Chapter LXI: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (14)

"Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed
emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under
his guidance as to render the conception practical and the
decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved
more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of
the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force,
leaguing liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home
and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history
we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its
vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision,
the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln.
volume 6, chapter 19._

ALSO IN:
_O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
division 10, chapter 9 (volume 3)._

_W. P. and F. J. Garrison,
William Lloyd Garrison,
volume 4. chapters 3-4._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January: Arkansas).
The capture of Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman.

Sherman withdrew his troops from the attempt against Vicksburg
on the 2d of January, and on the 4th he relinquished the
command to General McClernand, who had come down the river
with orders to assume it. On that same day "the expedition
sailed on the same transports that had brought them from
Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to
attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old
French settlement situated on the left or north bank of the
Arkansas River, 50 miles from its mouth and 117 below Little
Rock. … The expedition moved up the White River through the
cut-off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up
the latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort
Hindman. … By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and
the troops were on the march to invest the post. … The
gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the
afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops
were in position." Next morning a combined attack began, which
the garrison endured until 4 o'clock P. M. when the white flag
was raised. "Our entire loss in killed was 129; in wounded,
831; and in missing, 17; total, 977. … By the surrender there
fell into our hands 5,000 men. … After sending the prisoners
to St. Louis, having destroyed the defences and all buildings
used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops
re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon,
Arkansas, whence on the 17th … they returned to Milliken's
Bend."

_S. M. Bowman and R B. Irwin,
Sherman and his Campaigns,
chapters 7-8._

{3489}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January-April: Virginia).
Command given to Hooker.
President Lincoln's Letter to him.
Demoralized state of the Army of the Potomac,
and its improvement.

"General Burnside retired from a position he had never sought,
to the satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the
warm personal regard of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years
had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was relieved at
his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became
senior general officer, and succeeded to the command. No man
enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac.
… His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank,
manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in
constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his
appearance always attracted attention; and he was as well
known to almost every regiment as its own commander. He was a
representative man. … Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot
in Hooker's character than the odd pride he took in Mr.
Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at the time of his
appointment: … 'I have placed you [wrote the President] at the
head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this
upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I
think it best for you to know that there are some things in
regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe
you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like.
I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession,
in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself; which
is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are
ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather
than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command
of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition and
thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great
wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable
brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it,
of your recently saying that both the army and the Government
needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in
spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those
generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask
of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.
The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability,
which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do for
all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to
infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and
withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I
shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you
nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out
of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware
of rashness! Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless
vigilance go forward, and give us victories!' … Hooker was
appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest
words, took leave of the army. The troops received their new
chief with a heartiness and confidence which, since
McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker was
to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of
this weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary
changes he at once began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the
power of organization—were accepted with alacrity; and a
spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded speedily to what had
been almost a defiant obedience. The army was in a lamentably
low state of efficiency. Politics mingled with camp duties;
and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with an
entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the
Potomac to accomplish anything, were pronounced. Desertions
occurred at the rate of 200 a day. … Hooker states that he
found 2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as
absent on the rolls of the army, a large proportion from
causes unknown. Sharp and efficient measures were at once
adopted, which speedily checked this alarming depletion of the
ranks. … The testimony of all general officers of the Army of
the Potomac concurs in awarding the highest praise to Hooker
for the manner in which he improved the condition of the
troops during the three months he was in command prior to
Chancellorsville. … On the 30th of April the Army of the
Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, consisted of about
130,000 men under the colors,—'for duty equipped,' according
to the morning report. … While the Army of the Potomac lay
about Falmouth [opposite Fredericksburg], awaiting orders to
move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from
Banks's Ford above to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck), below
Fredericksburg, a line some 15 miles in length as the crow
flies. … Lee's forces numbered about 60,000 men, for duty."

_T. A. Dodge,
The Campaign of Chancellorsville,
chapters 3-4._

ALSO IN:
_F. A. Walker,
History of the 2nd Army Corps,
chapter 7._

_R. De Trobriand,
Four Years with the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 20._

[Image: Map of Vicksburg and Vicinity.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(January-April: On the Mississippi).
Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg.
Futile operations of the first four months.

