Chapter XIII: M. Grévy's Presidency (2)

The question of appointing the Controllers and deciding what their functions were to be, gave rise to more difficulties, caused by the obvious desire of many Frenchmen to get the Egyptian finances entirely into French hands. Ultimately Major Baring and M. de Blignières were appointed, but their powers were not formally defined until November. By the decree of November 15, 1879, it was laid down that the Controllers should have full rights of inquiring into all branches of the administration; the rank of Ministers and seats in the Cabinet, although restricted to making suggestions; the power of appointing and dismissing subordinate officials; and it was further enacted that they were irremovable without the consent of their respective Governments. By this action the British and the French Governments practically assumed the responsibility of Government, and for some time to come Egypt ceased to give trouble.

In the month of June, 1879, an event had occurred which was of profound importance to all political parties in France. The Prince Imperial had perished in Zululand, and with him had vanished the hopes of a resuscitated Empire. The tragedy of the Prince's death is heightened by the fact that it was only owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding that he was ever allowed to accompany the expedition. On March 1, Lord Salisbury writing to Lord Lyons stated that the departure of the Prince Imperial was: _'a mal entendu_ which we are unable to understand even here. The Government had very distinctly negatived it, but in consequence of some misapprehensions, our orders were not attended to by the military men, and he received encouragement which could not afterwards be withdrawn. If you think Waddington is at all sore on the matter, you are authorized to explain this fully to him. But I rather expect to hear from you that no importance is attached by the French Government to what has taken place.'

Two days later he again wrote:--

I am very sorry to hear that so painful an impression was
created in Paris. We have never been able to discover exactly
how it was done, or why our already clearly expressed objection
was disregarded. He was of course at liberty to go, and people
who ought to have known better were at liberty to write private
letters and go to railway stations. Of course nothing official has
been done, but the border line between official and private has
been very closely trenched upon. However, all we can do now is to
express our sincere regret.

At Lord Lyons's next interview with M. Waddington, the latter asked (not in a complaining manner) how the Prince's expedition to Zululand had been brought about, and was told in reply that the Prince had settled it himself through personal friends and that Her Majesty's Government had by no means approved of it. President Grévy alluded to the matter in the course of a conversation with the Prince of Wales, who happened to be in Paris, and also expressed no disapproval; in fact, he went so far as to remark: _qu'il avait très bien fait_. Thus the principal personages in France evidently did not consider the matter of much importance; but, on the other hand, the Republican press showed considerable irritation, which, under the circumstances, was perhaps not entirely unnatural, as it did not seem credible that the Prince could have started without the approval of the British Government. When the news of his death arrived, it was felt that, for the time being at all events, Bonapartism had been practically crushed out of existence.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, June 20, 1879.

In hearing of the sad end of the short life of the Prince
Imperial, one's first thought is for the Empress, whose bitter cup
of sorrows is now full.

The immediate political result is the utter disorganization
of the Imperial Party. It was far from strong, but still it was
the most efficacious element of opposition to the Republicans, and
they will now have things still more their own way. The Fleurys,
Rouhers, and the old Imperial following can never hope to live to
recover from the blow. I suppose Prince Napoleon will hardly put
himself forward in the position of a pretender to the Imperial
Crown, and he would have no party with him if he did. In the
more remote future his eldest son may prove a more formidable
candidate than poor Prince Louis could have been. He is said to be
a remarkably clever, attractive youth, and a thorough Bonaparte
in appearance. No hereditary responsibility for Sedan can be cast
upon him; he is undoubtedly of the Bonaparte race, and he has been
brought up in France. For the present, however, Prince Louis's
melancholy death is a decided accession to Republican strength.

The death of the Prince excited the sympathies of all classes in France with the stricken Empress, but when in July, preparations were being made for the funeral in England, the bitterness of French party politics displayed itself in that hostility which, carried beyond the grave, it is the least possible to condone.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 10, 1879.

