Chapter LXII: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (15)

To the New York Democrats, Mr. Lincoln said: "It is asserted
in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military
commander, seized and tried 'for no other reason than words
addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of
the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders
of the general.' Now, if there be no mistake about this, if
this assertion is the truth and the whole truth, if there was
no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest
was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a
very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to
the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made
because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the
raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and
to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to
suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the
political prospects of the administration or the personal
interests of the commanding general, but because he was
damaging the army, upon the existence of which the life of the
nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this
gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands
upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military
power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of
fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably
satisfactory evidence. I understand the meeting whose
resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the
rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has
shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall
be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires,
and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment.
Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I
must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to
desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by
getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting,
and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to
write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for
a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak
to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in
such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not
only constitutional, but withal a great mercy. If I be wrong
on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in
believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in
cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires
them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require
them: in other words, that the Constitution is not in its
application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or
invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of
profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself
makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the
government can constitutionally take no strong measures in
time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could
not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be
persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a
sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a
well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended
by the meeting, that the American people will by means of
military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public
discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of
evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the
indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any
more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so
strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to
persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his
healthful life. In giving the resolutions that earnest
consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the
fact that the meeting speak as 'Democrats.' Nor can I, with
full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly
presumed deliberation with which they prepared their
resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by
accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to
designate themselves 'Democrats' rather than 'American
citizens.'
{3498}
In this time of national peril I would have preferred to meet
you upon a level one step higher than any party platform,
because I am sure that from such more elevated position we
could do better battle for the country we all love than we
possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of
habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the
future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and
strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other.
But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful for
the country's sake that not all Democrats have done so. He on
whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and
tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me, and
the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in
these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham
on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these,
having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President
Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly
exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the
battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course
taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a
single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none
such."

_Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 849-350._

To the Ohio Democrats, the President wrote as follows; "You
claim, as I understand, that according to my own position in
the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and
this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military
service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions or
otherwise; and that if he had he should have been turned over
to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I
certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically
and by direct language advised against enlistments and in
favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know
that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the
arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more
recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrolment
preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of
assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had
to be met by military force, and this again has led to
bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility
more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I
solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the
military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course
in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged in a greater degree
than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a
greater degree than to any other one man. These things have
been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr.
Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they
originated with his special friends and adherents. With
perfect knowledge of them, he has frequently if not constantly
made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and
if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the
face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against
them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one
of which is yet I am totally ignorant. When it is known that
the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men
against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of
resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to
counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to
repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of
it. With all this before their eyes, the convention you
represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for governor of
Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to
sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of
course they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide
what are constitutional means; and, unlike the Albany meeting,
you omit to state or intimate that in your opinion an army is
a constitutional means of saving the Union against a
rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an
existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of
destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for
governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to
the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress
the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages
desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it
teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to
believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that
you will become strong enough to do so. After a short personal
intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say
I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I
assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look
upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by
consequence a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false
hope and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the
way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter in
order that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose,
indorse your names upon one of them and return it thus
indorsed to me with the understanding that those signing are
thereby committed to the following propositions and to nothing
else;

1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the
object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union;
and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional
means for suppressing that rebellion;

2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own
judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the
decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy while
engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and

3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have
the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while
engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed,
clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

And with the further understanding that upon receiving the
letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be
published, which publication shall be, within itself, a
revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham. It
will not escape observation that I consent to the release of
Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him
or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this
because he is not present to speak for himself, or to
authorize others to speak for him; and because I should expect
that on his returning he would not put himself practically in
antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it
chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential
gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of
immense value to the army—thus more than compensating for the
consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to
return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have
suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all
others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the
public safety may seem to require. I have the honor to be
respectfully yours."

_Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, page 362-363._

ALSO IN:
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, .
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 12._

{3499}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-July: On the Mississippi).
Siege and Capture of Port Hudson.
The clear opening of the great River.

