Chapter LXIII: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (16)

"Conceiving that the Confederates would move by the Warrenton
pike, in order to cross Bull Run and get possession of
Centreville—thus to interpose between the Federal army and
Washington—Meade retired as speedily as possible. He had, in
reality, the start in the race, notwithstanding the day's loss
in the return movement. … On the morning of the 14th, Lee
advanced from Warrenton in two columns, but not by the 'pike.'
The left, under Hill, moving by the turnpike to New Baltimore,
was ordered to strike the railroad at Bristoe Station; the
right column, under Ewell, taking a more easterly route, was
directed to effect a junction at the same point. When Hill
approached Bristoe, Meade's army, with the exception of
Warren's corps, had passed that point. As the head of this
column came up, the 5th Corps, under General Sykes, had just
crossed Broad Run. Hill at once formed a line of battle to
attack the rear of that corps, when Warren came up, and, by a
bold onset, drove the enemy back, securing 450 prisoners and 5
guns. The National army, having won the race for position, and
obtained possession of the heights of Centreville, Lee's
movement was at an end, and he had but to retire to his old
line again … and, on the 18th, began his retrograde movement.
The following day Meade commenced pursuit, with the intention
of attacking the enemy on his retreat, but did not overtake
him, being detained by a heavy ruin storm, which so raised
Bull Run as to render it unfordable. … On the 7th of November
the whole army was put in motion toward the Rappahannock,
along which river the enemy was in position at Rappahannock
Station and Kelly's Ford. In two columns Meade advanced toward
these points. General French, commanding the left
wing—composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d Corps—was directed to
cross at Kelly's Ford, while the right wing—comprising the
5th and 6th Corps, under General Sedgwick—marched upon
Rappahannock Station. The 3d Corps, under Birney, led the
advance on Kelly's Ford. Reaching that point, without waiting
for pontoons, Birney crossed his own division by wading,
carried the rifle-pits, captured 500 prisoners and prevented
the enemy re-enforcing their troops at the Ford, by means of
batteries which he planted on the hills that commanded the
crossing. At the same time the right wing was contending
against more formidable obstacles at Rappahannock Station.
Early's division of Ewell's corps occupied a series of works
on the north side of the river. … Gaining a good position,
commanding the fort from the rear, Sedgwick planted his guns
and opened a fierce cannonade upon the enemy's several
batteries. Under cover of this fire, the temporary works were
assaulted and carried at the bayonet's point. Over 1,500
prisoners, 4 guns and 8 standards were captured. Sedgwick's
loss was about 300 in killed and wounded. The right column now
crossed the river without opposition, and, uniting with
French's forces, advanced to Brandy Station. November 8th was
lost in getting forward the trains, and in reconnoitering.
Under cover of that night Lee withdrew across the Rapidan.
Taking position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan,
Meade remained quietly and undisturbed for two weeks. Finding
Lee indisposed for action, the Federal leader resolved once
more to try and bring on a general engagement. … The
Confederate army having gone into winter quarters, was located
over a wide extent of country. … This separation of the
enemy's corps, led Meade to hope, that, by crossing the lower
fords of the Rapidan, and advancing rapidly on the plank and
turnpike roads to Orange, C. H., he could concentrate his army
against Ewell's corps, cripple or destroy it, and then be able
to turn upon Hill, and in this way break Lee's army in
detail." But delays occurred which "frustrated the object of
the movement; … disclosed Meade's intention to the enemy, who
at once concentrated his entire force behind Mine Run, having
also time given for additional entrenchments along the menaced
points. The enemy's position was found to be exceedingly
strong by nature, and further perfected by the skill of busy
hands. … In front was Mine Run, a shallow stream, but
difficult to cross on account of its steep banks, the marshy
nature of the ground, and the dense undergrowth with which it
was flanked. … 'In view of the season of the year [said
General Meade in his subsequent report], the impossibility of
moving from that place if there came on even a couple of days
of rain; having failed in my first plan, which was to attack
the enemy before they could concentrate; and then having
failed in my plan to attack them after they had concentrated,
in the manner which I have related, I concluded that, under
the circumstances, it was impossible for me to do anything
more.' And this was the end of a movement, which, like
Hooker's advance to flank Fredericksburg, opened with fair
promise of success, and, like that advance, was a failure from
incidents which the situation permitted rather than asserted."

_O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
division 12, chapter 1 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN:
_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 10._

_J. E. Cooke,
Life of General Robert E. Lee,
part 7._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 29._

_A. A. Humphreys,
From Gettysburg to the Rapidan._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August: Missouri-Kansas).
Quantrell's guerrilla raid.
The sacking and burning of Lawrence.