The susceptibility the French Government is showing about
the funeral of the Prince Imperial is neither wise nor dignified.
If ever there was an occasion on which political animosities
might be left in abeyance, surely this is one. The death of the
Prince Imperial has put an end to many hopes and aspirations,
and has inclined numerous adherents of the family to acquiesce
in the present state of things. It is certainly not politic to
require of people in this frame of mind an overt manifestation
of heartlessness and ingratitude to the dynasty which has had so
mournful an end. The ceremony so manifestly relates to the past
and not to the future that there can be no reasonable objection
to allowing the old adherents of the family, whether Marshals and
Generals, or merely civilians to go over to attend it. I fancy
that Grévy himself and the Republicans _de la vieille_ cannot get
over, even on such an occasion as this, their old hostility to the
Empire.

These almost incredibly vindictive feelings again manifested themselves when a proposal was made that a monument to the unfortunate Prince should be placed in Westminster Abbey. M. Waddington, who must have been heartily ashamed of the part he was forced to play, remonstrated privately against the project, and intimated to Lord Lyons that he thought of writing to Dean Stanley, whom he happened to know, and of urging him not to consent to it.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 22, 1879.

I think, on the whole, I had better not answer your despatch
officially about the Prince Imperial's statue; but you can tell
Waddington unofficially as much of the following as you may
think useful. As soon as I got it, I communicated with the Prime
Minister, who sent to the Dean of Westminster. The Dean, when the
message reached him, had already forwarded to all the newspapers
a letter which you have read in the issues of this morning. On
reading it we came to the conclusion that the matter had gone too
far to be recalled.

On historical considerations the Dean proposes to put the
monument into Henry the Seventh's chapel, and for that purpose,
undoubtedly, the Queen's permission must be obtained. But as
regards the Abbey in general he is absolutely supreme. He might
put up a statue of Nana Sahib, if he chose. So we must decline to
accept any responsibility for his proceedings. As he has publicly
made the announcement that it is his intention, if not interfered
with, to give the requisite permission, it is clearly impossible
for us to 'apply pressure' to induce him to give way. The motive
for doing so would have to be confessed and would cause much
misapprehension.

I have expressed a wish to see the inscription before it is
put up, and I have no doubt I shall be allowed to do so. I think I
can assure M. Waddington that there is not the slightest danger of
anything about Napoleon IV. being contained in it.

* * * * *

The monument was never erected, the project meeting with much opposition in Parliament as calculated to offend the susceptibilities of the French Government.

It must be admitted that the circumstances surrounding the death of this unfortunate Prince reflect discredit, though in an unequal degree, upon both the French and the British Governments. If the French Government showed a petty and vindictive spirit totally unworthy of a great and powerful nation, the misunderstanding which enabled the Prince to go to South Africa; his vague and indefinite status with respect to the expeditionary force; the equally vague conditions attaching to his relations with Captain Carey, which were partly responsible for his death; the unhappy suggestion of the Abbey monument; the helpless attitude of the Government in the face of an enterprising ecclesiastic; and the subsequent unseemly discussion in the House of Commons, are eloquent of slipshod and careless methods which are discreditable to British administration and constitute a somewhat humiliating page in the national history.

The autumn of 1879 was marked by the conclusion of the Austro-German alliance, hailed at the time by Lord Salisbury as 'glad tidings of great joy,' and destined profoundly to influence European politics for many years to come. In spite of assurances given by Bismarck himself, by Andrassy, and by Haymerle, this new grouping of two first-class military Powers caused much perturbation at Paris, which was certainly not allayed by Lord Salisbury's benediction, and provided convenient material for an attack upon the tottering Waddington administration.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Nov. 14, 1879.

