Chapter XV: Arabi's Rebellion (1)

(1881-1882)

In September, 1881, the long-drawn-out Egyptian crisis culminated in the military _coup d'état_ of Arabi and the colonels, which resulted in the dismissal of the Ministry and the practical establishment in Egypt of a military dictatorship. From that moment European intervention, in some form, became inevitable, and it was the object of the British Government to continue to adhere honestly and consistently to the policy of working in conjunction with France, and to avoid carefully as long as possible any action which might necessitate the employment of force.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Sept. 30, 1881.

The article in the _Times_ has produced an anti-English
explosion on the subject of Egypt, and was certainly well
calculated to do so.

For my part, I think the best thing to be done is to take an
opportunity of distinctly manifesting at Cairo the continuance of
the Anglo-French understanding.

If we let either the Egyptians or Foreign Powers suppose they
can upset that, we shall not be able to maintain the English and
French Controllers, and if they disappear, the financial prosperity
will disappear with them, and we shall have the bondholders,
French and English, on our backs again.

If we let in other Foreign Powers, and at the same time try
to establish English predominance, we shall have those Powers
coalescing with France against us.

A split with us would very probably lead to France throwing
herself into the arms of Bismarck, and he would encourage all
her ambitious aims out of Europe, and, in particular, those
the prosecution of which would widen the breach between her
and England: or, in other words, be especially annoying and
inconvenient to us.

I hope things are so far calming down in Egypt, that we may
not be called upon to take any special measures this time; and
the best hope of avoiding them in future seems to be in making it
understood that England and France united will resist attempts to
overthrow the existing system.

I am all against letting the Turks thrust the smallest finger
into the pie. At this moment the French would never consent, and
would consider our bringing in the Turks a specially unfriendly
act, with a view to their Tunisian affairs. The less they merit any
consideration from us, the more sore they will be at not receiving
it. Besides which, where the Turkish hoof has trod, no grass grows,
and woe to the finances of any country with which the Turk can
meddle.

Of course, in what I have said about Egypt I have confined
myself to the present and the immediate future.

The chances of being able to avoid active intervention were in reality non-existent; for temporizing measures taken in conjunction with France could not put off for ever the day when, moral pressure having been found insufficient, armed force would necessarily have to be employed. When that day arrived, the probability was that France would want to send troops in conjunction with ours, and our consent to that course might involve us in war with France in a very short time. If we had the courage to tell the French that our interests were paramount in Egypt, and that therefore all other European Powers must be kept out, then we must be prepared to back our words with force, and everything therefore pointed to the naval superiority of England in the Mediterranean as being our paramount necessity. With real naval superiority in the Mediterranean we were practically able to make the French do our bidding, if we chose. We had the power to shut up their navy in French ports, to stop their communications with Africa, to render powerless two millions of French soldiers, and to demolish Bismarck's schemes of elbowing us out of the Mediterranean. Such was the happy position which we enjoyed in 1881, and it was a great contrast to that which we occupy at the present day; but it did not tend towards promoting goodwill between the two nations, and Lord Lyons constantly urged that some joint understanding should be arrived at, in the event of another military outbreak in Egypt. The situation had been complicated by the despatch of a Turkish mission, and the general impression in France was that Arabi and the colonels would shortly be engaged in a conspiracy to dethrone the Khedive and to restore something like the old _régime_ in the country. A positive declaration from the English and French Governments that they would not tolerate the overthrow of the Khedive and the established system might have effected much if it was felt that the two Governments would interfere by force, if necessary, rather than permit it; but this would not be felt or believed unless the two Governments had really come to an understanding and had agreed upon details; and when it came to discussing details the question at once presented difficulties. These difficulties were not lessened by a French Ministerial crisis in the autumn, as a crisis usually produced a fit of petty Chauvinism, such an encouragement to Consuls in the East to _porter haut le drapeau de la France_, the bullying of local authorities, and a demand for the extortion of monopolies and concessions for French speculators.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 4, 1881.

The Treaty of Commerce and Egypt will probably be the two
first questions we shall have to discuss with the new Government.

The Commercial negotiations seem to me to have been brought
exactly to the right point. Having obtained the three months
prolongation, we have resumed the negotiation on the day fixed, and
have continued it _bona fide_; and it now stands over in a manner
which will enable us to see in due time whether or no we can make a
treaty with the new Government.

As regards Egypt, the opinion gains ground here that at the
bottom of the agitation there is (or soon will be) a plot to
dethrone Tewfik and put Halim in his place as a 'National': _i.e._
anti-European, anti-French, and anti-English Control, Khedive. I
understand that de Blignières represented strongly to Gambetta that
the only way to produce quiet in Egypt and counteract intrigues
in favour of Halim at Yildiz Kiosk is for England and France to
declare positively at Cairo and Constantinople that they will not
stand it, but will resolutely support Tewfik and the existing state
of things. I do not know how far Gambetta assented to this, but I
am told he did not dissent from it.