"General Grant took personal command of the movement against
Vicksburg on the 30th of January, 1863. … The first plan made
was to dig a canal across the neck of land, or peninsula in
front of Vicksburg,—below the city,—at a point where the
isthmus was only a mile and a fifth in width. This had been
begun before General Grant's arrival. If a canal could have
been made large enough for large steamboats, then no matter
how strong were the fortifications of Vicksburg, the boats
would pass through, far away from their fire. So a canal ten
feet wide and six deep was made here, in the hope that the
freshets of the river would widen it, and so make it large
enough for large steamers. But very little came of the canal.
When the river did rise, it would not flow where it was meant
to do. It flooded the camps of the workmen. Meanwhile the
Rebels had made new batteries below it. Thus ended plan number
one. Another similar plan, to open a route by Lake Providence
and Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Washita and Red River,
did not succeed better. The canals attempted here were both on
the west of the river. A very bold attempt was made on the
east side, by what was known as the Yazoo Pass, into the
Tallahatchee and Yazoo River. The expeditions sent out by this
route would come out above Vicksburg; but it was hoped that
thus the Rebel gunboats on the Yazoo River might be destroyed.
If a practicable route were made here, the whole army could be
moved to Haine's Bluff,—above Vicksburg,—an upland region very
desirable for occupation.
{3491}
But nothing came of this movement, though some hard work and
some hard fighting were done in it. What resulted of
importance was, that the troops found their way into the
granary from which Vicksburg had been fed; and in the
resistance, many of the Rebels were destroyed. In such
attempts February and March passed away. Meanwhile Admiral
Farragut, of the navy, ran by the Rebel batteries at Port
Hudson, so that he communicated with Grant below
Vicksburg,—and Grant could communicate with General Banks, who
was trying to do at Port Hudson what Grant was trying to do
above. The distance from Vicksburg to Port Hudson is about 120
miles in a straight line, and more than twice that by the
crooked river. Grant now determined to pass the city of
Vicksburg on the west side of the river by marching his army
by land—with the help of boats on some bayous if possible—from
Milliken's Bend, which is twenty miles above Vicksburg, to New
Carthage, which is about as far below. At his request Admiral
Porter sent seven of his iron-clads, with three steamers and
ten barges, down the river, past the Rebel batteries. They
were well laden with forage and supplies. The crews of all but
one refused to go. But volunteers from the army offered,
enough to man a hundred vessels had they been needed. On a
dark night of the 16th of April, led by Admiral Porter, they
steamed down, with the barges in tow. They turned the bend
without being noticed. Then the first batteries opened on
them. The Rebels set fire to houses so as to light up the
scene; and from the ships the crews could see the men at the
batteries and in the streets of Vicksburg. Though every vessel
was hit, all got by, except the Henry Clay steamer. Finding
she was sinking, her commander cut off the barge he was
towing, which drifted safely down, and, soon after, the vessel
herself took fire. The crew escaped in their boats,—the vessel
blazed up and lighted up all around. At last, however, after
the boats had been under fire two hours and forty minutes, the
whole fleet except the Henry Clay arrived safely below the
batteries. Grant had thus secured, not only forage and stores,
but the means of transportation. On the 26th of April five
more vessels passed successfully, one being lost as before.
Grant was now strong enough to cross the Mississippi River.
His army had to march seventy miles on the west side by muddy
roads, scarcely above the river line. He feared he might have
to go as far down as a little town called Rodney for a good
landing-place on the east side. But a friendly negro man, who
knew the country, brought in information that there was a good
road inland from Bruinsburg,—and so it proved. Grand Gulf, on
the river, where the Rebels had a post, was still between
Grant and Bruinsburg. Porter attacked it with his gunboats,
and Grant was ready to land 10,000 troops to storm the place
if the batteries were silenced. But Porter did not succeed.
Grant therefore marched his troops down on the west side of
the river. Porter ran by Grand Gulf with transports in the
night, and, on the morning of the 30th of April, Grant crossed
the river with 10,000 men. They did not carry a tent nor a
wagon. General Grant and his staff went without their horses.
It was said afterwards that his whole baggage was a
toothbrush! Other divisions followed, and on the 3d of May he
left the river, and marched, not directly on Vicksburg, but
more inland, to cut off all communication with that city. His
army took three days' rations with them, and relied
principally for provisions on the stores in the rich country
through which they marched."

_E. E. Hale,
Stories of War told by Soldiers,
chapter 7._

ALSO IN:
_F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 4._

_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 31-32._

_G. W. Brown,
The Mississippi Squadron and the Siege of Vicksburg
(Personal Recollections of the War:
New York Com. L. L. of the United States)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D.1863(February-April: Tennessee).
Engagements at Dover and Franklin.

"In February [on the 3d], General Wheeler, Bragg's chief of
Cavalry, tried to capture Fort Donaldson, so as to stop the
navigation of the Cumberland River, by which some of
Rosecrans's supplies came in steamboats to Nashville. The fort
had not been repaired after its capture by Grant, but the
Village of Dover near it had been fortified, and it was then
held by Colonel A. C. Harding with about 600 men. The Union
men fought bravely, and in the evening the gunboat Fair Play
came up and opened a fire on the Confederates which drove them
away in confusion, with a loss of more than 500 men. Harding's
loss was 126. Early in March, General Van Dorn appeared near
Franklin [a little below Nashville] with a large force of
mounted men. Colonel Colburn, of the 33d Indiana, moved
Southward from Franklin with 2,700 men. Van Dorn and Forrest
met him, and after a fight of several hours [March 5] Colburn
had to surrender with 1,300 of his men."