"About the middle of May all the available force near the
river was concentrated at Baton Rouge, to assist in the attack
on Port Hudson. Thence Generals Augur and Sherman moved to the
south and east of that position, to cooperate with General
Banks. From Simmesport General Banks moved his army to invest
Port Hudson. … It was on the 21st of May that General Banks
landed, and on the next day a junction was effected with the
advance of Major-General Augur and Brigadier-General Sherman.
… On the 25th, the enemy was compelled to abandon his first
line of works. On the next day General Weitzel's brigade,
which had covered the rear in the march from Alexandria,
arrived, and on the morning of the 27th a general assault was
made on the fortifications. Port Hudson, or Hickey's Landing,
as it was called some years ago, is situated on a bend in the
Mississippi river, about 22 miles above Baton Rouge, and 147
above New Orleans." It was strongly fortified and well
defended by Colonel Frank Gardner. The artillery of General
Banks opened fire on the 27th, and at ten o'clock the same day
an assault was made, in which the colored soldiers showed much
firmness and bravery. The assault failed and the losses in it
were heavy. "A bombardment of the position had been made by
the fleet under Admiral Farragut, for a week previous to this
assault. Reconnoissances had discovered that the defences were
very strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments and
rifle pits, with abatis of heavy trees felled in every
direction. The upper batteries on the river were attacked by
the Hartford and Albatross, which had run the blockade, and
the lower by the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex. On
the 14th of June, after a bombardment of several days, another
assault on Port Hudson was made. … All the assaulting columns
were compelled to fall back under the deadly fire of the
enemy, and the fighting finally ceased about 11 o'clock in the
morning. The loss of General Banks was nearly 700 in killed
and wounded. … After these two attempts to reduce Port Hudson
by a land assault, on the 27th of May and 14th of June, the
purpose to make another was given up by General Banks, until
he had fully invested the place by a series of irresistible
approaches. He was thus engaged in pushing forward his works
when Vicksburg was surrendered. Information of this surrender
was sent to General Banks, and it was made the occasion for
firing salutes and a general excitement in his camp, which
attracted the attention of the enemy, to whom the surrender
was communicated. General Gardner, upon receiving the
information, sent by flag of truce, about midnight of the 7th,
the following note to General Banks: … 'Having received
information from your troops that Vicksburg has been
surrendered, I make this communication to request you to give
me the official assurance whether this is true or not, and if
true, I ask for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the
consideration of terms for surrendering this position.'"

_W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
chapter 29._

ALSO IN:
_F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 7._

_R. B. Irwin,
Port Hudson
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_R. B. Irwin,
History of the 19th Army Corps,
chapters 15-18._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume. 26._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June).
Call for Six-Months Men.

A call for 100,000 men to serve six months, for the repulse of
the invasion of Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and
Ohio, was issued June 15.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June: Virginia).
Lee's second movement of invasion and the inducements to it.
Northern invitation and Southern clamor.
The Southern view.