The result of much political manoeuvring was that in November, 1881, Gambetta was forced to take office and to exchange the irresponsible power which he had hitherto wielded in the background for Ministerial responsibility. As frequently occurs in similar cases, when the great mystery man was dragged out into the light of open day, his appearance was somewhat disappointing. His Administration, with one exception only, was composed entirely of men belonging to his own immediate following, and contained no one of any weight beside himself. Gambetta took the Foreign Office as well as the Presidency of the Council, and on the principle that _il vaut toujours mieux avoir affaire à Dieu qu'à ses anges_, this was an advantage, although it was believed that he entertained so great an admiration for Bismarck, that, following the latter's example, he would probably hand over the foreign diplomatist to an under secretary. The first impressions produced by the new Ministry were not favourable.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 18, 1881.

I don't think the present Ministry is so far at all a success.
Among other inconveniences arising from the appointment of men of
so little personal importance is that there is no one in Gambetta's
party who does not think that he ought to have been a Minister;
or, in other words, who acquiesces in the superiority of any of
those chosen. The fact that Léon Say and Freycinet were offered
portfolios, but would not accept them on Gambetta's terms, tells
against the selection ultimately made. Gambetta's personal genius
must make up for all deficiencies. He appears to have a talent
in particular for parliamentary tactics, especially for making
the right move on the spur of the moment. I doubt his having
deep-matured plans. So far as I can see, he lives _au jour le jour_
like ordinary men.

I had a long visit yesterday from Spüller, but we did not get
much beyond generalities. Gambetta and I have exchanged visits, but
have not met.

I do not hazard conjectures on commercial matters, as Dilke
will ascertain to-morrow exactly how the land lies. ... As a
diplomatist, I cannot but feel that there is convenience in being a
bachelor just now.

The last sentence does not refer to the fact that he had just been created a Viscount, but to the somewhat peculiar domestic circumstances attaching to certain members of the new Government.

It had been assumed that Gambetta's accession to office would be marked by a more vigorous foreign policy, especially in the direction of acquiring fresh territories in distant regions; but this was not justified by his own language or bearing, and at his first interview with the Ambassador he abstained from pompous common-places about preferring England to all the rest of the world, and desiring peace at any price, which was looked upon as a good sign. At the same time, there was, in his speeches about Tunis and the Mediterranean, a slight flavour of Chauvinism which would not have excited remark before 1870, but which would not have appeared in 1880, and would certainly not have been applauded in 1881, unless it had become generally known that Bismarck had sanctioned and encouraged French enterprises away from the continent of Europe.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 6, 1881.

Gambetta gave the Diplomatic Body an excellent dinner last
Saturday, and played his part as host very successfully.

What may be at the bottom of his heart, nothing has yet shown.

The change which has come over the relations between France
and Germany opens to him the door for a comparatively safe yet
ambitious Foreign Policy. Will he resist the temptation?

During the years which immediately followed the war, the
feeling of France towards Germany was composed of furious hatred
and of mortal dread. The line taken, consciously or unconsciously,
by Germany tended to add bitterness to this feeling. She interfered
dictatorially with France even in internal matters. Her object
seemed to be not only to impede the restoration of French strength
and wealth, but to prevent the French recovering even prestige
anywhere. She was, or affected to be, convinced that a war of
revenge on the part of France was imminent. She was believed by
the French to be angry at their showing so much vitality and to be
preparing to give them the _coup de grâce_.

At this moment, however, neither France nor Germany appears
to apprehend an attack or to be prepared to make one. Each appears
to consider the other too strong to be attacked with impunity.
Certainly Gambetta would not find the nation in heart to follow him
in defying Germany. If therefore his policy or his passions incline
him to do something striking to flatter the national vanity, how
is he to find the means? The Tunis affair has given Bismarck an
opportunity of showing him. It has enabled the Chancellor to
convince the French that they will have the countenance of Germany
in any enterprise in which they may engage out of Europe.

How far this may be part of a great plan of Bismarck's
to secure German supremacy in Europe by pushing Austria into
the Levant, Russia into Asia, and France into Africa and the
Mediterranean, and by shutting up England in her own islands, we
need not inquire. In any case it must suit Prince Bismarck to see
France making acquisitions of territory or influence, which weaken
her military force in Europe, throw burthens on her finances, and
make ill blood between her and other Powers.

Unhappily if Gambetta is so short-sighted as to give in to
temptation of this kind, difficult questions are, more than with
any other Power, likely to arise with England, who is in contact
with France all over the world and especially in the Mediterranean.

I hope better things, and I am not at all willing to despair
of a thorough good understanding between France and England which
would avert danger from both, and enable both to do good to all the
world. Still one cannot but be anxious at this moment. Egypt may be
the ticklish point.

The Parliamentary skill of Gambetta was seen to advantage during the short winter session, and compared favourably with the want of tact and vigour which had been displayed by his predecessors. He even obtained a success in the Senate, where he had not expected to find any sympathy at all, and some of the more sensible Conservatives became disposed to support him, more from fear of what might result if he fell than from personal attachment. Some of his appointments, however, aroused alarm, and he perturbed Lord Lyons by bestowing upon a journalist a most important post in the Foreign Office.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 30, 1881.