"Since the fall of Vicksburg many rebel soldiers had returned
from Arkansas to their homes in Western Missouri, and under
the secret orders so frequently sent from commanders in the
South into that State, the guerrilla bands along the Kansas
border suddenly grew in numbers and audacity. Though the whole
region was patrolled almost day and night by Union detachments
and scouts, a daring leader named Quantrell, who had been for
some weeks threatening various Kansas towns, assembled a band
of 300 picked and well-mounted followers at a place of
rendezvous near the line, about sunset of August 20. His
object being divined, half a dozen Union detachments from
different points started in chase of him; but skilfully
eluding all of them by an eccentric march, Quantrell crossed
the State line, and, reaching the open prairie country, where
roads were unnecessary, pushed directly for Lawrence, Kansas.
{3507}
… This town was 40 miles in the interior, and had no reason to
apprehend an attack, and though it could have assembled
several hundred men under arms in half an hour, its
inhabitants had no dream of danger when the marauders entered
the place at sunrise of August 21. Quantrell stationed
detachments to prevent any assembling or concentration of the
citizens, and then began a scene of pillage, arson and
massacre too horrible to relate. Stores and banks were robbed,
185 buildings burned, and from 150 to 200 inhabitants murdered
with a cold-blooded fiendishness which seems impossible to
believe of Americans. The direful work occupied but three or
four hours, when the perpetrators remounted their horses and
departed. Though they managed their retreat with such skill as
to avoid a general encounter, the pursuit was so hot that in
several skirmishes, and by cutting off stragglers and
laggards, 100 or more of the band were killed. The sudden
calamity raised excitement on the Kansas border to almost a
frenzy."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, page 211._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August-September: Tennessee).
Burnside's deliverance of East Tennessee.
The Union Army in Knoxville.

"Ever since the Federals had become masters of Kentucky they
had projected all expedition into East Tennessee. … Early In
the year 1862 the Federals had taken the defile of Cumberland
Gap, the principal door to East Tennessee; but drawn into the
pursuit of their adversaries in other directions, they had
very wisely renounced proceeding beyond the gap, and shortly
thereafter the Confederates had retaken the defile. In 1863
the role of liberator of East Tennessee was reserved for
General Burnside: it was an honorable compensation accorded to
the unfortunate but gallant soldier vanquished at
Fredericksburg. Two divisions of the Ninth Corps designated to
undertake this campaign having been, on June 4th, sent to the
aid of Grant, it became necessary to commence new
preparations. The scattered troops in Kentucky, several
regiments recruited in that State or composed of refugees from
East Tennessee, and a part of the fresh levies made in Ohio
and Indiana, formed the Twenty-third Corps, under the orders
of General Hartsuff. At the end of June … this little army was
in readiness to move, when Morgan started on his raid [and
Burnside's troops were sent in the pursuit]. Six weeks were
lost. It was the beginning of August. The Ninth Corps was
coming back from Vicksburg. But the men, worn out by the
climate, had need of rest. Burnside could not wait for them."
He set out upon his movement into East Tennessee with about
20,000 men, leaving Camp Nelson, near Lexington, on the 16th
of August. The Confederate General Buckner opposed him with an
equal number, including 3000 under General Fraser at
Cumberland Gap. Instead of attempting to force the passage of
the gap, Burnside "determined to make a flank movement around
the defile, by traversing more to the south, in the State of
Tennessee, the high table-land which on that side bears the
designation of Cumberland plateau. The roads which Burnside
would have to cross were long and difficult to travel, and
that portion of the country was little known, besides being
bare of resources; but the very difficult character of the
roads warranted the belief that the Confederates would be illy
prepared for defence in that region. No precaution was
neglected to ensure the success of this laborious and perilous
march," and the success achieved was perfect. "One can
understand with what joy the Federals, after eleven days of
toilsome march, entered the rich valley, a kind of promised
land, which stretched out before them. Public rumor had
greatly exaggerated their numbers. … Bragg, fearing with
reason lest by its flanking movements it [the division which
Burnside led in person] should separate him from Buckner and
then fall upon Chattanooga, had sent his lieutenant an order
to evacuate Knoxville." Buckner withdrew and Burnside made a
triumphal entry into Knoxville on the 3d of September.
"According to the testimony of eye-witnesses, the joy of the
people was beyond description. Innumerable Federal flags which
had been preserved in secret were displayed at the windows."
Frazer, who had not been withdrawn from Cumberland Gap, found
himself entrapped, when, on the 9th of September, Burnside
appeared before his works, and he surrendered without a shot.

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 1, chapter 2._

ALSO IN:
_A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th Army Corps,
part 3, chapters 4-5._

_T. W. Humes,
The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee,
chapter 13._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 30, part 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August-September: Tennessee).
Rosecrans's advance to Chattanooga.
Evacuation of the place by the Confederates.
Battle of Chickamauga.

"The seizure and occupation of the strategic point Chattanooga
was an essential part of the campaign by the national forces
against the Confederates. The Atlantic portion of the Southern
States is separated from the Mississippi Valley by majestic
folds of the earth's surface, constituting the Appalachian
Ranges. These folds run, in a general manner, parallel to each
other, and at intervals are crossed by transverse depressions
or gaps. Such passages or gateways are therefore of great
commercial, political and military importance. Chattanooga,
which in the Cherokee language means 'The Hawk's Nest,' is a
little town seated in one of these transverse depressions,
through which the Tennessee River and a system of railroads
pass. … From the region of Chattanooga the earth-folds range
in a southwesterly direction. Enumerating such of them as are
of interest on the present occasion, they are from west to
east as follows: Raccoon or Sand Mountain, Lookout Mountain,
Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, Chickamauga Hills. …
Chattanooga Valley … through which runs a stream of the same
name, is formed on the west by Lookout Mountain, here about
2,400 feet high, and on the east by Missionary Ridge, so
called because Catholic Missionaries had established, many
years ago, churches and schools upon it among the Cherokee
Indians. From the summit of Lookout Mountain portions of not
fewer than six States may be seen." In his Tullahoma campaign)
Rosecrans, in July, had compelled Bragg and the Confederate
army, by skilful flanking movements, to fan back to
Chattanooga.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1863 (June-July: Tennessee).