"The defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville was the
turning-point of the war, and for the first time there was
apparently a possibility of inducing the Federal Government to
relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate
authority in the South. The idea of the formation of a
Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had, up to
this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as
a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the
Federal arms in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had
caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt
whether the South could be coerced to return to the Union;
and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of
President Lincoln, declaring the slaves of the South free, and
placing the United States virtually under martial law, aroused
a violent clamor from the great Democratic party of the North,
who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was
disappearing. This combination of non-success in military
affairs and usurpation by the Government emboldened the
advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their
protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they
declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the
liberties of the country. Journals and periodicals, violently
denunciatory of the course pursued by the Government, all at
once made their appearance in New York and elsewhere. A peace
convention was called to meet in Philadelphia. … On all sides
the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard
raising their importunate voices. … The plan of moving the
Southern army northward, with the view of invading the Federal
territory, seems to have been the result of many
circumstances. The country [Southern] was elated with the two
great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and
the people were clamorous for active operations against an
enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern
steel. The army, which had been largely augmented by the
return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall
of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general
enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear
upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward
movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal
victory and a treaty of peace. Lee yielded to this view of
things rather than urged it. … Another important consideration
was the question of supplies. … More than ever before, these
supplies were now needed; and when General Lee sent, in May or
June, a requisition for rations to Richmond, the
commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper,
'If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in
Pennsylvania.'
{3500}
The considerations here stated were the main inducements for
that great movement northward which followed the battle of
Chancellorsville. … Throughout the month of May, Lee was
busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the
decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations
and improvements in the army. It was divided into three 'corps
d'armée,' each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by
an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet
remained at the head of his former corps. Ewell succeeded
Jackson in command of 'Jackson's old corps', and A. P. Hill
was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two
others. … On the last day of May, General Lee had the
satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped
and admirably-officered army of 68,352 bayonets, and nearly
10,000 cavalry and artillery—in all, about 80,000 men. … Lee
began his movement northward on the 3d day of June, just one
month after the battle of Chancellorsville. … Pursuing his
design of manœuvring the Federal army out of Virginia, without
coming to action, Lee first sent forward one division of
Longstreet's corps in the direction of Culpepper, another then
followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of June, Ewell's entire
corps was sent in the same direction—A. P. Hill remaining
behind on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near
Fredericksburg, to watch the enemy there, and bar the road to
Richmond. These movements became speedily known to General
Hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and
on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below Fredericksburg, and
crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite Hill. This
threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by Lee to
arrest his own movements. … He continued the withdrawal of his
troops, by way of Culpepper, in the direction of the
Shenandoah Valley." On the morning of the 9th of June, "two
divisions of Federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of
'picked infantry,' were sent across the river at Kelly's and
Beverley's Fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the
quarters of Stuart and find what was going on in the Southern
camps. The most extensive cavalry fight [known as the battle
of Brandy Station, or the battle of Fleetwood], probably, of
the whole war, followed. … This reconnoisance in force … had
no other result than the discovery of the fact that Lee had
infantry in Culpepper. … This attempt of the enemy to
penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt
the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley. The
Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg,
still remained facing General Hill, and, two days after the
Fleetwood fight, General Hooker moved up the river with his
main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near
Beverley's Ford. But these movements were disregarded by Lee.
On the same day Ewell's corps moved rapidly toward Chester
Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by
way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of
the 13th, having in three days marched 70 miles. The position
of the Southern army now exposed it to very serious danger,
and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of
soldiership in the general commanding it. In face of an enemy
whose force was at least equal to his own, Lee had extended
his line until it stretched over a distance of about 100
miles. … When intelligence now reached Washington that the
head of Lee's column was approaching the Upper Potomac, while
the rear was south of the Rappahannock, the President wrote to
General Hooker: 'If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg,
and the tail of it on the plank road, between Fredericksburg
and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim
somewhere—could you not break him?' … It would seem that
nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an
attack upon Hill at Fredericksburg, which would certainly have
checked Lee's movement by recalling Longstreet from Culpepper,
and Ewell from the Valley. But … instead of reënforcing the
corps sent across at Fredericksburg and attacking Hill,
General Hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north
bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall
back toward Manassas."

_J. E. Cooke,
Life of General Robert E. Lee,
part 6, chapters 9-12._

ALSO IN:
_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 21._

_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 9._

[Image: Map of the Battlefield of Gettysburg. July 1-3, 1863.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Pennsylvania).
Lee's Invasion.
The Battle of Gettysburg.