I will not despair, but I am feeling very great anxiety
about the Commercial Treaty. I am afraid that on this side of the
Channel, much more than in England, the failure of the negotiations
would have a most undesirable political effect. In France and on
the Continent generally, it would be taken as a sure indication of
a coolness between the two Governments. Gambetta would be taunted
by the Opposition with having alienated England (Italy having been
alienated before). Gambetta's supporters in the press and elsewhere
would try to throw the blame upon England, the English press would
retort upon France, and a very unpleasant state of feeling would be
the result.

Gambetta has astounded people by appointing a flashy newspaper
writer, of no particular principles, to the post of Political
Director in the Foreign Office. The Political Director is almost
the most important person in the office, as he drafts all the
political despatches and notes. I hope the communications to the
foreign ambassadors are not to be in the style of 'smart' newspaper
articles. I confess that when I saw the appointment in the _Journal
Officiel_, it did not occur to me that the man could be the same
Weiss who had been writing in the _Figaro_.

The friendly disposition of Gambetta towards England has already been noted, and beyond a certain tendency in his speeches towards Chauvinism, there was nothing in his conduct calculated to arouse alarm, but nevertheless a critical moment in Anglo-French relations appeared to be approaching at the beginning of 1882. The Government of France had passed into the hands of a Minister far more influential, more able, and more ambitious than any man who had taken part in public affairs since the retirement of Thiers, and the time was at hand when that Minister must decide on the line of policy to be followed with regard to Foreign Powers. The character and temperament of Gambetta naturally disposed him to endeavour to make his Foreign Policy more vigorous, more successful and more striking than that of his predecessors, and with that object he would probably take one of two courses. Either he would aim at emancipating France from her existing confidential servility towards Germany; or, despairing of that, he would continue the existing relations with Bismarck, and thus ensure the latter's willing acquiescence in aggressive proceedings on the part of France beyond the limits of Europe.

In order to shake off the German yoke, Gambetta evidently considered it essential that he should be able to place himself on distinctly friendly and intimate terms with England, and if he failed in this, the probability was that he would be obliged to revert to the patronage which was felt to be so irksome. But the change which had come over the relations between France and Germany opened the door to a foreign policy which was comparatively safe and easy, and yet did not present the disadvantage of being unambitious. The period which immediately followed the war of 1870, was, as has already been pointed out, marked by a feeling in France towards Germany of fierce hatred combined with extreme fear, and German policy, whether consciously or unconsciously, tended to embitter this feeling. Germany interfered dictatorially and ostentatiously even in French internal affairs, and the object seemed to be not only to crush the reviving strength of France, but to prevent her recovering anywhere, or in any matter, the smallest portion of her lost _prestige_. The German Government professed to believe that a war of revenge was meditated, and was credited with the intention of finally destroying France before the latter should be sufficiently recuperated to resume the struggle.

But with the lapse of time, a change of policy, and, to a certain extent, a change of feeling had taken place on both sides. Neither country was in any immediate apprehension of an attack from the other. A somewhat ostentatious interchange of courtesy had been substituted for their former reserve, and Bismarck had seized the opportunity of the invasion of Tunis to let the French understand that they would have the countenance of Germany in enterprises undertaken by them out of Europe. Apart from all far-reaching schemes for securing German supremacy in Europe, it was obviously in the interests of Germany that France should engage in enterprises and make acquisitions which dispersed her armies, disorganized her finances and created ill feeling with other Powers.

Gambetta was much too intelligent a man not to see through this policy, but the temptation to direct the energies of France into the Colonial, rather than the continental direction, might prove too strong for him if he despaired of gaining credit for his Government in another way. Unhappily, in such a case, with no Power were difficulties so likely to arise as with England, which was more or less in contact with France in all parts of the world, and especially in the Mediterranean. Nor could it be forgotten that in the speeches lately delivered on the subject of Tunis, Gambetta had made strong appeals to national pride with regard to French possessions and interests beyond the seas.

Still there was no reason to suppose that the so-called Colonial Policy was Gambetta's first choice. He was known to chafe under the practical subservience of France to Germany, and to feel deeply humiliated by it. At the bottom of his heart he cherished an ardent desire to recover the lost provinces, but he knew that neither the military strength of France nor the spirit of the people would warrant his attempting this within any assignable period. He did, however, aim at freeing the French Government from the sort of occult control which Germany had recently exercised over it, and at improving the position of France as a Great Power. He desired to present the Government over which he presided to France and to Europe as taking a dignified and important part in international questions, and feeling that these objects could best be attained by a real and visible friendship with England, he was evidently disposed to treat pending questions with a view to maintaining and manifesting a cordial understanding.

The two most important questions of the moment were, of course, Egypt and the Commercial Treaty.

As regards Egypt, there was so far complete unity between the two Governments--the strain having not yet arrived--but the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty appeared to be a more arduous affair. Gambetta was apparently ready to go as far towards making an acceptable Treaty as was possible without risking a defeat in the Chambers. But if the negotiations were to fail, he would probably despair of keeping up good feeling towards England in France. He would conceive that the failure would discredit him in the eyes of France and of Europe; that it would convey to foreign Governments an impression, which he could not remove, of there being a coolness between France and England, and that it would oblige him to seek for his Foreign Policy some other basis than union with England.

