Chapter LV: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (8)

"When Congress assembled … in the beginning of December, 1861,
so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and
so zealously had the people responded to their country's call,
that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your
committee by the adjutant general of the army, showed that,
exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the
army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men. During the
time this large army had been collecting and organizing,
nothing of importance had transpired in connexion with it,
except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the
rebels, which your committee treat of more at length in
another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of
Ball's Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate report.
The weather during the fall season, and for some weeks after
the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for
active military operations. As month after month passed
without anything being done by the army of the Potomac, the
people became more and more anxious for the announcement that
the work of preparation had been completed and active
operations would soon be commenced. From the testimony before
your committee it appeared that the army of the Potomac was
well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of
discipline by the last of September or the first of October.
The men were ready and eager to commence active operations.
The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed
to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared
they had no expectation of doing so. … Your committee
endeavored to obtain as accurate information, as possible in
relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of
Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here
upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in
December an order had been issued from headquarters
prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any
persons who should come into our lines from the direction of
the enemy; but all such persons were to be sent, without
examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions
were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was,
that the generals examined appeared to be almost entirely
ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having
only such information as they were allowed to obtain at
headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously
estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the
highest estimate based their opinion upon information received
at headquarters. … Subsequent events have proved that the
force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these
estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very
greatly overestimated. Your committee also sought to ascertain
what number of men could be spared from this army for
offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the
enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be
advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the
force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act
entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure
against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses
examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men,
leaving 100,000 or upwards that could be used for expeditions
at other points. … The subject of the obstruction of the
navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration
of your committee. … As was well urged by the Navy Department,
the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army
co-operate with the navy in securing the unobstructed
navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation
at that time, permit so important a channel of communication
to be closed. After repeated efforts, General McClellan
promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to
proceed down the river. … The troops did not arrive, and the
Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven.
Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan
why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was
informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so
large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he
had concluded not to send them. Captain Fox replied that the
landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy
Department had charge. … It was then agreed that the troops
should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again
notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the
arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that
time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain
Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the committee as to what
reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to
the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as
he could ascertain, was, that General McClellan feared it
might bring on a general engagement. … Upon the failure of
this plan of the Navy Department, the effective vessels of the
Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The
navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter
closed, and remained closed until the rebels voluntarily
evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps
having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening
communication by that route. On the 19th of January, 1862, the
President of the United States, as commander-in-chief of the
army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the
armies of the United States, one result of which was the
series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which
so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every
loyal man in the land. After this long period of inaction of
the army of the Potomac, the President of the United States,
on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order: …
'Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the
Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington,
be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of
seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward
of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in
the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to
move before or on the 22d day of February next. Abraham
Lincoln.'

{3446}

To this order General McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of
the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as
involving 'the error of dividing our army by a very difficult
obstacle, (the Occoquan,) and by a distance too great to
enable the two portions to support each other, should either
be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is
held in check.' He then proceeded to argue in favor of a
movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving
the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30
days would be required to provide the necessary means of
transportation. He stated that he regarded 'success as
certain, by all the chances of war,' by the route he proposed,
while it was 'by no means certain that we can beat them (the
enemy) at Manassas.' … Your committee have no evidence, either
oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the
arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the
President that led him to relinquish his own line of
operations and consent to the one proposed by Genera]
McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in
February, 1862. That council, the first, so far as your
committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by General
McClellan, and then by direction of the President, was
composed of twelve generals. … To them was submitted the
question whether they would indorse the line of operations
which General McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the
deliberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the
movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake
bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and across the
country to Richmond. The four generals who voted against the
proposed movement were Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman,
and Barnard. General Keyes voted for it with the qualification
that no change should be made until the enemy were driven from
their batteries on the Potomac. … Before the movement by way
of Annapolis could be executed, the enemy abandoned their
batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at
Centreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the
Rappahannock. When General McClellan, then in the city of
Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he
proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of
the whole army in the direction of the position lately
occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning of the
10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further
than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded
to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock,
ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and
destroyed the railroad bridge across it. … On the 13th of
March General McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a
council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of
army corps, (General Banks being absent,) and informed them
that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the
Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement
by way of the York and James rivers."

_Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War,
37th Congress, 3d session, H. R. Rep.,
part 1, pages 6-12._

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, consisting of
Senators Wade, Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, and of
Representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell, was
appointed in December, 1861. This Committee "was for four
years one of the most important agencies in the country. It
assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great
range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of
both the army and the Government; it called soldiers and
statesmen before it, and questioned them like refractory
schoolboys. … It was often hasty and unjust in its judgments,
but always, earnest, patriotic, and honest. … General
McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee
with something like contempt. But the President, with his
larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take
into account an agency of such importance; and though he
steadily defended General McClellan and his deliberateness of
preparation before the committee, he constantly assured him in
private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself
in readiness for a forward movement. … December was the fifth
month that General McClellan had been in command of the
greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was
impossible to convince the country that a longer period of
preparation was necessary before this army could be led
against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in
discipline or equipment. … McClellan reported to the Secretary
of War, that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered
150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an
advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of
240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective
total of 41,000 men. … Aware that his army was less than
one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented
himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the
time in drilling and disciplining his troops, who, according
to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not
account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military
operations, he says, were practicable until the end of
December; but he was never molested."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 5, chapter 9._

McClellan says, "It certainly was not till late in November,
1861, that the Army of the Potomac was in any condition to
move, nor even then were they capable of assaulting entrenched
positions. By that time the roads had ceased to be practicable
for the movement of armies, and the experience of subsequent
years proved that no large operations could be advantageously
conducted in that region during the winter season. Any success
gained at that time in front of Washington could not have been
followed up and a victory would have given us the barren
possession of the field of battle, with a longer and more
difficult line of supply during the rest of the winter. If the
Army of the Potomac had been in condition to move before
winter, such an operation would not have accorded with the
general plan I had determined upon after succeeding General
Scott as general in command of the armies"

_G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
pages 199-200._

ALSO IN:
_J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapters 3-4._

_A. S. Webb,
The Peninsula
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 3) chapter 2._

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
book 5, chapter 4 (volume 1)._

_G. B. McClellan,
The Peninsular Campaign
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
volume 2, pages 160-187)._

_G. B. McClellan,
Complete Report._

_J. G. Barnard,
The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents._

_J. C. Ropes,
Gen. McClellan's Plans
(Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 1)._

{3447}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862
(December-April: Virginia).
Jackson's first campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.
Battle of Kernstown.

"Soon after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was
promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government
having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department
of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E.
Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac
District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by
Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes," In November,
Jackson's force was about 10,000 men. "His only movement of
note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition at the end of
December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad and a dam or two near Hancock, on the Chesapeake and
Ohio canal. … In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and
General McClellan collected his army of more than 100,000 men
on the Peninsula. … Jackson's little army in the Valley had
been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so
that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5,000 men
of all arms available for the defense of his district, which
began to swarm with enemies all around its borders,
aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having
retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to
withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to
cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an
aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by
General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8,000
to 10,000 men. A little after the middle of March, Jack·son
concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied
a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of
Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe
engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's
repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the
Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit
was not vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired
before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting
qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops
from the Valley. The result was so pleasing to the Richmond
government and General Johnston that it was decided to
reënforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him
at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May."

_J. D. Imboden,
Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 282-285)._

"The losses at Kernstown were:
Union, 118 killed, 450 wounded, 22 missing=590;
Confederate, 80 killed, 375 wounded, 263 missing=718."

_N. Kimball,
Fighting Jackson at Kernstown
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, page 307, footnote)._

ALSO IN:
_G. H. Gordon,
Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,
chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1863.
President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus.

