Chapter XVI: Anglophobia (1)

(1883-1885)

The first day of 1883 was signalized by the announcement of the death of Gambetta, and those who were present at the Elysée on the occasion of President Grévy's New Year's Day reception will remember the singularly embarrassed demeanour of that uninteresting personage; an embarrassment which might have been accounted for on various grounds. Gambetta's death was followed in a day or two by that of General Chanzy, an event which caused consternation amongst the Monarchical and Conservative parties, as he was looked upon as the only man capable of stopping the too rapid progress of the Republican car. It was doubtless with the view of anticipating other pretenders, that Prince Napoleon seized the opportunity to issue a Proclamation denouncing the Republic, which resulted in his immediate incarceration in the Conciergerie.

For some months there had existed in France a feeling of uneasiness and of distrust in the maintenance of orderly government, and this feeling was greatly increased by the double loss of Gambetta and Chanzy. Gambetta was the only man in the Republican party whose ability and popularity were sufficient to induce the country to acquiesce in his wielding great power, and who was believed to have the will and the courage to exercise that power energetically in case of need. Chanzy was looked upon as the only man whose military reputation and influence qualified him to keep the army united and to use it with effect, in the case of grave political troubles.

As for the President of the Republic, M. Grévy, his energy and influence continued to diminish; the Chamber of Deputies was becoming more and more discredited, and the professedly anarchical parties were certainly increasing in violence, and apparently in numbers and influence as well. The public generally, even amongst the lower orders, showed few signs of great attachment to the Republican Government. That Government had not augmented their material prosperity, had not raised their social position, and had not realized their dreams of absolute equality with, or rather of predominance over, the rich and the educated. Every form of Monarchical Government was repugnant to them, but nevertheless a moderate Republic excited no enthusiasm whatsoever. The upper classes were alarmed and discontented; they did not believe that their property was secure, and they considered the work of administration was deplorably carried on by the various obscure Ministers who succeeded each other so rapidly in office; their religious feelings were daily shocked, while bad harvests, bad trade, and an unpromising financial situation added to the general feeling of dissatisfaction.

On the other hand, the 'spirited Colonial Policy,' which was now so much in evidence, did little to counterbalance this feeling, and the attempts which had been made to pander to the national vanity by the overbearing policy adopted towards Madagascar; the extension of French predominance in Tunis; annexations on the Congo; and the consolidation of the French Protectorate over Tonquin and Annam, had met with little success. The disquieting fact from the English point of view was that ill-feeling towards England, chiefly with regard to Egypt, had risen to a high pitch, and that each successive step taken by the British Government, and each declaration made by it, seemed only to increase the irritation. It was in this direction that, Lord Lyons feared, attempts would be made to divert public discontent by those who might be in power; and the procedure of the new French Government certainly justified the fear. The position which the French Government took up, was that of defending French influence and French interests in Egypt by its own independent means. It declared that by the abolition of the Control, a deep wound had been inflicted upon French dignity, while the principal security for the regular payment of the sums due in regard to the loans had been taken away. It did not hesitate to declare that any tampering with the Law of Liquidation, or with the lands and revenues pledged to the loans; or any failure to provide for the charges on the loans, would be regarded as a breach of international obligations on the part of Egypt, which would warrant the active interference of France. It hardly made any pretence of concealing its intention to work against English influence in Egypt by every means in its power, and unfortunately it was evident that in this anti-English policy it could reckon on the support of public opinion.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Jan. 9, 1883.

Blowitz's[37] intelligence certainly comes from the French
Foreign Office, sometimes, I dare say, directly, but often only
through the _Temps_. The _Temps_ is published the afternoon before
the day on which it is dated, and some hours before Blowitz's
letter goes to the _Times_. Blowitz's letter always goes by
telegraph, the _Times_ having the exclusive use of a line for some
hours every night.

It seems that Ferry will succeed Gambetta in the leadership
of the largest portion of the Republican party. I do not think he
is hostile to Duclerc, but if he attains to anything at all near
to Gambetta's position, Duclerc will only hold office during his
sufferance. Probably neither would be willing to serve under the
other.

If, as seems likely, the death of Gambetta leads to the
decay of the spirit of revenge upon Germany, this will (as I
have said before) increase the danger of all other Powers from
the restlessness of France, and will in particular increase our
difficulties in Egypt. If any modification of the arrangement of
the Law of Liquidation is proposed or any other step taken which
can give France a pretext for interfering in defence of French
interests, we may have trouble. If we leave a door open for French
intrusion, France may get so far in, that her _amour-propre_ may
force her to push on at all risks.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Jan. 16, 1883.

Prince Napoleon's Proclamation and his arrest have put all
other things out of people's heads here for the moment. He was
arrested, very roughly I understand, at 3 o'clock, as he drove up
to his own door in the Avenue d'Autin, and his papers were examined
and seized in the usual way on such occasions. There is not so
far any appearance of his having anything behind to back up the
Proclamation. It is said that he has rendered himself liable to
very severe penalties as a conspirator against the State. What
seems to be more generally expected is that the law enabling the
Government to exile the members of any family that has reigned in
France will be revived. If it is to be the beginning of political
proscriptions, in however mild a form, it will be a calamity and
perhaps a prelude to revolutionary times and ways.