Perhaps the fear that unsuccessful commercial negotiations would convert Gambetta into a foe was partly due to a communication from Sir Charles Dilke announcing that a commercial ultimatum was about to be hurled at the French Government. This communication is extremely instructive from the English Parliamentary point of view, for it recommended that in despatches the word 'bargain' should be carefully avoided, 'as it would strengthen the reciprocity argument.' In other words, although wine duties were to be utilized for the purpose of bargaining, the fact was not to be disclosed lest it might be construed as a departure from the sacred principles of Free Trade.

Attention was, however, quickly diverted from the Commercial Treaty to Egypt. On January 8, the British and French Governments presented the so-called Dual Note, in which they declared their intention of 'warding off by their united efforts all causes of external or internal complications, which might menace the _régime_ established in Egypt.' The Dual Note was by no means as successful as had been hoped, and it is clear that Gambetta was in favour of more decided and independent action than the British Cabinet. Within a few days Lord Granville was already writing to Lord Lyons and asking him whether it would not be advisable for England and France to ask permission from the Powers to appear as mandatories of Europe.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Jan. 17, 1882.

The news from Egypt is certainly not reassuring, and the
_mauvais quart d'heure_ may arrive at any moment.

M. Gambetta would probably desire joint intervention; the
objections to this are immense: I need not recapitulate them all to
you.

Single occupation, by England or by France, still more so.

I am not quite sure that Turkish occupation under proper
conditions and control by France and England, although a great
evil, would not be less bad than the three alternatives I have
mentioned. But it is not only bad in itself, but it would be
strongly opposed by the French, although it would be supported
by the German Powers. In these circumstances, an observation of
Malet's struck me as having some force. Talking of the intentions
of some of the other Powers to have their part in the question, he
said it would not be so objectionable, if they consented to allow
the English and French to be the mandatories.

The idea seemed to me to be worth considering, and I spoke to
Tenterden and Rivers Wilson (but to no one else) and requested them
to draw up a memorandum as to how this could be carried out. I send
you an extract, and I should like to have your opinion on it before
I submit it even to Gladstone as a possibility.

Gambetta of course would not like it. But his difficulty is as
great as ours if he were to understand that we will not agree to
joint occupation. There would be nothing humiliating to France if
the proposal was freely consented to by both countries and jointly
offered to Egypt.

For us it would only be acting on the Concert of Europe
principle, about which we have been making such a fuss.

This somewhat half-hearted proposal met with no approval from Lord Lyons, who expressed his objections in more decisive terms than were usual with him.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Jan. 19, 1882.

In your letter of the day before yesterday you ask me for
my opinion on a suggestion as to admitting other Powers to take
part in the Egyptian Question, on the supposition that France and
England should be their mandatories.

This would, _ipso facto_, be the abandonment of the
exceptional position which England and France have taken up in
Egypt. Whether this position can be, or ought to be, maintained for
a long time, is a question which I will not stop to examine.

That a proposal to abandon it, at this moment, would have a
very bad effect on our relations with France, does not, I think,
admit of a doubt. It would be taken as an abandonment of our
intention to give up, in the face of Europe, all special intimacy
with the French Government. It would give rise to suspicions
that we were trying to use the other Powers for the purpose of
ousting France from Egypt. The union of England and France on the
Egyptian Question is the principal symbol of there being a good
understanding between them, and to this symbol the French attach no
little importance.

I don't know that the designation of mandatories of Europe
would mend the matter. The other Powers would not commission
England and France to decide by themselves what measures should
be recommended for Egypt. They might depute England and France
to enforce the decisions of Europe, but this would only bring us
back to the joint intervention of the two Powers in a particularly
awkward and unmanageable form.

Practically, it would, I think, be found much more difficult
for us to keep well with France, if the other Powers were also to
have a voice in details. Hitherto England and France have managed
to come to an agreement with each other on the questions that have
arisen. It might be made more difficult for them invariably to side
with each other against other Powers. Political considerations as
to affairs distinct from Egypt might come into play. Setting aside
a natural and not improper jealousy on the part of each, lest its
associate should obtain separate and undue influence, the interests
of England and France in Egypt are very much the same. The main
interest of some Governments, and in particular that of the Porte,
might be antagonistic to cordiality between the two Western Powers.

A Commission appointed now to deal with questions relating to
the government and administration of Egypt would be a different
matter from the Commissions of 1878 and 1880.

In the first place, it seems probable that the Sultan would
protest strongly against it, and that he would do so whether or
no there were Turkish members of it appointed by him. His Majesty
might possibly acquiesce under strong pressure from all the Powers,
but would all the Powers put such pressure on him? In all matters
bearing upon the relations between the Porte and Egypt, it must, I
am afraid, be taken into consideration that neither France singly,
nor England singly, nor the two acting together, are likely at the
present time to exercise predominant influence at Constantinople;
and that, on the other hand, the Power which does exercise
predominant influence there shows no disposition to jeopardize that
influence by giving unpalatable advice, and is not supposed to have
any desire to promote cordiality between England and France.