On the 27th of April, 1861, President Lincoln issued the
following order "To the Commanding General, Army of the United
States"—at that time, General Scott: "You are engaged in
suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United
States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military
line which is now or which shall be used between the city of
Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance
which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the
officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs,
are authorized to suspend that writ." On the 2d of July,
another order was issued in exactly the same language, except
that it gave authority to suspend the writ at "any point on or
in the vicinity of any military line … between the city of New
York and the city of Washington." On the 14th of October, a
third order to General Scott declared: "The military line of
the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may
be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer
acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus in any place between that place and
the city of Washington." On the 2d of December a specific
order to General Halleck, commanding in the Department of
Missouri, authorized the suspension of the writ within the
limits of his command; and a similar order, long previously,
had specially empowered the commander of the forces of the
United States on the coast of Florida to do the same. On the
24th of September, 1862, a general proclamation by the
President subjected to martial law "all rebels and insurgents,
their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all
persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia
drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and
comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States";
and suspending the writ of habeas corpus "in respect to all
persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the
rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal,
military prison, or other place of confinement, by any
military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or
military commission." On the 3d of March, 1863, the authority
of the President to suspend habeas corpus (which some thought
questionable) was confirmed by act of Congress; and on the
15th of September in that year another general proclamation
was issued, referring to the act and declaring a suspension of
the writ "throughout the United States, in the cases where, by
the authority of the President of the United States, military,
naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of
them, hold persons under their command, or in their custody,
either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of
the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or
drafted or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land
or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters
therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules
and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed
for the military or naval service by authority of the
President of the United States; or for resisting a draft, or
for any other offense against the military or naval service."

_Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 38, 45, 54, 85, 93, 239, 406._

{3448}

"Whether it is the President or Congress that has power under
the constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus was a burning question during the civil war. …
The case of John Merryman … was the first to come up for
judicial interpretation. Merryman lived near Baltimore, and
appears to have been suspected of being captain of a secession
troop, of having assisted in destroying railroads and bridges
for the purpose of preventing troops from reaching Washington,
and of obstructing the United States mail. By order of General
Keim of Pennsylvania he was arrested at night in his own
house, and taken to Fort McHenry at that time in command of
General George Cadwallader. Taney, who was then chief justice
of the United States, granted a habeas corpus, but Cadwallader
refused to obey it, saying that the privilege had been
suspended by the President. On the return of the writ, the
Chief Justice filed an opinion denying that the President had
any power to suspend habeas corpus and affirming that such
power rested with Congress alone. Lincoln continued to arrest
and imprison without any regard to this opinion, and indeed
was advised by his Attorney-General that he was not bound to
notice it. … The writ of habeas corpus was … not suspended by
Congress until the rebellion was half over. In other words,
Lincoln suspended it for two years of his own accord and
without authority from anyone; for two years he made arrests
without warrants and held men in prison as long as he pleased.
… There are few things in American history more worthy of
discussion than the power exercised by Lincoln in those two
years. It was absolute and arbitrary and, if unauthorized, its
exercise was a tremendous violation of the constitution.
Whether it was justifiable and necessary is another matter. If
it was unconstitutional and yet necessary in order to save the
Union, it shows that the constitution is defective in not
allowing the government the proper means of protecting itself.
That Lincoln used this power with discretion and forbearance
there is no doubt. He was the most humane man that ever
wielded such authority. He had no taste for tyranny, and he
knew the temper of the American people. But, nevertheless,
injustice was sometimes done. His subordinates had not always
their master's nature."