"Hooker started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of
Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper's Ferry. There
is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull
Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not
occupied them but was farther to the East, Lee desired to do
so, for it would give him a strong position on Hooker's flank
and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore
directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction.
Stuart's reconnoitering party met the Union cavalry at Aldie,
and after a hard battle retreated. A series of cavalry combats
ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart's cavalry behind the
Blue Ridge. Hooker was strongly posted east of the Bull Run
range and could not be attacked with much chance of success.
As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved
to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for
Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart's
cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the
passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass
Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the
Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Lee reached Chambersburg with
Longstreet's and Hill's corps. Ewell's corps was in advance at
Carlisle [June 27] and York," and advance bodies of cavalry
were threatening Harrisburg. The militia of Pennsylvania, New
York and Maryland were called out in force, but arms and
ammunition for them were inadequate. "On June 28th, Hooker
determined to send Slocum's corps and the garrison of Harper's
Ferry—the latter about 10,000 strong—to operate against Lee's
rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker's superior,
General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops
from Harper's Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage
the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the
command of the army."
{3502}
He was accordingly relieved and the command was given to
Major-General George G. Meade, of the Fifth Corps. Meantime
(June 25-27) the Union army had crossed the Potomac and
advanced to Frederick, Maryland. "On June 28th, Lee learned
from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his
communication with Richmond was seriously endangered. … In
this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a
preliminary measure, he directed his entire army to move on
Gettysburg. This he hoped would induce Meade to concentrate in
his front and leave his rear free; which was precisely what
Meade did do. … Under the impression that Lee's army was
spread out along the Susquehanna from Carlisle to York, Meade
threw out his own forces fan-shaped to march in that
direction. … The Union corps were marching on and getting
farther apart, while the enemy were concentrating. The advance
of Hill's corps, on the morning of July 1st, struck Buford's
division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of
Gettysburg, and in spite of a stout resistance forced it
slowly back towards the town. The First Corps at this time was
five miles south of Gettysburg. General Reynolds went to the
support of Buford with the nearest division of the First
Corps—Wadsworth's—and directed that the others follow. While
forming his line of battle he was killed. General Howard
succeeded to the command of the field, but did not issue any
orders to the First Corps until the afternoon. In the meantime
General Doubleday continued the contest, captured a great part
of the forces that had assailed him, and cleared his immediate
front of all enemies. Before the Eleventh Corps came up the
enemy could have walked right over the small force opposed to
them, but owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry [which, not
crossing the Potomac to follow Lee until the 27th, had
undertaken a long raid around the Union forces, and did not
succeed in joining the main body of the Confederates until
July 2d] they had not been kept informed as to the movements
Meade was making, and fearing that the whole Union army was
concentrated in their front they were overcautious. There was
now a lull in the battle for about an hour. The remainder of
the First Corps came up and was followed soon after by the
Eleventh Corps under General Schurz. About the same time the
Confederate corps of General Ewell arrived and made a junction
with that of Hill. General Howard assumed command of the Union
forces. Repeated attacks were now made against the First Corps
by Ewell from the north and Hill from the west; but the
Confederate charges were successfully repulsed. … Ewell's
attack also struck the Eleventh Corps on the right and front
with great force. … General Meade, when he heard of Reynold's
death, was 14 miles from Gettysburg at Taneytown, preparing to
form line of battle along Pipe Creek. He at once sent General
Hancock forward with orders to assume command of the field.
Hancock, perceiving that Cemetery Ridge [about half a mile
south of Gettysburg] was an admirable position for a defensive
battle, determined to hold it if possible. This was not an
easy thing to do, for the enemy were in overwhelming force,
and the feeble remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps were
not in a condition to make a prolonged resistance. … Hancock
directed Doubleday to send a force to Culp's Hill on the
right, while he instructed Buford to parade up and down on the
extreme left with his cavalry. The enemy were thus led to
suppose that the Union line was a long one and had been
heavily reënforced. As the losses on both sides had been
tremendous, probably not exceeded for the same number of
troops during the war, the enemy hesitated to advance,
particularly as some movements of Kilpatrick's cavalry seemed
to threaten their rear. They therefore deferred action until
Meade concentrated the next day. On General Hancock's
recommendation General Meade ordered his entire army to
Gettysburg. By dusk part of the Third Corps had arrived, and
soon after the Twelfth Corps and the Second Corps were close
at hand. … Most of the troops, though worn out with hard
marching, arrived by midday of July 2d. The Sixth Corps had 34
miles to march and came later in the afternoon. … The attack
as ordered by General Lee was to begin with Longstreet on the
right and be made 'en échelon.' That is, as soon as Longstreet
was fairly engaged, Hill's corps was to take up the fight and
go in, and as soon as Hill was fairly engaged, Ewell's corps
on the right was to attack. The object was to keep the whole
Union line in a turmoil at once, and prevent reënforcements
going from any corps not engaged to another that was fighting;
but Hill did not act until Longstreet's fight was over, and
Ewell did not act until Hill had been repulsed. … The enemy …
failed in every attack against Meade's main line, with the
exception of that portion south of Culp's Hill. Elated by the
fact that he had made a lodgement there, Ewell determined to
hold on at all hazards and sent heavy reënforcements during
the night to aid Johnson to make an attack in the morning. …
So ended the battle of the second day. At day dawn [July 3]
General Warren, acting for General Meade, established a cordon
of troops and batteries which drove Johnson out of his
position on the right. … Lee having failed in his attacks both
on Meade's left and right had to decide at once whether he
would give up the contest and retreat, or make another attempt
to force the Union line. As he had been reënforced by Stuart's
cavalry, and as a fresh division under Pickett was available,
he determined to try to pierce the left center of the Union
army and disperse the force opposed to him. To this end he
directed Longstreet to form a strong column of attack to be
composed of Pickett's division and Pettigrew's division and
two brigades of Pender's division, under Trimble, of Hill's
corps. To create confusion and prevent General Meade from
sending reënforcements to the menaced point, Stuart was
ordered to ride around the right of the Union army and make an
attack in rear. And still more to facilitate the attack 135
guns were to concentrate their fire against the Union center
and disperse the forces assembled there. About 1 P. M. the
terrific cannonade began and lasted for two hours, by which
time the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted. …
Stuart's cavalry attack proved abortive, for it was met and
frustrated by two brigades of Gregg's cavalry aided by
Custer's brigade, after a severe battle, which was hotly
contested on both sides. Stuart's further progress was checked
and he was forced to retreat. … Pickett formed his great
column of attack and came forward as soon as the fire from the
Union batteries slackened."
{3503}
Fresh guns had, however, been brought into position and swept
the ground over which Pickett moved. His charge, one of the
most desperately determined of the whole war, was heroically
met by Gibbon's division of the Second Corps and by part of
the First Corps, under the personal direction of General
Hancock, who was severely wounded in the terrible conflict.
Pickett was forced to retreat with the survivors of his
onslaught, and "the whole plain was soon covered with
fugitives; but, as no pursuit was ordered, General Lee in
person succeeded in rallying them and in re-forming the line
of battle. The next day, July 4th, General Lee drew back his
flanks and at evening began his retreat by two routes—the main
body on the direct road to Williamsport through the mountains,
the other via Chambersburg, the latter including the immense
train of the wounded. Gregg's division (except Huey's brigade)
was sent in pursuit by way of Chambersburg, but the enemy had
too much the start to render the chase effective. Kilpatrick,
however, got in front of the main body on the direct route
and, after a midnight battle at Monterey, fought during a
terrific thunder storm, succeeded in making sad havoc of
Ewell's trains. … Lee concentrated his army in the vicinity of
Williamsport, but as French had destroyed his pontoon bridge,
and as the Potomac had risen, he was unable to cross. He
therefore fortified his position. Meade did not follow Lee
directly, but went around by way of Frederick. After
considerable delay the Union army again confronted that of Lee
and were about—under orders from President Lincoln-to make an
attack, when Lee slipped away on the night of July 14th to the
Virginia side of the Potomac. This ended the campaign of
Gettysburg. The Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded,
5,434 missing=Total, 23,003. The Confederate loss was 2,592
killed, 12,709 wounded, 5,150 missing=Total, 20,451."