* * * * *

As to French internal politics, the most striking feature is
the somewhat vague but almost universal feeling of uneasiness about
the future which pervades France. It is impossible not to see that
this feeling has increased even during the few weeks that have
elapsed since I went away on leave in August. I suppose that the
immediate fear is that the Waddington Ministry will be succeeded by
one more Radical, and that thus, step by step, the Ultra-Reds will
get the Government into their hands.

When I first saw Waddington on my return, he was in good
spirits, thinking that the threatened attacks upon him about
the amnesty, the Government, and especially the diplomatic
appointments, had blown over. Now, however, he is menaced with
an interpellation on the Austro-German understanding. This
understanding is, of course, extremely unpalatable to the French,
and among them the general belief is that it binds Austria to
assist Germany, in case of need, to defend Alsace and Lorraine
against France. Waddington has the most positive assurances from
Bismarck, Andrassy and Haymerle that there is nothing against
France in it, but this is not enough to reassure the cavillers.
The intention seems to be to reproach Waddington with this
understanding generally, as indicating the failure of his Foreign
Policy, and in particular to blame him for having an Ambassador at
Vienna who neither prevented, nor found it out, and an Ambassador
in London who did not make the French policy on the subject
properly understood by the English Government. It seems that
it is intended to argue that you would not have spoken of the
understanding in the terms you used at Manchester, if you had
known the painful impression it had made in France.

There are two opinions in France on the Foreign Policy to be
now adopted. Perhaps the general, unreflecting public are inclined
to throw themselves into the arms of Russia. The wise heads (and
there is some reason to hope that Gambetta may be among them) look
rather to England, and are willing to conciliate her by supporting
her views in the East. It may be worth while to take this feeling
into account, and perhaps with that view rather to put forward the
reinstatement of Khaireddin and Midhat as the objects in view, than
exclusively English appointments.

It seems to be a more or less established rule that when an English Foreign Secretary makes a speech, Ambassadors should write and expatiate upon the admirable effect which has been produced abroad, and Lord Lyons's comment upon Lord Salisbury's Manchester speech approaches more nearly to criticism than appears elsewhere in his correspondence. The charge of ignorance brought against the French Ambassador at Vienna was probably quite correct, but the British Embassy at Vienna must have been in the same case, for the existence of the Austro-German alliance was first discovered by that extremely able public servant, the late Sir Joseph Crowe, K.C.M.G.[26] As for the alleged inaction of the French Ambassador at London, that official was a retired admiral, whom apparently Waddington seldom seems to have consulted, and over whose unconscious head business was habitually transacted by the French Foreign Office.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Nov. 21, 1879.

We are within a week of the opening of the session, but the
situation has not become more clear. Gambetta and Waddington have
a personal dislike to each other, and no doubt Gambetta would be
glad to oust Waddington, and to put in his place some new Minister
for Foreign Affairs, such as the Marquis de Noailles, with some
creature of his own, such as Spüller as adlatus or Under Secretary
of State. But then Gambetta would find it difficult to do this
without bringing about such a break up of the Ministry as would
raise the question of his own taking office. But if those who ought
to know him well judge aright, he does not wish to come into power
until he sees his way to doing something very great--in fact to
getting back Alsace and Lorraine.

Gambetta professes to be strongly in favour of the English
Alliance, and for that and for other reasons, to make a liberal
treaty of commerce with us. I do not, however, imagine that his
ideas of a liberal treaty go beyond maintaining, or nearly so, the
tariffs as they stand in the existing Anglo-French Treaties.

I imagine he has thought of going to England himself whenever
he has a good opportunity, not with a view to putting himself into
the hands of Sir Charles Dilke and taking part in any Ultra-Radical
demonstration, but rather with a desire of conciliating the
moderate public opinion in England, and showing that he has no
desire to promote a Republican Propaganda abroad. He seems to have
a decidedly friendly feeling towards the present English Ministry.

I have heard that the Russian Grand Dukes had been led by
General Chanzy to expect a much more warm and cordial reception at
Paris than they actually met with, and that consequently they were
by no means pleased.