_J. D. Champlin, Jr.,
Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,
chapter 31._

"Sheridan, with his division, and about 1,800 cavalry, under
Colonel Minty, first swept down toward Shelbyville, and then
around toward Franklin, skirmishing in several places with
detachments of Van Dorn's and Forrest's men. In a sharp fight
at Thompson's Station, he captured some of the force which
encountered Colburn. He finally drove Van Dorn beyond the Duck
River, and then returned to Murfreesboro', with a loss during
his ten days' ride and skirmishing of only five men killed and
five wounded. His gain was nearly 100 prisoners. On the 18th
of March, Colonel A. S. Hall, with a little over 1,400 men,
moved eastward from Murfreesboro' to surprise a Confederate
camp at Gainesville. He was unexpectedly met by some of
Morgan's cavalry, when he fell back to Milton, twelve miles
northeast of Murfreesboro' and took a strong position on
Vaught's Hill. There he was attacked by 2,000 men, led by
Morgan in person. With the aid of Harris's Battery skilfully
worked, Hall repulsed the foe after a struggle of about three
hours. Morgan lost between 300 and 400 men killed and wounded.
Among the latter was himself. Hall's loss was 55 men, of whom
only 6 were killed. Early in April, General Granger, then in
command at Franklin, with nearly 5,000 troops, was satisfied
that a heavy force under Van Dorn was about to attack him. He
was then constructing a fort (which afterwards bore his name),
but only two siege-guns and two rifled cannon, belonging to an
Ohio battery, were mounted upon it.
{3492}
The fort … completely commanded the approaches to Franklin. …
On the 10th, Van Dorn, with an estimated force of 9,000
mounted men and two regiments of foot, pressed rapidly forward
along the Columbia and Lewisburg turnpikes, and fell upon
Granger's front. The guns from the fort opened destructively
upon the assailants, and their attack was manfully met by
Granger's troops. Van Dorn soon found himself in a perilous
situation, for Stanley [commanding cavalry] came up and struck
him a heavy blow on the flank. Smith [with cavalry] was
ordered forward to support Stanley, and Baird's troops
were_thrown across the river to engage in the fight. The
Confederates were routed at all points on Granger's front,
with a heavy Joss in killed and wounded, and about 500
prisoners. Van Dorn then turned his whole force upon Stanley
before Smith reached him, and with his overwhelming numbers
pushed him back and recovered most of the captured men. By
this means Van Dorn extricated himself from his perilous
position, and, abandoning his attempt to capture Franklin, he
retired to Spring Hill, with a loss of about three hundred men
in killed, wounded and prisoners. The Union loss was about 37
killed, wounded and missing."

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 3, chapter 4._

ALSO IN:
_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapter 18, (volume 1)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 23._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (March).
The Conscription Act.

"The Rebel Congress having long since passed [April 16, 1862]
a conscription act whereby all the "White males in the
Confederacy between the ages of 18 and 35 were placed at the
disposal of their Executive, while all those already in the
service, though they had enlisted and been accepted for
specific terms of one or two years, were held to serve through
the war, our Congress was constrained to follow afar off in
the footsteps of the enemy; since our ranks, [after] our heavy
losses in the bloody struggles of 1862, were filled by
volunteers too slowly for the exigencies of the service. The
act providing 'for the enrollment of the National forces' was
among the last passed [March 3, 1863] by the XXXVIIth Congress
prior to its dissolution. It provided for the enrollment, by
Federal provost-marshals and enrolling officers, of all
able-bodied male citizens (not Whites only), including aliens
who had declared their intention to become naturalized,
between the ages of 18 and 45—those between 20 and 35 to
constitute the first class; all others the second class—from
which the President was authorized, from and after July 1, to
make drafts at his discretion of persons to serve in the
National armies for not more than three years; anyone drafted
and not reporting for service to be considered and treated as
a deserter. A commutation of $300 was to be received in lieu
of such service: and there were exemptions provided of certain
heads of Executive Departments; Federal judges; Governors of
States; the only son of a widow, or of an aged and infirm
father, dependent on that son's labor for support; the father
of dependent motherless children under 12 years of age, or the
only adult brother of such children, being orphans; or the
residue of a family which has already two members in the
service, &c., &c. The passage and execution of this act
inevitably intensified and made active the spirit of
opposition to the War. Those who detested every form of
'coercion' save the coercion of the Republic by the Rebels,
with those who especially detested the National effort under
its present aspects as 'a war not for the Union, but for the
Negro,' were aroused by it to a more determined and active
opposition. The bill passed the House by Yeas 115, Nays 49—the
division being so nearly as might be, a party one—while in the
Senate a motion by Mr. Bayard that it be indefinitely
postponed was supported by 11 Yeas (all Democrats) to 35 Nays:
consisting of every Republican present, with Messrs.
McDougall, of California, Harding and Nesmith of Oregon. The
bill then passed without a call of the Yeas and Nays."