The only good I can see in it is that it may divert attention
here from Egypt, for the French were getting excessively cross with
us on that subject. I should not have been surprised if Duclerc's
Declaration and Yellow Book had been much more unfriendly than they
are. The Declaration was, it seems, received with icy coldness in
the Chamber. It is creditable to Duclerc that he did not fish for a
cheer by a Chauvin wind up, as Freycinet used to do. But if Duclerc
had been popular and had been thought to be firm in the saddle, he
would have met with a better reception.

Prince Napoleon's Proclamation did not in reality cause any great commotion or alarm, as it was obvious that he had no backing of importance; but it served as an excuse to introduce a preposterous Exclusion Bill directed against the members of all ex-reigning families. This measure created great indignation amongst the French Conservatives, more especially the provision which deprived the Princes of their Commissions in the army, and in consequence of modifications which were introduced. Duclerc and his colleagues resigned office, giving place to an ephemeral Cabinet under M. Fallières, subsequently President of the Republic.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Feb. 2, 1883.

Everything is at sixes and sevens here, and no one knows
to whom to turn in the absolute dearth of any man of decided
superiority since the death of Gambetta. It is curious that he
should come to be regretted as the mainstay of Conservatism.

I send you by the messenger a despatch from Villiers[38]
which seems to me to give a very clear and correct account of
the state of feeling in the French Army. I don't think it at all
overrates the dissatisfaction that exists among the officers. For
my own part I do not believe there is any organized movement,
Legitimist, Orleanist, or Bonapartist, actually in preparation
at this moment. But I do see that confidence in the duration of
the present institutions is diminishing, and that, as a cause or
a consequence, dissatisfaction and disquietude are increasing.
Something subversive may happen with very little warning beforehand.

Barring accidents, the probabilities seem to be that the
present Ministry may last about ten days, and that then Jules
Ferry may come in for some months and _après lui le déluge_.
Challemel Lacour is talked of as Minister for Foreign Affairs. As a
diplomatist you know him better than I do. The little social (so to
call it) intercourse I have had with him has been pleasant enough,
but he has the reputation of being irritable and cross-grained.

The proceedings against the Princes are bad enough in
themselves, and they are of evil augury. The Reds having once
tasted blood, may become ravenous for more, and who can say where
they may look for the next victims?

Notwithstanding the critical state of home affairs, the
French papers find room occasionally for bitter articles against
us about Egypt. The great point to attend to, in order to prevent
the smouldering irritations bursting into a blaze, seems to be to
avoid touching the Law of Liquidation, or the administrations of
the Daira and Domains. Any alteration, however great an improvement
it might be in reality, would give rise to unlimited suspicion and
dissatisfaction here.

The Prince of Wales had intended visiting Paris about this period, but in consequence of the violent feelings aroused by the Exclusion Bill and of the bitterness of the extremists against constituted dynasties, he was advised to keep away.

Their newspapers would have no scruple in attacking any
personage, however exalted, whom they believed to be opposed to
their deplorable bill. Indeed, the more exalted the personage,
and the more entitled to respect, the greater might be their
scurrility. Nothing can be more lamentable than all this, and I
am obliged to add that the general feeling towards England is not
particularly cordial. Taking everything into consideration, I have,
though very reluctantly, come to the conclusion that it is my duty
to report to Your Royal Highness that I cannot feel quite sure that
if you were at Paris something unpleasant might not happen, or that
at least very improper language might not be used by a portion of
the press; and I cannot conceal from Your Royal Highness that the
present moment is far from an opportune one for a visit.[39]

The increasing bad feeling produced a complaint from Lord Granville, who considered that 'it is hard upon me, that being probably, of all English public men, the one who for various reasons is most attached to France, we should always have such difficult moments to pass when I am in office.'

After all the fuss that had been made about Prince Napoleon's Proclamation, it came as a distinct anti-climax that his arrest was discovered to be illegal. He was accordingly released, and nothing more was heard of him; meanwhile it was generally believed that General Billot, the late Minister of War in the Duclerc Government, had actually made all preparations for a _pronunciamento_ in favour of the Duc d'Aumale, and that his project was only foiled on account of the want of enterprise shown by the Orleans princes themselves. General Billot was superseded by a certain General Thibaudin, who was considered to be especially well adapted for the purpose of carrying out the dirty work in connection with the dismissal of the Princes from the army.

After a period of much uncertainty, during which for more than a month there was no one at the French Foreign Office to whom the Foreign Diplomatists could speak on foreign affairs, or even any subordinate who could express an opinion or give an instruction, M. Fallières was got rid of, and a new administration was formed under M. Jules Ferry, M. Challemel Lacour becoming Foreign Minister.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Feb. 20, 1883.

I suppose Ferry must have made his Ministry by to-morrow or
the next day. I will not bore you with the innumerable conjectures
as to who his colleagues will be. It is said Thibaudin is to be
kept as Minister of War, long enough at all events to take the
measures against the Princes which a more respectable general would
shrink from.