Waddington seems to be as little prepared to go into the
Newfoundland question as he was two months ago. The impression
he makes upon me is the same that he made upon you. The Navy
Department keep him in awe of them and prevent his acting upon the
reasonable views he expressed to you at Berlin.

The various difficulties in all parts of the world which were before long to trouble Anglo-French relations for many years, had now begun to manifest themselves in such places as Newfoundland, Tahiti, Réunion, the Gambia, and elsewhere. All these troublesome questions fell under the Marine Department, and their accumulation was productive of an irritation which hampered M. Waddington, whose position was also weakened by a rabid demand made upon the Ministry for Government appointments. In fact it was difficult to see how any French Ministry could last, if the American system of a fresh division of the spoils was to take place whenever a change occurred. In America the Executive is safe for four years, but in France, directly the places had been distributed, the disappointed combined to overthrow the unhappy Ministers responsible for the distribution.

Meanwhile his most formidable opponent, the ex-Democrat, Gambetta, had assumed the _rôle_ of a grand seigneur, and gave sumptuous Parliamentary banquets which were pronounced by the highest gastronomic authorities to be exquisite in every respect. He contemplated a visit to London, and it is somewhat surprising to learn that the Democrat showed a very obvious prepossession in favour of the English Conservative Party.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Dec. 12, 1879.

Gambetta has heard with very great satisfaction that you and
Lord Beaconsfield would be very glad of the opportunity of seeing
him, which will be afforded if he carries into effect his idea
of going to England. He feels that it would be essential that
he should not make himself the guest or place himself under the
special guidance of any political person on one side or the other.
He would probably go to an hotel. As to the time of his visit,
he does not seem to have formed any definite plan. It seems to be
connected in his mind with the Treaty of Commerce, and he seems
inclined to secure himself a good reception by contributing first
to making a favourable Treaty of Commerce. I suppose he and his
countrymen would consider a Treaty simply renewing the arrangements
of 1860 as very favourable to us. He absolutely repudiates all
notion of anything like Republican propagandism. He has a strong
bias in favour of the Conservatives in England. His sympathies are
with an active Foreign Policy, and he has a grudge against the
Liberals because they did not come to the assistance of France in
the Franco-German war. He seems to follow English home politics
very carefully. He wishes England and France to act together in
the East, but considers that things have got into a horrid mess at
Constantinople, and expresses regret that the French and English
Embassies there do not pull more together.

I think one of his objects in going to England would be to
show people in France that he is considered a person of sufficient
importance to be admitted into the society of people of rank and
station in aristocratic England.

He has also no doubt the higher object of making France and
himself popular in England, so as to avert all risk of England's
joining the Austro-German Alliance to the detriment of France.

The danger would be that he would form too great expectations
of obtaining a positive alliance with England, and that if we did
not come up to his expectations in this respect, he might in his
disappointment, turn to Russia. But from this point of view, the
most dangerous thing would be to _froisser_ his susceptibility by
showing any coldness beforehand about his visit.

He undertakes to let us know whenever he comes to any
resolution about going to England.

From the above letter it will be seen how much importance was attached to Gambetta's views, and how desirable it was considered to secure his goodwill; but apparently the visit to London from which so much was expected, never took place--perhaps because his English Conservative friends were shortly afterwards turned out of office.