_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 21._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April: South Carolina).
The naval attack on Charleston.
Repulse of the Monitors.

"The engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned
had given to the government and the public a high opinion of
their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if
nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no
projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets. It was
supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty
force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its
numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its
surrender. … On the 7th of April [1863] Admiral Dupont made
the experiment. He had seven Ericsson Monitors, the frigate
Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the
Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the
Monitors. His intention was to disregard the batteries on
Morris's Island, attack the northwest face of Sumter, and
force his way up to the city. His fleet had 32 guns; the
opposing forts, in the aggregate, 300. At noon on that day the
signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, a Monitor,
took the lead. She had a raft-like contrivance attached to her
bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding
torpedoes. This occasioned some delay at the outset, through
its interference with her movements. On her way up she
exploded a torpedo, which, though it lifted her a little, did
no damage. At 2.10 P, M. she encountered obstructions
extending across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter;
beyond these, piles were seen extending from James's Island to
the Middle Ground. At 2.50 P. M. the guns of Fort Moultrie
opened upon her, followed shortly after by all the batteries
on Sullivan's Island, Morris's Island, and Fort Sumter. Not
being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and
subsequently other Monitors, the Passaic, Nahant, etc., were
obliged to turn, which threw the line into confusion, as the
other vessels, advancing, approached. This was particularly
the case with the flag-ship Ironsides, which became entangled
with the Monitors, and could not bring her batteries to bear
upon Fort Sumter without risk of firing into them; she was
obliged, on her way up, to anchor twice to avoid going ashore,
on one of these occasions in consequence of having come into
collision with two of the Monitors. The plan of the
Confederates was, by means of obstructions, to detain the
ships, while a concentrated fire was poured upon them in this
the 'first circle,' as it was termed.
{3493}
Two other still more powerful circles of fire must be passed
before the city could be reached. While in the centre of the
first circle, it was apparent that the Monitors were at a
fearful disadvantage. The forts and earth-works were armed
with heavy guns of the best construction. No ship was exposed
to the severest fire of the enemy for more than forty minutes,
yet in that brief period time of the ironclads were wholly or
partially disabled. In these forty minutes the battle was
substantially over, the question settled. The Keokuk was
struck 99 times, of which 19 were under her water-line. She
was in a sinking condition. She had been able to return only
three shots. The Passaic was struck 27 times; her turret was
jammed, and could not for some time be turned. The Nahant was
most seriously damaged; her turret was jammed, her captain
wounded, her quarter-master killed by a bolt which flew off
and struck him on the head. Many of the bolts of both turret
and pilot-house were thus broken; the latter became nearly
untenable in consequence of the nuts and ends flying across
it. All the other Monitors had received damages more or less
severe. The mailed frigate Ironsides had lost one port
shutter, her bow was penetrated by a red-hot shot. The damage
inflicted on Fort Sumter was comparatively insignificant. It
was Dupont's belief that, had the iron-clads been in action
half an hour longer, they would all have been disabled. 'To my
regret,' he says, 'I soon became convinced of the utter
impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force
under my command.' … The iron-clad fleet had therefore been
unable to pass the first line of obstructions, or to get out
of 'the first circle of fire.' The slowness of its fire was no
match for the rapidity and weight of that of the forts. The
iron-clads were able to fire only 139 times from the 14 guns
they could bring into action; the forts, from 76 guns, fired
2,209 times. The projectiles they used were wrought-iron
bolts, some of them tipped with steel, solid shot, shells, of
which 40 were filled with melted cast-iron, others with
incendiary composition. The total amount of cannon-powder used
by the forts was 21,093 pounds. The government, thus satisfied
that its iron-clad fleet was insufficient for the forcing of
Charleston Harbor and the capture of the city, now changed its
purposes, restricting its attempts to a more complete
blockade, the detention of a large confederate force in the
vicinity by continually threatening military operations, and
the destruction of Fort Sumter for the sake of a moral
effect."

_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 72 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN:
_D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the War,
chapter 33._

_C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
volume 2, chapter 33._

_W. C. Church,
Life of Ericsson,
chapter 21 (volume 2)._

_A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
chapter 30 (volume 2)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 14._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Virginia).
Hooker's disastrous movement.
Chancellorsville.
Stonewall Jackson's last flank movement.