Moreover, we have to consider not only the Sultan and the
Khedive, but the mutinous officers and the so-called National Party
in Egypt. From a telegram which Gambetta showed me yesterday,
it would appear that Arabi had expressed some idea of appealing
against England and France to the Great Powers collectively. But
would he and his party, whose watchword seems to be 'Egypt for
the Egyptians,' submit passively to the installation of a Foreign
Commission to settle all the important national questions? Would
they acquiesce in the subsequent enforcement of the decision of the
Commission?

The Commission might certainly sit at Alexandria, and it
might perhaps have the support afforded by the presence of an
Anglo-French squadron, or an International squadron. In either
case, would the squadron be provided with men to be landed in
case of need, and would the Commission be authorized to call for
the assistance and protection of a force to be put on shore? If
this were so, it might be merely a small beginning which might
ultimately render intervention in arms on a larger scale inevitable.

On the other hand, if the presence of the squadron were to
be merely a naval demonstration, would the fact of its being more
or less representative of all the Great Powers give it much more
weight than if it were made on behalf of England and France alone?
Would it, in either case, be safe to trust to the moral effect
of its being sufficient, and to its not rendering further action
imperative?

Gambetta seems to hope that firm and decided language, used
collectively now by France and England, may ward off a crisis.
If there be any chance of warding off a necessity for action, it
no doubt lies in this; but I suppose that with Gambetta the wish
is father to the thought. On the one hand, in face of the present
unpopularity of the Tunis expedition, it would be very awkward for
him to have to send another French force to Africa at the present
moment. But, on the other hand, he could not confront the mass of
enraged bondholders if he abandoned their interests; and public
opinion here, which is very sensitive about Egypt, would not
tolerate his letting France be openly set at naught in that country.

It is needless to add that the French Government would
bitterly resent it, if any hint were given to a third Power,
without their having been previously consulted, if there is any
idea on our part of withdrawing from our separate understanding
with them, and merging Egypt in the general Eastern Question. If
they were ever brought to consent to calling in the other Powers,
they would not readily forgive having their hands forced in the
matter.

For my own part, I would certainly, as regards Egypt, rather
have to deal with France only than with four or five more Powers.

There can be no shadow of doubt that Lord Lyons's view was the correct one, but Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone (no other member of the Cabinet is mentioned) seem to have hankered after the Concert of Europe, probably in consequence of the stroke of luck at Dulcigno.

'Your very powerful letter,' Lord Granville wrote on January
21, 'is gone to Gladstone. It is not easy to find an answer to all
your arguments. The question is whether there are not stronger
arguments against any other course. I think it is likely that I
shall write to you to ask you to speak to Gambetta.

'On the imminence of the crisis: the importance of perfect
union between England and France: our strong objection to intervene
alone--giving as reasons:--opposition of Egyptians; of Turkey;
jealousy of Europe; responsibility of governing a country of
Orientals without adequate means and under adverse circumstances;
presumption that France would object as much to our sole occupation
as we should object to theirs.

'Have carefully considered joint occupation; some of the
objections to sole occupation lessened, but others most seriously
aggravated.

'Deprecate Turkish intervention, but think it a lesser evil
than the two to which I have alluded, giving some reasons.

'Then propose the European element, as sketched out in my
private letter.

'Any concessions to Europe after any demonstrations on the
part of the German powers and Italy would place us in a false
position; but if made spontaneously and jointly by France and
England, would not have that inconvenience.

'Please reflect upon the way such arguments might best be put,
but let me have all your opinions upon it.

'Such able letters as your last are very valuable.'

Another letter written on the same day asks for advice as to what should be done 'if the crisis arrives, as is probable, in a week.' It was very evident that the Cabinet had no definite plan of their own, and were only too glad of the opportunity of consulting some one whose opinion was worth having.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, January 22, 1882.

I have received this morning your two letters of yesterday
about Egypt; and I have reconsidered the letters from me of the
19th to which they are answers.

There exists at this moment one new difficulty, the
uncertainty whether Gambetta will still be in office this day week.

I do not, however, find in this circumstance any reason to
modify the views expressed in my long letter.

Whoever may be in office here at the time, if we proposed to
call in the other Powers, we should be held (to use Commercial
Treaty slang) to have 'denounced' our good understanding with
France. We should be reproached with deserting our comrade at the
critical moment, and I am seriously afraid that for a long time
the feeling in France towards England would be bitter, and the
relations of the French Government towards the English Government
more than cold.

In my communication to the French Government respecting Egypt,
there are some topics in particular which would require delicate
handling.

First of these, I should mention Turkish intervention. This
has been a subject of difference between France and England for
half a century, and the French have a traditional feeling on
the subject at all times. But at this moment they (rightly or
wrongly) think it a matter of vital importance to them with regard
to Algeria and Tunis, and they would go very great lengths to
resist the introduction of the Turkish Troops into Egypt, or the
increase of Turkish influence there. They always suspect us of
hankering after Turkish support against them, not reflecting that
our influence at Constantinople is not so predominant as when they
supported Mehemet Ali against the Porte and England.