{3508}

He had ever since been urged from Washington to pursue his
attack and dislodge the enemy from the mountains. But he
delayed further movements for a month, repairing his railroad
communications, asking for reinforcements, and waiting for
corn to ripen for food and forage. When he advanced, it was to
turn the left of Bragg's position at Chattanooga, and "reach
his rear between Dalton and Atlanta. To do this, he had to
cross the Tennessee River below Chattanooga, and then pass the
three or four successive mountain ridges. … Rosecrans reached
the Tennessee River on the evening of the 20th of August, and
shelled Chattanooga from the heights on the north bank on the
21st. Bridges were thrown over the river at Caperton's Ferry,
mouth of Battle Creek, and Shell Mound, and the army, except
the cavalry, safely crossed in face of the enemy. By the 8th
of September" the several movements planned for Thomas, McCook
and Crittenden were successfully accomplished, and Chattanooga
was abandoned by the Confederates. "Thus the first object of
Rosecrans's campaign was accomplished: the important strategic
point Chattanooga was obtained. … Rosecrans, believing himself
perfectly secure in Chattanooga, and being convinced that
Bragg was fleeing southward, did nothing to fortify himself.
Taking measures to pursue his antagonist, he directed
Crittenden to leave one brigade at Chattanooga as a garrison,
and with the rest move forward to Ringgold. Thomas was to
march to Lafayette, and McCook upon Alpine and Summer Creek.
But Bragg, so far from continuing, had stopped his retreat—he
was concentrating at Lafayette. He had received, or was on the
point of receiving, the powerful re-enforcements directed to
join him. He was strictly ordered to check the farther advance
of the Army of the Cumberland. … Rosecrans had separated three
corps of his army by mountain ridges and by distances greater
than those intervening between each of them and the enemy.
Bragg had concentrated opposite his centre, and was holding
such a position that he could attack any of them with
overwhelming numbers. He had caused deserters and citizens to
go into Rosecrans's lines to confirm him in the impression
that the Confederates were in rapid retreat. … On the 11th of
September, Crittenden, not stopping to fortify Chattanooga,
pushed on toward Ringgold to cut off Buckner, who he had heard
was coming from East Tennessee to the support of Bragg.
Finding that Buckner had already passed, he turned toward
Lafayette to follow him, going up the east side of the
Chickamauga, but meeting a steadily increasing resistance he
took alarm, and fell back across that stream at Lee and
Gordon's Mills. The forces he had encountered were Cheatham's
and Walker's divisions. Thomas, who had now discovered Bragg's
position, directed McCook, who was advancing on Rome, to fall
back instantly and connect with him. Rosecrans's troops had
thus become scattered along an extended line from Lee and
Gordon's Mills to Alpine, a space of about forty miles. By the
17th they were brought more within supporting distance, and on
the morning of the 18th a concentration was begun toward
Crawfish Spring, but it was slowly executed. At this time the
two armies were confronting each other on the opposite banks
of the Chickamauga, a stream which, rising at the junction of
Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain … empties into the
beautiful Tennessee River above Chattanooga. In the Indian
tongue Chickamauga means 'The Stagnant Stream,' 'The River of
Death'—a name, as we shall soon find, of ominous import.
Rosecrans was on the west bank of the Chickamauga. … On the
18th his right was … at Gordon's Mills, his left near the road
across from Rossville. Bragg's intention was to flank this
left and interpose between it and Chattanooga. … On the 18th
Longstreet's troops were arriving from Virginia, and Bragg was
ready. … The battle of Chickamauga commenced on the morning of
the 19th." Bragg's flanking movement, executed under General
Polk, and directed against the left of Rosecrans's line, where
Thomas had command, did not succeed. "The centre was then
assailed and pressed back, but, having been re-enforced, it
recovered its ground. Night came, and the battle was thus far
indecisive. … The night was spent in preparation. Thomas
constructed abatis and breastworks before his lines. … Bragg
was still determined to flank the national left, and intervene
between it and Chattanooga. He had ordered Polk to begin the
battle as soon as it was light enough to see," but Polk
delayed and it was not until 10 o'clock that "Breckenridge's
division, followed by Cleburne's, advanced against the
breastworks of Thomas, which were mostly in Cleburne's front.
Cleburne moved directly upon them, Breckenridge swinging round
to flank them. With so much energy were these attacks made,
that Thomas had to send repeatedly to Rosecrans for help. The
Confederates had been gaining ground, but with these
re-enforcements Thomas succeeded in driving back Cleburne with
very great loss, and even in advancing on the right of
Breckenridge." But, presently, by some blunder in the giving
or construing of an order, one division—that of General
"Wood—was withdrawn from Rosecrans line and posted uselessly
in the rear. "By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in
the line of battle, of which Hindman, of Longstreet's corps,
took instant advantage, and, striking Davis in flank and rear,
threw his whole division into confusion. … That break in the
line was never repaired. Longstreet's masses charged with such
terrible energy that it was impossible to check them. The
national right and centre were dispersed, flying toward
Rossville and Chattanooga. Sheridan, however, at length
succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of his division,
and managed to reach Thomas. On Thomas, who, in allusion to
these events, is often called 'The Rock of Chickamauga.' the
weight of the battle now fell. Everything depended on his
firmness. … In the flight of the right and part of the centre
from the field, Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden were
enveloped and carried away. … Rosecrans … went to Chattanooga,
and thence telegraphed to Washington that his army had been
beaten. Thomas still remained immovable in his position," and
at a critical moment he was saved from a movement into his
rear, by General Gorden Granger, who pushed to the front with
some reserves. "Night came, and the Confederates were still
unable to shake him. But, as most of the army had retreated to
Chattanooga, he now deliberately fell back to Rossville. … The
dead and wounded he left in the hands of the enemy. On the
21st he offered battle again, and that night withdrew into the
defences of Chattanooga."