"Being now [April 28] fully prepared for active operations,
Hooker determined to take the initiative by moving on the left
of his opponent's position. By careful study of Lee's position
he correctly concluded that his left was his most vulnerable
point. In order to mask his real design he sent forward a
force of 10,000 cavalry under General Stoneman to operate upon
Lee's lines of communication with Richmond, and sent Sedgwick
with a force of 30,000 men still further to mask his movement.
Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th,
and Sedgwick appeared on the 28th on the heights below
Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken,
Hooker proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton, after
a picturesque description of the passage of the Rappahannock
and the Rapidan, tells us 'that on the afternoon of the 30th
of April four corps of the Federal army had gained the
position of Chancellorsville, where Hooker at the same time
established his headquarters.' Chancellorsville is situated
ten miles southwest of Fredericksburg. It is not, as its name
implies, a town or village, but simply a farm-house with its
usual appendages, situated at the edge of a small field
surrounded by a dense thicket of second growth, which sprang
up after the primeval forest had been cut to furnish fuel to a
neighboring furnace. This thicket extends for miles in every
direction, and its wild aspect very properly suggests its
name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important
roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while in
reality a more unfavorable place for military operations could
not well be found. Hooker, however, seemed well pleased with
his acquisition, for on reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday
night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced
that 'the enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from
behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground,
where certain destruction awaits him.' … General Lee was fully
aware of the preparations that were being made by his
adversary, but calmly awaited the complete development of his
plans before exerting his strength to oppose him. … On the
28th … Lee ordered Jackson to concentrate his whole corps in
the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg. Early on the morning
of the 29th Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below the mouth
of Deep Run, but made no other aggressive movement on that day
or the day following. On the night of the 30th, Lee was
informed of Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. He had been
previously informed of Stoneman's movements against his line
of operations by General Stuart, and was now satisfied that
the main attack of the enemy would come from the direction of
Chancellorsville. Therefore on the morning of the 1st of May
he made the necessary preparations to meet it. Accompanied by
his staff, he took a position on a height where one of his
batteries overlooked the Rappahannock. He there observed
carefully the position of Sedgwick, while waiting for
information from the direction of Chancellorsville. … Very
soon the sound of cannon indicated that the work had begun. At
the same time couriers arrived from Stuart and Anderson
informing the general that the enemy were advancing on the old
turnpike, the plank road, and on the river roads, and asking
for reinforcements. McLaws was immediately ordered to the
support of Anderson, and shortly after Jackson was ordered to
follow with three of his divisions, leaving … a force of about
9,000 men and 45 pieces of artillery in observation of
Sedgwick. When Jackson joined McLaws and Anderson a lively
skirmish was in progress, in which he immediately
participated.
{3494}
When General Lee arrived he found the Federals were being
driven back to Chancellorsville. At the close of the afternoon
they had retired within their lines. General Lee occupied the
ridge about three-quarters of a mile south-east and south of
Chancellorsville. The opposing armies were hidden from each
other by the intervening thicket of brushwood. … It was
obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be
attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore Lee
proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker
might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no
danger was apprehended by the Federal commander. … The
execution of a movement so much in accordance with his genius
and inclination was assigned to General Jackson. … At dawn on
the morning of the 2d, Jackson's corps, 22,000 strong, was in
motion, and while it was making one of the most famous flank
movements on record, General Lee, with the divisions of
Anderson and McLaws, with 20 pieces of artillery, a force not
exceeding 12,000 men, occupied the position he had assumed the
previous evening, and General Hooker, with 90,000 men, lay
behind his breastworks awaiting the Confederate attack. …
After making a circuitous march of 15 miles, Jackson reached a
point on the Orange Courthouse road three miles in the rear of
Chancellorsville. Had Hooker possessed a handful of cavalry
equal in spirit to the 'Virginia horsemen' under W. H. F. Lee
that neutralized Stoneman's ten thousand, he might have
escaped the peril that now awaited him. On the arrival of
Jackson on the plank road, Fitz Lee, who had covered his
movement with his brigade of cavalry, conducted him to a
position from which he obtained a view of the enemy, which
disclosed the following scene: 'Below and but a few hundred
yards distant ran the Federal line of battle. There was the
line of defence, with abatis in front, and long lines of
stacked arms in rear. … The soldiers were in groups in the
rear, laughing, chatting, and smoking, probably engaged here
and there in games of cards and other amusements indulged in
while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In the
rear of them were other parties driving up and butchering
beeves.' Returning from this point of observation, Jackson
proceeded to make his dispositions of attack, which by six
o'clock were completed. … Howard's corps was first assailed.
This corps, being surprised, was panic-stricken and fled
precipitately, and in its flight communicated the panic to the
troops through which it passed. Jackson's forces followed,
routing line after line, until arrested by the close of day.
The rout of the Federal army was fast becoming general, and it
was only saved from entire defeat by the interposition of
night. When compelled to halt Jackson remarked that with one
more hour of daylight he could have completed the destruction
of the Federal army. This, the most famous of all Jackson's
brilliant achievements, closed his military career. After his
troops had halted, and while the lines were being adjusted, he
rode forward with several of his staff to reconnoitre the
Federal position." The party were mistaken by some of their
own men for Federal horsemen and received a volley which
struck down Stonewall Jackson. He was wounded in both arms by
three bullets, and died from the effects eight days afterward.
"Early on the morning of the 3d the attack was resumed by the
Confederates with great vigor. Hooker, taking advantage of the
night, had restored order in his army and strengthened his
position; his troops regained courage and contested the field
with great stubbornness until ten o'clock when they yielded at
every point and rapidly retreated … within the strong line of
defences which had been previously constructed to cover the
road to the United States Ford. … While the operations above
described were in progress at Chancellorsville, General Early,
by skilful manœuvring, had detained Sedgwick at Fredericksburg
until the 3d, when that general, by a determined advance,
forced back Early, carried Marye's Heights, and proceeded
toward Chancellorsville. The condition of affairs was
communicated to General Lee during the fore·noon. Wilcox's
brigade, then at Banks's Ford, was ordered to intercept
Sedgwick and retard his advance, while McLaws's division was
ordered to support him. Wilcox on reaching Salem Church, six
miles from Chancellorsville, encountered the Federal advance,
and after a sharp conflict he repulsed it with loss. The
success of Wilcox delayed Sedgwick until Anderson and McLaws
could come up. The premeditated attack on Hooker being thus
interrupted, Lee, on the forenoon of the 4th, repaired to the
neighborhood of Fredericksburg. A combined attack was then
directed to be made by Early on the rear, while McLaws and
Anderson bore down upon the front. The battle was hotly
contested during the afternoon, in which the forces of
Sedgwick were defeated, and were only saved from destruction
by a night-passage across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford. On
the 5th Lee collected his forces at Chancellorsville to give
the 'coup de grace' to Hooker, but that general, under cover
of a dark and stormy night, effected his retreat beyond the
Rappahannock at the United States Ford."