I only hope the new Ministry will not try to divert public
attention from home difficulties by a 'spirited' Foreign or
Colonial Policy. Egypt is always a source of trouble ready to their
hand, if they want to produce excitement. I think the great thing
is to avoid touching the Law of Liquidation or the administration
of the securities for the loans; in short, to avoid giving them
any pretext for saying that the material interests of France are
injured, and the guarantee she held weakened. But it is premature
to speculate on these matters in ignorance of who the incoming
Ministers may be and what policy they will adopt.

The urbane M. Challemel Lacour, in his new capacity as Foreign Minister, was not likely to begin by making gushing protestations of deep affection for England, but Lord Lyons was disposed to consider this a hopeful symptom. 'I know by long experience that ardent professions of love for England on the part of an incoming Minister are not to be trusted to as good signs.' Mr. Gladstone was in Paris at the time and paid visits to the President, Challemel Lacour, and Jules Ferry; but much to the relief of the Ambassador, he avoided the subjects of Egypt and of Commercial Treaties, and no harm was done.

The Ferry administration possessed the advantage of attracting a better class of French politician than had lately been the case, and M. Waddington now reappeared upon the scene.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

March 6, 1883.

Jules Ferry appears to have hinted to Waddington that he would
be offered the Embassy in London, if he voted with the Government
on the interpellation in the Senate on the Decree putting the
Orleans Princes _en non-activité_. The Embassy at Vienna has, I
understand, been actually offered to and refused by him. He would
not, under any circumstances, take any Embassy but London, and
moreover he would in no case serve a Government of which Thibaudin
was a member.

Waddington asked Rivers Wilson if he could not suggest some
offer which might be made to France in order to place her once
more in cordial union with England in Egypt. There is, moreover,
a notice in the Havas, purporting to come from London, but very
likely put in more or less on authority here, to the effect that
France cannot, and England ought to, take the initiative of
proposing something. I entirely agree with you that the matter had
better lie still for the moment. I suppose you don't want to make
any such concession to France as would satisfy her, and certainly
matters would not be mended by our making another unsuccessful
proposal. I hope Waddington spoke entirely on his own hook and
not in concert with Challemel Lacour. It would be intolerable
if Challemel Lacour tried the system of indirect irresponsible
communications, the delight of Duclerc, which produced so much
annoyance and inconvenience, and in fact rendered any real
understanding impossible.

Jules Ferry is believed to be contemplating a conversion of
the 5 per cents. If he makes the attempt, it will bind him over
to keep things quiet abroad and at home, in order to secure the
success of the operation.

It is very provoking that the French should have put down the
New Hebrides among the places to which to transport their relapsed
criminals.

Lord Granville, who owned that he had nothing to propose about Egypt, even if he wished to do so, was not at all enthusiastic at the prospect of Waddington coming to London, 'I am not particularly anxious to have Waddington instead of Tissot, he would be burning to distinguish himself, and very _agissant_.' Lord Granville's fears of Waddington's activity were founded upon the fact that he had been selected as the French Representative at the Coronation at Moscow, and that, therefore, he would find it impossible to settle down quietly at the London Embassy without burning to distinguish himself, after 'flourishing about Europe.'

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 23, 1883.

It is whispered, at least by Waddington's friends, that it is
intended that his special Embassy to Russia shall be a prelude to
his becoming regular Ambassador in London: that the idea is that he
shall offer a Commercial Treaty to us; that he shall by this means
enlist the support of some members of Parliament and influential
manufacturers in England, and that then he shall obtain concessions
for us about Egypt, on the plea that, without such concessions,
the Chambers could not be brought to ratify a Commercial Treaty
favourable to us. The statements in the newspapers about the
assumption of Commercial negotiations between England and France
are stated to be _ballons d'essai_ to see how the wind sets with
regard to such a policy.

I just give you all this for what it may be worth. I doubt
very much whether formal negotiations or a stirring French
Ambassador in London would be likely to lead just now to cordiality
between France and England. The French could hardly do anything
that would satisfy us about trade, and we should find it very
difficult to do anything that would satisfy them about Egypt. My
hope would rather be that we might glide back into cordiality by
avoiding critical questions.

In talking to me about his Embassy to Russia, Waddington
mentioned, amongst its advantages, that it would bring him into
contact with important personages of various countries, and he said
he should probably visit Berlin and Vienna on his way home.

With Challemel Lacour at the Foreign Office there did not appear to be much prospect of 'gliding back into cordiality,' judging by the following account of an interview between him and some members of the Rothschild family who were frequently employed as intermediaries between the two Governments.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 30, 1883.

Alphonse de Rothschild and his cousin Sir Nathaniel came to
see me yesterday and told me that they had had an interview with
Challemel Lacour on the subject of the proposed sale of the Domain
Lands in Egypt. They told me that they found Challemel Lacour
extremely sore about the whole Egyptian Question. He appears to
have distinctly refused to forward in any way the sale of the
Domain and to have alleged as his reason that he would not help to
do away with any board of management in which a Frenchman still had
a seat; that this would tend to diminish the number of Frenchmen
holding influential positions in Egypt, while his object was to
increase, or at all events, to maintain the existing number. As
indeed might have been foreseen, he was very far from desiring
to facilitate any financial or other arrangements required by
England. We shall no doubt find the French very inconvenient
and embarrassing in Egypt at every turn. I hope they will not
be dangerous, unless some disregard of positive international
engagements affecting French interests gives the Chauvinists the
pretext they are looking out for, and drives the sensible men into
a corner, in face of their public declarations and of popular
irritation.