_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 67, volume 3._

{3509}

"During the heavy fighting of the 20th, Thomas was the only
general officer on the field of rank above a division
commander. … Well was he called the 'Rock of Chickamauga,' …
There is nothing finer in history than Thomas at Chickamauga.
All things considered, the battle of Chickamauga, for the
forces engaged, was the hardest fought and the bloodiest
battle of the Rebellion. … The largest number of troops
Rosecrans had of all arms on the field during the two days'
fighting was 55,000 effective men. … Rosecrans's losses
aggregated killed, 1,687; wounded, 9,394; missing, 5,255.
Total loss, 16,336. Bragg, during the battle, when his entire
five corps were engaged, had about 70,000 effective troops in
line. … His losses, in part estimated, were 2,673 killed,
16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing, a total of 20,950. A full
report of the rebel losses was never made."

_H. M. Cist,
The Army of the Cumberland
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7), chapters 11-12._

ALSO IN:
_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 1, chapters 2-6._

_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
volume 1, chapter 20._

_T. B. Van Horne,
Life of Major-General George H. Thomas,
chapters 6-7._

_W. B. Hazen,
Narrative of Military Service,
chapters 8-9._

_D. H. Hill, E. Opdycke, and others,
Chickamauga
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 30._

_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 15._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(August-October: Arkansas-Missouri).
The breaking of Confederate authority in Arkansas.
Occupation of Little Rock by national forces.
Rebel raids into Missouri.

"After the surrender of Vicksburg, the Federal General Steele
was sent to Helena, with a considerable force, and instructed
to form a junction with General Davidson, who was moving south
from Missouri, by way of Crowley's Ridge, west of the St.
Francis, and with the combined force drive the Confederates
south of the Arkansas River. Having effected this junction and
established his depot and hospitals at Duvall's Bluff, on the
White River, General Steele, on the 1st of August, advanced
against the Confederate army, which fell back toward Little
Rock. After several successful skirmishes, he reached the
Arkansas River, and threw part of his force upon the south
side, to threaten the Confederate communications with
Arkadelphia, their depot of supplies, and flank their position
at Little Rock. General Marmaduke was sent out with a cavalry
force to beat the Federals back, but was completely routed.
Seeing what must be the inevitable result of this movement of
General Steele, the Confederate General Holmes destroyed what
property he could, and after a slight resistance retreated
with his army in great disorder, pursued by the Federal
cavalry, and on the 10th of September General Steele, with the
Federal army, entered the capital of Arkansas. His entire
losses in killed, wounded and missing, in this whole movement,
did not exceed 100. He captured 1,000 prisoners, and such
public property as the Confederates had not time to destroy.
The Federal cavalry continued to press the retreating
Confederates southward; but a small force, which had eluded
pursuit and moved eastward, attacked the Federal garrison at
Pine Bluff, on the Arkansas, south of Little Rock, hoping to
recapture it and thus cripple the Federals and break their
communications. The attempt, which was made on the 28th of
October, was repulsed with decided loss on the part of the
confederates, and the same day the Federal cavalry occupied
Arkadelphia, and the Confederates retreated toward the Red
River. This completely restored Arkansas to the Federal
authority, except a small district in the extreme southwest,
and the region of Northwest Arkansas, over which the guerrilla
and other irregular troops of the Confederates continued to
roam, in their plundering excursions into Missouri, Kansas,
and the Indian Territory. Some of these were conducted on a
large scale. … The Confederate General Cabell, collecting
together as many of the guerrillas and Indians as possible,
and some of the routed troops driven from Little Rock and its
vicinity, started with a force variously estimated at from
4,000 to 10,000, in the latter part of September, from the
Choctaw settlements of the Indian Territory, crossed the
Arkansas River east of Fort Smith, and, on the 1st of October,
a detachment of his troops, under General Shelby, joined
Coffee at Crooked Prairie, Missouri, intending to make a raid
into Southwestern Missouri. This combined force, numbering
2,000 or 2,500 men, penetrated as far as the Missouri River at
Booneville, but were pursued by the Missouri militia, and
finally brought to a stand about eight miles southwest of
Arrow Rock, on the evening of the 12th of October. General E.
B. Brown who commanded the Federal troops, fought them till
dark that evening, and during the night, having detached a
small force to attack them in the rear, renewed the battle the
next morning at eight A. M. After a sharp contest they fled,
completely routed and broken up, with a loss of several
hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. They were pursued to
the Arkansas line and prisoners gleaned all the way. … With
these last convulsive throes, the active existence of the
Confederate authority in Arkansas died out. On the 12th of
November a meeting was held at Little Rock, to consult on
measures for the restoration of the State to the Union, and
was succeeded by others in different parts of the State."