_S. G. Fisher,
The Suspension of Habeas Corpus
during the War of the Rebellion
(Political Science Quarterly,
September, 1888)._

The view which President Lincoln himself entertained, and
under which he assumed and exercised authority to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus, was submitted to Congress in his first
Message, when it convened in special session, July 4, 1861. He
said: "Soon after the first call for militia, it was
considered a duty to authorize the commanding general in
proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to
arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes
and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous
to the public safety. This authority has purposely been
exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and
propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and
the attention of the country has been called to the
proposition that one who has sworn to 'take care that the laws
be faithfully executed' should not himself violate them. Of
course some consideration was given to the questions of power
and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of
the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were
being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one third of
the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution,
even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means
necessary to their execution some single law, made in such
extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically,
it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to
a very limited ex·tent be violated? To state the question more
directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the
government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even
in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if the
government should be overthrown, when it was believed that
disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it
was not believed that this question was presented. It was not
believed that any law was violated. The provision of the
Constitution that 'the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to
a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be
suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of
rebellion, and that the public safety does require the
qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was
authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and
not the executive, is vested with this power. But the
Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to
exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for
a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of
the instrument intended that in every case the danger should
run its course until Congress could be called together, the
very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended
in this case, by the rebellion. … Whether there shall be any
legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted
entirely to the better judgment of Congress."

_Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 59-60._

Congress gave tacit approval to this view of the President's
powers by passing no act on the subject until nearly two years
afterwards, as shown above.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(January-February: Kentucky—Tennessee).
The first breaking of the Confederate line.
Grant's capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.

"At the beginning of the new year the Union armies were over
660,000 strong, backed by a fleet of 212 vessels. McClellan
lay quiet upon the Potomac all winter, drilling, organizing,
disciplining the Army of the Potomac. In his front was Joe
Johnston, with a much smaller force, pushing forward with
equal energy the schooling of his soldiers. The Western
generals were more active. Albert Sidney Johnston, perhaps the
most promising Southern officer, was in command in the West,
with headquarters at Bowling Green. Buell lay in Johnston's
front, having superseded Sherman, whose 'crazy' suggestion
that 250,000 men would be required for operations on the
Western field had lost him the confidence of his superiors.
There was abundant method in his madness, as time all too
fully showed. In [Eastern] Kentucky the Confederate Humphrey
Marshall had been creating more or less political trouble, and
General Garfield was sent against him with some 2,000 men.
Marshall somewhat outnumbered Garfield; but in a vigorous
January campaign [beginning at Paintsville, January 7, and]
culminating at Prestonburg [January 10], Garfield quite
dispersed his forces, and drove him into the mountains.