The threatened attack upon the Waddington administration took the form of a vote of want of confidence which was moved in the month of December, but successfully rejected. The Ministerial success, however, was of a somewhat fictitious nature, as the Left Groups when united, outnumbered the Right, and the Government was, therefore, liable to be turned out by a combination. M. Waddington himself professed satisfaction, and affirmed with pride that he had been congratulated upon his majority by the British Government; while from Berlin, Vienna, and even from St. Petersburg, where he was not in favour, assurances had been received of the satisfaction felt at the prospect of his continuing in office. The result, too, of the vote enabled him to carry out an intention he had long had in his mind, of abandoning the Presidency of the Council, and of retaining the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs. His own wish was to see M. Léon Say Prime Minister, but as that was out of the question, he favoured the appointment of M. de Freycinet, who, in addition to other qualifications, possessed the confidence of Gambetta, and would therefore render it difficult for the latter to attack the Government. The proposed transformation of the Ministry, however, was found difficult to effect, chiefly owing to the animosity of Gambetta against Waddington; the former being credited with the intention of upsetting any Ministry in which the latter remained. Gambetta was in fact pursuing a systematic dog-in-the-manger policy which was little to his credit, for while continually attacking and threatening the Government he was unwilling to take office himself, with the Chamber then in existence, since he realized that the Ultra-Radicals were trying to force him into a position in which he would have either to accept responsibility or to abandon the leadership of the Republican Party. The object, in short, of Clémenceau and the extreme party was to use Gambetta up in order to make room eventually for themselves. Neither President Grévy or Freycinet showed any accommodating spirit with regard to Waddington's plans, and when Freycinet laid down conditions which were unacceptable, the President tried to persuade Waddington to remain on as Prime Minister; but Waddington's position had been further impaired by imprudent representation on the part of President Grévy and others, that he was highly acceptable to Bismarck as a Minister, and Waddington admitted openly himself that he was wanting in the qualifications of a French Parliamentary leader. Consequently the upshot of it all was that he resigned, and Freycinet was allowed to form a new administration on his own terms. 'I part with Waddington with great regret,' wrote Lord Lyons. 'He had the greatest of all recommendations, that you could believe him, and feel sure of him.' These regrets were shared by Lord Salisbury. 'I am very sorry for the loss of Waddington. It was a luxury to have a French Minister who worked on principles intelligible to the English mind.'

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Dec. 30, 1879.

With the new Ministry I suppose Gambetta's reign is to begin.
The Cabinet was almost ostensibly formed by him. He did not, and
probably could not, put in any of the chief men of his own party.
They are kept, or keep themselves, in reserve to come into power
with Gambetta himself. The present Ministers are personally to a
certain extent Moderate, and altogether, so far as they are known,
mediocre. Freycinet is said to have some inclination to assert
independence, but he has not hitherto rebelled against his old
master Gambetta.

The man who appears to have lost most reputation in the affair
is President Grévy. He knows well enough that it is Gambetta's
intention to supplant him, but he has allowed himself to be
circumvented with his eyes open, from lack of resolution and lack
of energy, and has apparently let his rival obtain complete control
of the Government.

I do not suppose that we shall see at present any marked
change in the Foreign Policy of the French Government. Freycinet
knows nothing whatever of Foreign Affairs. Gambetta has strong
general notions, but seems more inclined to insist upon disposing
of the patronage of the Foreign Office than to go into the details
of the business. At home I suppose the first measure will be a
wholesale redistribution of places. _Aux situations nouvelles,
il faut des hommes nouveaux_, was the principle proclaimed by
Clémenceau. Beust[27] turns the phrase round and says: _Aux hommes
nouveaux il faut des situations._

At all events the centre Gauche is dead, and with it the
Thiers' policy, which was to preserve as far as possible the
institutions, the laws and the administrative system in France,
with the simple change of having an elective President, instead
of an hereditary sovereign at the head. The policy could not last
long unless it was directed by a really able energetic President.
France is now about to try real democratic and republican
government, and it will be a dangerous experiment in a country like
this. It would be a still more dangerous experiment if the old
warlike spirit had survived in the people. Happily for peace, they
are more intent upon making and enjoying money than upon obtaining
military glory, or even upon recovering their lost provinces.
Gambetta will try for the recovery of the Provinces if he preserves
his energies and fortune seems to give him a chance.

I have just seen Pothuau[28] who seems very indignant at his
place in London having been offered to Waddington, and declares
that he has no intention of giving it up.