_A. Doubleday,
Gettysburg made plain (with 29 maps)._

ALSO IN:
_A. Doubleday,
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6, part 2)._

_J. Longstreet, H. J. Hunt and others,
Gettysburg
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 8._

_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 15._

_Comte de Paris,
History of the American Civil War,
volume 3, book 3, chapter 4._

_D. X. Junkin and F. H. Norton,
Life of General Hancock,
chapters 11-13._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 27._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Tennessee).
The Tullahoma campaign.

"During the first six months of the year 1863 the Army of the
Cumberland remained at Murfreesboro' and was comparatively
inactive. The troops were employed in the construction of
elaborate fortifications and in divers minor operations with
defensive or tentative objects. … Late in June the Army of the
Cumberland advanced against its old enemy, the Confederate
Army of the Tennessee, then holding the line of Duck River. In
this movement the Fourteenth Corps [General Thomas] was in the
centre, its appropriate place, and drove the enemy from
Hoover's Gap and from several positions in front of that gap.
General McCook [Twentieth Corps] on the right had a severe
combat at Liberty Gap, but finally pressed the enemy from the
hills. General Crittenden [Twenty-first Corps] on the left did
not meet much opposition. When Bragg's army had been driven
from its defensive line on Duck River, General Rosecrans moved
his army towards Manchester, and regarding this movement as
indicating either an attack upon his position at Tullahoma, or
the interruption of his communications, Bragg fell back from
that place. He did not consider himself strong enough to meet
Rosecrans in battle, and he consequently retreated first to
the Cumberland Mountains, and, soon after, across the
Tennessee River to Chattanooga. The Tullahoma campaign was
begun on the 23d of June and terminated on the 4th of July.
The enemy fought at the gaps of the mountains, but the defense
on the whole was feeble. The result was the possession by the
Army of the Cumberland of the region from Murfreesboro' to
Bridgeport, Alabama. At the close of the campaign the army
advanced to the northern base of the Cumberland Mountains, and
there halted to make preparations for a campaign south of the
Tennessee River."

_T. B. Van Horne,
Life of General George H. Thomas,
chapter 5._

ALSO IN:
_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapter 19 (volume 1)._

_H. M. Cist,
The Army of the Cumberland
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7)._

_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 14._

_D. S. Stanley,
The Tullahoma Campaign
(Sketches of War History,
Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: On the Mississippi).
The Defence of Helena.

