Chapter XVI: Front Matter (16)

"Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January
until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement
of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon
as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered
the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the
army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was
not until late in the spring that the new levies reached
headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to
Middlebrook and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th
of June Howe marched from Brunswick and … endeavored to bring
on a general engagement, … but Washington refused to leave the
strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy. Early
in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its
object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark
his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or
Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. … On the 23d of
July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels,
the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. … Signal
fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from
time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers
carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th,
it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed
it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting
with his brother, the general, continued on his course
southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay,
and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry."
Meantime, Washington had been in great uncertainty as to the
destination and intentions of his antagonist, but had drawn
his army near to Philadelphia. It had just been joined by
several distinguished foreign officers, Lafayette, De Kalb and
Pulaski in the number. At Philadelphia there was consternation
on the approach of the enemy, but "the pacific influence which
the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to
bear down all military efforts. … To impress the lukewarm with
the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the
breasts of the patriotic, on the 24th of August Washington
marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia.
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The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some
uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats." The
advance of Howe from Elk Ferry was slow, and it was not until
the 11th of September that the Americans encountered him, at
Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, where they had taken position.
In the battle which occurred that day the British gained a
clear victory, by means of a successful flank movement which
Cornwallis executed, crossing the river some miles above,
while General Knyphausen made feigned attempts at Chad's Ford.
"The American loss was about 1,000, killed, wounded, and
prisoners; that of the British, 579. … The day after the
battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He
rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the
Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle
should be risked before the city should be given up. On the
16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester
Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing had actually
begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining
the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the
hills north of the valley, and, finding it impossible to
repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the
Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and
attack their rear should they attempt to follow." But Wayne
was surprised at Paoli, and Washington was deceived by a
feigned movement, so that Howe succeeded in entering
Philadelphia without another battle, on the 26th, having
occupied Germantown the day before. "The main portion of
Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single
street, two miles in length, and five from the city." Here, on
the morning of October 4th, Washington attacked him, and, for
a time, with great success; but confusion and
misunderstandings on the part of the attacking columns arose,
which turned the half-won victory into a defeat. "The
Americans lost nearly 1,100 killed, wounded, and prisoners;
the British 521. … While the Americans were defeated in their
object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor.
It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that,
though driven from the field of Brandywine, they were still
aggressive." The next few weeks were employed by Howe in
reducing the forts which commanded the Delaware. Fort Mifflin
was taken after a severe siege, and this compelled the
abandonment of Fort Mercer, from which the British had been
repulsed with heavy loss. Early in December Howe moved upon
Washington's lines, at Whitemarsh, intending an attack; but
found them so strong that he dared not venture the attempt,
and returned to Philadelphia. "As the season was advancing,
and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it
was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the
west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties
into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods
and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was
severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness.
But the position was central and easily defended. The army
arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection
of huts began. They were built of logs, and were 14 by 15 feet
each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the
openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were
arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a
city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were
occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had
become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men
were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support
life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes
at the open fires. … The horses died of starvation by
hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own
provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to
protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through
their quarters with fearful rapidity. 'The unfortunate
soldiers,' wrote Lafayette in after-years, 'were in want of
everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes;
their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it
was often necessary to amputate them. … The army frequently
remained whole days without provisions, and the patient
endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which
each moment served to renew.' … While the country around
Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of
the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support
the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly owing to
the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after
leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its
sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the
congresses which had preceded it. 'The Continental Congress
and the currency,' wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, 'have
greatly depreciated.'"

_F. D. Stone,
The Struggle for the Delaware
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 6, chapter 5)._

The sufferings of the army at Valley Forge, and the shameful
neglect which it experienced, were indignantly described by
Washington, in a letter addressed to the President of
Congress, December 23, 1777: "Since the month of July," he
wrote, "we have had no assistance from the
quartermaster-general, and to want of assistance from this
department the commissary-general charges great part of his
deficiency. To this I am to add, that, notwithstanding it is a
standing order, and often repeated, that the troops shall
always have two days' provisions by them, that they might be
ready at any sudden call; yet an opportunity has scarcely ever
offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy, that has not
been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded on this
account. And this, the great and crying evil, is not all. The
soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by Congress, we see
none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of
Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have now little occasion
for; few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety
of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof
of the little benefit received from a clothier-general, and as
a further proof of the inability of an army, under the
circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of
soldiers, (besides a number of men confined to hospitals for
want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same
account,) we have, by a field-return this day made, no less
than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men now in
camp unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise
naked.
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By the same return it appears, that our whole strength in
Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have
joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive
of the Mary]and troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to more
than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty;
notwithstanding which; and that since the 4th instant, our
numbers fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they
have undergone, particularly on account of blankets (numbers
having been obliged, and still are, to sit up all night by
fires, instead of taking comfortable rest in a natural and
common way), have decreased near two thousand men. We find
gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going
into winter-quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of
mine would warrant the Remonstrance), reprobating the measure
as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or
stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and
moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an
inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours
to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a
superior one, in all respects well-appointed and provided for
a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to
cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania
and Jersey. But what makes this matter still more
extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen,—who
were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops from ocular
demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than
others, and who advised me near a month ago to postpone the
execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a
resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong
assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days
agreeably to a decree of the State (not one article of which,
by the by, is yet come to hand),—should think a winter's
campaign, and the covering of these States from the invasion
of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure
those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing
thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good
fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under
frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although
they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed
soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul,
I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to
relieve or prevent. It is for these reasons, therefore, that I
have dwelt upon the subject; and it adds not a little to my
other difficulties and distress to find, that much more is
expected of me than is possible to be performed, and that upon
the ground of safety and policy I am obliged to conceal the
true state of the army from public view, and thereby expose
myself to detraction and calumny."