Lord Lyons was destined to witness many more changes of Government in France before his final departure; most of them accurately described by the hackneyed phrase: _Plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose._

A letter from Major Baring written at the close of the year is worth quoting as evidence of the improved and hopeful condition of Egypt, and also of the harmony prevailing at the time between the English and French Controllers.

* * * * *

_Major Baring to Lord Lyons_.

Cairo, Dec. 29, 1879.

You may like to hear what I think of the state of things here,
so I venture to write this line.

There is a very decided improvement. Since I have been
connected with Egyptian affairs I never remember matters going so
smoothly. I like what I see of the Khedive, and I see a great deal
of him, for he frequently presides at the Council, and besides this
I often go to see him on business. Riaz's head is rather turned by
the decorations he has received, but he is very well disposed and
will always follow our advice, if we insist. He is oppressed with
the fear that Nubar will return to office; as, without doubt, he
will sooner or later; but it is not at all to be desired that he
should return just yet. What we want is _time_. If we can get along
for six months, or better, a year, without any considerable change
I really believe that the financial crisis which has now lasted so
long may be brought to a close.

Cherif and the Turks made overtures to Nubar the other day,
but he was wise enough to decline so unnatural a coalition.

Before long our financial scheme will be ready to launch, and
if, as I hope, it is accepted, the Commission of Liquidation will
no longer be necessary. This is perhaps the best solution of the
matter.

We shall reduce Unified to 4 per cent, and leave Preference
alone.

Blignières is behaving most loyally in everything which
concerns English interests. The Khedive and his Ministers have, I
think, got over the prejudice they entertained against him.

M. de Freycinet took over the Foreign Office as well as the Presidency of the Council; as has already been stated, he was quite ignorant of all foreign questions, and was also looked upon as less reliable than M. Waddington. The first official interview with him, however, produced a favourable impression, all the more because he did not let out a flood of common-places about devotion to England, and so forth; but the important question was to know what line Gambetta was inclined to take in Foreign Policy, and Sheffield was deputed to find out.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Jan. 17, 1880.

Gambetta has expressed confidentially to Sheffield to-day his
views as to the Foreign Policy of France; with the intention of
course that they should be communicated to me only in the strictest
privacy.

He considered that the Austro-German Alliance had been made
against France; that it entered into Prince Bismarck's calculations
that it might throw France into the arms of Russia, but that His
Highness thought that there would be more than a compensation for
this if in consequence of it England were completely detached from
France. Gambetta declared that France had not fallen into this trap
and would not fall into it--that she would never make an alliance
with Russia, but that if Russia were attacked by Germany, France
would have to take care of her own safety. He had information which
convinced him that there was no foundation for the assertions that
Russian troops were being massed on the frontier of Germany, and
he believed that these rumours were spread from Berlin to afford a
pretext for an attack on Russia, to be made so suddenly as to be
successful at once and to enable Germany to turn towards France
without any fear of Russia in her rear.

In order to disconcert this plan Gambetta thought it highly
important that a good understanding should be established between
England and Russia both with regard to Turkey and to India. He
held that it was the interest of France to urge in every way the
Russian Government to come to such an understanding with England.
He looked upon the state of things at Constantinople as very
bad, and attributed it to the disagreements between the French
and English Ambassadors; while in order to promote the accord
which he wished to see between England and Russia he desired that
the best feeling should exist between the French and English
Representatives at Constantinople. It was evident, however, from
what he said that any complaint against Fournier by England would
be met by counter-complaints on the part of France against Layard.
If Fournier resigned, Tissot the French Minister at Athens would be
Gambetta's candidate for the Embassy in Turkey.

Gambetta denied most positively that there was any truth
whatever in the rumours that he had been in communication with
Bismarck about the restoration of Lorraine to France or anything
of the kind. As to the insinuation that it was proposed that
while Lorraine should be restored, France should receive a slice
of Belgium in compensation for Alsace, Gambetta said that it
was plain that this could only have been put about to produce
ill-will between England and France. After the Benedetti affair, no
Frenchman in his senses would enter into secret arrangements with
Bismarck about Belgium, and the French Republic had certainly no
desire under any circumstances to despoil its neighbours.