{3449}

About the same time, Zollicoffer, with some 12,000 men, had
retreated from his post in advance of Cumberland Gap, where he
held the extreme right of the Southern line, to Mill Spring,
in Central Kentucky. General George H. Thomas was charged with
the duty of disposing of him. With about an equal force Thomas
promptly moved upon his enemy, and in a sharp action at Mill
Spring [January 19] utterly broke up his army. He thus early
showed the rare vigor he afterwards so fully developed.
Zollicoffer was killed. This first of our substantial western
victories (called 'Fishing Creek' by the enemy) [and also
called the battle of Logan Cross Roads by some Union writers]
was a great encouragement to our arms. Crittenden, who
succeeded to the command, withdrew his troops across the
Cumberland, abandoning his artillery and trains. Eastern
Kentucky was thus freed from the Confederates. Halleck's first
task as commander of the Western armies was to penetrate the
Confederate line of defense. This could be done by breaking
its centre or by turning one of its flanks. The former
appeared most feasible to Grant, and Commodore Foote, who
commanded the naval forces. Under instructions from Halleck,
seven of the gun-boat flotilla, with Grant's 17,000 men in
reserve, moved up the Tennessee river to attack Fort Henry and
essay the value of gun-boats in amphibious warfare. Grant
landed below the fort, and Foote then opened fire upon it.
Tilghman, in command, foreseeing its capture, was shrewd
enough to send off the bulk of his force to Fort Donelson. He
himself made a mock defense with a handful of men,
surrendering the fort after the garrison was well on its way.
Without the twin citadel of Donelson [distant about eleven
miles, southeastwardly, on the Cumberland River], however,
Fort Henry was but a barren triumph, for no column could
advance up the Tennessee river while this garrison threatened
its flank. It was here that Grant earned his first laurels as
a stanch soldier, by compelling, after a stubborn fight, the
surrender of this second fortress with its entire garrison.
Every effort had been made by Johnston to hold the place. He
must here fight for the possession of Nashville. Fort Donelson
was strongly fortified and garrisoned. Grant moved against it
from Fort Henry with 15,000 men; 5,000 less than the enemy.
The ground is difficult; the troops are green. But
reinforcements and the fleet come to Grant's assistance. The
fort is fully invested, under great difficulties from severity
of weather and the inexperience of the men. Happily there is
not much ability in the defense. Floyd, the senior officer,
determines to cut his way out. He falls heavily upon Grant's
right, held by McClernand and backed by Wallace, thinking to
thrust them aside from the river and to escape over the road
so won. A stubborn resistance defeats this sortie, though but
narrowly. A general assault is ordered, which effects a
lodgment in the works. Divided responsibilities between Floyd,
Buckner, and Pillow weaken the defense so as to operate a
surrender. Our loss was 2,300. The Confederates captured were
over 15,000 men. These successes broke through the centre of
the Confederate line, established with so much pains, and
compromised its flanks. Johnston found that he must retire to
a new line. This lay naturally along the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad. He had retreated from Bowling Green on
receipt of the news of the fall of Fort Henry, and was forced
thereby to cede to Buell possession of Nashville, and
practically of Kentucky. The advanced flank on the Mississippi
at Columbus was likewise compromised, and with the bulk of the
armament was withdrawn to Island No. 10, some forty miles