Another topic on which the French might be sensitive would be
the question of governing a country of Orientals. This is a matter
on which I feel strongly myself, but it would need to be dealt with
very cautiously, or the French would see in it a sneer against
their own shortcomings in Tunis and even in Algeria.

The objections to joint dual occupation are strong, but almost
any statement of them would apply with equal force, or more, to
joint sextuple occupation, or to the occupation by two Powers as
mandatories of the rest.

Malet, I see, telegraphs that the Chamber would, he thinks,
listen to the united Great Powers, but would not listen to England
and France alone.

Admitting that Malet is right (and he generally is right),
there always remains the difficulty as to putting this cumbersome
six-wheeled waggon into motion in any reasonable time.

And this brings me to the question in your second letter, what
course should I recommend, if the crisis, as is probable, arises in
a week.

It seems to me that in that case either things must be let
'slide,' or England and France must take some step together,
without waiting for the other Powers.

All the anxious speculations which had taken place with regard to Gambetta's future foreign policy turned out to be quite unnecessary, for on January 27, after little more than two months of office, he resigned, having been defeated, like any ordinary political mediocrity, on a question of domestic interest. His place was taken by M. de Freycinet, who succeeded in forming a respectable Ministry, but whose policy with regard to Egypt was as vague and undecided as that of the British Government, and whose views with regard to a Commercial Treaty were supposed to be identical with those of his predecessor.

Advantage was taken of the change by Lord Granville to again urge the substitution of the Concert of Europe for purely Anglo-French control in Egypt, and Freycinet showed himself much more amenable than Gambetta. As far as can be gathered, the attitude of both Governments was the reverse of heroic; the British Government was anxious to hand over its responsibility to other parties, and the French Government was not disposed to take any initiative at all. The French were, in fact, waiting for England to make a suggestion, and while perhaps ready to act in conjunction, wished that the responsibility of whatever proceedings were adopted in common, should rest primarily, if not exclusively, upon England. The Tunis enterprise had proved to be so much more troublesome and expensive than had been expected, that the Government shrank from becoming involved in anything of the same nature in Egypt. But the condition of affairs in Egypt was such that even the timid Freycinet Government might find its hand forced. An insult to a French functionary might produce an outbreak of Chauvinism which would force the Government to send a force to avenge it, and Gambetta would certainly have had a force ready for a contingency of this kind.

Nubar Pasha was in Paris at the time, and his views on the Egyptian situation were not without interest.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 7, 1882.

I do not find the least diminution of the French opposition to
Turkish intervention in Egypt, even if it were only moral.

Nubar has been here for some months, and often comes to see
me. His first object in life seems to be to get Blignières out
of Egypt, and his second to get Tewfik deposed. I conclude that
he thinks that both are obstacles to his own return to power.
His language is, that the dictation of the English and French
Controllers in Egypt was more than any country could bear; that the
present state of things is much better; office and power being in
the same hands; that Arabi Bey and his compeers will do very well
if they are properly managed, and that two quiet, conciliatory
(perhaps we should read imbecile) Controllers would keep everything
straight. I think he inclines to the moral intervention of the
Sultan. He seems to be intriguing with Germany. He had an interview
with Freycinet, to whom, according to his own account, he held the
language I have described above. He talks more ably than any one
else about Egypt, but always with a view to his own interests.

Any one who ever conversed with the late Nubar Pasha could not fail to be impressed with his ability, but like many other able Orientals, he was a consummate intriguer, and probably the predominant feeling in his mind was a desire to be reinstated in power. It should be explained that, at this time, Arabi was already practically at the head of the Government, although only occupying the post of Minister of War, and that M. de Blignières was still French Controller. M. de Blignières, however, resigned his post on March 12, and an open letter[35] from him to M. Clémenceau threw a lurid light on the tortuous and inexplicable course of French policy in Egypt.

'Lorsqu'il (Cherif Pasha) a du quitter le pouvoir; lorsque j'ai
compris que les chefs du parti militaire, qui l'avaient renversé,
pouvaient compter sur la bienveillance de notre gouvernement,
ce jour-là, ne me faisant aucune illusion sur les conséquences
nécessaires de cette politique nouvelle, j'ai résigné mes
fonctions.'

If, therefore, M. de Blignières was correct, the French were playing a double game; ostensibly acting in concert with England against the Nationalist agitation in Egypt, while secretly encouraging Arabi and his friends to persevere in their efforts. In one respect, however, they were consistent, namely in their opposition to Turkish intervention, and the traditional French opposition to Turkish influence in Egypt was accentuated in consequence of the recent events in Tunis and Algeria.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, April 4, 1882.