_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 14._

The Federal loss at Chancellorsville, in killed and wounded,
was 12,197; missing 5,000; total, 17,197. Confederate loss,
killed and wounded, 10,266; missing 2,753; total, 13,019.

_A. Doubleday,
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6), chapter 8._

ALSO IN:
_T. A. Dodge,
Campaign of Chancellorsville._

_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 8._

_D. N. Couch, O. O. Howard, and others,
Chancellorsville
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 4._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 25._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Mississippi).
Grierson's Raid.

Reporting to headquarters at Washington, on the 5th of May,
1863, General Hurlbut, commanding at Memphis, Tennessee, said:
"As the spring opened, I was daily more and more impressed
with the feasibility of a plan, long entertained, of pushing a
flying column of cavalry through the length of Mississippi,
cutting the Southern Railroad. By consent and approval of
General Grant, I prepared a system of movements along my
entire line from Memphis to Corinth for the purpose of
covering this cavalry dash. At the same time General Rosecrans
proposed to me to cover a movement of 1,800 cavalry from
Tuscumbia down into Alabama and Georgia.
{3495}
This did not interfere with my plan, but simply required extra
force to be developed from Corinth. Delays incident to
combined movements, especially from separate commands, kept
his expeditionary column back for six days. I commenced the
movement from Corinth on the 15th [April]. … On the 17th,
Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, with his own
regiment, the Seventh Illinois, and Second Iowa, moved from La
Grange, by way of Pontotoc, with orders, after passing
Pontotoc, to proceed straight down, throwing one regiment to
the left toward Okolona, and to push for and destroy the
Chunkey River Bridge and any others they could reach, and
either return, or proceed to Baton Rouge, as might be found
advisable. On the same day, April 17, a column of infantry
1,500 strong, and one battery, moved by railroad from La
Grange to Coldwater, with orders to push rapidly between
Coldwater and the Tallahatchee, and take Chalmers in flank and
rear while attacked in front by three regiments, a battery,
and 200 cavalry from Memphis, which left here on the 18th. I
considered that the effect of these movements would be to
puzzle the enemy and withdraw his force from the central line,
which has proven to be correct. … Grierson, on the 19th,
detached the Second Iowa below Pontotoc, which fought its way
gallantly back to La Grange and came home well mounted. The
main cavalry column (Sixth and Seventh Illinois) proceeded,
without loss or engagement, to Newton, on the Southern
Mississippi Railroad, and there destroyed bridges." Colonel
Grierson, in his own full report of the remarkable expedition
thus set on foot, after narrating the proceedings of his
command until it struck Newton Station, on the 24th of April,
continues: "From captured mails and information obtained by my
scouts, I knew that large forces had been sent out to
intercept our return, and having instructions from
Major-General Hurlbut and Brigadier-General Smith to move in
any direction from this point which, in my judgment, would be
best for the safety of my command and the success of the
expedition, I at once decided to move south, in order to
secure the necessary rest and food for men and horses, and
then return to La Grange through Alabama, or make for Baton
Rouge, as I might hereafter deem best. … After resting about
three hours, we moved south to Garlandville. At this point we
found the citizens, many of them venerable with age, armed
with shot-guns and organized to resist our approach. As the
advance entered the town, these citizens fired upon them and
wounded one of our men. We charged upon them and captured
several. After disarming them, we showed them the folly of
their actions, and released them. Without an exception they
acknowledged their mistake, and declared that they had been
grossly deceived as to our real character. One volunteered his
services as guide, and upon leaving us declared that hereafter
his prayers should be for the Union Army. I mention this as a
sample of the feeling which exists, and the good effect which
our presence produced among the people in the country through
which we passed. Hundreds who are skulking and hiding out to
avoid conscription, only await the presence of our arms to
sustain them, when they will rise up and declare their
principles; and thousands who have been deceived, upon the
vindication of our cause would immediately return to loyalty."
It was not until the 2d of May that Grierson and his small
force reached the Union lines at Baton Rouge. The total
accomplishments of the expedition—aside from the important
revelation it made of the condition of things in that region
of the Confederacy—are summed up in the Colonel's report as
follows: "During the expedition we killed and wounded about
100 of the enemy, captured and paroled over 500 prisoners,
many of them officers, destroyed between 50 and 60 miles of
railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over 3,000
stand of arms, and other army stores and Government property
to an immense amount; we also captured 1,000 horses and mules.
Our loss during the entire journey was 3 killed, 7 wounded, 5
left on the route sick; the sergeant-major and surgeon of the
Seventh Illinois left with Lieutenant-Colonel Blackburn, and 9
men missing, supposed to have straggled. We marched over 600
miles in less than sixteen days. The last twenty-eight hours
we marched 76 miles, had four engagements with the enemy, and
forded the Comite River, which was deep enough to swim many of
the horses. During this time the men and horses were without
food or rest. Much of the country through which we passed was
almost entirely destitute of forage and provisions, and it was
but seldom that we obtained over one meal per day. Many of the
inhabitants must undoubtedly suffer for want of the
necessaries of life, which have reached most fabulous prices."