_W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
chapter 36._

ALSO IN:
_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civile war in America,
volume 4, book 3, chapter 3._

_W. Britton,
Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border,
chapters 21-22._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(August-December: South Carolina).
Siege and Reduction of Fort Wagner.
Bombardment of Fort Sumter and Charleston.

After the unsuccessful assault and bloody repulse of July 18th
General Gillmore began against Fort Wagner the operations of a
regular siege.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(JULY: SOUTH CAROLINA)

"Trenches were dug, and by the middle of August the batteries
were within a quarter-mile of Wagner and within two and a half
miles of Sumter. The work on these batteries had to be done
mostly by night, for the forts kept up a heavy fire. Another
battery was also begun in the marsh on the west side of Morris
Island. The black mud there was so soft that it would not bear
the weight of a man, and was at least 16 feet deep. After the
site was chosen, a lieutenant was ordered to superintend the
work, and told to call for whatever materials he wanted. Being
something of a wag, he sent to the quartermaster for 100 men 18
feet high, to work in mud 16 feet deep; but as men of that
height could not be had, he had to be satisfied with workmen
of common stature.
{3510}
All the work had to be done in the dark, for it was within
range of the guns of the forts. During fourteen nights piles
were driven through the mud into the solid ground beneath, and
on them were piled 15,000 bags of sand to form a parapet.
After breaking down several trucks, a monster eight-inch
Parrott gun, a 200-pounder, was dragged across the swamp and
mounted, and about the middle of August the Swamp Angel, as
the soldiers named it, was ready to throw shells into
Charleston, nearly five miles away. On the 17th of August
twelve land-batteries and the monitors opened fire on Sumter,
Wagner, and Gregg. The heaviest of the fire was aimed at
Sumter, as General Gillmore wished to silence it before he
made another assault on Wagner. The bombardment was kept up
for seven days, when Gillmore sent a dispatch to General
Halleck, saying: 'Fort Sumter is to-day (August 24) a
shapeless and harmless mass of ruins.' On the 21st of August,
General Gillmore wrote to General Beauregard, who was in
command in Charleston, demanding the evacuation of Fort Sumter
and of Morris Island, threatening, in case of refusal, to
bombard Charleston. Not hearing from him, he ordered a few
shells to be thrown into the city from the Swamp Angel. Some
of them fell in the streets and frightened the people, but did
little damage. Beauregard then wrote him a letter in which he
accused him of barbarity in 'turning his guns against the old
men, the women and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping
city,' and called the act 'unworthy of any soldier. General
Gillmore replied that it was the duty of the commander of an
attacked place to 'see to it that the non-combatants were
removed,' and that he (Beauregard) had had forty days' time in
which to do it. But the Swamp Angel was fired only a few
times. At the thirty-sixth shot it burst and blew out the
whole of its breech, and no other gun was mounted in its
place. Gillmore then turned his attention once more to Fort
Wagner, which he determined to assault again. To do this it
was necessary to silence its guns and drive its defenders into
the bomb-proofs; so a heavy fire was opened on it by the
batteries, while the armored frigate New Ironsides poured
eleven-inch shells into it from the sea side. The bombardment
was kept up day and night, strong calcium lights being used by
night to blind the Confederates and to show all parts of their
works. The Confederates, driven from their guns, were obliged
to fly for safety to their bomb-proofs. In the morning of
September 7, the troops, under General Terry, were about ready
to make the assault, when it was reported that the fort was
empty. The garrisons of both Wagner and Gregg had fled during
the night, and the whole of Morris Island was at last in
possession of the Union troops. The next night an attack was
made on Sumter by thirty boat-loads of men from the fleet.
They reached the base of the walls and began to go up,
thinking that the garrison was asleep; but before they reached
the top a fire of musketry and hand-grenades was opened on
them by the Confederates within, aided by some gun boats
outside, and the assailants were driven off with a loss of
about 200. But little more was done against Charleston during
the rest of the year. General Gillmore thought that, as
Sumter's guns were silenced, the fleet might easily pass into
the harbor and capture Charleston. But Admiral Dahlgren did
not care to run the risk of the torpedoes and powder-mines
over which he knew he would have to pass. Besides, General
Beauregard had taken advantage of the long delay in taking
Wagner to strengthen the inner forts. Fort Johnson had been
made into a powerful earthwork, and the fleet, even if Sumter
were passed, would meet with as hot a fire as had been
experienced outside. General Gillmore therefore contented
himself with repairing Wagner and Gregg and turning their guns
on Charles·ton and the forts defending it. As they were a mile
nearer the city than the Swamp Angel battery, a slow
bombardment was kept up until near the end of the year. About
half of Charleston was reached by the shells, and many
buildings were greatly injured. As the wharfs and most of the
harbor were under fire, blockade-runners could no longer run
in, and the business of the city was thus wholly destroyed."