You will have seen by the despatches I sent you by post
yesterday that Freycinet has at last put the dots on his i's, and
distinctly proposed that Tewfik shall be deposed and Halim put
in his place. I cannot say I take to the idea. As you said to
Tissot, there might be some good in it if Halim had great moral and
intellectual qualities. But I don't see that we have any reason
to suppose he has such qualities. Nor indeed, if he had, do I see
how his mere appointment would at once set things straight in
Egypt. The removal of Ismail was a great blow to the prestige of
the Khediviate, and it would require a genius to re-establish its
authority, if another deposition takes place in so short a time.
I do not understand how Freycinet reconciles his present idea
with his objection to Turkish interference. If the Khedive is in
daily fear of being deposed by the Sultan, there will be abject
submission to Yildiz Kiosk and a constant flow of backsheesh to the
Porte.

Halim no doubt promises the French that he will be their man,
and if he becomes so, they may go great lengths to support him; but
how will this suit us? And how long will it be before it leads to
something very like armed intervention of the French in support of
him?

Then it seems to me that to depose Tewfik would be something
very like treachery, after the dual declaration made to him in
January.

It seems to me that the things to aim at should be: to keep
Tewfik; to give him some strength against military dictation, and
to preserve the Anglo-French Control, which means a reasonable
financial administration, and gives us at any rate some means of
knowing what the Egyptians (perhaps I ought to add) what the French
are about.

The immoral proposal to depose Tewfik met with no encouragement from Her Majesty's Government, as was only to be expected, and the only conclusion to be drawn from the equivocal language of M. de Freycinet was that he felt armed intervention to be inevitable, but wanted the proposal to come from England. He tried to persuade Lord Lyons to propose a plan of his own which should be put forward privately, but this met with no approval at all. '"Private and between ourselves conversations," between Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers generally cause mischief.'

As the situation in Egypt continued to get worse, the British Government was forced to take some action, and accordingly suggested that three generals, French, English, and Turkish, should be sent to Egypt 'to restore discipline to the Egyptian army.' As it was not proposed that these generals should employ anything but moral force, it is difficult to see how they could have succeeded, but Lord Granville appears to have considered that it would obviate armed interference, and the French Government having no plan of their own were presumably ready to accept almost anything, but caused considerable embarrassment by asking for a pledge that Turkish intervention by force of arms, in any circumstances, would not be tolerated. What Freycinet wanted, in fact, was to be able to declare to the Chamber that England and France were agreed not to allow armed Ottoman intervention.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 5, 1882.

Freycinet asked me just now to let him speak to me 'privately
and academically' about intervention in Egypt. He said his great
objection to Turkish intervention was that as matters now stand,
it would take place for a vague and indefinite object: that thus
it would be impossible to fix the exact time at which that object
would be accomplished, and that thus the Turks would have pretexts
for prolonging it indefinitely, for mixing themselves up in the
administration, for laying their hands on the Treasury, and what
not.

If the intervention was simply for installing a new Khedive,
his objections would be less. This would be a single definite
sovereign act of the Sultan. It might be accomplished in a week or
ten days, and the Ottoman troops would have no pretext for staying,
or for interfering in the administration. He should not object to a
Turkish, French, and English fleet going to Egypt to support some
single definite act of this kind, nor even, speaking solely for
himself personally, to Turkish troops being landed.

After some questioning from me, he said that, for a single
definite object, he personally might even prefer a Turkish
intervention, but that for any such vague purpose as supporting
Tewfik and restoring order, he thought Turkish intervention
absolutely inadmissible. If anything of that kind was to be
attempted, Anglo-French seemed to him the least open to objection.
Italian seemed to him to be worse than Turkish.

His idea was that we should set on foot some Government that
could stand by itself. Under Tewfik no such Government would in his
opinion be ever possible. He had no predilection for any particular
individual as Khedive: all he wanted was to have some reasonably
efficient man at the head of the Government.

He begged me to consider all this as strictly confidential,
personal, private, and academic; and he said that except in a
conversation of this character, he could not even have mentioned
the possibility of France consenting under any conceivable
circumstances to Turkish intervention; for he was by no means sure
that it would ever be agreed to by his colleagues or borne by
public opinion.

The 'confidential, personal, private, and academic' character of M. de Freycinet's conversation was, of course, merely intended to conceal his own vacillation and fear of having to communicate to the Chambers any announcement that he had sanctioned Turkish intervention in any shape whatever. A little later, however, he nerved himself to make a proposal that there should be a joint Anglo-French Naval Demonstration off Alexandria. An allied squadron consequently proceeded to that port, and its appearance produced a temporary panic in the ranks of the Nationalists; the latter, however, speedily recovered when it was realized that there were no troops on board, and that the Sultan, far from approving of the demonstration, had protested against it. The ultimatum of the allies was practically rejected, and Arabi, who had been compelled to resign, was reinstated in office nominally as Minister of War, in reality as dictator. To make Freycinet's position still worse, he got into difficulties in the Chamber.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 26, 1882.

The explosion has come, and if the irritation that prevails
in Paris to-day continues, Freycinet will be out of office, or
will, _per fas et nefas_, back out of his proposal that Turkish
intervention may be resorted to in Egypt. His Chauvin speech in the
Chamber about French preponderance, and what not, is now of course
turned against him.

There is an impression here that in order to keep Gambetta out
of office, Bismarck may help Freycinet to eat his words.