below Cairo. We could congratulate ourselves upon a very
substantial gain."

_T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 21-23._

_J. M. Hoppin,
Life of Rear Admiral Foote,
chapters 16-18._

_W. P. Johnston,
Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,
chapters 26-28._

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 7._

_Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
volume 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(January-March: Missouri-Arkansas).
Expulsion of the Confederates from Missouri.
Battle of Pea Ridge.

"Late in December General Samuel R. Curtis took command of
12,000 National troops at Rolla, and advanced against Price,
who retreated before him to the northwestern corner of
Arkansas, where his force was joined by that of General
McCulloch, and together they took up a position in the Boston
Mountains. Curtis crossed the line into Arkansas, chose a
strong place on Pea Ridge, in the Ozark Mountains, intrenched,
and awaited attack. Because of serious disagreements between
Price and McCulloch, General Earl Van Dorn, who ranked them
both, was sent to take command of the Confederate force,
arriving late in January. There is no authentic statement as
to the size of his army. He himself declared that he had but
14,000 men, while no other estimate gave fewer than twice that
number. Among them was a large body of Cherokee Indians,
recruited for the Confederate service by Albert Pike, who
thirty years before had won reputation as a poet. On March 5,
1862, Van Dorn moved to attack Curtis, who knew of his coming
and formed his line on the bluffs along Sugar Creek, facing
southward. His divisions were commanded by Generals Franz
Sigel and Alexander S. Asboth and Colonels Jefferson C. Davis
and Eugene A. Carr, and he had somewhat more than 10,000 men
in line, with 48 guns. The Confederates, finding the position
too strong in front, made a night march to the west, with the
intention of striking the Nationals on the right flank. But
Curtis discovered their movement at dawn, promptly faced his
line to the right about, and executed a grand left wheel. His
army was looking westward toward the approaching foe, Carr's
division being on the right, then Davis, then Asboth, and
Sigel on the left. But they were not fairly in position when
the blow fell. Carr was struck most heavily, and, though
reenforced from time to time, was driven back a mile in the
course of the day. Davis, opposed to the corps of McCulloch,
was more successful; that General was killed and his troops
were driven from the field. In the night Curtis reformed and
strengthened his lines, and in the morning the battle was
renewed. This day Sigel executed some brilliant and
characteristic manœvres. To bring his division into its place
on the left wing, he pushed a battery forward, and while it
was firing rapidly its infantry supports were brought up to it
by a right wheel; this movement was repeated with another
battery and its supports to the left of the first, and again,
till the whole division had come into line, pressing back the
enemy's right.
{3450}
Sigel was now so far advanced that Curtis's whole line made a
curve, enclosing the enemy, and by a heavy concentrated
artillery fire the Confederates were soon driven to the
shelter of the ravines, and finally put to rout. The National
loss in this action [called the battle of Elk Horn by the
Confederates]—killed, wounded, and missing—was over 1,300,
Carr and Asboth being among the wounded. The Confederate loss
is unknown. Generals McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, and
Generals Price and Slack wounded. Owing to the nature of the
ground, any effective pursuit of Van Dorn's broken forces was
impracticable."