I understand Louise Michel has been arrested. The Government
may gain ground by showing vigour, but unless it finds means of
convincing the officers in the army that it will secure their
position against the Radical endeavours to undermine it, things may
end in that fatal solution, a military _pronunciamento_.

The arrest of Louise Michel had taken place as the result of one of the numerous riots which occurred at Paris in the spring of 1883; they were not of much importance, but possessed some significance as being the first appearance of disturbances in the streets since the suppression of the Commune, and were due largely to the distress caused by bad trade, and to artificially stimulated expenditure on building, and other modes of finding employment. The result of the latter expedient was to raise the price of labour artificially and consequently to drive manufactures to other places, thus creating unemployment in Paris itself. In connection with these disturbances there was one singular peculiarity in the attitude of the so-called Conservative classes. Not only the Royalist and Imperial parties, but a considerable number of the richer people who were without any strong political bias, sympathized rather with the people in the streets than with the Government. The upper classes were, in fact, so dissatisfied with the existing state of things that they appeared willing to run the risk of seeing the Republican Government discredited and ultimately overthrown by popular tumult.

The following letter is an admirable illustration of the spirit in which the French viewed all English action in Egypt. Lord Dufferin, in the course of a despatch, had spoken in most appreciative terms of the friendly attitude adopted towards him by M. de Raindre, the French Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, and the British Government naturally supposed that it would be agreeable to the French Government if the despatch were communicated to them. Lord Lyons, however, who was much better acquainted with French opinion, thought otherwise.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 15, 1883.

I am rather frightened by the praises given by Dufferin in his
despatch of April 29th to the 'very correct and loyal attitude of
M. de Raindre, the French Agent and Consul-General, and of all the
French officials in Egypt.' If this despatch came to the knowledge
of the French Government or the French public, it might do de
Raindre a serious injury, and lead to the immediate substitution
for him of an Agent whose attitude would be more correct in the
French sense. I am afraid also that the claim Dufferin makes
to have considered the interests of the French in the Egyptian
service, however true it is, would provoke a howl of contradiction.

I do not mean to imply that Raindre's conduct has been at
variance with his instructions. I don't think it is the policy
of the French Government at this moment to get up irritating
discussions with us on small everyday matters, either in Egypt or
in other parts of the world. The French Foreign Office seems to
me to be, on the contrary, more conciliatory than usual in its
answers respecting such matters. I mark this with satisfaction
because I hope that in this way, provided we can avoid irritating
controversies, we may return insensibly to satisfactory relations.
But we are far enough from such relations in reality at this
moment. Challemel Lacour is not given, as you know, to talk about
general diplomatic policy, but others do not hesitate to let us
understand that while they are civil about small matters, they are
only biding their time till an opportunity comes of opposing us in
effect with great ones.

The course of affairs in Tonquin had not tended to restore the French to good humour by providing a compensation for their eclipse in Egypt, and the attempt to indulge in Chauvinism on the cheap had turned out to be a costly and unsatisfactory experiment. Had it not been for the provocations of the foreign press, it is possible that the spirited Colonial Policy with regard to Tonquin, Madagascar, etc., would have been abandoned quietly; but it was found intolerable to endure the daily administration of threats, ridicule, and supercilious advice showered from abroad. As it was, these expeditions did serve one useful purpose, namely, that of temporarily diverting attention from Egypt.

The reputation of the French Republic was not enhanced by a most discreditable incident which occurred at Paris in the autumn. The young King of Spain who had been visiting some of the European capitals, arrived at Paris on September 29, shortly after having been created by the German Emperor an Honorary Colonel of an Uhlan regiment at Strasbourg. On the strength of this honorary distinction he was met by a howling mob, which proceeded to demonstrate its patriotism by insults such as have seldom been offered to any foreign potentate, and for which the President of the Republic was forced to make an apology on the following day.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Oct. 5, 1883.

I do not remember any moment at which affairs here have
appeared to me so gloomy. The more I learn of the proceedings of
the French authorities, no less than those of the mob, the more
unpardonable do they appear. I have never felt the same repugnance
(and I have had my trials in this way) to the people with whom I
have to deal. It is a comfort to contrast the bearing of the King
of Spain with that of His Majesty's so called hosts. Jules Ferry
himself appears to have behaved decorously. I will forbear from
speculating on the ultimate effect of this deplorable affair on
French institutions. So far as I can see, Ferry and Wilson both
calculate on obtaining the advantage in a battle in the Chambers,
if they put off the fight till the session opens on the 23rd. In
the meantime, decency (if decency were at all taken into account
here at this moment) would seem to require that Thibaudin should
resign or be dismissed.

Our own political questions with the French Government do
not seem in a much more hopeful state than the general political
condition of things here.

Not content with having by carelessness allowed the King of Spain to be insulted, the French Government prevented a correct and complete report of President Grévy's apology from being published in the _Journal Officiel_, this action being on a par with the whole disgraceful proceedings. As, however, the only alternative to the existing Government appeared to be a thoroughgoing Intransigeant Cabinet, and there was no telling what the latter might do both at home and abroad, it was hoped that Jules Ferry and his colleagues would succeed in holding their own.