I am afraid that now, whether Freycinet stays in or goes out,
it will be next to impossible to have any comfortable understanding
with France about intervention in Egypt.

Even supposing all the other Powers cordially united with
us, to repeat the experiment of 1840 would be dangerous, and would
produce a scarcely ever to be remedied coldness (to call it by a
mild name) between us and France.

Then I share all Dufferin's misgivings as to the possibility
of either controlling the Turks if they set foot in Egypt, or of
ever getting them out. I have also a very strong fear of my own as
to the mischief they would do to the country. Even if they went
with the acquiescence of France, I think we should be constantly in
hot water with the French as long as they stayed.

If Gambetta comes in he will no doubt again propose joint
Anglo-French intervention. Unless the Porte is backed up very
strongly indeed, he will very likely make its intervention in Egypt
something like a _casus belli_ with Turkey--or in fact do as the
French did with regard to Tunis--declare that he will oppose by
force the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt.

The Anglo-French Naval Demonstration had been intended as a compromise between the two Governments over the question of Turkish intervention, but when it was seen to be useless, it was agreed that the Sultan should be asked to send a Special Commission to Cairo, and communications were made to the other Powers with a view to convoking a European Conference on Egypt; M. de Freycinet, who had for three months opposed the English proposal for Turkish intervention, suddenly discovering that there was no danger about it, if requested jointly by England and France. The Turkish Commission which proceeded to Egypt was not more successful in restoring order than the Anglo-French Naval Demonstration. It consisted of three persons; one of whom, Dervish Pasha, was instructed to support the Khedive and to threaten the Nationalist leaders; the second Commissioner was instructed to support Arabi and his associates; and the duty of the third Commissioner was to spy upon his two colleagues. In order to make everything quite safe, the latter was accompanied by a fourth official, whose duty it was to spy upon him, and it was perhaps owing to these over-elaborated precautions that the mission proved to be a complete failure.

On June 11, the massacre at Alexandria took place, and armed intervention became more and more inevitable, but some Governments still entertained the hope that diplomacy might yet be successful, and the Conference assembled at Constantinople towards the end of the month. The chief advantage of the Conference was that it disclosed the views of the various Great Powers, and the conditions which were to govern the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt were of so engrossing a nature that they were still being discussed when the battle of Tel-el-Kebir was fought two months subsequently, and the victorious British troops entered Cairo.

The vacillations and dilatoriness of M. de Freycinet irritated even the easy-going Lord Granville, who complained of having twice been put in a hole by him, and was justifiably anxious as to how he could defend his Egyptian policy successfully in Parliament if the French Government could not be relied upon for any consistent line of action. But while admitting that nearly everything had gone wrong up till now, and that the failure of the Sultan's Special Mission made the outlook still more gloomy, he consoled himself with the reflection (which was shortly afterwards shown in one respect to be quite erroneous) that, 'we have avoided a rupture with France, a rupture with Europe, and a possible war.' Within a few weeks, the error of this last assumption was to be conclusively established.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, June 20, 1882.

I do not hope much from the Conference: certainly I have very
little expectation of its forwarding the strong measures which the
Alexandria massacres seem to me to call for imperatively.

I think Germany will be very little inclined to urge the
despatch of Turkish troops. Bismarck's great object appears to be
to keep Freycinet in, and he fears, not without some reason, that
when the first Turkish soldier sets his foot in Egypt, Freycinet
will fall at Paris.

The Freycinet Ministry would probably be succeeded by a
Cabinet in which Gambetta would not actually have a seat, but
over which he would exercise very great influence. Bismarck very
probably exaggerates the strength of that influence and looks for
more direct hostility to Germany than it would really provoke. But
he is perhaps right in thinking that, under Gambetta's influence,
France would coquet with the Anti-German party in Russia, and would
lose no opportunity of fostering enmity to Germany whenever she
could find an opening for doing so. At all events, it would be
impossible for Germany to feel as much at her ease as she does now,
if Gambetta were the virtual director of French policy.

Freycinet's strength lies partly in the disinclination of the
nation for anything like what it calls adventures, but mainly in
the dread which the present Chamber has of Gambetta, the Scrutin de
Liste and a dissolution.

Meanwhile general dissatisfaction with the whole state of
things, and despondency do not diminish. People who looked to
Gambetta as the man to set things straight are directing their eyes
to other quarters, and there is even a sort of revival of Orleanism.

* * * * *

A few hours after this letter reaches you, you will in
all probability receive from me by telegraph the French answer to
the proposal to them to concert measures with us for the protection
of the Suez Canal. I don't think Freycinet likes the idea of
anything which may tend towards sending French troops to Egypt.
He seems to me to want to lean on the Conference in the hope that
by so doing, he may be able to stand quite still. Strange to say,
the Chamber and the public seem to be in the same mood. They like
to think that it is more upon England than upon them that the
discredit of putting up with the Alexandria massacre and the recent
patch up in Egypt would fall. Their present pusillanimity seems so
unnatural that I cannot think it will last. Gambetta will rouse
them from it, if he has the chance.