popular
mind, and with some reason perhaps, that a commander who sends
a flag of truce asking permission to bury his dead and bring
in his wounded, has lost the field of battle. Hence the
reluctance upon our part to ask a flag of truce. In effect it
was done at last on the evening of the third day after the
battle, when, for the most part, the wounded needed no further
care and our dead had to be buried almost where they fell."

_M. T. McMahon,
Cold Harbor
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

"According to the report of the Medical Director, Surgeon
McParlin, the wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle
of the 3d of June numbered 4,517. The killed were at least
1,100. The wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle of
the 1st of June were 2,125; the killed were not less than 500.
The wounded on the 1st and 3d of June were, therefore, 6,642,
and the killed not less than 1,600; but, adopting the number
of killed and missing furnished General Badeau from the
Adjutant General's office, 1,769 killed, 1,537 missing
(many—most, indeed—of them, no doubt, killed), we have 8,411
for the killed and wounded, and for the total casualties,
9,948."

_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865
(Campaigns of the Civil War),
page 191._

"I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor
was ever made. … At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was
gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed,
the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on
the Confederate side. … This charge seemed to revive their
hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect
upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached
the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold
Harbor seemed to have disappeared."