In the autumn, Challemel Lacour, who had become unpopular owing to the unsatisfactory campaign in Tonquin, resigned office, and his place at the Foreign Office was taken by Jules Ferry himself. Towards the end of November there arrived the news of Hicks Pasha's disaster in the Soudan, and although this event was not by any means unwelcome to the French, the chances of a speedy termination of the British occupation of Egypt naturally grew more remote.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 23, 1883.

I suppose there can be no hope that the disaster which has
overwhelmed Hicks's army is less serious than is reported. It seems
to be a grievous misfortune which has come at a most inopportune
moment for us. It is far from causing sorrow to our friends here.

I quite understand your not being keen to arbitrate between
France and China, and I don't think the French will be willing to
accept the arbitration of anybody. What they understand by our good
offices, is that we should help them to carry all their points
against the Chinese. It is supposed that the Committee will press
on the Government a larger vote for Tonquin than the Government has
asked for.

In the mean time things at home are looking gloomy in
France. There is likely to be a stagnation of trade and generally
much distress during the winter. People of all classes are
getting irritable, and seem to seek to vent their irritation on
foreign Powers. Add to this that the depression and pusillanimity
which followed 1870-1871, seem to be giving place to the former
overweening opinion of the strength of France and consequently to
Chauvinism.

I wrote a despatch to you by the last messenger as to the
effect the lowering the wine duties for Spain would have here. I
am never quite at ease when I think of our holding Most Favoured
Nation treatment at the pleasure of the French. The lowest class
who are gaining power are certainly not Free Traders.

In consequence of the Soudan disaster the Egyptian Government became anxious to call in the Turks to their assistance, and this project excited a strong feeling in France against the admission of the Sultan's troops, or of any Turkish fighting men into Egypt, to take part in the defence against the Mahdi, that feeling being founded on the old ground of danger to the French position in Tunis and Algeria. But, for the same reason, the French were disposed to throw a heavy responsibility upon England for taking precautions that the Mahdi should be effectually stopped somewhere or other. Everything, in fact, that England did in Egypt was wrong in French eyes, and there was a fresh outburst over an arrangement made between Lesseps and the English shipowners with regard to the Suez Canal.

In January, 1884, the British Government decided definitely upon the evacuation of the Soudan, and Gordon was despatched to carry out the operation.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Jan. 19, 1884.

I do not know that in the main any marked change in public
opinion in France about Egypt has taken place since I wrote ten
days ago; but as the state of things there remains unchanged
for the better or becomes changed for the worse, excitement and
reproaches against England increase. A catastrophe with regard to
the garrison of Khartoum or that of Sinkat, or any massacre of
Europeans, would probably produce a violent outcry against us, of a
much more intense character than the present general upbraiding as
to our allowing the advance of the Soudan towards civilization to
be stopped, and the slave trade to be revived.

I am told confidentially that Barrère, the French Agent at
Cairo, writes to urge his Government to decide upon some distinct
line of policy, in view of the present crisis. His own idea
would seem to be to ingratiate himself with the Egyptians at the
expense of the English, to lead them to attribute all the present
misfortunes to England and to teach them to look to France for
ultimate deliverance from them. I hear that he rates Baring's
ability very highly, but writes very disparagingly of the other
Englishmen in office in Egypt. One of his topics in decrying
England is said to be the sum charged by her on the Egyptian
Treasury for the occupying troops. He is said not to be averse to
touching the Law of Liquidation, because he conceives that, if this
is done, France will get her finger into the pie again.

Tonquin is, at this moment, secondary to Egypt in interest
here, but the French are getting impatient for news from Admiral
Courbet.

Nothing particularly critical has yet taken place in the
Chamber.

Lord Granville's reply seems to show that General Gordon was almost as great an optimist as himself.

* * * * *

Jan. 19, 1884.

Many thanks for your important private letter about Egypt. The
information may be of use to Baring.

Barrère is a very clever fellow, and has persuaded Baring that
he is very friendly.

Gordon went off yesterday, in a very good humour, determined
to help us in carrying out our policy of evacuation in the best
manner.

He is wonderfully optimistic, with a great contempt for the
Mahdi and disbelief in Arab fanaticism or love of real fighting. He
is not much afraid of a massacre. I trust he may be right.

A fresh disaster in the Soudan--Baker Pasha's defeat--encouraged the idea that these reverses were symptoms of weakness on the part of England, and gave France a reason for desiring to interfere, and a _locus standi_ for asserting a claim to do so.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 11, 1884.

The large majority obtained by the Government against the
coalition of the extreme Right and the extreme Left on Paul Bert's
extravagant proposals relative to the salaries of schoolmasters and
schoolmistresses, has strengthened their hands and has given some
confidence to the Union Républicaine Party, on which they mainly
rely. They also succeeded in defeating a very mischievous motion
made by Clémenceau in the Committee of 44 to send a deputation to
Anzin in order to inquire into, or more properly to foment the
troubles in the Anzin coal districts. Nevertheless, the state of
the country and of Paris in particular is far from comfortable.
The distress of the workmen, and the folly and unreasonableness of
their demands and expectations are on the increase. I send you by
this messenger a good despatch by Crowe[40] on the violent cry for
protection from the competition of foreign workmen as well as that
of foreign goods, which has been one of the consequences.