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 24, part 1, pages 520-529._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(April-July: On the Mississippi).
Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg.
The final operations.
His personal account of the siege and capture.

"April 30th was spent in transporting troops across the river
[to Bruinsburg]. The troops were moved out towards Port Gibson
as fast as they were landed. On the 1st of May the advance met
the enemy under Bowen about four miles west of Port Gibson,
where quite a severe battle was fought, resulting in the
defeat of the enemy, who were driven from the field. On May 2d
our troops moved into Port Gibson, and, finding that the
bridges over Bayou Pierre were destroyed, spent the balance of
the day in rebuilding and crossing them, and marching to the
North Fork, where we encamped for the night. During the night
we rebuilt the bridge across the North Fork, which had also
been destroyed, and the next day (the 3d) pushed on, and,
after considerable skirmishing, reached the Big Black, near
Hankinson's Ferry, and the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. … Here I
[General Grant] … received a letter from Banks stating that he
could not be at Port Hudson [which Grant had intended to join
Banks in attacking, before he turned against Vicksburg] for
some days, and then, with an army of only 15,000 men. As I did
not regard this force of as much value as the time which would
be lost in waiting for it, I determined to move on to
Vicksburg. The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May were spent in
reconnoitering towards Vicksburg, and also in crossing
Sherman's troops over to Grand Gulf. On the 7th, Sherman
having joined the main body of the army, the troops across the
Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement was commenced to
get in position on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad so as to
attack Vicksburg from the rear. This occupied the army from the
7th to the 12th, when our position was near Fourteen Mile
creek, Raymond being our right flank, our left resting on the
Big Black.
{3496}
To obtain this position we fought the battle of Raymond, where
Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps defeated
the Confederates under General Gregg, driving him back on
Jackson; Sherman and McClernand both having some skirmishing
where they crossed Fourteen Mile creek. As the army under
Pemberton was on my left flank, and that under General Joseph
E. Johnston on my right at Jackson, I determined to move the
army rapidly on Jackson, capturing and destroying that place
as a military depot; then turn west and destroy the army under
Pemberton, or drive it back into Vicksburg. The 13th was spent
in making the first of these moves. On the 14th Jackson was
attacked with Sherman's and McPherson's corps. The place was
taken, and all supplies that could be of service to the enemy
were destroyed, as well as the railroad bridge. On the 15th
the troops were faced to the west and marched towards
Pemberton, who was near Edwards's Station. The next day, the
16th, we met the enemy at Champion's Hill, and, after a
hard-fought battle, defeated and drove him back towards
Vicksburg, capturing 18 guns and nearly 3,000 men. This was
the hardest-fought battle of the campaign. On the 17th we
reached the Big Black, where we found the enemy intrenched.
After a battle of two or three hours' duration we succeeded in
carrying their works by storm, capturing much artillery and
about 1,200 men. … We crossed on the morning of the 18th, and
the outworks of Vicksburg were reached before night, the army
taking position in their front. On the 19th there was
continuous skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting
into better positions. … At two o'clock I ordered an assault.
It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our
troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the
enemy, and the siege of Vicksburg began. … Most of the army
had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations
issued by the commissary. They had had an abundance of food,
however, but had begun to feel the want of bread. … By the
night of the 21st full rations were issued to all the troops.
… I now determined on a second assault. … The attack was
ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A.
M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in
position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so
that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The
attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps
succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy …
but at no place were we able to enter. … As soon as it was
dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been
obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn,
and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg. A regular siege
was now determined upon. … The Union force that had crossed
the Mississippi river up to this time was less than 43,000
men. … The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on
the roads between these places, quite 60,000 men. … My line
was more than 15 miles long, extending from Haines's Bluff to
Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was
about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton
and Jackson in our rear, who was being constantly reënforced,
we required a second line of defense, facing the other way. I
had not troops enough under my command to man this. General
Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked for
reinforcements, forwarded them with all possible dispatch. …
Johnston … abstained from making an assault on us, because it
would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without
accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken
the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take
any risk of loosing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I
would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves
against an attack by Johnston." The siege was of six weeks'
duration, ending on the memorable 4th of July with the
surrender of Pemberton and 31,000 men, who were released on
parole. "Our men were no sooner inside the lines than the two
armies began to fraternize, We had had full rations from the
time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been
suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself saw our men
taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to those whom
they had so recently been engaged in starving out."