Gambetta expressed a desire that a liberal Treaty of Commerce
should be made with England and he was eloquent on the importance
of a close and cordial union between the two countries.

Gambetta impressed upon Sheffield that he was speaking to him
simply as a friend, and quite privately. I think it is interesting
and important to know what sentiments he expresses in this way:
but, of course, if he was quoted, or if what he said was allowed to
transpire, he would feel bitterly towards us and at once put an end
to all communications of the kind. His tone appears to have been
quite that of a man who felt that he would have the power to carry
into effect the policy he recommended in this country.

Freycinet has just been to see me, but I did not find him
equally communicative on the general Foreign Policy of France.

As Freycinet was occupied at that moment, _more Gallico_, in clearing the old officials out of the Foreign Office, and as he admittedly possessed little knowledge himself, his reticence under the circumstances was not surprising; but, so far as could be gathered, it was the intention of the new Ministry to follow the prudent course of their predecessors, a profession of faith evidently intended especially for Berlin. As regards the so-called Eastern Question, interest had temporarily shifted from Egypt to Greece, and the various Powers were endeavouring without much success to negotiate the cession of Turkish territory to that country. The usual spring war scare had taken a different shape, and, without any foundation whatever, Bismarck was credited with the extraordinary intention of suddenly falling upon Russia, while a coolness had sprung up between the French and Russian Governments owing to the refusal of the former to surrender the Nihilist Hartmann, who was implicated in an attempt to wreck a train in which the Russian Emperor was travelling.

This refusal annoyed the Emperor so much that he withdrew his Ambassador, Prince Orloff, from Paris, the French consoling themselves with the thought that if they lost the favour of the Russian Emperor they would, on the other hand, ingratiate themselves with Bismarck.

Upon the Greek Frontier question, which in consequence of an English proposal had been referred to an International Commission, there was, for some unknown reason, a disposition to blame the British Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Sir H. Layard._

Paris, March 19, 1880.

The withdrawal of Orloff, on account of the refusal of the
French Government to give up Hartmann, is of course the topic of
the day here. The form adopted is that which was used when normal
relations between Russia and the Pope were suspended some years
ago. The Emperor Alexander is, I understand, very angry; but I do
not know how long this _mouvement d'humeur_ will hold out against
the obvious political interest which both Russia and France have in
not being on bad terms with each other. There was a strong feeling
on the Left of the Chamber against giving Hartmann up, and as to
foreign relations, I suppose the French set pleasing Bismarck
against displeasing the European Alexander.

Freycinet is decidedly against the admission of Turkey to the
Greek Frontier Commission. It might have been politic to admit her,
though I don't see how she could have been asked to engage to be
bound by the votes of the majority.

I think things in the East are indeed looking serious. How
Turkey is to be kept going, in spite of herself, much longer,
passes my comprehension. I should be sorry to make a fourth in an
alliance between France, Russia and Turkey. If France and Russia
did unite for any serious purpose, I should think the last thing
they would wish would be to tie such a clog as Turkey to their
wheels. If there is any truth in the proverb, _Quem deus vult
perdere si_, etc., I am afraid that there can be very little doubt
that the ruin of Abdul Hamid is in the hands of Allah.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 21: French Secretary of Embassy at London.]

[Footnote 22: French Ambassador at Constantinople.]

[Footnote 23: Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, G.C.M.G.]

[Footnote 24: H.B.M. Agent and Consul General at Cairo.]

[Footnote 25: Now Earl of Cromer.]

[Footnote 26: At that period British Consul-General at Düsseldorf.]

[Footnote 27: Austrian Ambassador at Paris.]

[Footnote 28: French Ambassador at London.]