_J. D. Champlin, Jr.,
Young Folk's History of the War for the Union,
chapter 32._

ALSO IN:
_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 3, chapter 2._

_A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
volume 2, chapters 32-34._

_C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
volume 2, chapter 35._

_L. F. Emilio,
History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.,
chapters 6-7._

[Image: Map of the Battlefield of Chattanooga. 1863.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (October-November: Tennessee).
The raising of the siege of Chattanooga.
"Battle above the Clouds," on Lookout Mountain.
Assault of Missionary Ridge.
The Rout of Bragg's army.

After its defeat at Chickamauga the National Army was
practically besieged on Chattanooga. Bragg acquired strong
positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and was
able to cut off all of Rosecrans's routes of supply, except
one long and difficult wagon-road. On the 17th of October an
important reorganization of the Union armies in the West was
effected. "The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and
the Tennessee, were united under the title of Military
Division of the Mississippi, of which General Grant was made
commander, and Thomas superseded Rosecrans in command of the
Army of the Cumberland. General Hooker, with two corps, was
sent to Tennessee. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23d of
October, and found affairs in a deplorable condition. It was
impossible to supply the troops properly by the one
wagon-road, and they had been on short rations for some time,
while large numbers of the mules and horses were dead. Grant's
first care was to open a new and better line of supply.
Steamers could come up the river as far as Bridgeport, and he
ordered the immediate construction of a road and bridge to
reach that point by way of Brown's Ferry, which was done
within five days, the 'cracker line,' as the soldiers called
it, was opened, and thenceforth they had full rations and
abundance of everything. The enemy attempted to interrupt the
work on the road; but Hooker met them at Wauhatchie, west of
Lookout Mountain, and after a three-hours' action drove them
off [with It loss of 416 killed and wounded, the Confederate
loss being unknown]. Chattanooga was now no longer in a state
of siege; but it was still seriously menaced by Bragg's army,
which held a most singular position.
{3512}
Its flanks were on the northern ends of Lookout Mountain and
Mission Ridge, the crests of which were occupied for some
distance, and its centre stretched across Chattanooga valley.
This line was twelve miles long, and most of it was well
intrenched. Grant ordered Sherman [coming from Memphis] to
join him with one corps, and Sherman promptly obeyed, but as
he did considerable railroad repairing on the way, he did not
reach Chattanooga till the 15th of November. Meanwhile
Longstreet with 20,000 troops had been detached from Bragg's
army and sent against Burnside at Knoxville. After Sherman's
arrival, Grant had about 80,000 men."