_U. S. Grant,
The Siege of Vicksburg
(Century Magazine, September, 1885)._

ALSO IN:
_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 31-30._

_The Vicksburg Year
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapters 6-8._

_F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapters 5-6._

_W. Swinton,
Twelve Decisive Battles of the War,
chapter 7._

_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 12._

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 24._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-June).
The arrest of Vallandigham.
President Lincoln to the Copperheads.

"The man whose name became unfortunately pre-eminent for
disloyalty at this time was Clement L. Vallandigham, a
Democrat, of Ohio. General Burnside was placed in command of
the Department of the Ohio, March 25, 1863, and having for the
moment no Confederates to deal with, he turned his attention
to the Copperheads, whom he regarded with even greater
animosity. His Order No. 38, issued on April 13, … warned
persons with treasonable tongues that, unless they should keep
that little member in order, they might expect either to
suffer death as traitors, or to be sent southward within the
lines of 'their friends.' Now Mr. Vallandigham had been a
member of Congress since 1856; … he was the popular and rising
leader of the Copperhead wing of the Democracy. Such was his
position that it would have been ignominious for him to allow
any Union general to put a military gag in his mouth. Nor did
he. On the contrary he made speeches which at that time might
well have made Unionists mad with rage, and which still seem
to have gone far beyond the limit of disloyalty which any
government could safely tolerate. Therefore on May 4 he was
arrested by a company of soldiers, brought to Cincinnati, and
thrown into jail. His friends gathered in anger, and a riot
was narrowly avoided. At once, by order of General Burnside,
he was tried by a military commission. He was charged with
'publicly expressing sympathy for those in arms against the
government of the United States, and declaring disloyal
sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of
weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to
suppress an unlawful rebellion.' …
{3497}
The evidence conclusively sustained the indictment, and the
officers promptly pronounced him guilty, whereupon he was
sentenced by Burnside to confinement in Fort Warren. … The
Democrats throughout the North, rapidly surveying the
situation, seized the opportunity which perhaps had been too
inconsiderately given them. The country rang with plausible
outcries and high sounding oratory concerning military
usurpation, violation of the Constitution, and stifling
freedom of speech. … Mr. Lincoln only showed that he felt the
pressure of the criticism and denunciation by commuting the
sentence, and directing that Vallandigham should be released
from confinement and sent within the Confederate lines,—which
was, indeed, a very shrewd and clever move, and much better
than the imprisonment. Accordingly the quasi rebel was
tendered to and accepted by a Confederate picket, on May 25.
He protested vehemently, declared his loyalty, and insisted
that his character was that of a prisoner of war. But the
Confederates, who had no objection whatsoever to his peculiar
methods of demonstrating 'loyalty' to their opponents,
insisted upon treating him as a friend, the victim of an enemy
common to themselves and him; and instead of exchanging him as
a prisoner, they facilitated his passage through the blockade
on his way to Canada. There he arrived in safety, and thence
issued sundry manifestoes to the Democracy. On June 11 the
Democratic Convention of Ohio nominated him as their candidate
for governor, and it seems that for a while they really
expected to elect him. … On May 16 a monster meeting of 'the
Democrats of New York' was told by Governor Seymour that the
question was: 'whether this war is waged to put down rebellion
at the South, or to destroy free institutions at the North.'
Excited by such instigation, the audience passed sundry
damnatory resolutions and sent them to the President. Upon
receiving these Mr. Lincoln felt that he must come down into
the arena, without regard to official conventionality. On June
12 he replied by a full presentation of the case, from his
point of view. He had once more to do the same thing in
response to another address of like character which was sent
to him on June 11 by the Democratic State Convention of Ohio."

_J. T. Morse,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 2, chapter 6._