"One of the most brilliant of the minor victories of the war
was gained at Helena, Arkansas, on the west bank of the
Mississippi, on the 4th of July, General Holmes [Confederate]
had asked and received permission to take that place, in the
middle of June, and had mustered for that purpose an army of
nearly 10,000 men. The garrison of Helena consisted of a
division of the Thirteenth Corps and a brigade of cavalry
numbering in all 4000 men, commanded by Major-General B. M.
Prentiss. Holmes felt so sure of victory that he doubtless
selected the 4th of July for his attack in a mere spirit of
bravado. He assaulted at daylight with converging columns, two
of which made considerable impression upon the outworks, but
never reached the town. The defense of the Union troops was
singularly skilful and energetic, and, after a few hours of
fighting, Holmes, finding himself utterly defeated, retired at
half-past ten. The little army of Prentiss was, of course, too
small to pursue. The last Confederate attempt to hold the
Mississippi River thus ended in a complete and most
humiliating repulse."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 11._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: Mississippi).
The capture and destruction of Jackson.

When Vicksburg surrendered, Johnston was hovering in the rear
of Grant's army, and Sherman was watching his movements. On
the very day the surrender was completed the latter marched
rapidly upon Jackson, with 50,000 men, Johnston retreating
before him. The city was invested on the 10th, and defended by
the Confederates until the night of the 16th when they
evacuated with haste. General Sherman, writing to Admiral
Porter on the 19th of July, said: "We … have 500 prisoners,
are still pursuing and breaking railroads, so that the good
folks of Jackson will not soon again hear the favorite
locomotive whistle.
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The enemy burned nearly all the handsome dwellings round about
the town because they gave us shelter or to light up the
ground to prevent night attacks. He also set fire to a chief
block of stores in which were commissary supplies, and our
men, in spite of guards, have widened the circle of fire, so
that Jackson, once the pride and boast of Mississippi, is now
a ruined town. State-house, Governor's mansion, and some fine
dwellings, well within the lines of intrenchments, remain
untouched. I have been and am yet employed in breaking up the
railroad 40 miles north and 60 south; also 10 miles east. My
10-miles break west, of last May, is still untouched, so that
Jackson ceases to be a place for the enemy to collect stores
and men."

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 24, part 3, page 531._

ALSO IN:
_J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapter 8._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: Kentucky).
John Morgan's Raid into Ohio and Indiana.

"The most famous raid of this time was that made in July by
John Morgan across the Ohio River. General Buckner was then in
East Tennessee, near the borders of Kentucky, getting ready to
make another dash toward Louisville, and Morgan went ahead to
prepare the way. He crossed the Cumberland River into Kentucky
with about 3,000 mounted men, sacked Columbia, captured
Lebanon with 400 prisoners, and rode on through Bardstown to
Brandenburg on the Ohio River, plundering and destroying as he
went. Many Kentuckians had joined him on the way, and he then
had 4,000 men and ten pieces of artillery. The advance of
Rosecrans's army just at that time prevented Buckner from
joining him, and Morgan determined to cross into Indiana.
There were two gunboats in the river, but he kept them off
with his artillery while his men crossed on two captured
steamboats. Morgan then rode through Indiana toward Cincinnati
fighting home guards, tearing up railroads, burning bridges
and mills and capturing much property. The whole State was
aroused by the danger, and thousands of armed men started
after the bold riders. Morgan became alarmed, and after
passing around Cincinnati, almost within sight of its
steeples, turned toward the Ohio to cross again into Kentucky.
A large Union force was following, others were advancing on
his flanks, and gunboats and steamboats filled with armed men
were moving up the river to cut him off. The people aided the
pursuers all they could by cutting down trees and barricading
the roads to stop Morgan's march. He was so delayed by these
and other things that he did not reach the Ohio until July
19th. He hoped to cross at a place called Buffington Ford, but
the Union men were upon him and he had to turn and fight.
After a severe battle, in which the Union troops were helped
by gunboats which cut off the raiders from crossing the ford,
about 800 of Morgan's men surrendered, and the rest, with
Morgan himself, fled up the river fourteen miles to Bellville,
where they tried to cross by swimming their horses. About 300
men had succeeded in getting over when the gunboats came up
and opened fire on them. A fearful scene ensued, for it was a
struggle of life and death. … Some got across, some were shot
and some drowned. Morgan was not among the fortunate ones who
escaped. With about 200 men he fled further up the river to
New Lisbon, where he was surrounded and forced to surrender.
This was a wonderful raid, but it did not do the Confederate
cause any good. A large part of the property destroyed was
private property, and this roused the anger of all the people
of the Border States. … Morgan and some of his officers were
sent to Columbus and confined in the penitentiary, from which
he and six others escaped in the following November by making
a hole through the bottom of their cell and digging a tunnel
under the foundations of the building."