_R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Secession,
chapter 20._

"My orders for battle," writes General Grant, "were all
prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival, except the dates,
which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so
far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special
advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's
corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the
hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite
Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at
a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope
between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into
Chattanooga Valley. The plan of battle was for Sherman to
attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend
our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten or
hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either
to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his
base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like
service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout
Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way
possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south
of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across
the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to
Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the
enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce
this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied
the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged
with most of his forces on his two flanks. To carry out this
plan, Sherman was to cross at Brown's Ferry and move east of
Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission
Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of
sight of the enemy on the ridge." Remaining in this concealed
position until the time of attack, Sherman's army was then,
under cover of night, to be rapidly brought back to the south
side of the Tennessee, at a point where Missionary Ridge
prolonged would touch the river, this being done by pontoons
ready provided at a spot also concealed. The execution of the
plan was delayed by heavy rains until November 23, when
Burnside's distress at Knoxville forced Grant to begin his
attack on Bragg by an advance of Thomas's army, at the center,
before the flanking preparations were completed. "This
movement [General Grant's narrative continues] secured to us a
line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the
morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied to this
time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other
way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost
in this preliminary action about 1,100 killed and wounded,
while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the
prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing
of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood
until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first
day. … By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a
position to move," and by daylight two divisions of his
command were on the south side of the river, "well covered by
the works they had built. The work of laying the bridge, on
which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. … By
a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one
over the South Chickamauga … and all the infantry and
artillery were on the south side of the Tennessee. Sherman at
once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. … By
half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height
without having sustained much loss. … Artillery was dragged to
the top of the hill by hand, The enemy did not seem to be
aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained.
There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds
were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary
Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley.
But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made
several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away,
but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack
was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to
fortify what he had gained. … While these operations were
going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the
west. He had three divisions … all west of Lookout Creek. The
enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and
entrenched. … The side of Lookout Mountain confronting
Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of
chasms. … Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved
Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up
Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The remainder of Cruft's
division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the
crossing of the railroad. … This attracted the enemy so that
Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist
obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the
mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured
the picket of over 40 men on guard near by. He then commenced
ascending the mountain directly in his front. … By noon Geary
had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain,
with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but
there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the
command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the
upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. Thomas and I
were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our
line a continuous one. … The day was hazy, so that Hooker's
operations were not visible to us except at the moments when
the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and
musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was
partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works.
During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top
of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the
view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where
Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At four o'clock
Hooker reported his position as impregnable.
{3513}
By a little after five direct communication was established,
and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce
him. … The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and
the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob.
It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full
view. … Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see,
and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held
the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east
base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base … and
Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly
towards the hill to be captured." The fighting was severe for
hours, and Bragg moved heavy masses of troops to resist
Sherman's advance, while a division from Thomas was sent to
reinforce the latter. "It had now got to be late in the
afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker
crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and
compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also. The enemy had
evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he
would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over
Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads
behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no
obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction
above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga
Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected
from his forces. … But Sherman's condition was getting so
critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed
any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying
under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the
signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at
once." In this splendid charge the Union troops drove the
Confederates from the first line of their works and then
pushed on, with no further orders, to the second line, with
the same success. "The retreat of the enemy along most of his
line was precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and
his officers lost all control over their men. Many were
captured and thousands threw away their arms in their flight.
Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River
at a point above where the enemy crossed. … To Sheridan's
prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland and the nation are
indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery,
and small arms that day. … The enemy confronting Sherman, now
seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. …
Hooker [pushing on to Rossville as soon as he had succeeded in
getting across Chattanooga Creek] … came upon the flank of a
division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along
the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but
little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as
many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were
captured. … The victory at Chattanooga was won against great
odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position."

_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 42-44 (volume 2)._

"Grant's losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4,529
wounded, and 330 missing; total 5,616. The enemy's losses were
fewer in killed and wounded, owing to the fact that he was
protected by intrenchments, while the national' soldiers were
without cover. Grant captured 6,142 prisoners, 40 pieces of
artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7,000
stand of small arms; by far the greatest capture, in the open
field, which had then been made during the war. The battle of
Chattanooga was the grandest ever fought west of the
Alleghanies. It covered an extent of 13 miles, and Grant had
over 60,000 men engaged. The rebels numbered only 45,000 men,
but they enjoyed immense advantages of position in every part
of the field." Pursuit of the retreating Confederates began
early in the morning of the 26th, and considerable fighting
occurred on that day and the next. At Ringgold, Hooker was
checked by Cleburne's division, which held an easily defended
gap while the main column with its trains were moved beyond
reach. In this battle at Ringgold Hooker lost 65 killed and
377 wounded. He took three pieces of artillery and 230
prisoners.

_A. Badeau,
Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,
chapters 11-12 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 5.

_H. M. Cist,
The Army of the Cumberland
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7),
chapters 13-14._

_Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 2._

_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapter 13 (volume 1)._

_P. H. Sheridan,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 16._

_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapters 21-22 (volume 1)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 31._

_B. F. Taylor,
Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (October-December: Tennessee).
The Siege of Knoxville.

"The Army of the Cumberland remaining quiet at Chattanooga,
Bragg (or his superiors) conceived the idea of improving his
leisure by a movement on Burnside, which Longstreet was
assigned to lead. Burnside had by this time spread his force
very widely, holding innumerable points and places southward
and eastward of Knoxville by brigades and detachments; and
Longstreet advancing silently and rapidly, was enabled to
strike heavily [October 20] at the little outpost of
Philadelphia, held by Colonel F. T. Wolford, with the 1st,
11th, and 12th Kentucky cavalry and 45th Ohio mounted
infantry—in all about 2,000 men. Wolford … withstood several
hours, hoping that the sound of guns would bring him
assistance from Loudon in his rear; but none arrived; and he
was at length obliged to cut his way out; losing his battery
and 32 wagons, but bringing off most of his command, with 51
prisoners. … Our total loss in prisoners to Longstreet
southward of Loudon is stated by Halleck at 650. The enemy
advancing resolutely yet cautiously, our troops were withdrawn
before them from Lenoir and from Loudon, concentrating at
Campbell's Station—General Burnside, who had hastened from
Knoxville at the tidings of danger, being personally in
command. Having been joined by his old (9th) corps, he was now
probably as strong as Longstreet; but a large portion of his
force was still dispersed far to the eastward, and he
apprehended being flanked by an advance from Kingston on his
left. He found himself so closely pressed, however, that he
must either fight or sacrifice his trains; so he chose an
advantageous position and suddenly faced the foe: his
batteries being all at hand, while those of his pursuers were
behind; so that he had decidedly the advantage in the fighting
till late in the afternoon, when they brought up three
batteries and opened, while their infantry were extended on
either hand, as if to outflank him.
{3514}
He then fell back to the next ridge, and again faced about;
holding his position firmly till after nightfall; when—his
trains having meantime obtained a fair start—he resumed his
retreat, and continued it unmolested until safe within the
sheltering intrenchments of Knoxville. Our loss in this affair
was about 800; that of the enemy was probably greater. …
Longstreet continued his pursuit and in due time beleaguered
the city [November 17], though he can hardly be said to have
invested it. … The defenses were engineered by Captain Poe,
and were signally effective. Directly on getting into
position, a smart assault was delivered on our right, held by
the 12th Illinois, 45th Ohio, 3d Michigan, and 12th Kentucky,
and a hill carried; but it was not essential to the defenses.
Our loss this day was about 100; among them was General W. P.
Sanders, of Kentucky, killed. Shelling and skirmishing barely
served to break the monotony for ten weary days, when—having
been reenforced by Sam Jones, and one or two other small
commands from Virginia—Longstreet delivered an assault, by a
picked storming party of three brigades, on an unfinished but
important work known as Fort Sanders, on our left, but was
bloodily repelled by General Ferrero, who held it—the loss of
the assailants being some 800, … while on our side the entire
loss that night was about 100; only 15 of these in the fort.
And now—Bragg having been defeated by Grant before
Chattanooga, and a relieving force under Sherman being close
at hand—Longstreet necessarily abandoned the siege, and moved
rapidly eastward unassailed to Russellville, Virginia: our
entire loss in the defense having been less than 1,000; while
his must have been twice or thrice that number. Sherman's
advance reached the city, and Burnside officially announced
the raising of the siege, December 5th."