I am afraid all this does not tend to make the Government
more conciliatory on foreign affairs. They are hourly expecting
to hear of the fall of Bac-Ninh, and if they are quite successful
there, they are only too likely to turn their thoughts to getting
a little glory out of the Egyptian question, as well as out of the
Madagascar, Congo, and other matters in which they are more or less
opposed to England.

So far as we are concerned, the effect the reconciliation
between Russia and Germany has had upon the French is not good.
So long as they had any hopes of a quarrel between Germany and
Russia, they felt bound to reserve their strength in order to take
advantage of it, and to cultivate good relations with other Powers,
in order to secure at least their non-interference. Now they have
given up the hope of a break between Russia and Germany, and are
at the same time confident that all the Continental Powers are
determined on peace. They think therefore that they may expect to
be _tête-à-tête_ with us and to be free to act as suits them in
affairs in which we are concerned.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

March 12, 1884.

Your letters are most interesting, though not comforting. The
difficulty of keeping on friendly terms with France is not to be
underrated.

I await with almost equal interest the news which we shall
probably get this evening from [illegible] and that which I suppose
will come in a few days from Bac-Ninh.

I am afraid victory will make the French Government very
difficult to deal with; on the other hand, a defeat, which is not
likely, will make the Chinese intolerable.

Our own troubles, especially in the Soudan, are great. If
things could settle there, I am confident that Egypt would soon
recover the state in which she was before Hicks's defeat, and this
notwithstanding all the intrigues which are going on there.

Bismarck says he shall give us no trouble about the Law of
Liquidation, but that other nations will. What will be the best way
of approaching the French Government when we have made up our own
minds?

As to protection, it will create a very angry feeling here.
It will ruin the French and it will make us the monopolists of the
neutral markets of the world so long as we can keep at peace.

The Egyptian blister has diverted public attention from Merv.
The question was treated in excellent speeches in the Lords, but
the debate was dull and flat.

We do not make you a very handsome present in Mohrenheim. He
is like a diplomatist on the stage.

Baron Mohrenheim, a diplomatist of a very conventional type, had just been transferred to Paris from the Russian Embassy in London, and was generally credited with strong anti-English sentiments.

On the question of the financial condition of Egypt, the British Government finally decided to propose a European Conference, and the decision was communicated to the French Government. As was only to be expected, the English proposal produced a conflict of opinion in France. Some approved of calling in Europe generally, but others denounced the proposal as a new proof of the treachery of England, who, according to them, was bound to treat with France alone, and called loudly upon the French Government to refuse to go into a Conference on equal terms with other Powers. All seemed to think, however, that the moment had come for France to reassume a position equal with that of England, if not superior to it. The attitude of the French Government itself was more moderate. Jules Ferry accepted the Conference 'in principle,' and endeavoured to show that two absolutely false notions prevailed in England which seemed to be the great obstacles to an understanding between the two countries. One was that if the English withdrew their troops from Egypt, France would send hers in; the other, that France sought to re-establish the Control.

The position in which Gordon now found himself in Khartoum began to cause Her Majesty's Government serious misgivings, and many expedients were suggested for relieving Ministers from their embarrassment. Amongst them appears a serio-comic proposition from the Baron de Billing, a well-known figure in Anglo-French society.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 4, 1884.

I send you copies of a letter written to me by Baron de
Billing yesterday and of a memo annexed to it. I don't know what
you will think of the offer to rescue Gordon which they contain,
but I deem it right to lay it before you. Billing made it to me
verbally yesterday, and I begged him to put it in writing. The
inclosed papers are the result.

Billing did not tell me who the persons were by whom the
rescue was to be effected, but I understand that they were Arab
Sheikhs or something of that kind. Apparently they are in Paris,
for he professed to go to consult them before he sent me the memo.

He says you have known him from a boy.

'_Il se porte garant de l'honorabilité des personnes en jeu._'
For my part '_Je ne me porte garant de rien_' in the matter.

Billing insisted much on the importance of his receiving a
speedy answer.

MEMO.

'_Gordon Pasha sera remis aux autorités egyptiennes ou
anglaises à un des ports de la Mer Rouge ou aux avant-postes de
l'armée anglo-egyptienne moyennant:_

1°. _le paiement immédiat par Lord Lyons d'une somme de deux
mille livres sterling à une personne désignée par le Baron de
Billing, ancien chargé d'affaires de France à Munich, Tunis et
Stockholm._

2°. _Le versement d'une somme de 48,000 livres sterling au
credit du Baron de Billing chez Messrs. Coutts, ses banquiers
ordinaires, le jour même où parviendra à Londres la nouvelle
officielle de la remise de Gordon Pasha entre les mains des
autorités anglo-egyptiennes._

_N.B._--1°. _Un compte détaillé sera rendu à Lord Lyons de
l'emploi des deux milles livres sterling immédiatement exigibles._

2° _Gordon Pasha devra prendre l'engagement écrit de quitter
sur le champ l'Egypte et de s'en tenir éloigné pendant une période
de 10 ans._ (_Je crois qu'il sera possible de faire modifier cette
dernière prétention qui semble bien peu pratique._)

_Le Baron de Billing se porte garant vis-à-vis de Lord Lyons
de l'honorabilité des personnes en jeu, et il ajoute que vû son
expérience de l'Afrique, il croit à de sérieuses chances de succés._

_Un permis de séjour en blanc pour l'Egypte sera remis au
Baron de Billing pour un Musulman à désigner par lui._'

(_Très important._)

In spite of Lord Granville's life-long acquaintance with the Baron, the proposal (which bears a striking resemblance to some of the incidents in the Dreyfus case) was declined, and nothing more was heard of him in connection with the rescue of Gordon.

The French military operations in the Far East were terminated temporarily by a Treaty with China, concluded in May, under which the Protectorate of France over Tonquin and Annam was recognized, and there was some uncertainty at first as to how the commercial terms would be interpreted. When the Prince of Wales, who was then in Paris, called upon President Grévy, the latter dilated effusively upon the satisfaction which all nations must feel at the new opening of trade to them in Tonquin and Annam. On the other hand, the _Temps_, a newspaper of considerable authority, talked of the _ouverture au commerce exclusif de la France des Provinces de l'Empire celeste limitrophes de nos possessions de l'Indo-Chine_. 'I have observed,' Lord Lyons wrote sadly, 'no symptoms lately in France of anything like a decently liberal commercial spirit.' Nor when M. Jules Ferry was congratulated upon the Tonquin settlement, did that statesman let fall any hint of an intention to open to the rest of the world the commercial advantages which France had secured for herself. In fact, the chief result of the French success in Tonquin seemed to be, that, having at all events, got rid temporarily of this difficulty, a more unconciliatory line of policy than ever would be adopted as far as Egypt was concerned.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 27, 1884.

You may have observed that, contrary to my usual habit, I
have been sending you lately a great many extracts from French
newspapers. My reason is of a very painful kind. I have thought it
necessary to give you specimens of the ill will towards England,
the suspicions of her, and the irritability respecting her which
seem to become more and more prevalent here. To these unpleasant
symptoms I might add that exclusive and illiberal commercial views
and extreme Protectionist ideas are in the ascendant: and that thus
the spirited Colonial Policy now in vogue, becomes a danger instead
of an advantage to foreign commerce, which it might be if it opened
new areas to the trade of all nations.

The Ferry Government is wafted along by the pleasant breezes
from Tonquin, but they must be on the look out for squalls as they
near the revision of the Constitution and the discussion of the
Budget of 1885.

The _Gaulois_ is hardly looked upon here as a serious paper,
but the calumnies upon Sir J. Drummond Hay which it professes
to have derived from a report made, I suppose _viva voce_, by
Ordega[41] to Ferry, are too bad. Menabrea says that the Italian
Minister at Tangier is a man of herculean strength and fierce
temper, and that he is as likely as not to wring Ordega's neck if
he catches him. _Libre à lui de le faire._

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

May 28, 1884.

We must be very clumsy to invite so much indignation in France
and at the same time to run the risk of being turned out next month
for being so subservient to her.

Waddington seems in earnest to bring about a good
understanding, but our press, over which the Government has
absolutely no control, will be most offensive, until the vote of
censure against the Conference, which is almost sure to be brought
on, is decided one way or the other.

It will require all Salisbury's want of caution to try to come
in upon a quarrel with all Europe upon the Egyptian question.

The Egyptian policy of the Gladstone Government, subsequently to the successful campaign of 1882, never met with much favour in any quarter in England, but it was not surprising, on the whole, that Lord Granville should be pained by French hostility, since nothing whatever had been done to warrant it. Had we behaved ill to France, there might have been a chance of returning to favour by altering our procedure; as it was, there was no reasonable ground of offence whatever, and therefore the prospect of restoring friendly relations appeared to be all the more remote.

Lord Hartington, then a prominent member of the Gladstone Government, was in Paris at the beginning of June, and Lord Granville seems to have been much alarmed as to the language which he might use with reference to Egypt in conversation with French Ministers. Lord Hartington was probably not in the least desirous of conversing with French Ministers upon Egypt or upon any other subject, and wished to go _incognito_, 'as he was constantly in the habit of doing;' but it was represented to him that unless he called upon Jules Ferry it would be believed that he was engaged upon a secret mission, and Lord Lyons was therefore asked to give him some preliminary coaching.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, June 3, 1884.

I sent Lord Hartington your letter yesterday, and I had a long
visit from him in the afternoon.

As matters stand, what seems to me most to be dreaded with a
view to our relations with France is a vote of the House of Commons
censuring an arrangement made by Her Majesty's Government with the
French Government. Such a vote, and the debate by which it would be
preceded, would, I cannot but fear, have a truly lamentable effect.

I understand that Jules Ferry is having a memorandum on the
Finances of Egypt drawn up by Blignières, and that it will dispute
the accuracy of Mr. Childers's information and represent that the
Finances were in a flourishing condition, and that there were
surpluses even during Arabi's rebellion, up to the time at which
England took the thing in hand. The memorandum will probably deny
there being any necessity for reducing the interest of the debt, if
the Finances be properly managed.