_J. D. Champlin Jr.,
Young Folk's History of the War for the Union,
chapter 31._

ALSO IN:
_B. W. Duke,
History of Morgan's Cavalry,
chapters 14-15._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 23._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: New York).
The Draft Riots.

See NEW YORK (CITY): A. D. 1863.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: South Carolina).
The lodgement on Morris Island, and the assault on Fort Wagner.

After Du Pont's attack upon the forts in Charleston harbor
"the Confederates enjoyed two months of undisturbed leisure
for the construction and strengthening of their works, though
all this time the matter of a new essay at the reduction of
Sumter occupied more than its proper share of the attention of
the Government.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(APRIL: South CAROLINA).

The forces in the Department of the South were not sufficient
to undertake a siege of Charleston by land, and the exigencies
of the more important campaigns going forward in Virginia,
Tennessee and Mississippi prevented their being reenforced. It
was resolved, therefore, to restrict operations to the harbor
and the islands immediately adjoining, and Admiral John A.
Dahlgren—after the death of Admiral Foote, who had been
designated for the purpose—and General Q. A. Gillmore were
charged with the command of the military and naval forces
engaged. … Admiral Dahlgren … assumed command on the 6th of
July. Gillmore had already been on the ground some three
weeks, and had nearly completed his preparations for a descent
upon Morris Island, when Dahlgren arrived. The admiral,
without a moment's delay, entered into the plans of the
general, and within forty-eight hours collected his scattered
monitors and steamed away to the harbor of Charleston. Morris
Island is a low strip of sandy beach, which lies to the south
of Charleston and, with Sullivan's Island to the north, guards
the entrance to the harbor, the two stretching out to sea like
the open jaws of an alligator. They are each about three and a
half miles long, separated from the mainland on the north, and
from the high ground of James Island on the south, by miry and
impracticable marshes stretching a distance of two or three
miles. Their inner ends are a little less than four miles from
the Charleston wharves, with Fort Sumter lying midway.
Gillmore resolved to make his attack from Folly Island, which
lies on the coast directly south of Morris, which it greatly
resembles in conformation, and from which it is separated by
Light House Inlet. It was occupied by a brigade under General
Israel Vogdes, who had fortified the southern end of it,
controlling the waters of Stono harbor and the approaches of
James Island.
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There was a heavy growth of underbrush at both ends of the
island; taking advantage of this, Vogdes, under Gillmore's
direction, constructed ten powerful batteries near its
southern extremity, completely masked from the enemy's view;
their purpose being to operate against the enemy's guns near
the landing place, to protect the debarkation of the troops,
and to cover their retreat in case of necessity. Most of this
work was done at night, and all of it as silently as possible.
… Alfred H. Terry's division of 4,000 and George C. Strong's
brigade of 2,500 were quietly brought together on Folly
Island, and on the afternoon of the 8th of July the former
force was sent up the Stono to make a demonstration against
James Island, while Strong's brigade was ordered to descend
upon Morris Island at daybreak of the 9th. Colonel T. W.
Higginson of the First South Carolina Volunteers, colored, was
ordered at the same time to cut the railroad between
Charleston and Savannah; a duty in which General Gillmore says
he 'signally failed.' The others punctually performed the
tasks assigned them. Terry's feint against Stono was so
imposing as to be taken for the real attack, by Beauregard,
who hastily gathered together a considerable force to resist
him, and paid little attention to the serious movement on the
beach." The Confederate troops on Morris Island, taken by
surprise, were "speedily driven out of all their batteries
south of Wagner, and abandoned to Gillmore three-fourths of
the island, with 11 pieces of heavy ordnance. The next day he
ordered Strong's brigade to assault Fort Wagner, an attempt
which failed, with slight loss on each side. On the 16th Terry
was attacked by a superior force on James Island, and although
he repulsed the enemy with the assistance of the gunboats
which accompanied him, he was recalled to Fol]y Island, the
purpose of his demonstration having been accomplished.
Although General Gillmore had as yet no conception of the
enormous strength of Fort Wagner, the assault and repulse of
the 11th of July convinced him that it could not be carried
offhand. He therefore determined, on consultation with Admiral
Dahlgren, to establish counter-batteries against it, hoping
with the combined fire of these and the gunboats to dismount
the guns of the work and so shake its defense as to carry it
by a determined assault. The preparations were made with great
energy, and by the morning of the 18th, exactly one week after
the first assault, General Gillmore was ready for the second."
The batteries and the fleet opened fire on the fort at noon of
July 18th; its defenders were soon driven from the parapets,
and "in the course of the afternoon the whole work seemed to
be beaten out of shape"; but, being constructed of fine quartz
sand, it had suffered damage only in appearance. At twilight,
the storming party, headed by Colonel Robert G. Shaw and his
Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment of colored troops, made a
most brave and resolute assault, actually climbing the parapet
of the fort, but only to leave 1500 dead, dying and wounded
upon its treacherous sands. The heroic young Colonel Shaw fell
dead among the foremost men; General Strong, Colonel Chatfield
and Colonel Putnam were killed or mortally wounded; General
Truman Seymour was wounded severely, and many other excellent
officers were in the lists of the slain or the sadly disabled.
"The death of Colonel Shaw was widely lamented, not only
because of his personal worth, but because he had become in a
certain sense the representative of the best strain of New
England anti-slavery sentiment. The Confederates recognized
this representative character by their treatment of his
corpse, replying to a request of his friends for his remains,
that they 'had buried him under a layer of his niggers.'"