_R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Secession,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_W. Baxter,
Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove._

_O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
volume 3, pages 56-71._

_Official Records, series 1,
volume 8, pages 189-330._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(January-April: North Carolina).
Burnside's expedition to Roanoke and
capture of Newbern and Beaufort.

"Roanoke Island, lying behind Bodie's Island, the sand-bar
that shuts off Upper North Carolina from the Atlantic Ocean,
offers some of the most interesting souvenirs of early
American history. … As stated by General Wise, to whom its
defense was intrusted by the Confederate government, it was
the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two
sounds, eight rivers, four canals, two railroads. It guarded
more than four fifths of the supplies of Norfolk. The seizure
of it endangered the subsistence of the Confederate army
there, threatened the navy yard, interrupted the communication
between Norfolk and Richmond, and intervened between both and
the South. … After the capture of Hatteras Inlet in August,
1861, light-draught steamers, armed with a rifle gun, often
stealthily came out of these waters to prey upon commerce. …
An expedition for operating on this part of the North Carolina
coast was placed under command of General Burnside, who was
ordered (January 7th, 1862) to unite with Flag-officer
Goldsborough, in command of the fleet, at Fortress Monroe,
capture Newbern, seize the Weldon Railroad, and reduce Fort
Macon. The force consisted of 31 steam gun-boats, some of them
carrying heavy guns; 11,500 troops, conveyed in 47 transports;
a fleet of small vessels for the transportation of sixty days'
supplies. It left Hampton Roads on the night of January 11th,
and arrived off Hatteras in two days, as a storm was coming
on. The commander found with dismay that the draught of
several of his ships was too great to permit them to enter. …
Some dishonest ship-sellers in New York had, by
misrepresentation, palmed off on the government unsuitable
transport vessels, of which several were lost in that
tempestuous sea. … It was only by the greatest exertion and
perseverance, and not until a whole fortnight had elapsed,
that the entrance to Pamlico Sound was completed. The villainy
that led to this delay gave the Confederates ample time for
preparation. Not until the end of another week (February 7th)
had the reorganized expedition gained the entrance to Croatan
Sound, and worked through its shallow, marshy passes. The
weather was beautiful by day; there was a bright moonshine at
night. The gun-boats found a Confederate fleet drawn up behind
the obstructions, across the channel, near Pork Point. They
opened fire on the fort at that point. It was returned both
from the works and the shipping. Meantime troops were being
landed at Ashby's, a small force, which was attempting to
resist them, being driven off by the fire of the ships. The
debarkation went on, though it was raining heavily and night
had set in. It was continued until 10,000 men had been landed
on the marsh. Before dark, however, the work at Pork Point had
been silenced, and the Confederate fleet had retired to Weir's
Point. … When day broke, Burnside commenced forcing his way up
the island. He moved in three columns, the central one,
preceded by a howitzer battery, upon the only road, the right
and left through the woods. The battery that obstructed this
road was soon carried, though not without resistance. The men
had to wade waist-deep in the water of the pond that protected
it. … Toward Nag's Head the Confederate force, expelled from
the captured work, attempted to retreat. They were, however,
overtaken, and the rest of the command on the north of the
island, 2,500 strong, was compelled to surrender. The
Confederate fleet was pursued to Elizabeth City, whither it
had fled, and there destroyed. A large part of the town was
burned. A portion of the national fleet went into the harbor
of Edenton and captured that town. Winton, on the Chowan
River, shared the same fate. Burnside next made an attack
(March 14th) on Newbern, one of the most important sea-ports
of North Carolina. As the troops advanced from the place of
landing, the gun-boats shelled the woods in front of them, and
thereby cleared the way. A march of 18 miles in a rain-storm,
and over execrable roads, did not damp the energy of the
soldiers. … Newbern was captured, and with it 46 heavy guns, 3
batteries of light artillery, and a large amount of stores.
Burnside's losses were 90 killed and 466 wounded. Preparations
were next made for the reduction of Fort Macon, which commands
the entrance of Beaufort Harbor. On April 25th it was
bombarded by three steamers and three shore batteries; the
former, however, in the course of an hour and a half, were
compelled to withdraw. But the shore batteries, continuing
their attack, silenced the guns of the garrison, and, in the
course of the afternoon, compelled the surrender of the fort.
In connection with this expedition some operations of minor
importance occurred. … The chief result, however, was the
closure of the ports and suppression of commerce. General
Burnside's forces were eventually, for the most part,
withdrawn. They were taken to Alexandria, and joined the army
of General Pope."

_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 59 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:
_D. Ammen,
The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,
chapters 8-9._

_A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th Army Corps,
part 1, chapters 3-5._

_B. P. Poore,
Life of Burnside,
chapters 12-14._

{3451}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (February-April: Georgia-Florida).

Siege and capture of Fort Pulaski.
Temporary occupation of Florida.
Discouragement of Unionists.

The blockade of Fort Pulaski may be dated from the 22d of
February. Preparations were then made on Tybee Island to
bombard it. The most of the work had to be done in the night.
The work was carried on under the supervision of General
Gillmore, who was in chief command, and on the 9th of April
eleven batteries, containing an aggregate of 36 guns, were in
readiness to open fire. General David Hunter, who had just
succeeded General Sherman in command of the Department,
arrived at Tybee on the evening of the 8th. At sunrise, on the
morning of the 10th, Hunter sent Lieutenant J. H. Wilson to
the fort, with a summons to the commander of the garrison to
surrender. The latter refused, saying: "I am here to defend
this fort, not to surrender it." At a few minutes after eight
o'clock the batteries opened fire, and at the end of thirty
hours the garrison surrendered. In reporting the capture,
General Hunter wrote: "At the end of eighteen hours' firing
the fort was breached in the southeast angle, and at the
moment of surrender, 2 p. m. on the 11th instant, we had
commenced preparations for storming. The whole armament of the
fort—47 guns, a great supply of fixed ammunition, 40,000
pounds of powder, and large quantities of commissary stores,
have fallen into our hands; also 360 prisoners, of whom the
officers will be sent North by the first opportunity that
offers. The result of this bombardment must cause, I am
convinced, a change in the construction of fortifications as
radical as that foreshadowed in naval architecture by the
conflict between the Monitor and Merrimac. No works of stone
or brick can resist the impact of rifled artillery of heavy
caliber." General Benham, immediately commanding the
operations, remarked in his report: "This siege is … the first
trial, at least on our side of the Atlantic, of the modern
heavy and rifled projectiles against forts erected and
supposed to be sufficiently strong prior to these inventions,
almost equaling, as it would appear, the revolution
accomplished in naval warfare by the iron-clad vessels
recently constructed." Captain (acting Brigadier-General) Q.
A. Gillmore, the officer immediately in charge of the works on
Tybee Island, has given, in a report made in 1865 to the
Adjutant-General of the United States of America, an account
of the difficulties under which the batteries which performed
the chief part in the siege were erected: "Tybee Island is
mostly a mud marsh, like other marsh islands on this coast.
Several ridges and hummocks of firm ground, however, exist
upon it, and the shore of Tybee Roads, where the batteries
were located, is partially skirted by low sand banks, formed
by the gradual and protracted action of the wind and tides.
The distance along this shore from the landing place to the
advanced batteries is about 2½ miles. The last mile of this
route, on which the seven most advanced batteries were placed,
is low and marshy, lies in full view of Fort Pulaski, and is
within effective range of its guns. The construction of a
causeway resting on fascines and brush-wood over this swampy
portion of the line; the erection of the several batteries,
with the magazines, gun platforms, and splinter-proof
shelters; the transportation of the heaviest ordnance in our
service by the labor of men alone; the hauling of ordnance
stores and engineer supplies, and the mounting of the guns and
mortars on their carriages and beds had to be done almost
exclusively at night, alike regardless of the inclemency of
the weather and of the miasma from the swamps. No one except
an eye-witness can form any but a faint conception of the
herculean labor by which mortars of 8½ tons' weight and
columbiads but a trifle lighter were moved in the dead of
night over a narrow causeway, bordered by swamps on either
side, and liable at any moment to be overturned and buried in
the mud beyond reach. The stratum of mud is about 12 feet
deep, and on several occasions the heaviest pieces,
particularly the mortars, became detached from the
sling-carts, and were with great difficulty, by the use of
planks and skids, kept from sinking to the bottom. Two hundred
and fifty men were barely sufficient to move a single piece on
sling-carts. The men were not allowed to speak above a
whisper, and were guided by the notes of a whistle. The
positions selected for the five most advanced batteries were
artificially screened from view from the fort by a gradual and
almost imperceptible change, made little by little every
night, in the condition and appearance of the brush-wood and
bushes in front of them. No sudden alteration of the outline
of the landscape was permitted. After the concealment was once
perfected to such a degree as to afford a good and safe
parapet behind it less care was taken, and some of the work in
the batteries requiring mechanical skill was done in the
daytime, the fatigue parties going to their labor before break
of day and returning in the evening after dark. … The three
breaching batteries—Sigel, Scott, and McClellan—were
established at a mean distance of 1,700 yards from the scarp
walls of Fort Pulaski. The circumstance, altogether new in the
annals of sieges, that a practicable breach, which compelled
the surrender of the work, was made at that distance in a wall
7½ feet thick, standing obliquely to the line of fire and
backed by heavy casemate piers and arches, cannot be ignored
by a simple reference to the time-honored military maxims that
'Forts cannot sustain a vigorous land attack,' and that 'All
masonry should be covered from land batteries.'"

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 6, pages 134-135, 155, 161._

"By this victory, won on the first anniversary of the fall of
Fort Sumter [April 12], the port of Savannah was sealed
against blockade-runners. The capture of Fort Jackson above,
and of the city, would have been of little advantage to the
Nationals then, for the forces necessary to hold them were
needed in more important work farther down the coast. While
Gillmore and Viele were besieging Fort Pulaski, Commodore
Dupont and General Wright were making easy conquests on the
coast of Florida." Fort Clinch, on Amelia Island, Fernandina,
Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and other places, were abandoned
by the Rebels on the approach of the National forces. But
these conquests proved rather unfortunate than otherwise. "At
first, the hopes they inspired in the breasts of the Union
people developed quite a widespread loyalty. A Union
convention was called to assemble at Jacksonville on the 10th
of April, to organize a loyal State Government, when, to the
dismay of those engaged in the matter, General Wright prepared
to withdraw his forces, two days before the time when the
convention was to meet. … In consequence, … very little Union
feeling was manifested in Florida during the remainder of the
war."

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 2, chapter 12._

{3452}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (February-April: Tennessee).
The advance up River.
Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.