_George Washington,
Writings,
edited by W. C. Ford,
volume 6, pages 259-262._

It was during this trying winter, while the army suffered at
Valley Forge, that it was joined by Baron Steuben, an
accomplished Prussian officer, trained in the school of
Frederick the Great, with a record of distinguished service in
the Seven Years War. He came as a volunteer, and was welcomed
by Washington, who found in him the organizer, the
disciplinarian, the instructor, which the rudely formed
American army so greatly needed. The services rendered by
Baron Steuben during that first winter of his stay in America
were especially valuable, beyond measure. In his own account
of the state of things which he found he says: "'My
determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon
my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied,
but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first
place, I informed myself relative to the military
administration. I found that the different branches were
divided into departments. There were those of the
quarter-master general, war commissary, provisions commissary,
commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc.
But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to
say, they had imitated the English administration, which is
certainly the most imperfect in Europe. The general asked me
to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the
departments, and their various branches in the European
armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties
of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon
the functions of the quarter-masters (maréchaux généraux de
logis) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for
a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system,
bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and
quarter-master had a commission of so much per cent. on all
the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense
was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were
none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were
those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the
depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many
millions. I pointed out to General Washington and several
members of Congress the advantages of the contract system. I
even drew up a memorandum on the subject, which Colonel
Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which
things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies.
But whether it was that they thought such a system
impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to
check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were. I
directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I
found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were
supreme. … The number of men in a regiment was fixed by
Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry,
and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for
three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day,
rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company
complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and
division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon
which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or
of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number,
that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers.
Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen
a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one
corporal! … The soldiers were scattered about in every
direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants,
and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several
thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more
commissaries and quarter-masters at that time than all the
armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one
servant, but others had two and even three.
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If the captains and colonels could give no account of their
men, they could give still less an account of their arms,
accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc.
Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all
the articles. A company, which consisted, in May, of fifty
men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then
consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits,
who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the
clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had
completed their time of service. General Knox assured me that,
previous to the establishment of my department, there never
was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish
from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost
in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was
still greater. The American soldier, never having used this
arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his
beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not
astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the
States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine months.
Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his
successor received another from the public store. No captain
kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As
our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture
to say that during an entire campaign there have not been
twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. … The men
were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of
the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color
and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge,
mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old
blanket or woolen bed-cover. With regard to their military
discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. … I
commenced operations by drafting 120 men from the line, whom I
formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this
guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day;
and to remove that English prejudice which some officers
entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's
duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the
musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I
wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each
drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a
fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a
military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy,
and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision. …
I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army,
and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They
formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed
front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for
the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I
dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was
eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on
a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to
brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers
with an entire division in presence of the
commander-in-chief.' … The most interesting narrative of the
energy employed by Steuben, and the success of his system, is
given by his favorite aid-de-camp and intimate friend, William
North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his
biographical sketch: 'Certainly it was a brave attempt!
Without understanding a word of the English language, to think
of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve
their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word,
a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their
equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a
man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or
high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first
parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how
to follow in a changement to which they had not been
accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were
getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B.
Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from
his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the
orders and interpret to the troops. "If," said the baron, "I
had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more
rejoiced." … Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp,
and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most
worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time,
no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of
this great object. Through the whole of each campaign, when
troops were to maneuver, and that was almost every day, the
baron rose at three o'clock; while his servant dressed his
hair he smoked a single pipe and drank one cup of coffee, was
on horseback at sunrise, and, with or without his suite,
galloped to the parade. There was no waiting for a tardy
aid-de-camp, and those who followed wished they had not slept.
Nor was there need of chiding; when duty was neglected, or
military etiquette infringed, the baron's look was quite
sufficient.' … Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers
and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much
precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief.
Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in
the army, he had greater power and authority than any general
could boast of."

_F. Kapp,
Life of Frederick William von Steuben,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapters 13, 18-19, and 23-27._

_G. W. Greene,
Life of General Nathanael Greene,
book 2, chapters 16-25 (volume l)._

_J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott,
History of Philadelphia,
chapter 17 (volume l)._

_C. J. Stille,
Major-General Anthony Wayne,