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 15._

ALSO IN:
_T. W. Higginson,
Army Life in a Black Regiment._

_G. W. Williams,
History of the Negro Troops,
chapter 9._

_M. V. Dahlgren,
Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren,
chapter 14._

_A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
chapter 31 (volume 2)._

_D. Ammen,
The Navy in the Civil War,
volume 2: The Atlantic Coast, chapter 7._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 28._

_L. F. Emilio,
History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers,
chapters. 4-5._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July-November: Virginia).
Meade and Lee on the Rapidan.
Bristoe Station.
Rappahannock Station.
Kelly's Ford.
Mine Run.

The 18th of July found the whole army of General Meade once
more on the Virginia side of the Potomac. "His plan for the
pursuit of Lee was not unlike that of McClellan a year before,
but although he displayed much greater expedition and energy
in the execution of it than were shown by his predecessor, the
results, through no fault of his own, were unimportant.
General French, who had taken no part in the battle of
Gettysburg, had been placed in command of the Third Corps; he
was an old officer of the regular army, excellent in drill, in
routine, and all the every-day details of the service, but
utterly unfit for an enterprise requiring great audacity and
celerity. He was assigned upon this expedition to the duty of
throwing his corps through Manassas Gap and attacking the
flank of the enemy as he moved southward by Front Royal. Meade
succeeded in getting French into the Gap in time to have
broken the rebel army in two; but when he attacked, it was in
so inefficient a Manner, and with so small a portion of his
force, that the day was wasted and the enemy made their way
down the Valley to the lower gaps. This failure was a source
of deep mortification to General Meade. … The pursuit of the
enemy was not continued further. … The months of August and
September were a period of repose for the Army of the Potomac.
It was in fact in no condition to undertake active operations;
a considerable body of troops had been taken from Meade for
service in South Carolina, and a strong detachment had been
sent to the City of New York for the purpose of enforcing the
draft there. General Lee had retired behind the Rapidan for
several weeks of rest; neither army was ready at that time to
attack the other." Early in September Longstreet's Corps was
detached from Lee's army and sent west to strengthen Bragg at
Chattanooga, and in the latter part of the same month about
13,000 men (Eleventh and Twelfth Corps) were taken from Meade
and sent, under Hooker's command, to the same scene of pending
conflict. "But, even with this reduction of his command, after
the return of the troops detached to the North, Meade found
himself with an army of about 68,000 men; and, knowing this
force to be somewhat superior to that of the enemy, he
resolved to cross the Rapidan and attack him; but again, as so
often happened in the history of the contending armies in
Virginia, Lee had formed the project of a similar enterprise,
and began its execution a day or two in advance. He had
learned of the departure of two corps for the West." On the
9th of October "he began a flanking movement to the right of
the Union line."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 9._

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