I do not know whether such a reason will be assigned to us,
but in fact it seems that the French object to any large loans
being guaranteed by England, on account of the lien, so to speak,
which it would give England upon Egypt. The French would prefer a
simple fresh issue of Unified stock.

In the meantime, the French bondholders are bestirring
themselves and protesting against any arrangement being made
without their being consulted.

Jules Ferry, however, himself thinks little of any other
consideration in comparison with the political success which it
would be to him to give France again a political footing in Egypt,
and as a means to this, to get a time fixed for the departure of
our troops. I do not think he is afraid of much disapproval here
of his counter-concession--the engagement that French troops shall
not enter Egypt, either on the departure of the English troops or
afterwards. Unless the engagement were very formally made and very
peculiarly and stringently worded, it would be felt here that it
did not amount to much. For though it would preclude the occupation
of Egypt by the French to preserve order and promote reforms in the
same way we occupy the country now, it would not be interpreted
here as preventing France using force to avenge an insult or
protect distinct French interests in cases which would constitute a
_casus belli_ as regarded any ordinary country.

I do not quite understand the exact position in which stands
the suggestion that the Financial question should be first
settled by England with the several Powers separately, and then a
conference be held for a day or two only to ratify what had already
been settled. Does this afford an opening for purely financial
negotiations, and admit of dropping the French political proposals
which appear to be so unpopular in England? I believe Jules Ferry
is in some tribulation about the difficulties his proposals have
met with in England, and is half inclined to be sorry he made them
so strong, though I doubt whether Waddington has made him fully
aware of the violence of the opposition they encounter in England.

Generally speaking, I am very unhappy about the growing
ill-will between France and England which exists on both sides
of the Channel. It is not that I suppose that France has any
deliberate intention of going to war with us. But the two nations
come into contact in every part of the world. In every part of it
questions arise which, in the present state of feeling, excite
mutual suspicion and irritation. Who can say, when and where, in
this state of things, some local events may not produce a serious
quarrel, or some high-handed proceedings of hot-headed officials
occasion an actual collision?

The variety and number of questions upon which Lord Lyons was requested to pronounce an opinion have already been commented upon; now he was asked to consider the effect of a hypothetical vote of the House of Commons.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Trentham, June 4, 1884.

Many thanks for your important and pregnant letter. I quite
agree that the relations between England and France will be
disagreeable if the House of Commons rejects our proposals; but
this, though possible, is not so probable as Hartington thinks.

The M.P.'s neither desire a Salisbury administration; still
less a dissolution.

But how will our relations be, if we previously break off
with France? and what can you suggest for the settlement of the
financial difficulties of Egypt, if we obtain no sanction for a
change of the Law of Liquidation?

Do you think that the House of Commons would allow us to take
the whole debt upon ourselves, in order to save the bondholders? I
should be really grateful for your suggestions on this last point.

From the above letter it is plain that Her Majesty's Government had no definite Egyptian policy, and were merely stumbling along concerned only, as frequently happens with British Cabinets, with the possible result of a division in the House of Commons. The only evidence of policy was a strong inclination to evade responsibility; to hand it over to a collection of Powers; and to fritter away such advantages as had been so hardly won, in the hopeless attempt to recover the goodwill of the French Government.

Lord Lyons's reply was to the effect that nothing would have a worse effect than a bitter debate in the House of Commons followed by the censure of terms agreed upon by the French and English Governments. But as there was no doubt whatever that the French Government intended to take advantage of the Conference to place France in the same position in Egypt as that which she formerly held, a firm policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government might have a better effect than an over-yielding one.

The Egyptian Conference met in London at the end of June and continued its sterile discussions for upwards of a month before finally breaking up, while the tone of the French press grew more and more hostile, and anything in the nature of a concession on the subject of the interest of the debt or on any other matter affecting French material interest was denounced in the fiercest terms. Even the craven British proposals with regard to the limitation of the military occupation were treated with contempt, and no person came in for greater abuse than M. Waddington, who was now established as Ambassador in London, and was constantly denounced for subservience to England, solely because he owned an English name.

The Conference broke up in August, and the Cabinet, which was now being continually denounced on all sides for its feeble and procrastinating policy, decided upon despatching Lord Northbrook on a special mission to Cairo. Before Lord Northbrook started he had a long interview with Lord Lyons, who did his best to impress upon him the views, interests, and susceptibilities of France, and the great importance of not running counter to them if possible.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Oct. 17, 1884.

I opened my first conversation with Ferry, the day after my
return, with a message from you as to your desire to be on good
terms, and to avoid unpleasantness in treating matters between
the two countries all over the world. I enlarged upon this theme,
and made it as plain to him as I could, without letting the
conversation degenerate into recrimination, that if France were
perpetually irritating us, we on our side had the means, and should
not always be able to abstain from using them, of making ourselves
very disagreeable too. The subject was treated in the most friendly
way by me, and Ferry was profuse in his acknowledgments to you, and
in assurances; but I should have been glad if I could have brought
him to more practical advances towards intimacy and good fellowship
than I was able to do. However, the conversation may perhaps have
done some good.