_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 18._

ALSO IN:
_A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps,
part 3, chapter 6._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 31, part 1._

_T. W. Humes.
The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee,
chapters 14-16._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (November).
President Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg.

"By the retreat of Lee from Gettysburg and the immediate
pursuit by Meade, the burial of the dead and care of the
wounded on that great battlefield were left largely to the
military and local authorities of the State of Pennsylvania.
Governor Andrew G. Curtin gave the humane and patriotic duty
his thoughtful attention; and during its execution the
appropriate design of changing a portion of the field into a
permanent cemetery, where the remains of the fallen heroes
might be brought together, and their last resting-place
suitably protected and embellished, was conceived and begun.
The citizen soldiery from seventeen of the loyal States had
taken part in the conflict on the Union side, and the several
Governors of these States heartily cooperated in the project,
which thus acquired a National character. This circumstance
made it natural that the dedication ceremonies should be of
more than usual interest and impressiveness. Accordingly, at
the beginning of November, 1863, when the work was approaching
its completion, Mr. David Wills, the special agent of Governor
Curtin, and also acting for the several States, who had not
only originated, but mainly superintended, the enterprise,
wrote the following letter of invitation to President Lincoln:
'The several States having soldiers in the Army of the
Potomac, who were killed at the battle of Gettysburg, or have
since died at the various hospitals which were established in
the vicinity, have procured grounds on a prominent part of the
battlefield for a cemetery, and are having the dead removed to
them and properly buried. These grounds will be consecrated
and set apart to this sacred purpose, by appropriate
ceremonies, on Thursday, the 19th instant. Honorable Edward
Everett will deliver the oration. I am authorized by the
Governors of the different States to invite you to be present
and participate in these ceremonies, which will doubtless be
very imposing and solemnly impressive. It is the desire that
after the oration, you, as Chief Executive of the nation,
formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few
appropriate remarks. It will be a source of great
gratification to the many widows and orphans that have been
made almost friendless by the great battle here, to have you
here personally; and it will kindle anew in the breasts of the
comrades of these brave dead, who are now in the tented field
or nobly meeting the foe in the front, a confidence that they
who sleep in death on the battlefield are not forgotten by
those highest in authority; and they will feel that, should
their fate be the same, their remains will not be uncared-for.
We hope you will be able to be present to perform this last
solemn act to the soldier dead on this battlefield.' President
Lincoln expressed his willingness to perform the duty
requested of him. … At the appointed hour on the 19th a vast
procession, with military music, moved to the cemetery grounds
where, in the midst of a distinguished auditory, the orator of
the day, Edward Everett, made an address worthy alike of his
own fame and the extraordinary occasion. … Mr. Everett ended
in a brilliant peroration, the echoes of which were lost in
the long and hearty plaudits of the great multitude, and then
President Lincoln arose to fill the part assigned him in the
programme. It was a trying ordeal to fittingly crown with a
few brief sentences the ceremonies of such a day, and such an
achievement in oratory; finished, erudite, apparently
exhaustive of the theme, replete with all the strength of
scholastic method and the highest graces of literary culture.
If there arose in the mind of any discriminating listener on
the platform a passing doubt whether Mr. Lincoln would or
could properly honor the unique occasion, that doubt vanished
with his opening sentence; for then and there the President
pronounced an address of dedication so pertinent, so brief yet
so comprehensive, so terse yet so eloquent, linking the deeds
of the present to the thoughts of the future, with simple
words, in such living, original, yet exquisitely molded,
maxim-like phrases that the best critics have awarded it an
unquestioned rank as one of the world's masterpieces in
rhetorical art.
{3515}
He said: